

# **Work and Dissolution**

A phenomenological interpretation of practice and perception  
in the early works of Husserl and Heidegger

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I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research and contains as its main content work which has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary institution.

Malcolm Riddoch

*This investigation is dedicated to my parents, Jane and Jim Riddoch.  
I would also like to thank my supervisors, Jeff Malpas, Alec McHoul and Paul McDonald, for their unfailing interest and vigorous challenges to see this work through its various stages to completion.*

**ABSTRACT**

The specific aim of this thesis is to provide an interpretation of the relation between Husserl's early texts on the phenomenology of time, perception and practice, and Heidegger's existential phenomenological analytic that he developed throughout the 1920's culminating around the publication of *Being and Time*. As a phenomenological interpretation of Heidegger's existential phenomenology, it will first work through Dreyfus' influential critique of Husserlian intentionality and account of Heidegger's notion of authenticity. Dreyfus' account of the relation between Husserl and Heidegger, and his existentialist interpretation of authenticity, overlooks the fundamental part that originary temporality plays for phenomenology in general. Husserl's concept of time, as the constant dissolution of the retentional/expectant primary memory of consciousness, simply is ecstatic temporality. Heidegger uses this notion of originary time throughout his early existential phenomenological analyses, yet while doing so, he reduces Husserl's phenomenology down to merely a subject's theoretical relation to objective sense data, a criticism that Dreyfus also follows. In defending Husserl's holistic phenomenology of perception, practice and time from such a rationalist interpretation, I will attempt to situate his theory of time within the existential analytic of Dasein. The dissolution aspect of retention will become the fundamental principle of originary temporality, and the basis of an outline of the conditional structure of lived experience as a whole.

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*Introduction**§1. Aims and outline of an interpretation of practice and perception*

The specific aim of this thesis is to provide an interpretation of the relation between Husserl's early texts on the phenomenology of time, perception and practice, and Heidegger's existential phenomenological analytic that he developed throughout the 1920's culminating around the publication of *Being and Time*. The first part of this interpretation will require selectively reading back from Heidegger towards those early phenomenological texts that influenced his existential analytic, namely Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and the writings on 'inner time consciousness', as these developed the method and the object of the initial programmatisation of phenomenology outlined in the *Ideas Books 1 and 2*. With this interpretive strategy in mind, the Husserl exposition outlined here is in no way intended as an exhaustive account of Husserl's phenomenology as a whole. On the contrary, it will be concerned largely with what has generally been described as Husserl's early phase of 'descriptive phenomenology', from 1901 through to 1913, before the full development of his transcendental phenomenology<sup>1</sup>. Specifically, this thesis will deal with a selective account of the possible relation between practice and perception in Husserl's early descriptive analyses and in relation to Heidegger's existential phenomenology, with the whole organised around the similarities in their interpretations of time.

Such an interpretive strategy, in working through the continuities and discontinuities of Husserl's and Heidegger's early phenomenological analyses, must also acknowledge the contentious status of the texts of this period. These early texts are characterised by their developmental nature and internal inconsistencies, where both writers are continually 'on their way'

working through meditative analyses towards a general overview of the fundamental problems at hand. These problems are in fact what are constantly in question in all of these phenomenological analyses, and both philosophers demand a constant recursion back to the basics of what it means to understand something like this world and ourselves. From this perspective, all understanding, either philosophical or everyday, is questionable and founded on traditional assumptions and biases that themselves need to be uncovered and thought through. The exploratory nature of both Husserl's and Heidegger's early phenomenologies thus lays them open to a multitude of possible interpretations, dependent on one's own philosophical leanings. What I would like to offer here is but one possible interpretation of the continuity in the relation between these two seminal thinkers, a continuity organised around the themes of practice, perception and time.

The complexities of this relation will entail working through various interpretive strategies, from a textual exegesis of the works involved, outlining the chronological development of the two main themes of practice and perception, through to the philosophical interpretation required to reconstruct the continuities and discontinuities in these thinkers analyses, both internal to their own development and in their difficult relation to one another. In fact, it is precisely this 'difficult relation' between Husserl and Heidegger that is in question here, a relation that actively influenced both thinkers and which will be the main focus of this thesis. In this sense, I will be much less concerned to argue for the authority of one text over another, or one philosopher over the other. Rather, the interpretation offered here will attempt to reconstruct the development of various specific arguments in Husserl's early works, such as the *Logical Investigations* and the *Phenomenology of*

*Internal Time Consciousness*, from the perspective of the ‘Husserlian’ elements of Heidegger’s phenomenology.

For Husserl, the phenomenological project was a collective concern utilising a number of gifted assistants, including Heidegger, under the master’s supervision. Husserl’s early texts attempted to set out the fundamental areas of analysis, the regional ontologies that were to be developed by his students. Yet these texts are themselves largely collective analyses, edited and reworked by any number of assistants before being committed to publication. Then there are his meditative manuscripts, many of which still remain unpublished in the Husserl Archives, and which offer a unique insight into the development of his thought. The published works are generally very dense, abstract technical discussions with surprisingly few concrete descriptive analyses. These analyses are, however, to be found in the lecture manuscripts and in his phenomenological workshop collaborations with students. An interesting example of this difference between heavily edited published material and the more exploratory, descriptive analyses is to be found in Husserl’s phenomenology of time. The 1929 publication of *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, with Heidegger credited as editor, is largely derived from a lecture course given by Husserl in 1905 yet also contains heavily edited material based on manuscripts dating from 1901-17. The book thus includes not only much of the lecture course but also a number of analyses that span the move from the *Logical Investigations* through to *Ideas Book 1*, first published in 1913, and on towards Husserl’s involvement with Heidegger. Although Heidegger received editorial credits in the published text, his involvement does not seem to extend much beyond writing a short introduction and then passing the manuscript on to the publishers. The original manuscript was actually compiled by Husserl’s assistant Dr. Edith

Stein over several years and included editorial revisions by Husserl from as late as 1917, none of which are indicated in the 1929 text. So instead of a clear statement of Husserl's notion of time, what is given is a confusion of ideas collated by several people with no chronology to indicate just how Husserl's analysis developed.

In contrast, the German manuscript edited by Rudolf Boehm in 1966 and finally translated into English in 1991 as *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, is derived from original material in the Husserl Archives, is heavily referenced with chronological notes and generally gives a much clearer picture of the development of Husserl's thinking on time. In this case, the 'meditative' manuscripts written by Husserl provide a better overall view of his notion of time rather than the heavily re-worked publication. However, care must be taken here in that Husserl's personal manuscripts were always a 'work in progress', testing out hypotheses and developing ideas that may not have made it into a final definitive statement of his philosophy. Yet perhaps this is precisely the point I would like to make about my own interpretation here; that there is no final definitive statement of Husserl's phenomenology. From his early works through to the final years, the vast scope of what Husserl was attempting to explore and describe over four decades lays it open to any number of possible interpretations, and this is as true of his manuscript writings as it is of the published material.

Heidegger's early writings, on the other hand, are largely based on lectures he delivered over the course of his teaching career, with the exception of *Being and Time* and the *Kantbuch*, that have since been included in the official Gesamtausgabe editions with uncommented revisions by the later Heidegger. The lack of access to the Heidegger Archives compounds this problem of editorial control and so care must also be taken here as well when attempting

to interpret the relation between Husserl's phenomenology and Heidegger's appropriation of that, especially given that Heidegger clearly influenced Husserl's own understanding of phenomenology from the 1920's on. This difficult two way relationship, reconstructed from published and archival sources that themselves have undergone decades of revision by various editors and much of which still remains locked away or ignored, is already the subject of a great deal of commentary. A general consensus seems to have been reached some time ago in certain philosophical circles as concerns the status of phenomenology and Heidegger's apparently 'radical break' with Husserl. These interpretations more or less revolve around the view that phenomenology remains a branch of rationalist philosophy and was the model of traditional thinking that Heidegger used in his critique of subjectivity, rendering Husserl a nonetheless interesting, early twentieth century relic of the history of philosophy. Obviously, I would like to challenge this view, or at the very least point towards an equally coherent, alternative interpretation of phenomenology; an interpretation that uncovers Husserl's fundamental insights on the structure of time, practice and perception that also inform Heidegger's influential question about 'being'.

This phenomenological interpretation of the relation between Husserl's and Heidegger's early analyses will therefore firstly, by way of introduction, work through Hubert Dreyfus' account of both Husserlian intentionality and Heidegger's notions of practical understanding and existential authenticity. Dreyfus' influential critique of certain theories about artificial intelligence and cognitive science treats Husserl's notion of intentionality in terms of a 'system of beliefs' and then opposes this to Heidegger's practical critique of rationalism and subjectivity<sup>2</sup>. On this reading, Heidegger's relation to Husserl is analogous to the pragmatic critique of modern representationalist

philosophy. Against this reading of the Husserl-Heidegger relation I will attempt to show that the differences between the two are far more complex than Dreyfus allows. The latter insists that the analytic of Dasein is largely concerned with the practical aspects of our everyday coping behaviour, whereas Husserlian ‘representationalism’ is confined to specific problem solving states.

In his various writings on the subject Dreyfus seems to conflate Husserl’s notions of the noema and intentionality in general with rationalism, representations, thoughts, and beliefs. How these terms are all actually related in the one critique of both Husserl and artificial intelligence theories is perhaps the topic for an entire thesis in itself. Basically, Dreyfus claims that for Husserl all action is “mediated by internal representations” (Dreyfus, 1991a, p. 249), where human understanding is primarily a network of intentional states or a ‘system of beliefs and rules’. Alternatively, I will argue that Dreyfus misrepresents Husserlian intentionality as somehow merely concerned with an ego’s representations or intentions, where intentionality is equated with rationally mediated behaviour in that “I must represent to myself that my bodily movement is meant to bring about a specific state of affairs” (Dreyfus, 1993, p. 34). Dreyfus uses Heidegger’s notion of practical understanding in a critique of this rationalist position, and so practice becomes an “unthinking activity” (p. 35) that is intermittently interrupted by problem solving rational states of mind. This changeover from absorbed practical activity to a “*deliberate subject/object intentionality*” (p. 34), is precisely the difference, for Dreyfus at least, between Heidegger’s critical notion of practice and Husserl’s supposed rationalism.

This equation of Husserl with rationalist philosophy, and with Cartesian notions of subjectivity in particular, is perhaps an easy one to make,

depending on which texts of Husserl's one might peruse. However, I will argue that this supposed Cartesianism is from the very beginning of the *Logical Investigations* onwards an effort to problematise the basic concepts of any rationalist account of subjectivity in order to realign the natural sciences on a more fundamental philosophical ground. This is what Husserl will later call his 'neo-Cartesianism', an attempt to revolutionise modern thinking through a phenomenological critique of our traditional understanding of the subject/object relation. Such a 'neo-Cartesian' critique of modernity is opposed to any simple form of rationalism or to the naïve Cartesian theories about rationally mediated subjectivity that Dreyfus attempts to ascribe to Husserl. While I will use this notion of 'naïve Cartesianism' throughout this thesis, I would like to point out that it is a generalised term that should not perhaps be equated too readily with Descartes whose philosophy is also open to a number of more critical readings. While I agree with the general intent of Dreyfus' critique of rationalism and representationalism, where "only a Platonist thinks that representations exist independently of meaningful practices" (Dreyfus, 1991a, p. 264), I will argue against the wholesale reduction of Husserlian phenomenology down to an uncritical Cartesian model of the subject/object relation, and contend that Husserl is a completely inappropriate figurehead for the rationalist side of this debate.

I will also contend that what is missing in this generalised rationalist view of phenomenology is a recognition of the fundamental importance that Husserl's analysis of time plays in the early development of his phenomenology, an analysis that underlies and ties together his theories on perception and practice. Yet this emphasis on time is also missing from Dreyfus' interpretation of Heidegger, for he concentrates solely on the practical aspects of the first division of *Being and Time* and largely neglects the

temporal problematic of the second division which is relegated to an existentialist ‘error’. Although I agree that Dreyfus has no need to take time into account in his analyses of everyday practical coping, I will argue that the ‘existentialist’ interpretation of Heidegger elides the temporal aspects of existential phenomenology and, in doing so, completely overlooks the fundamental relation that time plays for both Husserl and Heidegger. Thus, whilst Dreyfus’ account of practical activity is an innovative and very useful interpretation of practice and the ‘ready to handedness’ of the ‘equipmental totality’ as given in the first division of *Being and Time*, his rationalist interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology and elision of the temporal aspects of authenticity cannot account for the depth of continuity between Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenologies<sup>3</sup>. Through Dreyfus then, I will argue against any simple equation of phenomenology with phenomenism, of intentionality with rationalism, or of the phenomenological ego with empirical subjectivity. Likewise, from the perspective of a fundamental ontology of time, the existentialist account of Heidegger fails to recognise the ontological intent of authenticity in uncovering the temporal structure of Dasein. This double critique of Husserl’s ‘representationalism’ and Heidegger’s ‘existentialism’ revolves around the fundamental phenomenological problem of time.

With these interpretive difficulties in mind, the existential phenomenological reading of the early Husserl’s works suggested above will start with the *Logical Investigations* and specifically the second volume of these which, according to the later Heidegger at least (1972, p. 76), is concerned with “the description of the acts of consciousness essential for the constitution of knowledge”. This particular aspect of phenomenology, and more precisely the “sixth investigation in the first edition” (p. 78), was apparently a seminal influence

on the early Heidegger's thinking. This influence began in the first year of his university studies, circa 1909 (cf. Taminiaux, 1978, p. 63) and intensified when Husserl arrived at Freiburg University and met with Heidegger in mid 1916. Heidegger's habilitation thesis, completed that year, was apparently based in part on Husserl's *Ideas Book 1* and the "conceptual pairs noesis-noema" (Kisiel, 1993, p. 30). After the First World War Heidegger then worked with Husserl as his assistant, from January 1919 at Freiburg University, with free access to Husserl's manuscripts, during which time he developed a 'factically' phenomenological interpretation of the history of philosophy. After leaving Freiburg for a teaching position at Marburg University in the autumn of 1923 Heidegger continued to develop his own individual, 'factual' approach to phenomenology, working through a series of lecture courses that form the first drafts of *Being and Time*.

From the beginning then, Husserl's early works were a formative influence on Heidegger, and conversely, Heidegger's brilliant work with Husserl influenced the progress of phenomenological analysis in general through into the twenties. However, Heidegger's interests were already concentrating on only certain themes of Husserl's exceptionally wide ranging analyses, themes that Husserl himself perhaps had yet to return to. The later Heidegger identified the sixth chapter of the sixth investigation as a fundamental influence on his philosophy where the "distinction which is worked out there between sensuous and categorial intuition revealed itself to me in its scope for the determination of the 'manifold meaning of being'" (1972, p. 78)<sup>4</sup>. Husserl had attempted to revise the sixth investigation and was unhappy with the results and so it was left out of the 1913 German edition of the *Logical Investigations*. It is a testament to its influence on his students that he was persuaded by Heidegger and others to include it in the 1921 edition.

Husserl's phenomenology, and specifically the sixth chapter of his sixth investigation on the difference between 'sensuous and categorial intuitions' (*Sinnliche und kategoriale Anschauungen*<sup>5</sup>), thus forms in some way, and at least in part, the theoretical basis for Heidegger's existential analytic.

The fundamental problem of Husserl's early phenomenological analysis revolves around a description of intentional synthesis at the level of perceptions, where categories of the understanding are objectively constituted in the flux of sensible intuitions. In comparing this descriptive analysis of immanent consciousness to empirically based accounts of 'systems of belief', a basic distinction must be drawn between the phenomenological and the empirical notions of experience<sup>6</sup>. It is my contention that Husserl's interpretation of intentionality precludes the empirical distinction operating between concepts and raw experience, and thus exceeds any simple notion of Cartesian intentionality. From the phenomenological perspective, the flux of lived experience is intentionally structured and thus always organized meaningfully within the immanent 'life world', or that lived context within which we deal with the things themselves. With the bracketing of an empirical model of experience, the method of introspective or immanent analysis becomes a necessity for any phenomenological approach to the problem of perception. This anti-Cartesian starting point and its 'methodological solipsism' is, more or less, shared by Heidegger and becomes the cornerstone of authenticity as one's ownmost relation to being.

Dreyfus' interpretation of Husserl, on the other hand, does not seem to take account of the problem of perception as considered phenomenologically. Primarily, perception for Husserl involves a mode of intentional synthesis which is itself the ground for any representations, thoughts or expressed beliefs about the world. Furthermore, both the subjectivity of the subject and

the objectivity of objects are constituted immanently in consciousness in such a way that there can be no notion of an ‘intentional content’ mediating between the ego and its ‘external’ world. With the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl outlines both the object and the method of his phenomenology of consciousness. However, it is only with his subsequent writings on ‘inner time consciousness’ that he develops the structure of the temporal constitution of intentional synthesis.

Husserl’s exposition of perception is, nonetheless, still open to both representationalist and non-representationalist interpretations. It remains a curious fact that his use of traditional concepts and terms, albeit in a phenomenological context, and the vast scope of his philosophical interests allows for equally cogent if incompatible interpretations of just what ‘phenomenology’ stands for. It is a contention of this thesis that Husserl’s analysis of time forms the fundamental basis of his notions of intentionally structured subjectivity, objectivity and representation, or of human understanding as a whole, and as such, radically undermines any rationalist interpretation of his phenomenology. The problem of the derivation of categorial intuitions from the flux of lived experience, or of the phenomenological ego and the ‘objective being’ of things from primordial or originary temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*), became Husserl’s all consuming task through a decade of phenomenological research leading up to the publication of the *Ideas 1*. This task, first worked out in *The Phenomenology of the Internal Consciousness of Time*, involved the necessity of accounting for the intentional structure belonging to any transcendence of the ‘Heraclitean flux’ of lived experience that, left unfounded, would plunge Husserl’s project into an extreme scepticism. The outcome of Husserl’s solution to this scepticism is that the transcendental absolute of the *Ideas 1* is itself founded in

phenomenological time, or the self-constitution of the flux of lived experience. It is on this basis that Husserl then derives his neo-Cartesian approach to phenomenology, for which the self-identity of the pure ego is founded in nothing other than the originary temporal structure of intentional synthesis. As such, this neo-Cartesianism is a far cry from any simple notion of an ego's intentional mediation of sensory experience.

Following on this approach to the temporal problem of intentionality and transcendence, the problem of the relation between practice and perception in both Husserl's and Heidegger's early works will be worked through by way of *Ideas Book 2* and the publications immediately surrounding *Being and Time*. In this way, and in contrast to the account of the relation between Husserl and Heidegger as given by Dreyfus, this thesis will attempt to outline the differences and problematise the continuities between the two phenomenologists. Central to this reading will be the problem of perception as given in Heidegger's *History of the Concept of Time*, the Marburg lecture course which presents an early pre-'existentialist' draft of *Being and Time*, free of Kierkegaard's terminology and with a relatively in depth analysis of Husserl's theories about perception<sup>8</sup>. Developing on the temporal interpretations of intentional synthesis outlined above, it should become obvious that perception is not a sufficient condition for explaining the unity of everyday lived experience. Given the practical setup within which perceptions of the world make sense, Heidegger thus requires a wider notion of intentionality than Husserl's perceptual account allows.

Now it has been generally accepted that Heidegger's account of practical understanding provides a radical critique of Husserl's phenomenology, and Dreyfus is a major proponent of this interpretation, yet the account of practice given in Husserl's *Ideas 2*, along with the fundamental role that

originary temporality plays in the phenomenology of time, seriously undermines this assumption. In 1912, after completing the transcendental analyses of *Ideas Book 1*, Husserl started work on the *Ideas Book 2*. In these analyses, only translated into English in 1989, Husserl works with a non-theoretical notion of practical understanding that is not rationally mediated by the natural attitude. Heidegger's critique of Husserl, which Dreyfus largely follows, is based on the claim that for phenomenology the thinking subject or rational ego mediates practice. The exposition of a non-theoretical practical understanding given in the first division of *Being and Time*, and drafted in the lecture notes for the *History of the Concept of Time*, forms the basis of this critique of phenomenology. *Ideas 2* complicates this critique in that for Husserl practical understanding becomes a non-theoretical or 'background' mode of shared understanding, and is the foundation for the everyday natural attitude and all natural scientific understanding.

What complicates matters further is the chronology of Husserl's revisions of the manuscript for this second book which suggest that Heidegger may have influenced the development of Husserl's analysis. This work was written from 1912-15, with ongoing revisions through to 1928, while Heidegger received a copy of the 1925 manuscript in the middle of working up his Marburg University lecture course on the *History of the Concept of Time*. *Ideas 2* is based on Husserl's 'pencil manuscript' which was written in 'one stroke' in 1912 after the completion of *Ideas 1*, then revised by Husserl in 1915. Edith Stein, under Husserl's supervision, edited this manuscript in 1918, adding the third section on the personalistic attitude and its practical understanding, written in 1913, and various notes dating back to 1908. Husserl returned to this manuscript in 1923, revising the third section, and the 1925 manuscript was compiled by Husserl's assistant Ludwig Landgrebe<sup>9</sup>.

In reference to this last manuscript, Heidegger (1985, p. 121/167) suggests that Husserl has responded to his earlier criticisms and revised the basis of the analysis of the personal ego and its practical attitude. Heidegger goes on to insist that the earlier 1914-15 version of *Ideas 2* still “worked along the lines set by the first part of the just published *Ideas toward a Pure Phenomenology [Ideas 1]*” (p. 121/167). The implication here is that the distinction between the natural and practical attitude that Husserl was working on in the 1925 version of *Ideas 2* is the result of Heidegger’s critique of phenomenology. While this is certainly possible it is also the case that Heidegger received *Ideas 2* at a critical time in the development of his own interpretation of practical understanding and the first draft of what becomes the existential phenomenological analytic of Dasein.

To further compound matters, however, even though Heidegger acknowledges that now the natural attitude is ‘subordinated’ to the personalistic or practical attitude he still insists that Husserl’s analysis as a whole is founded on the same traditional concepts as *Ideas 1*, and specifically on Descartes’ “old definition of man as *animal rationale*” (p. 125/174). In fact, this reliance on the supposedly fundamental position of the transcendental analytic in *Ideas 1* characterises Heidegger’s entire critique of Husserlian phenomenology. From Husserl’s notion of intentionality through his work on perception and time, phenomenology is interpreted by Heidegger on the basis of the transcendental analytic as being both a statement of Husserl’s fundamental ontological position and as merely a reiteration of Descartes’ rationalist model of subjectivity<sup>10</sup>.

I have already suggested that this rationalist interpretation of phenomenology may be somewhat misleading, and I will argue that the transcendental analytic, with its analysis of the natural attitude and objectivity, is itself

founded on Husserl's earlier 'non-subjective' phenomenological analysis of time. Yet throughout the various scattered passages of the early Heidegger's critique of phenomenology there is a remarkable silence on the matter of Husserl's account of time<sup>11</sup>. The *History of the Concept of Time* makes a passing reference to Husserl's account to the effect that it remains to be dealt with later on in the lecture course, yet Heidegger failed to include it. It did, however, make it into Heidegger's last lecture course at Marburg University on *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* in 1928, the year before Heidegger's edition of Husserl's *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* was finally published. Yet again, although Heidegger more or less admits that Husserl's notion of phenomenological time is precisely what Heidegger calls originary temporality or *Zeitlichkeit*, he still insists that Husserl's account is predicated on a traditional notion of subjectivity<sup>12</sup>. The thoroughly Husserlian notion of lived time as given in the play of expectancy and retention in making present, which Heidegger makes constant use of here and in *Being and Time*, is apparently not only one of Husserl's greatest ontological insights but one that he himself completely failed to understand in terms of its radical implications for traditional subject oriented philosophy. Or at least that seems to be the gist of Heidegger's critique, a critique that seems to me perhaps rather disingenuous or just simply wrong<sup>13</sup>.

Through these various texts, I hope to point towards something of a convergence of themes concerning time, presence and practice for both Heidegger and Husserl, where the relation between perception and practical activity is to be found in their originary relation to ecstatic temporality. Interestingly enough, just such a relation is set out in Heidegger's lecture course at Marburg University in the summer of 1927 on the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, in which references to Husserl are curiously few and far

between<sup>14</sup>. Given the year after the publication of *Being and Time*, Heidegger saw this lecture course as completing the third division of the first part of his magnum opus, or at least that was his intention. As a treatise on time and being, it deals with the relation of the traditional notion of being, as perception or presence, to practical comportments, and offers a radical interpretation of the intentional structure of perception and practice originating in the ecstatic temporality of Dasein (*Zeitlichkeit*) as the structure of temporality (*Temporalität*) in general<sup>15</sup>. Such a structure can also be derived from Husserl's early texts, and I think the similarities here are striking and point towards a definite convergence in the phenomenologies of both Heidegger and Husserl, a convergence centred around the continuity in their analyses of time.

The final sections of the thesis will therefore attempt to situate the authentic resolute projection of ecstatic temporality as given in *Being and Time* in relation to Husserl's phenomenology of time, as well as Dreyfus' interpretation of practice, and following certain elements of the latter's critique of authenticity. With Dreyfus then, I would like to argue against Heidegger's notion of falling as the 'temptation of fleeing', and the use of authentic angst as a methodological principle. With this corrective in mind, authenticity as a phenomenological method, rather than an existentialist way of life, discloses the originary temporal structure of the self-unity of lived experience. Heidegger uses Husserl's concept of lived time to show the temporal constitution of this self as the unitary process of the three ecstases of past thrownness and anticipatory futural projection in 'making present'. Husserl's radical formulation of originary temporality is central to Heidegger's temporal interpretation of lived experience in that it also situates practical activity in its fundamental, temporal relation to perception.

The problematic, two way relation between Husserl and Heidegger will illustrate the existential relation between self and world as the temporal relation between practice and perception. On the interpretive basis of this 'Heideggerean' reading of Husserl, the problem of authenticity and its relation to falling absorption in the three ecstases of time will be interpreted in terms of Husserl's account of the temporal structure of intentional synthesis. Such a 'Husserlian' interpretation of authentic temporality will outline the central role that perception (and presence) plays within the self-projection of Dasein and its openness to the practical world of equipmental things<sup>16</sup>. This thesis will thus conclude with an attempt at an outline of the conditional structure of the temporality of lived experience, in a synthesis of elements of Husserl's phenomenology and Heidegger's account of the horizontality of being. Such a synthesis is obviously a rather speculative exercise, and it is intended here merely as one possible interpretation of the philosophical link between the thought of Husserl and Heidegger, where:

all true thought remains open to more than one interpretation—and this by reason of its nature. Nor is this multiplicity of possible interpretations merely the residue of a still unachieved formal-logical univocity which we properly ought to strive for but did not attain. Rather, multiplicity of meanings is the element in which all thought must move in order to be strict thought (Heidegger, 1968, p. 71).

*I–Dreyfus**§2. Husserl's 'representationalism'*

Hubert Dreyfus has introduced the notion of background coping strategies into the problematic of *Being and Time*. What then are the grounds of Dreyfus' philosophy of practice? Obviously, it begins with his reading of the existential analytic of Dasein insofar as it concerns the ready-to-handedness of equipmentality. From this perspective, everyday life is characterized by the artefacts that surround us and form the world of our practical concerns, such as the chair one sits in, the word processor one is using, the window through which one looks out into the garden, and even the garden itself inasmuch as it is the product of human labour and serves its purpose as such. But none of these need occupy one's mind while at work, unless of course the system crashes or the chair's arm falls off, or perhaps when one's work involves an ontology of practice. Rather, what one is occupied by is the work at hand, whatever that may be. The artefacts have already been understood one way or another simply by being used and thus coming to form part of the total structure of everyday life and its practical contingencies.

For Dreyfus, this has some far reaching consequences in that everydayness is, from an ontological perspective, first and foremost a totality of background coping strategies. One's everyday world is meaningfully structured by way of these practices that can remain unthought as such and yet which we more or less share in common. Presumably these practices are largely handed down in that they have a common usage which each generation must adapt for themselves in a constantly changing world. Practice, therefore, implies an individual's social and historical relation to the world, where one's own

concrete practices are themselves set up and made meaningful within this wider background system of intelligibility.

Mundane everydayness thus becomes that received, yet necessarily indeterminate, cultural manifold within which we are all immersed, and which meaningfully discloses our world by way of our own non-theoretical, everyday, practical coping strategies. This communal relation is the existential ‘subject’ of Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein, *das Man*, the ‘they’ or ‘one’ which we all are together “though not as the sum” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 164/127<sup>1</sup>). From this communal perspective, one’s primary relation to the world is not by way of meaningful representations but, rather, practical activity and its common understanding. This is never merely an isolated individual relation to the world but more a primordially communal individuality. In this way, one has already understood the chair by sitting in it without actually having to bring it to mind. Furthermore, this practical relation to the chair is itself meaningful (but as yet ‘untheorized’) only within the context of one’s practices as a whole, or everydayness understood as a ‘totality of involvements’. On reflection one might recall the concept ‘chair’ and make it explicit but this is possible only because it has already been understood in the context of one’s everyday practical experience in general.

Everydayness is already, then, an holistic affair in the sense that it is a meaningful whole, and a unity of sorts, rather than merely the sum of its specific cases. It is here that Dreyfus’ claims that Heidegger “criticizes the traditional ontological claim that ultimate reality is made up of context free independent substances” (Dreyfus, 1991a, p. 246). This hermeneutics of everyday practical coping strategies therefore amounts to a ‘contextualisation’ in which any object can, in the first case, be meaningful only within the overall practical context of the everyday world in which one finds it.

However, in what sense is this meaningful context to be thought as the totality of one's practices or coping strategies? This would be a background totality that in some way escapes representation, in that it has always already revealed and set up the practical, everyday context within which one's individual practices and their artefacts might be meaningfully represented. Furthermore, such an indeterminate context would be thoroughly historical; that is if one's own coping strategies have a provenance in the common usage and assuming that there can be no absolute break with tradition.

It is only from within this contextual whole, within the background totality that sets up and orders one's own coping strategies and our 'shared practices' in general, that one might then come to meaningfully conceptualize or represent an object as what it is. Thus it is that, according to Dreyfus, the problem of the subject's relation to an objectively given world mediated by 'representative content' is an epistemological problem that collapses into the ontological analytic of Dasein. In the analytic, "Heidegger shows that this subject/object epistemology presupposes a background of everyday practices into which we are socialized but that we do not represent in our minds" (Dreyfus, 1991a, p. 3). So instead of working from the specific in order to give meaning to the whole, one finds oneself already given in the whole which itself remains indeterminate. In this holistic or background sense, practice is 'prior' to representation. Following on this proposition, it would seem that any correspondence theory of truth, any mentalistic notion of intentionality or a system of beliefs, and all other epistemologies founded on the subject/object relation or on an abridgement of everydayness down to a totality of possible cases, must presuppose a world that has already been understood by way of one's own everyday practice and its common usage.

Against the notion that we make sense of the world by way of a system of beliefs, Dreyfus suggests the possibility that there are “no beliefs to get clear about; there are only skills and practices” (1991a, p. 22). We can therefore only offer an interpretation of what is already implicit and unthought, rather than attempt to systematize beliefs which are themselves only meaningful in the context of our practical activities. Our beliefs about the world are, in this sense, thoroughly derivative of a world that has already been meaningfully disclosed in one’s own practical understanding and the activities it informs. For Dreyfus, this seems to imply that “Ontology, then, cannot be a Kantian transcendental analytics or a Husserlian eidetic science” (p. 22).

Given that Kant and Husserl figure prominently, in both a positive and negative sense, in the analytic of Dasein, this would seem to be a rather problematic assertion. However, whilst Heidegger calls his existential phenomenology a transcendental analytic, it is true that he appropriates Kant and the transcendental terminology for his own purpose, which leads to the question of the temporal being of Dasein. Yet even given this, I would still argue that the transcendental relation to being exceeds the problem of representation, at least at the level of the representation of objects or things in general. One might have a transcendental concept for a specific thing such as a ‘chair’, for example, which organizes all its different empirical aspects into some sort of synthetic unity of apperception, and this might be a problem given the foregoing analysis of coping practices and usage in general. For when coping, one does not need to explicitly involve oneself with the concept ‘chair’ in order to use it, one merely sits down and gets on with the work at hand, such as for instance preparing a meal, or constructing a written thesis. Representational thinking is not, in this case, concerned with the chair as such but, rather, with the practical contingencies at hand and specific to

one's work. In this sense, one's work practices are what first set the stage for their representational strategies or concepts, and these are put into play within a world that has already been practically understood one way or another and which can remain in the background.

However, this specific problem of transcendental conceptuality is not the primary focus of Heidegger's transcendentalism, and here I would like to move from the question of coping to the question of the ontological method within which something like 'coping' comes to be disclosed. For when one considers Dasein as such, one is concerned with something other than a ready to or present at hand object. Dasein is instead, one's own concerned relation to tools or artefacts in general and the world of beings as a whole. As far as the transcendental existential analytic of Dasein is concerned; "Transcendental knowledge relates not to objects, not to beings, but to the concepts that determine the being of beings" (Heidegger, 1982, p. 128/180<sup>18</sup>).

So in what sense might the notion of 'coping strategies' determine the being of beings? An object is given to or comes to presence for Dasein, yet not explicitly as an object in its objectivity; such an explicitly theoretical determination comes after the fact as far as everyday practice is concerned. Rather, the object is first given and becomes intelligible only in the overall and ongoing context of practice. Our shared practices or common usage, as a contextual or background whole, confer this intelligibility. Given this, and insofar as Dreyfus equates being with intelligibility (1991a, p. 257), does the 'background system of shared practices' then become something like a transcendental concept for the being of beings? That is, could it be said to be a condition for the possibility of the lived experience of beings as such? Perhaps, but the meanings of 'background system' and of 'sharing' are far

from clear, and furthermore, the relation of practice to transcendental truth is not simply that of a possible condition for lived experience in general.

Heidegger's transcendental method involves an investigation of practice insofar as its relation to what is ready to hand, rather than a subject's self-representations, constitutes the intelligibility of everydayness. And here, the task of "bringing to light Dasein's existential constitution leads first of all to the twofold task, intrinsically one, *of interpreting more radically the phenomena of intentionality and transcendence*" (Heidegger, 1982, p. 162/231). This existential notion of intentionality is to be understood in Heidegger's sense, as Dasein's relational 'comportment' (*Verhalten*) towards beings as a whole. Comportment includes any way of behaving or of relating oneself to the world, what Dreyfus calls coping strategies; it is in a sense the founding concept of the existential-ontological analytic in which that "kind of Being towards which Dasein can comport [*verhält*] itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself somehow, we call 'existence'" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 32/12).

So in what sense is intentionality related to transcendence? Or in other words, in what sense are our background practices related to Dasein's transcendence in which the flux of one's lived experience is already understood as our familiar mundane everyday world? Obviously, such a question must first make clear the relation between intentionality and practice, which brings me to the contentious issue of Husserl. If the early Heidegger has a 'methodological' debt owing to Kant it is probably nothing compared to that owed to Husserl's early phenomenology. Yet the existential analytic also apparently marks a radical departure from the latter. For Dreyfus, this departure is primarily due to Husserl's epistemological reliance on an analysis of the subjectivity of consciousness for which the objective

world is given by way of an ideal mental unity or noema. From this interpretive perspective, all action is derivative of and “mediated by internal representations” (1991a, p. 249), and thus everydayness becomes a network of intentional states or a ‘system of beliefs and rules’.

Dreyfus, as already stated, argues against the notion of a system of beliefs, or network of noemata, in favour of the notion of a system of shared background practices, “on the basis of which actions and objects make sense” (p. 268). As an example, one might consider a picture hanging on a wall, maybe it is a print of a pair of Van Gogh’s peasant shoes. What one has in mind in considering the picture is not, of course, the subjective representation of it but, rather, the picture itself. Representing the picture is a way of relating to it concernfully and this representation can only make sense in the context of one’s embodied practical relation to the picture itself, whether that is manifested in putting the crooked picture straight, or perhaps even in using it in a philosophical critique of representation. What is primary is one’s practice, and for Dreyfus this practical perspective amounts to a refutation of the Husserlian notion of noema, or representative intentional content, as mediation (p. 266). Representation is, in this sense, never a mediating cause of practical activity, as it might seem to be in Husserl, rather, the representing subject is de-centred with regards to practice. With this displacement the notion of a ‘thinking self’, and so also the subject/object relation it implies, can only become meaningful in retrospect and from within a world that has already been understood in practice.

So again, the everyday world of one’s own lived experience is in this sense understood not by way of a thinking subject’s system of representative knowledge but, rather, it has already been organized and made sense of by way of one’s own practices and their common usage. Intentionality, as

representational thinking at least, would be thoroughly derivative of this more originary practical disclosure of the world. However, Dreyfus also goes on to claim that in everyday coping, the comportment involved in Heidegger's concerned circumspection [*besorgende Umgang*], there are no "mental states" whatsoever (1991a, p. 86), a claim that seems quite remarkable. In support of this, Dreyfus differentiates between the intentionality of mental representations and that of practical activity, where "intentionality without the experience of self-referential content is characteristic of the unimpeded mode of everyday activity" (Dreyfus, 1993, p. 22). From this perspective, everydayness is predominantly characterized by the "experience of a steady flow of skillful activity" (p. 24), more or less free of goal-oriented representations. Only in disturbances, or dysfunction, where our coping strategies fail us and artefacts become a problem in themselves, are there then reflective 'intentional states' which are equated with beliefs. Only in this sort of breakdown does the intentional subject emerge. In this way, Dreyfus takes a moderately pragmatic approach to the problem of intentionality that bypasses the sort of radically naïve, pragmatic mis-reading of Heidegger that he accuses Okrent or Føllesdal of falling into, that is, of taking comportment as simply practice (Dreyfus, 1991a, p. 48). However, Dreyfus' pragmatism still seems to largely exclude representation from the scene of practical activity, relegating representational practices to specific and secondary problem solving states.

It would seem then that the painting itself need not concern us, as an objective thing, beyond its function as a lovely work of art, as an object of aesthetic, nostalgic or financial concern and so on. This is what Dreyfus calls 'simple absorption'. It does not require a coherent system of beliefs or a total conceptual grasp of the world in order to function; one merely gets on with

the business at hand. Yet how can these concerned relations with the picture be said to have no intentional content, that is, no representations, no conscious content, until the absorption breaks down when one finds the picture is hanging crooked on the wall? Then it must be straightened, which apparently only now requires a subjectively intentional or self-reflective relationship towards said picture as an objectified problem. Yet surely any practice, absorbed or otherwise, has its representational strategies apart from merely problem solving or maintenance, even and especially if these only make sense within the overall context of one's own everyday coping and its common usage? Or is it that everyday coping is constantly having to cross over such breakdowns or disturbances in a constant play of representational practices and practical activities—perhaps absorption is never purely 'simple' but is already a constant process of displacement and re-absorption?<sup>19</sup> Which is to say, one copes, more or less.

Furthermore, such an insistence on excluding representational content from coping strategies, where Husserl's supposedly mentalistic notion of intentionality is equated with a system of beliefs, requires a rather selective interpretation of Husserlian phenomenology. For noemata cannot be directly equated with representative content because the actual content of inner intuition is rather a relational process of sense making or noesis. This is the 'pure stream of consciousness', the life world (*Lebenswelt*), or one's own lived experience of things as they present themselves and are cognized as such. Within the immanence of lived experience, the mode of being of the noema is the "way in which it is 'implicit' in the mental process, in which it is 'intended to' in the mental process" (Husserl, 1982, p. 234/200). As Dreyfus himself points out, for Husserl "the noema is not present (even marginally) to ordinary involved consciousness" (Dreyfus, 1982, p. 118), rather it is only

correlated with its noetic process that intends the objectivity of an object through that noema. Dreyfus thus recognizes that, in Husserl's sense, the noema is "an atemporal, aspatial, nonsensuous, abstractable, ideal unity" (p. 118) as opposed to noetic processes, those concrete mental processes which are 'aimed at' the fulfilment of their correlated noematic 'ideas' or concepts.

Given this, then, it still remains that for Husserl these internal subjective acts of noesis are founding acts whose unity is made possible by the mathematically idealised categories or noema, which is perhaps where the problem of transcendental conceptuality arises. The noemata are transcendental concepts that indirectly, by way of the constant re-presentative process of noesis, make possible the identity and unity of the natural attitude and its lived experience. 'Inner' consciousness is the sphere within which these experiences take place and thus the self-representing ego is the origin of practical actions indirectly mediated via noematic ideation. Against this notion of representational or transcendental identity, we have already posited the proposition that it is coping, as one's own non-theoretical, concerned relation to the everyday world, that first makes possible and gives meaning to concepts and representations in general. As far as the practical critique of intentionality as representative content is concerned, Dreyfus' reduction of noetic content to a system of noemata is perhaps a useful shortcut.

Yet what is at stake in the exclusion of mentalistic intentionality from coping and in the equation of noesis with noema? If one excludes both the ubiquity of noesis and its temporal character as an ongoing psychological process, where does that leave the notion of a 'system of shared practices'? In the earlier paper mentioned above, circa 1982, and working from within the subject/object distinction of transcendental phenomenology, for Dreyfus our "habits and skills for coping with objects are aspatial and atemporal, like the

noema. The same skill can be actualized in many different situations. But unlike Husserl's conceptualized noema, skills are not ideal, abstractable meanings" (p. 122). Dreyfus seems here to be attempting to substitute practice for the noema as those "perceptual skills" (p. 122) by way of which we unify objective experience. He displaces ideal categories with embodied practices which are not themselves rationalized categories and thus "there is only the embodied subject coming to grips with embodied objects" (p. 123).

Dreyfus attempts in this way, on a subjective basis, to refute Husserl's notion of the phenomenological reduction and his account of the pure ego<sup>20</sup>. On this account, it is embodied practical activity that mediates a subject's relation to the objectively given world. Such an account remains, obviously, a subjectively pragmatic interpretation of intentionality but this interpretation is posited within an engagement with Husserl, and Dreyfus is much more careful where Heidegger's account of intentionality is concerned. Yet besides this problem of subjectivity an interesting problem concerning temporality arises. Just what is it that allows the same skills to be actualized over and again? If Dreyfus holds that skills are 'atemporal', and this is not at all clear in his later work, then such a belief might account for the notion that the background can in some sense be a 'system of shared practices'.

But this temporal determination is precisely what is elided throughout the whole analysis when Dreyfus foregoes a discussion of the noetic process in favour of the noemata as a 'system of beliefs'. Furthermore, this practical shortcut belies the possibility that the analytic of Dasein is itself a radical reworking, rather than a denial of Husserl's intentional relation. As far as Husserl is concerned, whilst the system of noemata is an atemporal and ahistorical ideal structure, the noetic process of inner intuition and its representational ego which constantly found these noemata is a temporal

process or lived phenomenon. Access to the transcendental concepts can only be gained by way of a constant recursion to this process which is simply one's own ongoing lived experience of the things themselves, or what Husserl calls the irreducible 'flux' of lived experience.

Now this access to the atemporal categories was to be provided in the reduction to transcendental subjectivity and perhaps it is at this point that Heidegger's phenomenological method must diverge from that of Husserl's. For the temporally synthetic process of noesis, at least up until the late twenties, was a theoretical concern for the latter insofar as it founded the atemporal categories or ideas. The pure ego effected in the reduction is apparently that which constitutes the unity of the temporality of inner intuition, and as such this atemporal ego stands outside and is the origin or overseer of the temporal stream of noesis.

This account of the self-identical ego is apparently what Husserl's entire eidetic phenomenology stands or falls upon, at least from the perspective of *Ideas 1*. It is that ground of 'pure' consciousness, within the constant flux of lived experience, on which it is possible to posit the objectivity of objects, and as such it is the ground for the possibility of a purely scientific philosophy. According to this subjective interpretation of time, temporality remains in a sense 'derivative' of the atemporal ego (although even here the depth of Husserl's analysis opens up some interesting possibilities) whereas for the existential analytic, in which the being of Dasein is to be interpreted as time, temporality (as *Zeitlichkeit*) is itself the fundamental problem (Heidegger, 1962, p. 38/17). Heidegger thus might be said to 'reverse' this subjective relation to phenomenological time, in that temporality becomes the origin of both the thinking subject and of intentional compartments in general. From the perspective of Dreyfus' interpretation of Husserl, it is this

radical critique of subjectivity that characterises Heidegger's relation to Husserl.

Given the above considerations, if one reduces the 'life world' and its noetic processes to a static or atemporal system of beliefs or noemata and then largely excludes it from considerations of the system of shared practices, then perhaps the existential analytic does mark a radical break with Husserlian 'eidetic science'. However, as far as the question of temporality is concerned, this break with the ideal structure of the noemata might also mark a radical continuity with, as an existential phenomenological interpretation of, the lived experience of noesis. Or in other words, even as Heidegger posits his critique of the Husserlian notion of the noemata and the pure ego as some sort of ideal ground for representation, the representing subject might still remain as the groundless temporal process of noesis, or sense making, immersed within a world that has already been understood by way of practice.

Representation is, in this sense, not to be largely excluded from the existential analytic as some sort of derivative epi-phenomenon, rather, it is already equiprimordial with the practical activities that themselves are meaningful only within the background intelligibility of the world. As Dreyfus himself points out, for Heidegger (1982, p. 297/422) "self and world are the basic determination of the Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-world". This is, of course, not the relation between a disembodied ego or representing subject and its mediated objective world, for the subject/object relation must presuppose a world that has already been disclosed in our everyday practices. Yet something like a 'self' remains as an originary relation to this world, that is, as a basic mode of Dasein's comportments, and this 'self' has a temporal structure. In this sense, the

temporality of noesis may very well reflect the temporal structure of intentional compartments in general, and in doing so it may also provide the clue to understanding the relation between intentionality and Dasein's transcendence.

This is a question of whether or not, and in what restricted senses, Husserl's phenomenological analysis of the temporality of noesis might at least in part be said to lay the methodological grounds for Heidegger's temporal analysis of Dasein; that is if one grants that the temporal analysis of 'life' or lived experience is central to Heidegger's phenomenological method, coming as it is from out of the German tradition of *Lebensphilosophie* as exemplified in Dilthey, Brentano and Husserl. Not that existential-ontology can be simply equated with these problematics, and Heidegger himself was constantly at pains to distance himself from their legacy and various other mis-readings of *Being and Time*. Such mis-interpretations, as in an anthropological reading of the first division (Heidegger, 1989b, p. 69), or mistaking authentic resoluteness for some sort of 'existentialist' morality (p. 87-88), and above all, any tendency towards subjectivizing Dasein, are all to be vigorously guarded against. All such superficial 'existentialist' moralisms and subjective anthropologies reduce Dasein down to something like 'man', or at worst the inner experience of subjective ideation. Just such a misreading seems to have allowed Husserl to accuse his wayward prodigy of mistaking a naïve philosophical anthropology for properly fundamental ontology. Therefore, if Dasein is to be glossed as 'life' or 'lived experience' this existential experience must not be reduced to the privative notion of a subject's relation to its objective world.

For Dreyfus (1993, p. 35), Heidegger's notion of experience "can only be characterized as openness. It is not a mental, inner, private event" as he

suggests it is for Husserl. Or rather, perhaps existential experience can not merely be reduced to noesis, for while Husserl emphasized the subjective or 'inner' experience of cognition as a mediating process of representation, Heidegger introduces this thinking self to its unthought world of practical contingencies. It is within this wider practical notion of embodied intentional experience that anything like representations can themselves become meaningful, and where both the self and its world are given equiprimordially in the 'openness of the Da of Dasein'<sup>21</sup>.

From this existential-ontological perspective, the subjective 'stream of consciousness', of noesis, need not be largely excluded from Heidegger's analysis of artefacts and our common practical understanding of the world. Instead, intentionality's temporal character as representational mediation, is to be derived from within the wider and more ordinary context of a world that has already been understood by way of one's own practical activities in general. Comportment would, in this sense, include both representation and embodied practical activity, and both would have a provenance in the unthought background intelligibility of the world. Representation itself becomes a mode of mentalistic comportment within comportments as a whole. Yet, and essentially in agreement with Dreyfus, these representational practices cannot of themselves make sense of the world, rather, it is practical comportments and our embodied activity in the world that have already set up the meaningfulness of any representation. So perhaps, then, one represents and even copes by representing the situation as it gives itself, but representation is not for all that the sole and purely self-conscious origin of one's relation to the world. If mentalistic intentionality is subsumed in this way by the intentionality of coping strategies, then in what sense is the temporality of representation 'embedded' within that of shared practices as a

whole? This begs in part the question of division two of *Being and Time* concerning the authentic projection of the temporality of everydayness.

What, then, might be the origin of our comportment or intentional relations? That is, what is the origin of our representations and practical activity? According to Dreyfus, it is the background system of intelligibility that first gives meaning and order to our concrete individual coping strategies. This background is nothing other than the everyday understanding of being that we share in common, for apparently “Heidegger calls this nonexplicitable background that enables us to make sense of things ‘the understanding of being’” (Dreyfus, 1991a, p. 4). Practical activity, and perhaps this marks the limit of Dreyfus’ qualified pragmatism, is thus not the primary ground of everyday experience. As he states in an earlier article on the relation between practice and theory; “Although practical understanding—everyday coping with things and people—involves explicit beliefs and hypotheses, these can only be meaningful in specific contexts and against a background of shared practices” (Dreyfus, 1980, p. 18). This background constitutes the intelligibility of both theoretical and practical comportments. Thus the understanding of being is what is primary, for it simply ‘is’ the background intelligibility of mundane everydayness. Yet what is the origin of this understanding? This is nothing other than the question of being that Heidegger sets out in his existential analytic. According to this analytic, what constitutes the unity or ongoing familiarity of our practices and their world is ‘care’, and here, for Heidegger:

Care, as a primordial structural totality, lies ‘before’ [*“vor”*] every factual ‘attitude’ and ‘situation’ of Dasein, and it does so existentially *a priori*; this means that it always lies *in* them. So this phenomenon by no means expresses a priority of the ‘practical’ attitude over the theoretical (1962, p. 238/193).

Again, both theory and practice must be seen as equiprimordial, where representations and embodied practical activity belong to, are organized and set up by, ‘care’ and its background understanding of being. From the perspective of the existential analytic of Dasein, there can be no precedence of praxis over theory or vice versa, for each belongs to the other in that “just as *praxis* has its own specific kind of sight (‘theory’), theoretical research is not without a *praxis* of its own” (p. 409/358)<sup>22</sup>. For instance, philosophical reflection as a writing practice requires its own tools of trade, such as a pen at least, or a word processor perhaps. In an existential-ontological sense, therefore, it is a theorizing practice set up and brought to fruition within the wider context of one’s own care for this ‘life’ and living in general. Dasein, in its relational compartments, is thus not merely a thinking subject’s representations of the world, nor is it solely non-theoretical, embodied practical activity towards this world of beings. Theory and praxis must come together in Dasein by way of the complex unity of ‘care’ which constitutes the intelligibility of everydayness. Furthermore, this ‘constituting’ is an ongoing articulated or temporal process for which the “*background* consists in a continual intentional activity that he [Heidegger] calls *ontological transcendence*” (Dreyfus, 1993, p. 36).

For Dreyfus then, the background is related to both existential intentionality and transcendence, which brings me back to the question of Heidegger’s transcendentalism. In what sense are representations and embodied practical activity related to Dasein’s transcendence, in which the temporal flux of one’s lived experience is always already given as one’s own familiar, mundane, everyday world? According to Heidegger, the transcendence of Dasein is its ‘overstepping’ character, which is made possible by the “*ecstatic character of time*” (1982, p. 302/428). Heidegger’s notion of transcendence has a

temporal structure which gives an ongoing sense of unity to the manifold flux of experience, that is to say, existential transcendence is related to the understanding of being which is itself constantly projected in care.

The question concerning practice, therefore, must also involve the relation between intentionality and temporality. As suggested above, Husserl's problematic is already concerned with this temporal relation, although, according to both Heidegger and Dreyfus, it was posited in a subjective sense. From the perspective of Heidegger's existential appropriation of transcendence, and in what seems to be a deliberate elision of Husserl, Kant is apparently the "first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of Temporality [*Temporalität*] or has even let himself be drawn hither by the coercion of the phenomena themselves" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 45/23). So perhaps, then, these two problematics, the Kantian transcendental analytic and Husserl's eidetic science, might come together in the existential analytic where "intentionality is founded in the Dasein's transcendence" (Heidegger, 1982, p. 162/230).

For Dreyfus' pragmatic interpretation of Heidegger, this intentionality is largely practical activity, while the representing subject is generally confined to specific secondary self-reflexive activities. The temporality of everyday existence is therefore characterized by a steady stream of "unthinking activity" (Dreyfus, 1993, p. 35) occasionally interrupted by self-conscious, goal-oriented, representational coping. This 'steady stream' of absorption, periodically interrupted by self-referential representations, is the closest that Dreyfus gets to positing a temporal interpretation of practical activity. While I agree with the emphasis that intentionality in general cannot be "understood as a relation between a self-sufficient subject with its intentional content and an independent object" (p. 19), and without in any way wanting to re-

introduce a notion of a mediating subject, I would still like to suggest that the time frame for the emergence of this insufficient representational self must be compressed somewhat. For given the originary structure of 'self and world', as well as the intimate relation between existential intentionality and temporal transcendence, it is possible that everyday coping should be understood more as a constant play of representations and embodied practical activities. In this sense, one's absorption in the work at hand would never be purely 'simple' but is already a constant temporalising process of displacement and re-absorption.

So in what sense then might existential intentionality, as representation and embodied practical activity, be founded in Dasein's transcendence? And what is their originary relation to the background intelligibility of the common understanding of being, as projected in the manifold articulated structure of care? Furthermore, what is the relation between this notion of 'care', always in each case one's own, and the 'shared' or common understanding of being? For Heidegger this is a question of *das Man*, of the relation between the individual and their community, and in terms of practice it concerns the relation between one's own coping strategies and Dreyfus' notion of sharing. Thus it is also a question of these common practices as a background or 'systematic' and, in some sense, temporalising whole. So how, then, is one's relation to the 'background system of shared practices' to be disclosed as one's relation to the 'they', and what is the methodological access proper to this disclosure?

### *§3. Heidegger's 'existentialism'*

In the existential analytic, access to one's 'ownmost' understanding relation to the world is provided by way of an 'authentic' disclosure, and this apparently amounts to a radical re-interpretation of Husserl's

phenomenological reduction. In this existential reduction however, the pure ego is not given to itself in its pure subjectivity and as the basis for transcendence but, rather, this ego is given as the groundlessness of subjective representation immersed within a world that has already been understood in practice, one way or another. Or in other words, whilst Husserl's reduction gives the pure ego as the "*absolute source of all intelligibility*" (Dreyfus, 1991a, p. 177), Heidegger's method gives Dasein as thrown into a "*public system of significances*" (p. 177). Again, for Dreyfus, this represents a radical and exclusive difference between the ego and an 'unthinking' public openness to common practices, where the former is restricted to sporadic problem solving states.

Yet it is also possible, given a different reading of Husserl, that the *ego cogito* remains the subject of Heidegger's existential analytic. Such a reading will be deferred, for the moment, in order to introduce the notion of authenticity. Suffice it to say, however, that for this thesis the relation between Husserl's reduction and the methodology of authenticity will be much more complex than Dreyfus allows for. Dreyfus insists that the reduction or epoché, as a suspension of judgement and a bracketing of traditional assumptions about the nature of the *cogito* and consciousness, is still based on the relation of a rational ego to its intelligible world, that is, as Cartesianism. It remains to be seen just how far Husserl's bracketing of traditional notions of Cartesian subjectivity go towards a radical critique of rationalism as a whole, a critique he may very well share with Heidegger and his practical notion of authenticity.

On the basis of this existential-phenomenological interpretation of authenticity, one is already and constantly thrown into a world which is 'sensible' and on the basis of which one represents this world and oneself

along with others. Such is the authentic step back to the ‘openness’ within which the self is always finding itself. For the early Heidegger, this reduction amounts to a disclosure of the temporality of mundane everydayness, which was to be given, at least in a preparatory sense, in the authenticity of resoluteness. Authenticity involves a disclosure of the temporal being of Dasein and, as such, it is the method of the existential-ontological analytic for which “phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being ... to the understanding of the being of this being (projecting upon the way it is unconcealed)” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 21/29). What then is the relation of authentic disclosure to the shared background system of everyday practices or coping strategies?

If the first division of *Being and Time* deals with the background practices of everyday coping that constitute the intelligibility of our world, then the second division must involve the temporal origin of these practices, and the origin of intelligibility or the understanding of being in general. To start with, this temporal interpretation is prepared for in the ‘existentialist’ chapters on death, nullity and ecstatic temporality at the beginning of division two. Authentic, resolute angst becomes the method by way of which the temporalising origin of Dasein, which is always in each case one’s own existence in the world, is to be phenomenologically ‘demonstrated’. The phenomenological disclosure of the world, as a reduction back to the being of Dasein, is an ‘authentic disclosedness’ that Heidegger calls ‘resoluteness’, and more specifically:

This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience—*this reticent self-projection upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety*—we call ‘resoluteness’ (1962, p. 343/296-297).

Resoluteness, as *Ent-schlossenheit*, is a mode of disclosedness, or *Er-schlossenheit*. It is difficult to convey the intimate relation of resoluteness to

disclosure in the English translation where the former must already imply a sense of opening up. Thus for Dreyfus, *Ent-schlossenheit*, as authentic resoluteness, “means un-closedness, i.e., ‘openness’” (Dreyfus and Rubin, 1991b, p. 318), and so resolute openness is perhaps a better translation for this phenomenological way of revealing the origin of the world of everyday life. To be resolute is to be “open to the Situation” (p. 320) within which something like one’s world can become meaningful. This ‘Situation’ or place is wherever one already finds oneself with others and alongside the things themselves, it is the space of one’s embodied practices and representations. In terms of ‘shared practices’ then, resoluteness means to be open to that indeterminate contextual whole within which oneself, these others and things have already been disclosed and are therefore already intelligible, one way or another, and within which representational thought can itself be meaningful. Resoluteness is a way of disclosing the world which has already been opened up by way of our shared practices and, in this sense, it is only one mode of disclosure, one way of revealing the world of our everyday concerns. Resolute openness might itself be said to be an ontological practice, and so one practice amongst others.

However, resolute openness is an *eigentliche Erschlossenheit*, that is, it is an authentic mode of disclosedness or way of revealing this already disclosed world of ours. This authentic disclosure is distinguished from the other practical ways of opening up and revealing the world in that it seeks to ‘demonstrate’ the way something like a system of practices disclose the world in general. These coping strategies as a whole, which of necessity have not themselves been disclosed as an explicit object of our everyday concerns, remain in the background and are therefore ‘inauthentic’. Heidegger stresses that authenticity or *Eigentlichkeit* is not intended as a moral valuation but

rather plays on the notion of the ‘ownmost’ as ‘one’s own’ phenomenological relation to existence. Such a play, in which *Eigentlichkeit* is a cognate of *eigen*, of what is properly one’s own, is also elided in the English translation. Practical coping is absorbed in the contingencies of one’s everyday concerns and while thus absorbed it does not concern itself with itself as coping, obviously, until a strategy fails, or when one’s everyday philosophical concerns are focused on the self-reflexivity of an ontology of practice. Generally, however, coping strategies are not concerned with themselves as a system of shared practices that as a whole constitute the intelligibility of one’s own world and so are, in this restricted technical sense, merely ‘inauthentic’ (*un-eigentlich*) or ‘not-ownmost’ concerns.

This emphasis on the ‘ownmost’ is crucial to Heidegger’s notion of resolute authenticity and to his existential phenomenological method in general. For the demonstration of the origin of everydayness is an ‘attestation’ of finitude that calls oneself as a witness to one’s own existence or lived experience in the world. In such a call, authenticity, as an ontological method, is a form of ‘solipsism’ that is concerned not with some sort of ‘worldless’ subject but with this lone self immersed in its world. One’s own self and world belong together in the authentic disclosure of Dasein as “*solus ipse*” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 233/188) and this qualified solipsism is characteristic of the phenomenological method in general. For, as in Husserl, it is not a question of theorizing from an ‘external’ point of view about some subject’s relation to the world but, rather, of descriptively analyzing that relation from one’s own standpoint. What the resolute attestation opens up for this lone existential self, is the originary indeterminate totality or background system of ‘shared practices’ that has already revealed and set up the meaningfulness of one’s own world and which cannot be represented as such. This is our ‘pre-

ontological' understanding of being, of ourselves and the world we live in. Such an indeterminate understanding is based on the intelligibility of a world that has already been set up and revealed by coping and its common usage.

The knowing subject, as a thinking self or *ego cogito*, is incapable of grasping the totality conceptually, at least not beyond a resolute recognition of their own finitude, simply because they have already been given by or thrown into the contextual whole that gives meaning to their representations. Resoluteness is, for Dreyfus, "the openness that results from the acceptance of the breakdown of the ethical illusion of lucid total choice, and the realization that the self is impotent and empty" (Dreyfus and Rubin, 1991b p. 318). Given the originary impotence of representational thinking, such a realization of self-nullity cannot be deduced, rather, one must take up the call to resolute openness for one's self as a witness to one's own originary finitude. This non-representational call is the call of conscience, it calls one out of an 'inauthentic' absorption in the practical necessities of everyday life and into a resolute openness to originary finitude, and as such it is a 'reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost being-guilty'. According to Dreyfus, this existential guilt is "Dasein's structural indebtedness to the culture for an understanding of itself that it can never clearly choose, yet out of which it must act and for which it is fully responsible" (Dreyfus and Rubin, 1991b, p. 308). Conscience is the call to face this originary guilt as the groundless nullity of one's 'indebtedness' to the manifold cultural traditions that constitute or set up the intelligibility of our world. And so, by way of authentic resolute openness, Heidegger posits in theological terms the ontological possibility of a confrontation with the modern phenomenon of what some philosophers have called the 'abyss of groundlessness'. In the authentic projection of finitude, one is called to bring this 'abyss', as the

nullity of the modern subject and its essential historicism, to account for itself rather than flee into either some form of moral righteousness or ‘agnostic’ relativism.

These, then, are the functional terms of Heidegger’s authentic method as phenomenological reduction. This reduction back to the being of Dasein, accomplished in the resolute call of conscience, discloses one’s ownmost finite relation to the indefinite background intelligibility within which the thinking subject is already given and who is therefore and necessarily always already guilty without appeal. This background, in some sense to be temporally understood as the understanding of being, is that which is constantly setting the stage for one’s practical activities and their representational strategies. Or rather, authenticity discloses one’s own understanding as it constantly manifests itself in the play of representations and embodied practice, that is, in an unrepresented play that constitutes the intelligibility of mundane everydayness. Yet this outline of resoluteness is incomplete, for one more defining element remains in this authentic formulation, that of existential angst or anxiety.

Dreyfus identifies anxiety as a “special method” (1991a, p. 176) of fundamental ontology, a method that is specifically related to this authentic reduction and the finitude it uncovers. Yet in what sense can angst become a methodological concern for the resolute projection of finitude? According to Heidegger, at any particular moment one already finds oneself in the world of one’s own concerns, and this ‘finding’ is given in one’s ‘state-of-mind’ or ‘affectedness’ (*Befindlichkeit*). As an ontological structure of Dasein’s existence, it is manifested as whatever mood one finds oneself in. It is in this way, that Dasein always “finds itself in its thrownness” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 174/135) wherever and however that may be. This existential notion of

‘finding’ is not an objective way of knowing oneself, moods cannot be merely reduced to, or derived from, a knowing subject’s relation to the world. Dasein’s *Befindlichkeit* is not meant “in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has” (p. 174/135). Any practical activity, any way of thinking about things, any lived experience at all, already ‘has’ its mood. Moods are, in this founding sense, equiprimordial with practical comportments, and of course both of these are ‘prior’ to representations of that world. Ontologically then, “mood is a primordial kind of Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself *prior to* all cognition and volition, and *beyond* their range of disclosure” (p. 175/136).

Both the wider notion of intentionality, as comportmental understanding, and this grounding sense of ‘mood’ are fundamental innovations of existential phenomenology which distinguish it from its eidetic origins. As far as mood is concerned, whereas Husserlian phenomenology was apparently focused on the “paradigm of perceptual and theoretical seeing” (Held, 1993, p. 288), Heidegger’s existential analysis of mood extended this paradigm to include that of hearing or ‘hearkening’. For Held, this existential extension of the Husserlian paradigm amounts to a ‘hermeneutic phenomenology’. Furthermore, Heidegger was “only able to discover the systematic import of the phenomenon of mood because he appropriated, from the hermeneutic tradition, the notion that thinking is dependent upon a hearing” (p. 288-289). This hermeneutic notion of hearkening by way of one’s moods is the basis for being able to hear the silent ‘call of conscience’, and it is in this sense that Heidegger (1962, p. 235/190) posits the possibility that angst as a phenomenon can take on “a methodological function *in principle* for the existential analytic”.

As far as this methodological projection goes, for Dreyfus, angst is the “disclosure accompanying a Dasein’s preontological sense that it is not the source of the meanings it uses to understand itself” (1991a, p. 180). The representational self thus comes up against its own groundless finitude and this revelation is given, or rather, is found in angst. Yet in what way of, or relation to, one’s own being might one first find angst in order to hearken to the call of resolute openness? In the existential analytic angst is inextricably tied to an ontological notion of death for which “Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 310/266). Death is not to be thought in the sense of an event that will befall others, nor even oneself, for it is Dasein’s ‘limit-situation’ as the ‘possibility of the impossibility’ of being able to comport oneself towards one’s existence. One’s own death is not an event that will befall any of us, simply because this existential death is the limit of any possible experience whatsoever. As such, it calls Dasein itself into question.

In being able to hear the silent call which announces itself in the angst of death, one hearkens to nothing other than one’s own being in the world itself as it gives itself. Angst is that mood or feeling in which death is given as one’s ownmost possibility and, as such, it becomes the basis for a ‘positive existential reduction’. The reduction back to one’s own finitude made possible in this methodological angst, is experienced as a resolute opening up of the world in which Dasein is constantly immersed. Death is, in this existential sense, always something ‘immediate’ in which the “primordial ‘limit-Situation’ of Being-towards-death, will be disclosed as a moment of vision [*Augenblick*] which has been held on to” (Heidegger, p. 400/349). The *Augenblick* is that which death and angst are to open up in the call to authenticity.

Such an ontologically directed hearkening towards death is itself possible only because “Being-towards-death is grounded in care” (p. 303/259). The authentic angst of death thus discloses, within the *Augenblick* and in a ‘pre-representational’ sense, nothing other than the background itself as care, and it can function in this way, methodologically speaking, because this background is already and fundamentally a mortal relation to being. All life is constantly subject to death, and in this existential sense, death already ‘lies before’ any possible lived experience of the world. The methodological angst of authentically resolute openness is itself only possible in that death is a necessary and fundamentally structural component of care. Or in other words, methodological angst and its authenticity is possible only because we are already constantly confronted by the structural angst of death inherent to our mortal mundane everydayness. Everyday care is itself a ‘being towards death’, and whether death is ‘met with’ explicitly or not, it is something we must deal with one way or another. Death frames one’s life, and from birth through all the successive degenerations of ageing, one ‘cares’ for this life.

Authentic angst is thus possible only in that the angst of death is already a structural component of mundane everydayness. It is at this point that Heidegger introduces the necessity of making angst an explicit methodological principle of his existential ontology. For when coping with one’s everyday contingencies one is of course absorbed in the work at hand, and this is the meaning of ‘inauthenticity’ (*Uneigentlichkeit*). Even when the structural angst of death is manifested close by with the passing away of friends or family, or in the face of a debilitating illness or accident, or even simply in a remembrance of the passing of years, one must still return to the necessities of having to get on with life. This ‘getting on with’, as a return to the everyday cares and practical contingencies one shares in common with

others, in a return to the 'they' or *das Man*, does not then explicitly take itself as an anxious being towards death, at least not generally in an ontological sense. Given this constant 'inauthentic' return to the necessities of life, Heidegger posits the philosophical method of resolute angst as a way in which Dasein's fundamental "not-being-at-home" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 233/188) is given in itself. That is, methodological angst institutes a defamiliarising break with the mundanely familiar inauthentic concerns into which we are constantly and of necessity falling back into.

As for this problem of everyday inauthenticity, Dreyfus identifies two modes of its falling, as given in the existential analytic, between which Heidegger 'hesitates' and both of which conceal the origin of finitude. These two senses of the fall Dreyfus names as 'structural' and 'psychological' falling. The former explains falling as the basic structure of intelligibility given in the first division of *Being and Time*. As I have already suggested, for Dreyfus and his interpretation of intentionality, the intelligibility of our everyday world is constituted in an absorption in everyday practices whose origin is the understanding of being. Structural falling is this everyday absorption in coping in which Dasein has a tendency to forget itself, and necessarily so if it is to get on with the work at hand. The second sense of falling, which Heidegger in *Being and Time* deals with extensively in the second Division's chapters on death and resolute openness, gives it as the 'they's' fearful fleeing in the face of the angst of death.

Rather than just staying with the notion that we must, of necessity, fall back into an absorption in our everyday concerns, that one must get on with life, Heidegger interprets this falling back as a fearful fleeing into busying oneself. The inauthentic 'they', which we all are together as public individuals, is then guilty of "slinking away from that thin wall by which the 'they' is

separated, as it were, from the uncanniness of its Being” (1962, p. 323/278). This cowardly ‘slinking away’ from the defamiliarising possibilities of structural angst, and so from the authentic call of conscience, is interpreted as an attempt to tranquillize oneself in busying about concernfully, and so one does one’s decadent best to forget. As such a tranquillizing forgetting, one is ‘motivated’ to fall away from structural angst into concerned absorption. It is in this ‘motivational’ or ‘psychological’ sense that Dreyfus criticises Heidegger as foregoing an ontological or properly structural account of falling. Although the motivation to flee is posited in relation to the structural necessity of death and, therefore, also of its angst, and so we might talk of a possible tendency to turn away from death, it is difficult to see how one might then construe the ‘they’ as a whole as necessarily fearful and thus take fleeing as an existential structure of Dasein.

It remains an interesting question as to why Heidegger requires this somewhat reactionary interpretation of the they and our everyday concern. He emphasizes the ‘amoral’ sense of inauthenticity and yet interprets our constant return to everyday concerns as a cowardly refusal to face the angst of death by way of a fleeing into ‘tranquillization’. Why not just say that the angst of death surfaces within everydayness, that it is in fact a structure of everydayness as such, but that one, of necessity, ‘gets on with life’? Falling absorption in everyday coping would still be an existential structure of Dasein which would still require a methodologically authentic disclosure of care within the structural angst of death. But do we then need to interpret our common relation to death as fleeing? Perhaps it is a pedagogical device but the fact remains that much of Heidegger’s conception of the inauthentic ‘they’ takes the form of an authentic polemic.

Whilst accepting the structural account of falling, Dreyfus argues against the necessity of the ‘psychological’ account, and this is perhaps his most innovative criticism of *Being and Time*, and one that I shall return to. However, on the basis of this distinction he then goes on to suggest that the notion of inauthenticity itself is in some sense redundant. For whilst structural falling is an existential necessity, all “other versions of falling that are associated with inauthenticity, and so would not characterize authentic Dasein, cannot qualify as existentials, but are only existentielle possibilities” (1991a, p. 227). Apparently for Dreyfus, falling absorption is characteristic of both inauthenticity and authenticity because “Dasein is structurally absorbed in the world” (p. 229). Thus an absorption in one’s everyday concerns can in these terms itself be achieved ‘authentically’, while a motivated fleeing from the anxiety of death into an inauthentic forgetfulness is, by definition, merely ‘psychological’. Inauthenticity is, therefore, associated with merely ‘existentiell’ possibilities, possibilities that one might fall into but are not a necessary structure of everydayness.

In this way, inauthenticity has been reduced to the psychologically motivated fall into a ‘tranquillized’ indifference to the angst of death. In this interpretation, the notion of inauthenticity is intimately related to Heidegger’s ‘confusion’ over the different senses of structural and ‘psychological’ falling. This latter represents for Dreyfus a “motivational account ... a secularized version of Kierkegaard’s account of sin” (1991a, p. 226) and, as such, it is ‘appropriately’ consigned to an appendix in his interpretation of Heidegger. Kierkegaard’s Christian existentialism thus becomes the model for Heidegger’s disdainful rejection of the ‘they’, and as such this ‘existentialist’ notion of inauthenticity is seen to be merely an early ‘psychologistic’ aberration along Heidegger’s path of thinking. Such an interpretation

relegates psychological or ‘existentialist’ falling as fleeing, and its correlated notion of inauthenticity, to the status of a pre-ontological temptation rather than a necessary existential structure of Dasein.

This conclusion begs the question as to the existential structure of everyday falling absorption, which is not generally an impassioned authentic ‘freedom towards death’, but according to Dreyfus, nor is it inauthenticity. The basis for this interpretation of inauthenticity is the distinction Dreyfus makes between ‘undifferentiated’ and inauthentic everydayness to the effect that, as Heidegger puts it, “this *potentiality-for-Being*, as one which is in each case *mine*, is free either for authenticity or for inauthenticity or for a mode in which neither of these has been differentiated” (1962, p. 275/232). And so it seems then that there is this third mode of existence somewhere in between the two extremes. A footnote refers the reader back to Division I, §9 regarding the theme of the analytic of Dasein where:

At the outset of our analysis it is particularly important that Dasein should not be interpreted with the differentiated character of some definite way of existing, but that it should be uncovered in the undifferentiated character which it has primarily and usually (Heidegger, 1962, p. 69/43).

On the basis of these distinctions, Dreyfus states that “Division I deals with the undifferentiated mode” (1991a, p. 27), and it is this mode which will then be correlated with the properly structural notion of falling as absorption, rather than the merely pre-ontological notion of an inauthentic fleeing from death. It remains an unfortunate consequence of Heidegger’s confusion that he ‘sometimes’ refers to this undifferentiated mode as inauthentic. Or rather, throughout the analytic Heidegger only ever refers to the inauthenticity of everydayness as an existential structure of Dasein, and in only a handful of cases to its undifferentiated character. While still holding to the finding that ‘falling as fleeing’ might, in some sense, be extraneous to the existential

ontology (and it is interesting to note, as Dreyfus also points out, that it is dropped from consideration in the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*), I would like to suggest an alternative reading of these ‘three modes of existing’.

What is undifferentiated in everyday Dasein is whether one considers oneself either authentically or inauthentically related to one’s own being. This is where the existential analytic explicitly begins, with those beings for whom “their Being is ‘a matter of indifference’; or more precisely, they ‘are’ such that their Being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 68/42). The question of being starts with its historical obliteration as a question and even this obliteration has been forgotten in the face of what is so overwhelmingly self-evident, which is being itself (as Quine says in answer to the question ‘what is there?’—Everything). Undifferentiated Dasein is, in this sense, nothing other than inauthentic Dasein fallen into an absorption in the world of our everyday concerns and forgetful of either already being inauthentically absorbed or of the possibility of authentically disclosing this absorption. It therefore seems that a structural forgetting belongs to the inauthentic fall into coping with everydayness, so much so that it must forget its inauthenticity (unless of course one introduces the notion of ‘guilt’ in an ontological sense).

This is precisely what Heidegger states, in that the “Self must forget itself if, lost in the world of equipment, it is able ‘actually’ to go to work” (1962, p. 405/354). But Dreyfus takes this ‘Self’ as an authentic self that decides to forget itself ‘authentically’, and that therefore authenticity must also be able to function within this forgetting. Yet what is the authentic projection of resolute openness apart from a remembrance of being? And what is the existential analytic apart from a positing of this question concerning the forgetting of being? Once authenticity is conflated with this (inauthentic)

forgetting of being then one can conclude that falling absorption, as a properly existential structure, can be either authentic or ‘undifferentiated’ (inauthentic). Is it possible however, that forgetting is the origin of our undifferentiated inauthentic absorption in work? And in this way, “*Having forgotten [Vergessenheit]* as an inauthentic way of having been, is thus related to that thrown *Being* which is one’s own” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 389/339).

Dreyfus is led to this notion of an authentic forgetting in absorption as a way of overcoming a number of irregularities in Heidegger’s account of the relation between authenticity and inauthentic falling. According to Dreyfus’ account, if one ‘mistakenly conflates’ structural falling with merely psychological fleeing, where “Dasein’s *structural tendency to fall away* is identified with giving in to the *temptation to cover up*” (1991a, p. 229), then temptation of course becomes a structural necessity. Following this logic, if falling as fleeing from angst is an existential structure, then Dasein must be essentially inauthentic and so, by simple definition, authenticity becomes impossible. Given that Dreyfus can exclude ‘falling as fleeing’ from the existential analytic, in order to solve this apparent contradiction he then needs to both conflate inauthenticity with this fleeing, and then take authenticity and the ‘undifferentiated’ state as representing two modes of everyday absorption. In doing so, the first three chapters of Division II of *Being and Time* on angst, death and the authentic temporality of resolute openness become hopelessly entangled in Heidegger’s misguided Kierkegaardian ‘existentialism’.

But now it seems that structural falling is also intimately related to undifferentiated inauthenticity, and authenticity must then in some sense be the negation of this constant return to an absorption in the everyday matters at hand, rather than a mode of forgetful absorption itself. So how can

authenticity be the negation of a necessary existential structure? This is the question Dreyfus asks (1991a, p. 229), and it remains a question, given that his account of undifferentiated absorption, versus inauthenticity as merely fleeing, is untenable. If authenticity must be a mode of falling, in some sense, is it possible that it might be a mode of absorption in work? The relation of authenticity towards inauthentic forgetfulness would seem to be fraught with ambiguities. And these difficulties seem to revolve around the reciprocal possibility that authentic “Being-one’s-Self takes the definite form of an existentiell modification of the ‘they’” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 312/267) which can also mean that “proximally and for the most part Dasein is *not* itself but is lost in the they-self, which is an existentiell modification of the authentic self” (p. 365/317). How can authenticity and inauthenticity both be modifications of the other?

According to Dreyfus (1991a, p. 194) authenticity is a mode of falling absorption in the world of work and coping, it is the “self-understanding of resolute Dasein, acting in the world for the sake of its ownmost possibility (death)”. Heidegger calls the sight associated with this self-understanding, ‘transparency’ in the sense of “knowledge of the self” (1962, p. 186/146). The existential notion of ‘self’ is of course nothing like a point in time or some sort of present at hand thing that can be taken apart and inspected. For Dreyfus, this means that Dasein’s authentic self-understanding, as clear sighted perspicuity, is a “style of absorbed activity” (1991a, p. 194) in which authentic Dasein “must continue doing what one does and being absorbed, even to the extent of being lost in its everyday work” (p. 228)<sup>23</sup>.

This notion of authentic absorption is to be distinguished from that of ‘undifferentiated’ or inauthentic absorption that is, as Heidegger says, “completely fascinated by the ‘world’ and by the Dasein-with of Others in the

‘they’” (p. 220/176). What distinguishes authenticity then, for Dreyfus, is a ‘resistance’ to this falling into fascination, in which one holds back but is still immersed in one’s work and copes with everyday life. One might forget oneself ‘authentically’ in this way but not so much as to become fascinated with the world and so lose the transparency of one’s primordial relation to the situation. In order to be authentically detached in this way, one must presumably then resolutely keep death in mind while one acts in the world.

In this sense, Dreyfus agrees that authenticity as a choice can be a modification of the publicly forgetful one-self which is so immersed in its world that it has no time to contemplate a more authentic relation to death. On the basis of this notion of authenticity he then suggests that the reverse is misleading, that undifferentiated inauthenticity might already be an existentiell modification of the authentic. For how “could the authentic self be already there to be appealed to” (1991a, p. 242) before one has faced the angst of death and finitude authentically? Dreyfus corrects this ‘misleading’ ambiguity by pointing out that of course, while we might all begin as inauthentically absorbed individuals coping with everydayness as it presents itself, we all have the potential ability to become authentic Dasein. In this sense authenticity, as an absorbed but resolute mode of acting in the world, does not in some sense underlie our inauthentic ways of being but these ways simply have the potential to become authentic.

However, Dreyfus also suggests that for Heidegger’s notion of authentic conscience to make sense this seeming contradiction is at the same time necessary. For authenticity is what is called to in the silent call of conscience and so Heidegger, following his motivational interpretation of falling as fleeing, must misrepresent authenticity as somehow already being a basis for inauthentic everydayness. It is to this basis, from which we are always fleeing

in fear, that the call is directed. Thus this version of authenticity as a ground for inauthenticity is merely the result of Heidegger's 'psychological' reading of angst. Such a misrepresentation calls into question the whole structure of authentic resoluteness as given in the first three chapters of the second division of *Being and Time*. The notion of authenticity given there becomes an unsuccessfully 'secularized version of Kierkegaard's concept of anxiety'.

Following Dreyfus' interpretation of Heidegger then, we are always already fleeing from the angst of death into a tranquillized absorption in the world but once we resolutely face up to our originary finitude then the way is open to an authentic way of acting in this world. The way we become open to this possibility is, for Heidegger, in the secular call of conscience that somehow appeals to that authentic ground of Dasein which we are always fearfully turning away from. Now as Dreyfus has already pointed out, if this fleeing from the nullity of existence becomes an existential structure of Dasein, then "Dasein becomes essentially inauthentic" (Dreyfus and Rubin, 1991b, p. 334) and we have a paradox. It follows that inauthenticity can only be thought as simply the potential to be authentic rather than being an existentiell modification of the authentic self. Furthermore, "once one is authentic, falling back into inauthenticity becomes incomprehensible" (p. 334)<sup>24</sup>. For why would anyone flee the sober impassioned joyfulness of authenticity for irresolute inauthenticity? Once one's life is characterized by a joyful openness towards its finitude in the realization that life cannot be conceptualized in its entirety but must be lived one way or another, why would one then return to the irresolute ways of the past?

Dreyfus' entire critique of conscience, the untenable distinction between inauthentic and undifferentiated ways of being, the contentious distinction between fascinated and authentic forgetful absorption, and the rejection of an

authentic basis for inauthenticity, are all founded on the notion that authentic resoluteness is primarily an ‘existentialist’ prescription for living in the everyday world. Once authenticity is reduced to a way of acting in the world, as even a forgetful absorption in work (and this is interpreted predominantly in terms of Kierkegaard), then the interesting problem of falling as fleeing opens the way for Dreyfus’ solutions to these other ‘problems’ in terms of “Heidegger’s inability to account for Dasein’s temptation to plunge into the one” (Dreyfus and Rubin, 1991b, p. 335).

However, Heidegger at no point in *Being and Time* simply equates authenticity with falling absorption in the ready to hand. Nor does he align it with an ‘existentialist’ morality as a way of acting in the world. Quite the opposite is the case, and such an interpretation would amount to an anthropology of Dasein rather than account for the fundamentally ontological structure of authenticity. Now it is possible that an ‘existentialist’ anthropology, such as Kierkegaard’s or even Sartre’s, might find a philosophical basis in an authentic existential ontology of Dasein, but that ontology is still not for all that an ‘existentialist’ work<sup>25</sup>. Furthermore, any ‘existentialist’ interpretation of authenticity must be founded in a recognition of the existential-ontological analytic of Dasein. If this non-existentialist problematic is elided, the entire project of *Being and Time*, that of the interpretation of being as time, risks obliteration at the hands of an anthropology of authentic practice.

#### *§4. An elision of temporality*

So far, it has been suggested that Dreyfus both over-emphasizes the differences between Husserl and Heidegger as well as interprets the Kierkegaardian terminology of authenticity in an existentialist way. Now while authenticity might very well lend itself to a notion of social conduct, as

a resolute disclosure of finitude it is in the first instance an ontological method in the sense of the ‘how’ of the existential-phenomenological reduction. This reduction demonstrates the origin of one’s own representations and embodied practical activity as constituted in the understanding of being, and specifically in the opening up of the *Augenblick* in terms of the three ecstases of time. Authenticity is first and foremost a phenomenological demonstration of ecstatic temporality as Dasein’s self-projection. Furthermore, it is in this sense that authenticity, as a temporal interpretation of the self-unity of lived experience, was also supposed to provide an access to the “*temporalization-structure of temporality [Zeitlichkeit]*, which reveals itself as the historicity of Dasein” (Heidegger, 1962, 381/332).

What then is the peculiar relation of resolute openness to inauthentic falling and its existential angst? As suggested above, the ‘moment’ of authenticity is given in the ‘blink of an eye’. For Dreyfus, this *Augenblick* is the “moment of transformation from falling to resoluteness ... of the total gestalt switch of Dasein’s way of being-in-the-world from inauthenticity to authenticity” (1991b, p. 321). The first realization of authentic finitude is thus a ‘transformative moment’ which is, for Dreyfus’, “the form of the authentic present” (p. 322). The transformation, in facing up to the nullity of one’s own Dasein, is an openness to the ‘Situation’ in which Dasein already finds itself. In this version of openness, everything is decided at one moment ‘in time’ from which point on the future and past are to be interpreted authentically. This means that on realizing authentic finitude, one must from then on adopt an ongoing, authentically resolute commitment to keeping oneself open in a constant repetition or return to the basic nullity of one’s thrownness.

In the constant return or repetition the self-constancy of authentic commitment is constituted as “an empty *formal* constancy” (p. 326). Such a

self-constancy produces a ‘new’ temporal structure “reflected in a structural difference in the temporality of the inauthentic and authentic modes of existence” (ibid). This new way of temporalising the world represents a difference in style but not necessarily in content, for although the situation one finds oneself in might not change, one’s way of confronting that situation does. From the transformative moment of authenticity onwards, authentic Dasein does not merely wait for the future to befall it, rather it “*foreruns* its death, i.e., constantly expresses in the style of its activity the nothingness that it is” (p. 327). One then authentically and resolutely repeats and foreruns and thus “lives out the temporality of Dasein in such a way as to give a *constant form* to its activity” (p. 327), and once authenticity has been realized in this fashion why would one turn back to the old irresolute ways of one’s inauthentic past?

In this way, Dreyfus transforms Heidegger’s notion of authenticity from an ontological disclosure of ecstatic temporality into a mode of everyday existence, and this anthropological transformation is modelled quite closely on a reading of Kierkegaard. Now whilst he remains an important writer for Heidegger, it is perhaps easy to overemphasize the ‘existentialist’ connection in *Being and Time*. As Kisiel points out, in his account of the development of the existential analytic:

Contrary to the impression given by the published editions, Heidegger was sparing in his use of the language of existentialism then in vogue until the very last draft of BT. His resistance to the popular jargon was breached not for existentialist but for ‘formally indicative’ reasons, by his discovery at the last minute of the ‘ecstatic-horizonal’ structure of temporality (Kisiel, 1993, p. 7).

Furthermore, he also claims that the *Augenblick* is an interpretation of the Aristotelian *kairos* as the moment of vision. In this moment, resolute openness brings one back from falling absorption and into “the comprehending moment of insight” (ibid, p. 437). Heidegger’s philosophical

work, through the early twenties, was characterized in part by his phenomenological interpretation of the Greeks, and so *Being and Time* is in this sense as much an interpretation of Aristotle and Husserl as it is of Kierkegaard, and perhaps much more so<sup>26</sup>. However, and besides the matter of Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger, can Dreyfus' static notion of the authentic present as occurring in a transformative moment in time do justice to ecstatic temporality as an ongoing process of falling forgetting and authentic remembrance? Is authenticity primarily characterised by a transformative moment of wonder? As Heidegger says of Kierkegaard's conception of temporality and the *Augenblick*:

what he has in mind is man's [sic] 'Being-in-time'. Time as within-time-ness knows only the 'now'; it never knows a moment of vision. If, however, such a moment gets experienced in an existentiell manner, then a more primordial temporality has been presupposed, although existentially it has not been made explicit (1962, note iii, p. 497/338).

It would seem then that the interpretation of authenticity as initiated in a transformative moment that, from then on, guides one's absorbed activity in the world, is an existentiell appropriation of the existential analytic. That is, if one accepts the possibility that a more primordially authentic temporality, in some sense based on the *Augenblick* understood ontologically, is that which first makes meaningful a notion of the 'now', its 'past' and their 'future'. But this existentially ecstatic *Augenblick*, as the form of the authentic present, cannot then be thought in some sense as one of a sequence of 'nows' occurring in time, rather, it is the source from out of which sequential time itself becomes meaningful. The *Augenblick* is, in this sense, more the 'living present' within which one's entire life flicks by, and where one always already finds oneself. It is also within this 'primordial moment' that one might first realise one's finitude, and on realizing this, then conceptualise that

transformative realisation in terms of a past ‘now’ from which point on all subsequent ‘nows’ will be met with ‘authentically’.

In conceptualizing authenticity in this inauthentically ‘existentialist’ way as a personal transformation, perhaps one has lost the originary sense of the *Augenblick* within which, nevertheless, one already constantly is<sup>27</sup>. In this sense, the notion that authenticity is in some way an ‘existentialist’ prescription for living that is experienced in a transformative event, runs the risk of obliterating that temporalising moment on the basis of which ‘existentialist’ authenticity can represent itself in this way. By taking the *Augenblick* as a moment in time that is present only to fall away into the past, one risks losing the sense of ecstatic temporality. Thus it is that, for Heidegger, the “‘leaping-away’ of the Present—that is, the falling into lostness—has its source in that primordial authentic temporality itself which makes possible thrown Being-towards-death” (1962, p. 399/348). In misinterpreting authenticity as some sort of social possibility one would be, in this sense, already constantly falling away from an authentic understanding of being, understood as the ‘temporalisation-structure’ of temporality, into what is merely the present ‘now’.

Any notion of an existentialist authenticity would therefore itself be an inauthentic forgetting of being, as opposed to an existential-ontological disclosure of the temporality of that falling being. As such a disclosure, existential authenticity can be an existentiell modification of the inauthentically absorbed existentialist self only on the basis that this falling forgetfulness, which is necessary if one is to get on with life, is called to witness its already temporal way of being. What is life if not a constant temporal play of existence for which falling back into an absorption in work remains an essential existential structure? It is in this sense, then, that

inauthenticity is also an existentiell modification of that authentic moment within which the meaningfulness of its world is given as such and into which we must fall. It is this falling that existential authenticity must ‘resist’, if one is to come back to oneself from out of an absorption in work and coping and into the authentic moment of vision. Resistance, it seems, would still be necessary, at least for the early Heidegger, and the resolutely methodological angst of death is the form of this resistance given in the constant ongoing immediacy of the *Augenblick*.

Yet this necessity of angst and its defamiliarisation is precisely what makes the relation between authenticity and falling absorption so ambiguous. For falling has its “temporal roots primarily in the Present (whether in making-present or in the moment of vision” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 401/350). Falling is an existential structure of Dasein and, as such, it is a temporal structure of authenticity but not in the sense of an absorption in everyday work. Angst ‘makes strange’ what is familiar and in this way the fall back into a forgetful absorption in the present concerns of one’s work is held back or resisted in some sense. It is held back in order to ‘hold onto’ the temporalising ‘moment’, but falling is not then itself arrested, for the structure of resolute authenticity is such that irresolute, inauthentic falling is “*co-certain*” (p. 356/308).

The ambiguous nature of the relation between inauthenticity and authenticity remains a problem, Dreyfus’ attempted solutions notwithstanding. The difficulties of the latter seem largely to be due to the fact that his reading of the relation between authenticity and inauthentic falling fails to take temporality into account. It might be objected here that he set out to interpret equipmentality in terms of practical coping, as given in Division I of *Being and Time*, and so specifically disregards the temporal interpretation of

everydayness given in Division II. Yet Dreyfus does offer a temporal account of the existential analytic, in both his restriction of the *ego cogito* to sporadic moments within the ‘steady flow’ of coping, and in the existentialist’s constant return to ‘authentic’ worldly possibilities. As Dreyfus himself says:

Although the chapters on originary temporality are an essential part of Heidegger’s project, his account leads him so far from the phenomenon of everyday temporality that I did not feel I could give a satisfactory interpretation of the material.... With regard to the very difficult chapters on time, I was saved by William Blattner (Dreyfus, 1991a, p. viii).

Given these interpretations of time, I would argue that much of Dreyfus’ interpretation of Heidegger, from his abridgement of Husserl’s phenomenology as a form of naïve Cartesianism, through to the ‘existentialist’ reading of authenticity, is a result of an elision of the basic function that temporality plays within the existential analytic of Dasein as a whole. This is especially so, given that the first division of *Being and Time* was to be a ‘preparatory description of that field within which the phenomenon of time becomes manifest’ (Heidegger, 1985, 142/192<sup>28</sup>).

Nonetheless, I would like to emphasize that this critique of Dreyfus is not merely criticism for the sake of criticism but, rather, it is intended as a genuine attempt to engage with his interpretation of equipmentality, the manifold relations of the ‘in-order-to’, ‘being-with’, and worldhood, in terms of embodied practical activity and the totality of shared background practices, and in relation to Heidegger’s existential phenomenological notion of originary temporality<sup>29</sup>. Dreyfus’ account of the ontological priority of practical understanding over theoretical knowing, and the strident critique of rationalism, go a long way towards unpacking Heidegger’s otherwise dense and idiosyncratic idiom.

As regards this relation of coping to originary temporality, this engagement with Dreyfus' critique of Heidegger's 'existentialism' has attempted to demonstrate that such a critique is itself based on an existentialist interpretation of authenticity that fails to take temporality into account. In such a failure the central function of authenticity is elided. Instead of prescribing a way of acting in the world, for Heidegger the resoluteness of authenticity was intended to provide a phenomenological access to the object of the analytic of Dasein, which is the temporality of one's own mundane everyday existence<sup>30</sup>. In this sense, the 'existentialist' sections dealing with death, nullity and authentic temporality in *Being and Time* are a methodological turning point in the progress of the existential analytic towards a temporal interpretation of intentional comportment. Following the traditional reading of the analytic of Dasein, the authentic projection of death demonstrates nothing other than the 'temporalisation-structure' of everyday intentionality.

In this temporal sense, the analysis of authentic temporality is an intensification of the question of everyday being, giving Dasein's self as a groundless temporalising process of relation towards the things and others one deals with in this world. It fulfils, in part, the goal of *Being and Time*, in a temporal interpretation of the being of Dasein in preparation for the never completed projection of the temporal meaning or sense of being in general. Heidegger's analytic can in no sense be construed as an 'anti-representationalist' denial of the ego, or a purely pragmatic account of existence, even one in which the self is relegated to the status of an epiphenomenon, for it is in the temporalising structure of the self that all of intentionality, whether representational or practical, is constituted. As Heidegger himself states, *Zeitlichkeit* is:

ecstatic-horizonal self-projection simply as such, on the basis of which the Dasein's transcendence is possible. Rooted in this transcendence is the Dasein's basic constitution, being-in-the-world, or care, which in turn makes intentionality possible (Heidegger, 1982, p. 312/444).

*Being and Time* stops short of explicating how intentional comportments are grounded in the ecstatic structure of self-projection, such an analysis was intended for the projected third division of part one. In 'time and being' the 'temporalization-structure' of the historicity of Dasein, already implicit in ecstatic temporality, was to be demonstrated. Neither does the subsequent lecture course on the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* elucidate this structure of *Temporalität*, despite its early promises. This is the famous 'failure' of the existential analytic of Dasein, a failure that left Heidegger in the untenable position of holding to the radical finitude of historical thrownness without being able to explicate that finitude in terms of temporality. Heidegger's existential phenomenological account of temporality seems to end up in an extremely sceptical form of historicism.

For Dreyfus, however, an acceptance of originary finitude is the only answer, for once "one sees that truth requires that things be disclosed and that practitioners share a skill for using assertions to point them out, there is nothing more that needs to be explained" (1991a, p. 273). Yet how is this appeal to finitude anything other than an acceptance of historical relativism? More to the point, such an appeal still leaves unquestioned just how we manage to share in something like a 'background skill' in the first place. In what sense 'is' the background? Dreyfus' interpretation of the ready to hand has more or less shown that any representative relation one might think of is itself meaningful because it is already "embedded in a set of shared practices" (1991a, p. 273). This 'embedding' takes the form of what seems to be an artificial distinction between practical activities and periodic representations, as if theoretical comportments are somehow extraneous to an absorption in

work. I have argued for the necessity of both as a constant and ongoing play of intentional comportments that are constituted in the temporality of Dasein's 'self-projection'. This does not then imply that representation returns as the mediator of action, quite the contrary, for both practice and its theory belong to, and are directed towards, that 'totality of involvements' that constitute the ongoing rush of one's everyday life, or Dreyfus' background system of shared practices. One might try to rationalise one's relation to life but this rationalisation is itself a finite representational relation that is already 'embedded' in a 'system of shared practices' and its unthought everyday world.

What his analysis does not show, however, is how this notion of a 'shared background system' can be structurally related to care and its understanding of being. Yet this is an explicitly temporal problematic and it includes the questions of just how theoretical comportments might be embedded within practical understanding as a whole; how practical comportments are structurally related to the background and its relation to the understanding of being; how transcendence is a condition for this understanding and its comportments; and finally how all of these are already implicitly given in the 'temporalisation-structure' of Dasein's self-projection. If one foregoes these questions concerning temporality and settles with a notion of finitude grounded in shared background skills, one leaves the notion of 'system' unquestioned. If originary finitude is the conclusion of Heidegger's preparatory analysis of the 'ready to hand' and its practical understanding, then what is the temporal origin of this finitude?

If this origin is grounded in the notion of a background 'system', then in what sense is this an advance over an atemporal notion of a system of beliefs? Are practices in some sense to be conceived as atemporal elements of the

background familiarity of our shared world? That is, do they belong to a non-thematic, non-normative yet still systematic understanding of being? And is it on this atemporal basis that skills can be shared? One might then object that, of course, shared systems of practice are constantly changing just as societies are constantly adapting to changing conditions but this still leaves unquestioned just what is meant by this notion of ‘system’ and how it can make possible anything like ‘sharing’. As Dreyfus points out, “Heidegger wants to avoid what he sees as the recurrent structure of traditional ontology, namely, grounding all kinds of being in a causally self-sufficient source. (He later calls this structural mistake ontotheology)” (1991a, p. 12). Yet what is the notion of ‘background system’ if not an explanatory ground for Dreyfus, and as such, a causally self-sufficient source?

Heidegger’s question concerning the meaning of being does not end with the originary finitude of one’s own thrown historical situation in which we are all immersed and which remains necessarily resistant to objectifying representations of that situation. To do so would be to accept historicism and so relegate his entire analytic to a philosophical dead end. That is not to say, however, that there is a way out of this originary historical indeterminacy but, rather, that the analysis of temporality was intended to demonstrate the structural conditions within which finitude is constantly being constituted. This is where the question of the meaning or sense (*Sinn*) of being starts, where *Sinn* is the “*formal structure* of the background practices” (Dreyfus, 1991a, p. 222), as our indeterminate pre-ontological sense of being which can never be objectively analysed but instead retains the structure of the hermeneutic circle. Sense is the ‘background familiarity’ in terms of which we make sense of and understand existence, and as such, it is the ground of intelligibility. Being (in the sense of intelligibility) as an ‘ultimate ground’

collapses into the essential indeterminacy of the formal structures of *Sinn*. Mundane everydayness is where the analytic of Dasein starts from and returns to, but only in order to disclose the temporalising 'formal structures' of this pre-ontological understanding of being, within which this mundane world and ourselves are already meaningfully constituted. These temporal conditions were to be the 'sense' of being, grasped thematically. In order to explicate these conditions in terms of the relation between practical activity and perception, I will return to the problem of Husserl's phenomenology and his difficult relation to Heidegger.

*II–Husserl**Phenomenology of Perception**§5. Back towards the Logical Investigations*

Husserl's *Logical Investigations* was for Heidegger “*the basic book of phenomenology*” (1985, p. 24/30). Using Heidegger's account of the development of Husserl's ‘phenomenologically descriptive psychology’, the following will offer a selective reading of that phenomenology and is not intended in any sense as an exhaustive account. Instead of the problems of the intentionality of meaning and expression that occupy much of the investigations, this chapter will concern itself solely with an explication of the phenomenology of perception insofar as it might clarify Heidegger's complicated relation to Husserl. For Dreyfus (1991a, p. 13), Husserl's descriptive analysis of perception is characterized by a Cartesian or representational notion of experience. According to this argument, any Husserlian reading of Heidegger's existential phenomenology runs counter to the latter's critique of Cartesianism for which:

every idea of a ‘subject’—unless refined by a previous ontological determination of its basic character—still posits the *subjectum* (*hypokeimenon*) along with it, no matter how vigorous one's ontical protestations against the ‘soul substance’ or the ‘reification of consciousness’ (Heidegger, 1962, p. 72/46).

However, I will argue that the phenomenological relation between representation and perception also, as in Heidegger, implies a holistic critique of the Cartesian and empirical subject, a critique that radically undermines any rationalist theory of perception or practice. From this perspective, it is questionable as to whether either an empirical or Cartesian model of experience can be adequate to the matter of phenomenology. For Husserl, the subject is an abstraction of what is actually the case, and yet his

phenomenology attempts a retrieval of this Cartesian modernity by way of theorizing a more critical basis for the *ego cogito*. The early modern problem of how the psychological realm can conform to the external reality of the physical world will not then be a presupposition of Husserl's but the object of a radical questioning. The problem of how objects produce representations in a subject presupposes a psycho-physical model of experience as a relation between a mind and external objects, whereas a holistic analysis of perception implies that the psychological cannot be reduced to the physical.

The phenomenological account of perception, according to this reading of Husserl, is not a representational mediation between a subject and an external world, instead, representations are seen as embedded in a dynamic intentional process of perception. The analysis of 'representation' (*Vorstellung*) at the level of the simple perceptual 'presentation' of things (as an act of intuition) is concerned with a process that is something other than a representational mediation between an ego and external objects. Intuition (*Anschauung*), as the perception of objects, is a receptive process rather than the act of a thinking subject giving meaning to the world. Husserl's method deals with the inner constitution of beliefs, rather than any sort of empirical sensory input and behavioural outputs, such that the notion of an isolated subject interacting with the objective world is itself called into question. Both the subjectivity of the subject and its ideal objectivities are constituted in an ongoing intentional 'identity synthesis' that structures all perception. With the intentional structure of straightforward perceptions as a basis, the correlation between categories of the understanding and the mental process of sensible intuition becomes Husserl's major philosophical task following the publication of his investigations. What is elided in Dreyfus'

representational account of Husserl, is this analysis of categorial intuition as a temporal relation to the flux of lived experience, and of the ego as the temporal form of that experience. I would also like to suggest that with this elision one also loses the phenomenological relation to the existential analytic of Dasein as founded in the intentional structure of perception.

This temporal problem concerning Heidegger's relation to Husserl's phenomenology is intended as an attempt to uncover, in part, the sense of Heidegger's central question concerning being, that of the meaning of being (*Sinn von Sein*), which opens the path of thinking in *Being and Time*. Firstly, however, is the translation of *Sinn* as 'meaning' at all appropriate to this question? For such a translation perhaps misses the fundamentally phenomenological sense of *Sinn*. Schürmann (1987, p. 13) suggests that the *Sinn von Sein* can only be understood, not as "the 'meaning' of being, but its directionality". Rather than 'meaning' then, *Sinn* will here be interpreted from the perspective of intentionality that has to do with the senses and sensibility, and thus with the analytic space of phenomenology.

For this interpretive purpose then, 'sense' will stand for the ongoing sense of our directedness towards ourselves, the others and things in this world, or in other words, towards existence as a whole. The sense of being is the meaningfulness of this world within which one always already finds oneself constantly given. It is this directedness and its temporal structure, its constancy, that is given in the sense of being and which constitutes anything like a particular 'meaning'. The task of the existential analytic is to thematically grasp the sense of 'being', and demonstrate this in the analytic itself. Yet this meaning of being, as in some sense originated in temporality, will be that which first sets up and constitutes the meaningfulness of Dasein, of the self and its world, or of anything that can be said to be. The question

of the ‘*Sinn*’ von *Sein* is therefore posited here, as a question of the ‘outside’ of meaning in the thinking of being, an ‘outside’ or ecstasis that marks the public inauguration of Heidegger’s path in *Being and Time*, and which inevitably draws out the thinking of being through all of its various incarnations where, as the later Heidegger says:

To follow a direction that is the way that something has, of itself, already taken is called, in our language, *Sinnan*, *Sinnen* [to sense]. To venture after sense or meaning [*Sinn*] is the essence of reflecting [*Besinnen*]. This means more than a mere making conscious of something. We do not yet have reflection when we have only consciousness. Reflection is more. It is calm, self-possessed surrender to that which is worthy of questioning (Heidegger, 1977, p. 180).

This protracted meditation apparently started with the young Heidegger in 1907 and his reading of Brentano’s work on ‘the many senses of being according to Aristotle’. From this beginning he then became acquainted with Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* in the first year of his university studies, circa 1909 (cf. Taminiaux, 1978, p. 63). The master himself came to Freiburg University in 1916, the year Heidegger completed his habilitation thesis on a neo-Kantian interpretation of Duns Scotus. According to Kisiel, the operative concept of this thesis is Husserlian “intentionality, operating there through the coincidence of the conceptual pairs noesis-noema” (Kisiel, 1993, p. 30).

After a two year break from teaching, due to the Great War, Heidegger arrived at a “transformation of my fundamental standpoint” (Heidegger cited in Kisiel, n. 6, p. 553). Thereafter, on resuming his teaching duties at Freiburg he worked alongside Husserl as his assistant from 1919-23, developing a ‘factically’ phenomenological interpretation of the tradition from the ancient Greeks through the Scholastics and on to Luther, Kant, Hegel and Husserl. Now while there are many other threads to this early development; such as the beginnings in Jesuit theology, the seminal influence of Lask’s factual interpretation of Fichte, and the wider influence of especially Natorp’s neo-

Kantianism on both Husserl (even prior to the *Logical Investigations*) and Heidegger; the specific focus of this thesis will be on the development of a phenomenological account of time.

If Heidegger's 1925 Marburg lectures on Husserl's phenomenology immediately prior to the publication of *Being and Time* are included, this early development was grounded in a confrontation, spanning fifteen years, with Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (Taminiaux, 1978, p. 65). The second German volume of these deals with "the description of the acts of consciousness essential for the constitution of knowledge" (Heidegger, 1972, p. 76). This aspect of Husserl's phenomenology in general, and "above all the sixth investigation in the first edition" (p. 78), apparently continued to fascinate Heidegger throughout his early years at both Freiburg and Marburg. Husserl however, had already deleted this significant sixth investigation in the second German edition of 1913 for reasons of 'exhaustion' and dissatisfaction with his attempted revision. He was subsequently persuaded by Heidegger and others, who "begged the master again and again to republish" (p. 78), to include it in the 1921 edition, albeit with something of a reworking of the second section and its notion of categorial intuition. As the later Heidegger says, in retrospect, it was in this work and especially its sixth chapter that the "distinction which is worked out there between sensuous and categorial intuition revealed itself to me in its scope for the determination of the 'manifold meaning of being'" (p. 78).

Thus it is that, working at first with Husserl and through weekly 'special seminars' on a phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle, and then against the neo-Kantians at Marburg, Heidegger methodically made his way through a remarkable decade of thinking, from his habilitation thesis to the

publication of *Being and Time*<sup>31</sup>. It is this existential analytic of Dasein, for which ‘being is the transcendens pure and simple’, that would:

not have been possible if the ground [*Boden*] had not been prepared by Edmund Husserl, with whose *Logische Untersuchungen* phenomenology first appeared.... what is essential in it does not lie in its *actuality* as a philosophical ‘movement’. Higher than actuality stands *possibility*. We can understand phenomenology only by seizing it as a possibility (Heidegger, 1962, p. 62-63/38).

Husserl’s phenomenology, and specifically the sixth chapter of his sixth investigation on the difference between ‘sensuous and categorial intuitions’ (*Sinnliche und kategoriale Anschauungen*), thus forms, in some sense, the theoretical basis for Heidegger’s existential analytic. This chapter opens the second section of the sixth investigation entitled ‘Sensibility and Understanding’ (*Sinnlichkeit und Verstand*), a specifically Kantian or rather, for Husserl, neo-Kantian problematic. As concerns this phenomenological opening, Husserl (1970b, p. 662/iv<sup>32</sup>) was of the opinion that “the chapter on ‘Sensuous and Categorial Intuition’ ... has opened the way for a phenomenological clarification of *logical* self-evidence”. This phenomenological notion of self-evidence refers to the ‘pure’ givenness of perception that apparently collapses the distinction between sensibility and the understanding into ‘categorial intuitions’. Perceptual intuitions must be understood to “embrace not only the entire sphere of external and internal sensibility ... but also the sphere of categorial acts” (Husserl, 1975, p. 8). The phenomenological notion of perception encompasses both the sensible as well as the realm of identity and universals given in ‘authentically’ a priori categorial intuitions, and it is with this distinction that the “author believes he has revealed the foundation and cornerstone of every future phenomenology and theory of knowledge” (p. 9).

This, then, is the phenomenological basis of Husserl’s ‘representationalism’ which is opened up by way of an investigation into the “difference between

sensuous and categorial perception [*Wahrnehmung*]” or ‘intuitive experience’ (1970b, p. 786/144). The fundamental problem of perception encompasses the difference between ‘matter’ or sensuous ‘stuff’ (*Sinnlichem Stoff*) and categorial form. In this matter-form distinction, matter (*Materie*) is not to be understood in a figurative or interpretive sense but, rather, as the actual ‘stuff’ encountered in any individual sense perception. This perceptual stuff is simply what gives itself in one’s dealings with things in general, in work, and in life as a whole. Husserl is here dealing with ‘sheer sensory perception’ but these percepts are already meaningful as what they give themselves to be in simple everyday intuition, in the ‘inner life’ of the consciously cognizing subject.

What is not simply given in the ‘natural’ or everyday perception is the “division between ‘sensuous’ and ‘supersensuous’ percepts” (p. 786/144). Perhaps one sees and intuits the body of this text, for instance, or the room, the sunlight through the window, the colour of the autumn leaves and so on. This is the meaningful ‘stuff’ of our perceptual life within which everyday consciousness is constantly absorbed and directed towards. What are not explicitly given to this sensuous perception are the ideal categories that already allow it to see the room and its contents as the meaningfully enduring objective things that they are, or the garden as what it already is and will presumably be tomorrow, as something objectively given and present in and for perceptual experience.

Husserl’s analysis of perception begins with this distinction between the everyday givenness of percepts and the purely ideal categories this givenness implies, where: “Sensuous or real objects can in fact be characterised as *objects of the lowest level of possible intuition*, categorial or ideal objects as *objects of higher levels*” (p. 787/145). The innovation that this phenomenological

approach implies is that the categories are not imposed by an intellect onto experience but are intuited objectively in lived experience itself. In this sense, one perceives the things themselves in acts of intuition, both the founding sensible matters and their ideal objectivities together. Such objectivities are only given in an act of perception, and so sense perception becomes the ground of phenomenology. Given this hierarchically organized conceptual ground, Husserl will later identify the “proper theme of the *Logical Investigations*, and by suitable extension, of the entire phenomenology”, as the “task of thematising, for the purpose of enquiry, the correlation between ideal objects of the purely logical domain and the subjective, psychic experiences as constituting (founding) acts” (Husserl, 1977, p. 201). This logical domain is nothing apart from the sensible but is rather founded in the categorial components of perceptual intuitions. In what amounts to a qualified mode of transcendental idealism, these categories are objectively given in intuition itself as the ideal form of the sensible matters themselves.

Now it is at this point in Husserl’s sixth investigation, after outlining the fundamental distinction within perception between sensuous and categorial intuitions, that he briefly deals with the category of being. He does this in order to ‘illuminate’ this sketch of a difference, where the “form-giving flexion *Being*” (Husserl, 1970b, p. 780/137) will demonstrate such in a suitably radical manner. For the old Heidegger, this is the point at which “Husserl touches lightly, brushes the question of being in the sixth chapter of the sixth *Logical Investigation*, with the notion of categorial intuition” (cited in Taminiaux, 1978, p. 67). ‘Being’ thus presumably becomes, for Heidegger, something like a fundamental categorial intuition. In this sense, it is possible that Husserl’s phenomenology, even as it touches on and then apparently forgets the question of being, will nonetheless provide the thematic ground

for Heidegger's ontology in this notion of a categorial intuition of being; with the important caveat, however, that this category must be understood as in some sense exceeding the problematic of subjective perception and consciousness.

On the clarification of this fundamental phenomenological difference between sensuous and categorial intuitions, for Husserl the question of being qua existence, and in its attributive or predicative senses (the latter in reference to Kant), is that which 'precisely refers' to this distinction. 'Being' and its copula refer to beings, to everything that can be said to be, and thus it names the entire context of what can give itself in natural everyday sense perceptions. As far as these sensuous intuitions are concerned, they must be understood to include not only the "sphere of *real* objects, which is in fact no other than the sphere of *objects of possible sense-perception*" (1970b, p. 782/139), but also that of the ego and its own self-understanding. Perception is thus understood phenomenologically as that which immediately gives itself to sight, hearing and the other senses and yet also includes "the ego and its internal experiences [*Erlebnisse*]" (p. 781/138). As suggested above, these lived sensible experiences—sight as well as thoughts about what is seen and so on—are what is given in everyday perceptions, which are not merely a chaotic flux of sense data. This givenness is the mundane intelligibility of everyday perception in the sense that "I do not see coloured sensations but coloured things, I do not hear tone-sensations but the singer's song etc. etc." (Husserl, 1970a, p. 559/374).

Phenomenology is, in this sense, a descriptive analytic of the sensible that includes 'inner' sense or thinking and its self-consciousness. It is within this all encompassing notion of the sensible, and including mental representations, that "the word 'being' can find no possible *objective correlate*"

(1970b, p. 781/138). For according to Husserl, “Being is nothing *in* the object.... but Being is also nothing attaching *to* an object” (p. 780/137). Thus it is that being names everything that ‘is’ and can be given in sense perceptions, and yet “*being is absolutely imperceptible*” (p. 781/138). As in Heidegger, being cannot therefore be explicated in terms of beings or individual sense percepts simply because it is not given as a sensible percept; being ‘is’ not. Husserl, therefore, seems to think of *Sein* only in this purely ideal categorial sense, it is pure ideality. Yet Husserl’s phenomenology does not then found being in some theoretical supersensible realm of the ideal, but, rather, as a categorial intuition founded in ongoing acts of sense perception. The form/matter distinction does not name two separate entities, for the form is intuitively given in the matters themselves. In this sense, being cannot be thought without beings, for “the concept of Being can arise only when *some being, actual or imaginary, is set before our eyes*” (p. 784/141).

Being can only be thought ‘with’ beings but not in terms of beings (and this is analogous to Heidegger’s position). Being is thus purely a categorial ideality or ‘concept’ but it is founded in an act of intuition. Furthermore, this “holds of all *categorial forms* (or of all *categories*)” (p. 784/141), in that these categories are constantly given in the manifold flux of everyday sense perceptions. All the concepts of the understanding become formal, categorial intuitions rather than forms of intuition. For Husserl, it is only in the givenness of sensible intuitions that the objectively given categories of knowledge, that transcend each finite subjective experience, can be intuited. These categorial intuitions constitute the ideal ‘sense’ of everyday perceptions, the objective sense in saying of anything that it ‘is’ and will be what it already is; something objectively enduring to which intuition can constantly return, and such is the mundane ‘objectness’ of a hammer for instance. Therefore, the question of

the ‘meaning’ of being, following this reading of Husserl, must become a question of the *sense* of being, understood in this phenomenologically categorial sense. This necessity has already been understood by Husserl in the *Logical Investigations* as the difference between being and beings, as an exemplary case of the difference between categorial and sensuous intuitions, within the problem of perception and consciousness.

#### *§6. Husserl and empiricism*

For Heidegger (1985, p. 71/98) this phenomenological difference, based on the possibility of categorial intuitions, represents something of a breakthrough in the old scholastic problem of how universals can be said to ‘exist’. The ideal sense of objective being is to be found in sensible intuitions, as they are given in one’s own lived, everyday, perceptual experience, yet it is neither a simple realism nor idealism, and as such it is also opposed to the nominalist solution of this problem. In the most general of terms, the realist/idealist debate attempts to assign universals either to reality or to the mind, whereas nominalism simply refuses to countenance the notion that universals can be said to exist anywhere other than in the mere breath of the voice (*flatus vocis*). That is to say, ideality is a semantic concern rather than ontological.

Russell’s Platonic realism for instance, at least according to Quine (1953, p. 14), holds that the world is already meaningfully structured and that these structures take the form of universal, abstract entities that “have being independently of the mind”. Against this, the idealist will insist that concepts are mind made entities that one constitutes in the understanding or in the imagination in order to apply to the flux of experience. Quine’s nominalism however, attempts to straddle the differences between these two apparently irreconcilable positions by way of rejecting the notion that meanings exist

either objectively in the world or subjectively in the mind. This position simply rejects the notion that meaning can be a content or a structure at all. Thus the answer to the problem of the existence of universals is analogous to that given by the mediæval nominalists, to wit, meanings cannot be said to exist either objectively or subjectively but are simply the meaningful predicates of truth statements.

The novelty of this nominalist approach to such an age old ontological problem is that it refuses to take part in ontological arguments regarding the status of meanings or concepts, apart from simply refusing to posit such things in the first place. Given this standpoint, the problem for philosophy then seems to become one of systematizing the logic of possible truth statements about the world, rather than wallowing about in metaphysical confusion over the objectivity, or otherwise, of meaning. Nominalism rejects the notion that meanings or abstract entities exist in any real or ideal sense but are more the meaningful relations implied in statements about the world. So one might say, ‘it is just bad grammar’, to speak as if the mind is in some sense a receptacle for thought-things, or as if universals can, in some sense, exist independently in the world. In thus reducing realism and idealism to the problem of a metaphysical confusion over the status of the term ‘meaning’, nominalism can neatly sidestep this old polemic in an insistence that meanings do not exist; given that is, that one’s quasi-ontological tendencies are to refrain from “admitting abstract objects at all” (Quine, 1953, p. 15). It is statements that are meaningful, more or less, inasmuch as they refer to and simplify the flux of experience.

Obviously then, ideality is not a *res*, an existent thing like a chair, for instance, somehow inherent in the world or in the understanding. Yet given this, is ideality then simply a *flatus vocis*, a mere breath of the voice? Or does

this nominalist approach to the problem of meaning merely forego the ontological problematic in favour of an epistemological ‘solution’? It is precisely against this nominalist approach that Heidegger (1985, p. 71/97) posits the notion of categorial intuition as a ‘significant breakthrough’ in understanding how ideal structures can be objectively given in experience. Yet whilst insisting on the objectivity of the categories, neither Heidegger nor Husserl fall prey to the problem of the reification of meaning (Carnap’s misinformed ‘refutation’ of the nothing notwithstanding). Categorial intuition is posited precisely as a way of overcoming the old naïvely metaphysical problem of a mis-construing of meaning or concepts as being somehow ‘present at hand’ (*Vorhandenes*).

For Husserl, meanings are always meaningful relations effected in ongoing intentional syntheses, and the ongoing ‘sense’ of these relations are always, albeit implicitly, directed towards the ideal objectivities of sensible intuitions of the world. These objectivities are what Husserl calls categorial intuitions in the *Logical Investigations* and then noema in *Ideas 1*. As already suggested above, the categorial intuition of objective being is simply the possibility of perceiving anything as what it is and as enduring from moment to moment within the flux of lived experience—one sees the actual chair and comes back to it as that self-same chair, and so on<sup>33</sup>. In an ideal sense, a sensible thing exists or rather persists as a self-identical object; it ‘is’ what it is in that its implicit ‘objectness’ constantly gives itself to perception. Yet this ideal intuition is not itself explicitly given (except in a philosophical disclosure of such) but, rather, it is implicit to the sensible intuition of this or that particular chair, and as such, it is the objectively given ideal condition for coming back to that same chair time and time again.

Husserl's problematic thus situates the objectivity of ideality within the ongoing synthesis of sensuous intuitions or mental processes as given to natural everyday perceptions. In this sense, the ideal 'objectness' of things, as a concept of the understanding, is already an intuited given. Categorical intuitions are given objectively in the things themselves, and so the "exhibition of categorical structure serves to broaden the idea of objectivity such that this objectivity can itself be exhibited in its content in the corresponding intuition" (Heidegger, 1985, p. 72/98). Now given this, it seems that within the confines of perception, and the consciousness of the intentional ego, Heidegger is not at all averse to the ideal notion of the 'objectness' of the things themselves, and therefore also to the objectivity of categorical intuitions that are given in those sense perceptions. I will return to this point later in discussing Heidegger's critique of Husserl but suffice it to say that whilst this ideal objectivity as given to subjective experience will not be sufficient for explaining the existential sense of being, or Dasein's transcendence, the problem of the subject/object distinction in Heidegger's existential phenomenology does not seem merely to be one of a simple rejection of the subject and its ideal objectivities. Whereas Husserl succeeds, according to Heidegger, in giving the notion of the objectivity of idealities a wider phenomenological scope, the latter thinker will presumably widen this scope further to include the 'practical' aspects of the ready-to-hand that already set up the meaningful framework or the conditions for conscious experience.

Now the nominalist might object to all this talk of 'objectness' and categorical intuitions in that, to say that something 'is' is simply making a truth claim about the possible objective existence of that same thing. The phenomenological notion of the objective being of such is merely then a

*flatus vocis*, a truth statement about something such as this or that particular chair or hammer. Yet such an objection, considered phenomenologically, merely states the obvious. For Husserl, it does not seem to be a question of how the understanding can more or less adequately formulate what is given to it in the flux of experience and express that givenness in truth statements about the matter at hand, but, rather, how that understanding has already taken the form of the objective reality given in sense perceptions.

The *Logical Investigations* are concerned, at least in part, with how statements about things can already be meaningful within lived experience as a whole. It is on the basis of the ongoing intuited meaningfulness inherent to perceptions, that statements about such and such a thing can themselves be meaningfully applied to that experience. In this way, the ideal sense of the objective being of the manifold of sensible beings is constantly intuited in sense perception and it is only on this basis that ‘to be’ and its copula can be employed in its various senses in truth statements about those beings. So in this sense, Husserl is a realist in that idealities are objectively given, but their objectivity is still encountered nowhere else than in the ongoing mental processes of consciousness, of the ‘mind’ or ‘ego’ understood as intentional synthesis, and within the intentionality of lived experiences as a whole. In this latter sense, Husserl is also an idealist and yet the structures of experience as given in acts of intuition are such that, for Heidegger, the “ideal constituents show themselves in themselves, which are not constructs of these acts, functions of thinking or of the subject” (1985, p. 71/97).

Husserl’s phenomenology is thus both an idealist realism and a realist idealism, or what he will later call his transcendental idealism. This problematic situates the objectivity of ideality within the ongoing synthesis of sensuous intuitions or mental processes. In this sense the ideal, as a concept

of the understanding, is already an intuition given in the constant intentional synthesis of perceptual experience; and these ideal categories are themselves objectively given only in sensible intuitions. Or as Husserl will later state, within the immanence of lived experience the mode of being of the noema is the “way in which it is ‘implicit’ in the mental process, in which it is ‘intended to’ in the mental process” (Husserl, 1982, p. 234/200).

Something like a hammer, for instance, gives itself to natural everyday perception as this particular piece of equipment for this particular task and so on, but its objectivity is intended precisely in such a sensible perception. One constantly returns to the sensible hammer, providing that one simply sees or at least feels and can sense it as such, as that self-same hammer. How else might one make use of such things either practically, or in truth statements such as these, unless they give themselves to simple mundane perceptions in their self-evident objectivity? From this perspective, one never first comes across a many sided sense perception which is subsequently identified as something; concepts are in this sense not applied to pure sense data or raw experience. What one first comes across is the thing itself in whatever aspects it shows itself; its thingly sense is intended in a natural perception. It is only on this basis that something can then become a problem when it either stands out as something strange, or refuses to ‘fit’ into the intended perception; and so what seems to be a weird sort of hammer becomes a geological pick, or what was at first a stranger looming in the dark becomes a tree stump and so on. From the perspective of ongoing lived experiences, one tends not to first come across a pure sense datum free of expectations or meaningful possibilities, for consciousness is always a consciousness of something.

Phenomenology thus attempts, by way of the notion of categorial intuitions as given in intentional syntheses, to expand this notion of what it means for ideal structures 'to be' objectively. Whilst both refuting and incorporating the realist and idealist notions of meaning, phenomenology problematises any simple nominalist position. For if one presupposes that existence means a temporal way of being, then things exist as what they are and as enduring in time, and this enduring 'objectness' is effected in an intentional synthesis. But then, abstract structures also have this temporal mode of being, as given in the ongoing intentional process of categorial and sensible intuitions within which the objectivity of objects is constituted at the level of simple perceptions of the things themselves.

Now at this point the nominalist might possibly want to object again to Husserl's descriptive analytic on the grounds that there is simply no scientifically formal basis for positing statements about the flux of experience, and this is perhaps an unavoidable problem for Husserl, and the task of his entire life's work. How can a phenomenology of consciousness lay the grounds for a 'purely' scientific analysis of the 'purely' ideal objectivities belonging to lived experience? Such a problem already frames the descriptive analyses of the *Logical Investigations* and will consume Husserl over the subsequent decade of thinking towards his initial systematisation of phenomenology in *Ideas 1*. This problem also seems, in large part, to contribute to Heidegger's departure from that system, for in prioritizing the ideal objectivities of the sensible things or matters themselves Husserl apparently abandons the 'factual' ground of phenomenology, that of the everyday 'natural attitude', for its ideal abstraction.

According to Quine, on the other hand, as far as truths about experience are concerned, all we have is a system of beliefs that must rationally conform to

sensory experience. The fundamental scientific belief is that of the physicalism of objects, with which, “by bringing together scattered events and treating them as perceptions of one object, we reduce the complexity of our stream of experience to a manageable conceptual simplicity.... we associate an earlier and a later round sensum with the same so-called penny” (Quine, 1953, p. 17). Here, physicalism is associated with the temporal sequence of sense impressions that arise and are constantly being interpreted as this or that object. Such an associative interpretation of the phenomenal flux of experience is seen as more a useful way of organizing those impressions so as to make sense of the world, rather than as an ontological statement about experience itself. As such, physicalism is merely a way of talking about sense experience, a language game, and yet one that is also open to a formalised mathematical systematisation. For Quine, it seems that abstract entities such as those posited in mathematics and given in the play of notations can be countenanced in formalism since mathematical idealities are of use in simplifying the relations between physical objects. This physicalist belief in turn simplifies the “literal truth” (p.18) of the phenomenalist flux of experience.

In assigning a semantic rather than an ontological value to the notion of objectivity and the mathematical-scientific systems that theorize the objective world, Quine’s nominalism assigns scientific logic to the status of a belief system. Non-scientific beliefs, such as in the gods of homer for instance, thus “differ only in degree and not in kind” (p. 44) from a belief in physical objects, and yet the latter is still epistemologically superior because it has proven to be more efficient in ordering the barrage of sensations. In that the gods of Homer neither simplify an account of the flux nor refer to any spatio-temporal entities, they are obviously of less use, especially in our scientific-

technological world, in the efficient ordering of experience. Occam's razor applies here, and to good effect, in devaluing truth statements that complicate an account of experience beyond that given in the rational simplification of objectivity and the thoroughly useful terms of mathematics and the physical sciences. In this way, the chaotic barrage of sense impressions that constitutes experience is simplified by a belief in physicalism, which can then be ordered according to rigorous scientific logic and, ultimately, according to the system of Platonic universals in formal mathematics.

In opposition to any realist ontology of meaning, this semantic association between an objective way of simplifying the "flux of experience" (p. 18) and the flux itself, is purely pragmatic. Quine envisages a formal 'field of force' consisting of logically systematic truths that are ideally coherent within the system but at the 'outer edges' must conform to the "barrage of sensory information" (p. 46). Such conforming is a pragmatic choice of one holistic belief system over another, and Quine suggests that the belief in physical objects, and thus in science, is epistemologically superior to most. Superior, that is, except in regards to that phenomenalism of experience of which it is a simplification. As such a pragmatic simplification, physicalism is 'physically' fundamental (p. 17) while phenomenalism as the 'literal truth' of the flux of experience is epistemologically fundamental. So it is that, following Occam's razor, we pragmatically "adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged" (p. 16). In a rejection of Russell's and Carnap's realism, this linguistic approach envisages a pragmatic relation between a holism of beliefs, as a conceptual scheme or language, and raw sensory experience.

Pragmatic nominalism can in this way deflect ontological problems as met with in a Platonic realist account of experience, such as Russell's or in Logical Positivism. This is achieved by withdrawing to a "semantical plane" (p. 16) where ontological problems about the possible meaningful structure of experience become linguistic problems concerning whether 'something' can be said to be the case or not. Such a semantic move seems to leave the question of conflicting ontologies open, with the real philosophical work relocated to epistemological considerations. It is in this shift to a pragmatic epistemology that Quine's two dogmas of empiricism problematise any attempt at a realist interpretation of experience and pave the way for the distinction between a holism of beliefs and raw experience. The first dogma to be avoided involves the distinction between purely analytic statements that refer to conceptual facts, and observational or synthetic statements that refer to experiential facts. The second dogma, that of reduction, requires that all statements ultimately refer to or must be grounded in sensory experiences, and as such for Quine (1953, p. 41) these two dogmas "are at root identical" in that the second logically derives from the first.

Both the analytic-synthetic distinction and the notion of reduction to sensory experiences, apparently reflect a futile quest for 'purely' scientific certainty in the realm of philosophical thinking. Quine sees the Cartesian quest for certainty "as a lost cause" (1969, p. 74), and all dogmatic forms of empiricism, such as Logical Positivism for instance, are of course tarred with the same brush. Cartesian rationalism is subjected to a pragmatism of the relation of the *ego cogito* to sensory experience, such that no longer must this relation be one of absolute givens but, rather, of scientific probabilities and ad hoc hypotheses. This is Quine's moderate answer to the problem of scepticism, it relegates both the sceptic and the Platonic realist to an indefensibly dogmatic

empiricism, and realigns the epistemological problematic towards a more pragmatically scientific approach.

Husserl's project, on the other hand, might seem on the above account to be something of a naïve Cartesianism of the radically reductive sort, perhaps even akin to Carnap's positivism. This might seem to be the case especially where Husserl attempts to retrieve Cartesian certainty and ground it in a critical phenomenology of perception. For in collapsing the understanding into sensibility, all ideal categories, all utterances and meaningfulness in general, are ultimately founded in sensible intuitions, that is, in perception. In an attempt to answer the problem of scepticism, Husserl wanted to derive all logical idealities purely from the flux of lived experience itself, and it was with this 'purely' scientific ideal in mind that his idea of phenomenology was first posited.

The question here, then, is whether or not Husserl's notion of intentional synthesis entails a commitment to Cartesian rationalism or an empirically naïve subject/object dualism, based on the quite possibly misguided ideal of ultimately founding all scientific knowledge on sensory experience. The question of Husserl's phenomenological concept of subjectivity thus also involves Dreyfus' equation of Husserlian phenomenology with a simple version of Cartesian intentionality, of a subject's intentionally mediated relation to the external world of sensory inputs, and thus of intentional synthesis as a mediating system of beliefs. It should, however, on the above reading of the notion of categorial intuition in the *Logical Investigations*, be evident that Husserl's phenomenology quite possibly exceeds the problems that Quine's critique of empiricism poses for any empirically realist stance. In fact, intentional synthesis would seem to be much closer to Quine's holism of beliefs than any realist commitment to mapping concepts onto

individual sense percepts. And yet as always, with Husserl the philosophical situation is never so simple.

Phenomenology, as the name perhaps implies, is a re-interpretation of phenomenal experience in that what first actually gives itself to sense perception are meaningful sensations, that is, the things themselves. For instance, one never sees multiple views of a 'round sensum' that are then processed after the fact and recognized as a coin of such and such denomination. What is seen is the coin itself, as it is given in the meaningfully lived context of whatever situation one might find oneself in having to do with money and suchlike. That is the implication of intentionality, in that any sense datum is experienced within a 'lived' context, and where simply by way of reaching into a wallet what is intended and met with is the coin itself rather than a round sensum<sup>34</sup>. What this seems to mean, for Husserl, is that not only sensory concepts, like colours, are directly given in sense perceptions but ideal notions like 'objectivity' are also given in actual sense perceptions. The prior meaningfulness of the things themselves is part of natural everyday perception, before we come to problematise experience in terms of a subject or an intellect making sense out of, or organizing, raw sense data.

Obviously, such an approach to the problem of experience does not seem to rely on the notion of an empirical subject and its sensory experiences. Husserl's phenomenology might have something like the analytic-synthetic distinction, in that categorial idealities are inherently different from sensible concepts that are explicitly related to sense perceptions, yet categorial intuitions are also an 'implicit' part of perception. Whilst Husserl envisages a hierarchy of knowledge with purely ideal forms (as in pure logic and mathematics) at the top which are ultimately founded on sensuous concepts,

ideality is also implicitly given at this founding level of sensible intuitions. Husserl's phenomenology of perception is the 'authentic' ground for all of his analyses of expression and meaning. It is at the level of simple, 'natural' perceptions of things that both the objective being of those things and their sensible 'content' are meaningfully intended such that there cannot be, in any phenomenological sense, a sequence of raw sensory data that is organized into an objective thing. It belongs to the structure of intentional synthesis that what is met with in any perception is the thing itself, and so what we see, hear and feel, what we perceive in general are things and never a meaningless barrage of sense impressions. This emphasis on the meaningfulness of perception, as opposed to any notion of raw sensory data, is the fundamental phenomenological distinction between lived experience and empirical sensory experience.

Quine's pragmatically nominalist position, on the other hand, still makes an ontological assumption about the relation of knowledge to the empirical structure of experience. For Quine still holds to the possibility of a naturalised epistemology based on an analysis of a physical human subject's responses to experimentally controlled sensory inputs. The relation between the 'meagre' sensory input, of electromagnetic radiations and so on, and the 'torrential' output of a subject's descriptions of the "three dimensional external world and its history" (Quine, 1969, p. 83), mediated by a system of beliefs, becomes the object of a pragmatically realigned epistemological study. According to Quine, it seems that there is a meaningless flux of raw sensations that one attempts to meaningfully organize into some sort of experiential unity. This organizing tendency reacts to the raw sensations at hand in attempting to ascribe objective truth values to manifold impressions, yet in a refusal of realism this is a thoroughly pragmatic attempt to order the

world according to the rigorous logic of science. Whilst Quine's holism of beliefs, and the notion of the two dogmas of empiricism, radically undermines a realist account of experience, he still holds to the basic empirical distinction between conceptual schema and raw experience, a distinction that the early Husserl is not only careful to avoid, but that provides the basis for his phenomenological critique of Descartes and Kant.

Davidson's critique of Quine (cf. Malpas, 1992, p. 196), points out this residual commitment to a distinction between concepts and experience in what the former calls the 'third dogma of empiricism' (Davidson, 1984, p. 189). In asserting a more thoroughly holistic account of belief systems, Davidson rejects any notion of 'raw' sense experiences that must be somehow organized into a conceptual scheme of things, for within a holism of beliefs any simple sensation can only be presented as already a meaningful part of an organized world. This circularity of experience means that there is no such thing as a simple raw sensation, and this more thoroughgoing holism is also characteristic of Husserl's starting point. Intentionality, in the phenomenological sense of intentional synthesis, implies that all sensory experience is based on an immediately prior meaningful intuition that 'anticipates' the next sensation, and so instead of a sequence of tonal data we hear a tune, and in a 'lived' way the tune precedes the data, so to speak.

Davidson's holism of beliefs precedes raw sense data and, as such, makes the latter notion philosophically obsolete, at least that is an implication of the third dogma of empiricism. Similarly for Husserl, although these two are worlds apart philosophically, sensibility is already meaningfully structured according to the process of intentional synthesis at the founding level of perceptions. Such is the "psychological holism" (Malpas, 1992, p. 115) of Husserl's account of intentionality as it relates to Davidson's critique of the

empirical distinction between concepts and experience. For phenomenology, the notion that lived experience is a raw sensory flux that is subsequently organized according to either pragmatic or metaphysical concepts like space, time, objectivity and so on, is itself an abstraction of what is actually given in sense perception in the first instance, as in meaningful lived experiences. This attempt to ground ideal objectivities in the phenomenological flux of lived experience thus involves a number of innovations that include just such a reinterpretation of the 'empirical' as the things themselves and as given in the ongoing process of sensible perceptions.

The catch cry of phenomenology was 'to the things themselves', the matters themselves, as they give themselves to everyday natural perceptions of the world. This was supposed to be, in Husserl's terms, an epistemology of lived experience (or from Heidegger's perspective, a fundamental ontology of the world) as an analysis of how the world has already been meaningfully given to perceptions in order for that meaningfulness to then become the object of a philosophical question. The world is simply already known, in a holistic sense, and it is on the basis of this 'pre-ontological' understanding that utterances, or representations in general, can make sense. As far as the empirical model of experience is concerned, it would seem that we first have to have something like a lived world in order to wonder about it and theorize it in terms of an intellect over against the flux of sense data.

It will be my contention that Heidegger more or less follows Husserl's holistic notion of intentionality for which lived experience is always already meaningful. There is in no sense, except as a philosophical abstraction, a phenomenal flux onto which a 'subject' or intellect imposes some form of interpretation, whether that is an associative belief in objects based on a pragmatic or realist account of experience, or a transcendental apperception

of the thing in itself. And so as Heidegger says, concerning the existential as opposed to the psychological notion of hearing:

Hearkening is phenomenally still more primordial than what is defined ‘in the first instance’ as “hearing” in psychology—the sensing of tones and the perception of sounds. Hearkening too has the kind of Being of the hearing which understands. What we ‘first’ hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking waggon, the motor-cycle. We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling. It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to ‘hear’ a ‘pure noise’ (1963, p. 207/163-164).

In following the implications of intentionality as regards the meaningfulness of sense experiences, such as in hearing, Heidegger’s existential ontology is also, at least in part, grounded in sensible (*Sinnlich*) perceptual experience, or in what could be called a phenomenological ‘empiricism’. For Husserl apparently not only “enabled us to understand once more the meaning of any genuine philosophical empiricism; he has also given us the necessary tools” (Heidegger, 1963, note x, p. 490/50). This critical ‘empiricism’ grounds itself in a constant return to the sensible, as that which is always already understood as what it is, and this temporally prior meaningfulness or “‘A-priorism’ is the method of any scientific philosophy which understands itself” (ibid). On the other hand, the relation between Husserl and Heidegger is not merely one of continuity but also apparently one of a radical critique as well. While following his master in grounding categorial structures in the phenomenal flux, Heidegger holds that the sense that one makes of this flux is due as much to un-represented practical accomplishments as to the ongoing perceptions of an intentional ego. This wider notion of intentionality Heidegger calls ‘relational comportment’<sup>35</sup> (*Verhalten*), and yet it is this notion of intentionality that must also, against Dreyfus and from a phenomenological perspective, encapsulate the perceiving subject. Why this must be so will hopefully become clearer with an outline of the relation

between phenomenology and empiricism, and the methodological difference this relation implies between intentional synthesis and something like a system of beliefs.

Husserl's phenomenological approach to the problem of founding logical truths in psychological experiences begins with the 'prolegomena to pure logic', the first volume of the *Logical Investigations*. The notion of intentionality that Husserl develops, following on Brentano, more or less does away with the psychological subject for whom all experience becomes experience of something, rather than of raw sense data. In its generality, the empirical model of experience involves a human subject with a certain range of sensory stimulations in the form of olfactory reactions, tactile pressures, electromagnetic radiation and sonic vibrations, along with the 'resultant' linguistic and behavioural outputs presumably mediated via some sort of cognitive structure or belief system. Radical behaviourist or some pragmatist models will reject even 'inner' beliefs on the basis that these are not objectively verifiable phenomena. From this empirical perspective, the notion that sense experience is somehow already organized into a coherently meaningful whole, before being expressed in meaningful behaviour and utterances, is perhaps thoroughly counter-intuitive.

However, from a phenomenological perspective, as well as for Davidson's holistic account of beliefs, the notion of an external world of raw sense data would seem to be a philosophical abstraction of what actually is the case as far as lived human experience is concerned. Given this rejection or qualification of the 'external', and of an empirical psychological subject, for phenomenology it is precisely the 'inner' dimension that must be explored and so Husserl does not "discuss states of animal organisms (not even as belonging to a possible nature as such), but perceptions, judgements, feelings

*as such*, and what pertains to them *a priori* with unlimited generality” (1970a, p. 262/18). One might then assume that phenomenology, as a descriptive psychology of inner experience, is naturally drawn into the rather unscientific practice of introspection common to much late nineteenth century psychological method. For Husserl, however, introspection is a necessary methodological consequence of his philosophical interpretation of intentional synthesis. This ‘immanent analysis’ must exclude “all empirical facticity and individuation” (p. 254/9) in experiences for which the notion of a subject’s inner mediating intentions are opposed to ‘outer’ sense data and behavioural responses. According to Husserl, psychologists “usually discuss such difficulties when they consider introspection as a source of our detailed psychological knowledge, not properly however, but in order to draw a false antithesis between introspection and ‘outer’ perception” (p. 254/9).

The immanent analysis of phenomenology does not merely apply to an inner system of beliefs or intentional states that mediate a subject’s reaction to objective things given in sense data. The simple model of the intentional subject that Dreyfus (1991a, p. 5) applies to Husserl, is just such an empirically inspired model of early modern Cartesian intentionality. For Husserl, these ways of conceiving of experience naïvely posit a subject’s inner life over against the externality of either objects or a phenomenal flux of sense data, and yet it is precisely the constitution of something like a subject and its objectivities that is immanently in question. It is in this sense that, whilst dealing with a ‘descriptive psychology’ of lived experience, the phenomenological “*concept of consciousness can be seen in a purely phenomenological manner*, i.e. a manner which *cuts out all relation to empirically real existence* (to persons or animals in nature)” (Husserl, 1970b, p. 537/347-348).

The phenomenological manner of descriptive analysis treats the simple perception of something in its ‘bodily presence’ as an effect of intentional synthesis. A thing, the hammer for instance, is meaningful in its ‘objectness’ simply by looking at it. There is no simple relating of a subject to real external objects via an intentional (representational) content because the objectivity of objects and the subjectivity of the ego are both constituted in the process of intentional synthesis. Husserl simply excludes “the natural performance of all empirical (naturalistic) apperceptions and positings” (1970a, p. 261/18), and with this exclusion the so-called ‘external’ world of sense data does not seem to be philosophically relevant as far as phenomenology is concerned. Given this theoretical basis, the notion of sense data is merely an ontological abstraction derived from the empirical model of experience. The problematic of intentional synthesis thus resituates the notion of an ‘external’ reality within the meaningfulness of the lived world of subjects and objects that is objectively constituted immanently in consciousness and nowhere else.

Yet this is not to say that, for Husserl, empiricism is to be refuted but, rather, that it is insufficient as a scientific basis for philosophy. It is precisely as a philosophical analysis of empiricism itself that phenomenology was first set up, in the presupposition that “there must be *ideal elements and laws even in the field of empirical thinking, in the sphere of probabilities*. In these the *possibility* of empirical science in general, of the probable knowledge of the real, has its *a priori* basis” (Husserl, 1970a, p. 247/257). An analysis of empirical thinking will necessarily entail, for Husserl, an immanent description of the phenomena that are given to the empiricist and that are theorized as subjective or objective facts:

Facts are originally ‘given’ to us only in the sense of being perceived (and likewise in the sense of being remembered).

In perception things and events themselves putatively confront us, seen and grasped, so to say, without intervening partition. And what we see before us, we utter in judgements of perception: these are the immediate 'given facts' of science (Husserl, 1970a, p. 246-247/256).

Not, then, the empirical data of sensory inputs and behavioural and linguistic outputs of a psychological subject but, rather, the lived experience of the empirical analyst for whom these facts are meaningfully given in perception; this is the object of phenomenological analysis. Husserl's phenomenology of empiricism is thus concerned with the analysis of empirical data itself, as it is given to the analyst, and this form of analysis implies a radically different methodology and ontology of experience. Immanent description necessarily follows from the 'bracketing' of empirical perceiving, it is not merely one possible method available to the phenomenologist but is required in the rejection of the notion of an 'external' world of empirical sense data. It is in this methodological sense, that Husserl's notion of categorial intuitions at the level of perceptions must be understood, as a philosophical answer to empirical psychology as it was developing in especially Wundt's laboratory work.

This methodological difference between phenomenology and empiricism is a consequence of the 'bracketing' of the internal-subjective and external-objective ontology of experience. What Husserl calls his 'methodological solipsism', is far from positing a subject isolated from its external world, rather, the subjectivity of the subject and the objectivity of the world are intentionally constituted within the immanence of perception<sup>36</sup>. Such a phenomenological approach collapses the problem of the subject's relation to objective reality, and the distinction between conceptuality and experience, into the immanence of one's own lived experience. Similarly, although at this point in Husserl's early analyses there are radical differences to do with the practical dimension of intentionality in Heidegger's existential

analytic, the authenticity of angst “individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as *solus ipse*” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 233/188). The phenomena of self and world are collapsed into Dasein, and this belonging together is only to be disclosed as one’s own existence, and thus existential phenomenology must also rely on a solipsistic method that refuses to posit an “isolated subject-Thing into the innocuous emptiness of a worldless occurring” (ibid).

Again, mere introspection is not intended in either Husserl’s or Heidegger’s phenomenologies, and both of their accounts radically question the Cartesian subject-object dualism as it appears in the empirical distinction between conceptuality and ‘external’ sense experience. Yet the question of how a subject’s internal beliefs or intentions are related to the external world of sensations, is explicitly taken up by Husserl in his attempt to retrieve the Cartesian tradition and its empirical ontology of experience. Such a phenomenological retrieval undermines the Kantian analytic, based as it is on the distinction between the understanding and sensibility, or categorial synthesis and empirical experience. For Kant, the scandal of philosophy that he sets out to resolve lies in the historical failure to logically account for the subject’s knowledge of the external world (cf. Kant, 1929, p. Bxxxix). For Heidegger, on the other hand, the “scandal of philosophy’ is not that this proof is yet to be given, but that *such proofs are expected and attempted again and again*” (1962, p. 249/205). Heidegger rejected this empirical distinction in favour of the radical terminology and method of fundamental ontology. Husserl’s phenomenological critique (*Abbau*) of the Cartesian model of experience explicitly rejected the Cartesian doctrine in favour of what he would later call his “neo-Cartesianism” (Husserl, 1960, p. 1), that phenomenologically accounts for the subject-object problem. It was this new ground for Cartesian certainty that was supposed to revitalize the scientific

project of modernity in the West, founded on a holistic notion of intentional synthesis and the immanent constitution of objective being.

To reiterate, for phenomenology phenomena simply are not raw sense data, there is no *primaeval* chaos of sense impressions that have to be subsequently organized into some sort of ordered everyday experience of things, and so it simply is not a question of applying beliefs or language games to the flux of experience. Husserl's phenomenological 'empiricism' starts with what is actually given in one's own sense perceptions, that is, the everyday mundane things themselves along with the implicit idealities these perceptions imply. Phenomenology does not thematise abstract, empirical phenomena such as light sensations, audible tones and so on, which are not really phenomena at all. Phenomena are what first give themselves to lived human experience, that is, the things themselves as the matters themselves, the chair itself as what it already is and where it stands, the sound of the birds in the garden, the hammer and so on. Without this fundamental distinction between phenomenology and empiricism, any simple equation of categorial intuitions and the process of intentional synthesis with a naturalistic system of beliefs or Cartesian intentionality risks completely misconstruing both Husserl's project and his complicated relation to Heidegger<sup>37</sup>.

There can be, in no phenomenological sense, some sort of intellectual working out of raw sensations in order to arrive at what has already given itself to our perceptions, as in the simple, mundane, lived experience of things to which we constantly and of necessity always return. It is, rather, on the basis of the sense of lived experience which is already constantly meaningful as what it is, that one might then refer to abstractions such as visible data, or objects. In the case of perception, one perceives the self-same thing from different angles, one doesn't perceive a multiplicity of sense data

and then extrapolate from that to the notion of an object. The objectivity of things is intended in mundane natural perceptions, in ongoing categorial intuitions of things as they already appear. It is on the basis of these simple, straightforward intuitions that the scientific belief in the physicalism of objects can itself make sense.

From the perspective of especially the sixth investigation of the *Logical Investigations*, intentional synthesis at the level of natural perceptions is the a priori ontological basis of lived experience. Both Husserl and Heidegger, although with important differences in both method and the focus of analysis, attempted to phenomenologically describe the simple givenness of perception, without first abstracting it into some sort of correspondence between a psychological subject and the objective world conceived as a flux of raw sense data. Only on the basis of having already come to understand the world can one then attempt to formally organize experience in terms of a pure logic, and such a holistic approach to experience undermines the Cartesian subject as the relation of a thinking ego to the external world. This was Husserl's fundamental phenomenological insight and his scientific crusade; that of a retrieval of the Cartesian notion of the subject, and the empirical foundation of the sciences, in order to found them on a critical phenomenology of lived experience and so prepare for a renewal of the project of modernity.

#### *§7. Straightforward perception as a ground*

Following the above reading of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, phenomenology was first posited on the basis of a radical rethinking of the empirical distinction between concepts and raw experience, or form and matter, and this critique is especially reflected in the sixth investigation. The second section of this investigation, as an analysis of perception, begins with the

distinction between the understanding and sensibility, such that Husserl's holism collapses the category of objective being into sensuous intuitions. That is, a thing is given in perception by way of its 'bodily presence', it endures in time as an objectively given thing, and this 'presence' is a categorial intuition effected in an intentional identity synthesis. This phenomenology of perception is the foundation of all of Husserl's descriptive analyses of expression and meaning, for it is in the sensible intuitions of things that all signifying intentions, all judgements, and representations in general, are 'fulfilled'. This fulfilment refers to the givenness of the things or the matters themselves in perception, where the sensible matters are given along with their implied categorial intuitions. So one sees and uses this particular hammer in these particular circumstances, while the 'objectness' of that same hammer is an implied condition of its use. Such an approach implies a holistic account of perception such that what is first given are the things themselves, rather than raw sensations that are then made meaningful by an isolated ego as in the empirical model of experience.

Now this reading of Husserl is somewhat at odds to that given by Dreyfus, who interprets the phenomenology of perception in terms of the "act of giving meaning to meaningless sounds or marks and of the meaning given" (Dreyfus, 1982, p. 107). The intentional act of perception becomes that of a subject's meaning 'superimposed' over the raw flux of experience, and this notion of intentionality presupposes the traditional distinction between mind and body, thus illustrating "Husserl's commitment to the separation of form and matter" (p. 107). It follows for Dreyfus that a phenomenology of perception became untenable for Husserl because this traditional separation between sense or meaning and the actuality of the thing given to perception (its bodily presence), undermines any attribution of sense to the act of

perception itself. Therefore one can have an “account of what the mind takes the object to be but no account of our bodily interaction with the object in perceiving it” (p. 108).

Dreyfus arrives at this conclusion by attempting to show how the separation of signifying and intuitive acts implies that perception itself can be separated into signifying and intuitive components, and so on in an infinite regress “in which sense coincides with sense indefinitely” (p. 105). Perception thus is never a ‘fulfilling act’, it cannot be a ground as a fulfilment for any signifying act, because it itself is subject to the separation of form and matter. This ‘intentionalist’ account of Husserl’s phenomenology seems to rely on a representational notion of perception, for which the categorial intuition of a thing’s bodily presence, or “the perceptual noema, like the intentional essence of a perceptual act, is a meaning *by virtue of which we refer to perceptual objects*” (p. 112). So it seems then, for Dreyfus, that a perceptual object is intuitively given but its perceptual or intuitive sense is a separate intentional act that represents that original ‘opaque’ presentation. With this representational distinction at the level of perceptions, we have the thing itself in its actual bodily presence and a meaning-intention imposed on that presentation by the intentional ego, thus “even perceptual acts can be understood as ways of making sense of our experience by giving a meaning to meaningless data; for Husserl, judging, remembering, perceiving, and enjoying are all forms of meaning-giving” (Dreyfus, 1982, 114).

From this perspective, it is the ego that intends the sense of ‘bodily presence’ for a perceived thing and, in this way, perception is reduced to an intentional, as in representational, mediation between a subject and its objective world of sense data. This representationalist model of intentionality also underlies Dreyfus’ interpretation of Husserl in *Being in the World*. In what

amounts to an appropriation of certain contemporary theories on the philosophy of mind, Husserl's notion of intentionality is reduced to the level of a subject's relation to the world "mediated by internal representations" (Dreyfus, 1991a, p. 249), and thus everydayness becomes a network of intentional states, beliefs or noemata. According to Dreyfus, phenomenology uncritically follows this traditional Cartesian notion of the ego, and so we get "the Husserlian notion of a disembodied, detached, pure ego capable of creating these ideal meanings and imposing them on the sensuous manifold" (1982, p. 119). However, in support of Husserl, Heidegger warns against just such a 'misunderstanding' of the phenomenological relation between sense and understanding, or categorial forms and matter, that merely reiterates "the old mythology of an intellect which glues and rigs together the world's matter with its own forms" (Heidegger, 1985, p. 70/96). Husserl's investigations were set up precisely as a descriptively holistic analysis of the subject's own relation to the world, and in such a way as to radically undermine this early modern account of Cartesian subjectivity.

Yet Dreyfus overlooks Husserl's contribution towards this anti-Cartesian critique and ascribes it wholly to Heidegger's practical intervention against the theoretical tradition. Whilst Heidegger's critique is still, of course, valid, such an assertion on the part of Dreyfus is based on an interpretation of categorial intuitions or noemata in terms of a representational mediation between a subject and its world. Such a rationalist interpretation also entails the elision of the problem of temporality in Husserl, and subsequently the obliteration of Heidegger's relation to phenomenology. This seems to be what happens in Dreyfus' analysis of Husserl's notion of the perceptual noema. According to Dreyfus, the phenomenology of perception introduced in the *Logical Investigations* is forsaken in the first book of the *Ideas* for "a theory

of how objects are taken or intended but not how they are given or presented” (Dreyfus, 1982, p. 108).

Husserl’s move away from the perceptual problem is apparently brought about by the difficulties that arise with a phenomenological analysis of the structure of perception, that is, with the regression problem and how it is that perception can itself have a fulfilling sense that is directly related to the actual perception of the thing in its bodily presence. Given this interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology, it then becomes a problem just how it is that noemata are related to perception, and so Dreyfus asks: “If the noema is interpreted as an atemporal, aspatial, nonsensuous, abstractable, ideal unity in Husserl’s sense, there is no way to understand how a system of such entities could ever be said to *be* a perceptual object” (p. 118); no way, that is, if one takes the noema as an ideal representation of an externally given object, rather than as the ideal ‘objectness’ of a thing enduring in time and effected in an intentional synthesis.

Against this representationalist reading of Husserl, I would like to suggest an alternative reading that resituates the theoretical/practical problem in Husserl and Heidegger; reinstates the ideal ‘realism’ of a phenomenology of perception, for which the objectively given being of things is an effect of intentional synthesis rather than an intended meaning imposed by a rational ego; and emphasizes the centrality of the phenomenology of perception and its temporal problematic for Husserl’s later works. For rather than omitting an analysis of perception in favour of an epistemology of sense, as Dreyfus suggests, it is precisely the problem of the intentional structure of perception and its relation to categorial intuition that constitutes the basis of Husserlian phenomenology and his positive relation to Heidegger. The fundamental question facing Husserl, on the completion of his logical investigations, was

just how categorial intuitions, or what become the ‘system of noemata’, are intended in the mental process of intentional synthesis. Taking the objective being of things given in perception as the most fundamental form of this synthesis, the question becomes; how is the sense of the bodily presence or objectness of an enduring self-identical thing an intentional effect of mental processes? What Dreyfus elides in his account of the problem of perception in Husserl is the temporal problematic concerning the intentional structure of inner time consciousness. This latter is precisely a ‘theory of how objects are given or presented’, on the basis of which the later transcendental theory of ‘how they are taken or intended’ (in *Ideas 1*) was subsequently based.

From the perspective of this alternative reading of Husserl the problem of perception is based on a holistic critique of the empirical subject, in which the distinction between concepts and experience has been collapsed into a phenomenology of lived experience. Within lived experience, the givenness of objective being is grounded in the ongoing flux of perceptual acts, yet what is the intentional structure of such acts? Husserl is attempting to phenomenologically describe the subjectivity of consciousness in terms of intentionality. This latter is basically defined, after Brentano, as ‘consciousness is consciousness of something’, where the ego and its perceptions can only be theorized in relation to the things themselves, the things of one’s lived experiences in the world. The subjective, or ‘immanent’, sense of perception is thus always meaningfully directed towards things, in that perceptions and thoughts are always related to the ongoing sense of everyday life. Intentionality is a relational totality within which individual everyday perceptions can be meaningful, and also within which something like an ego is itself, in a peculiar sense, constituted. The notion of a

conscious ego's lived experience thus becomes the analytic object of phenomenology where:

we call all experiences in an ego's experiential unity 'phenomena'. *Phenomenology* is accordingly the theory of experiences in general, inclusive of all matters, whether real (*reellen*) or intentional, given in experiences, and evidently discoverable in them. Pure phenomenology is accordingly the theory of the essences of 'pure phenomena', the phenomena of a 'pure consciousness' or of a 'pure ego' (Husserl, 1970b, p. 862/236-237).

The problem of how an ego can in effect be an experiential unity will occupy Husserl for at least a decade after the publication of the *Logical Investigations*, and this problem will also have significant consequences for the methodological possibility of attaining to the 'purity' of phenomenological analysis, in the reduction to a 'pure ego'. However, at this early stage of his analysis, Husserl seems to be content with laying out the general grounds of phenomenology and the authentic method proper to it. In retrospect, circa 1925, Husserl sees the phenomenological method of this 'descriptive psychology' as the:

laying bare of a revealing inner intuition of the acts of thinking hidden for the thinker himself, an essential description moving itself within pure intuition and relating to the pure givenness of experience (Husserl, 1977, p. 202-203).

The movement of this revealing of the intuitive grounds of thinking, founded in the pure givenness of lived experience, comes together in an analysis of "how consciousness, as a process of achieving subjectivity, looks like in itself" (p. 203), and in terms of the subjective experience of the thinker. The subject of phenomenology is a knowing one, as concerns the possibility of transcendental knowledge as a unity of the flux of individual sense experiences. This transcendental form of analysis, nevertheless, attempts to stay with its subject, for it:

takes all apperceptions and judgemental assertions which point beyond what is given in adequate, purely immanent intuition, which point beyond the pure stream of

consciousness, and treats them purely as the experiences they are in themselves (Husserl, 1970b, pp. 862-863/236).

The phenomenological method consists of an analysis of the ‘pure stream of consciousness’, an abiding within the sensuous realm of subjective experience, in a refusal of all supersensible apperceptions which ‘point beyond purely immanent intuition’. In this refusal, it is not that the categorial is denied its transcendental character, rather, Husserl attempts to distinguish the transcendens from the sensible only in that the “connection between the wider and narrower, the *supersensuous* (i.e. raised above sense [*Sinnlichkeit*], or categorial) and *sensuous concept of perception*, is no external or contingent matter, but one rooted in the whole business at hand” (p. 785/143). Husserl, here, seems to refuse what he sees as a Kantian (or more probably, a neo-Kantian) problem; the positing of conceptuality as in some sense other than given in the intuitions themselves. The distinction he draws between categories of the understanding and the sensible is one that inhabits the problem of intuition, or perception itself. His phenomenological method revolves around a descriptive analysis of this perceptual difference, which is not yet the ontological difference.

Such a method is grounded in the possibility of ‘purely categorial intuition’ as given in the constant ongoing flux of experience. These categorial intuitions can in no way be divorced from the sensuous intuitions that found them, for the “idea of a pure intellect ... quite cut off from a ‘faculty of sensibility’, could only be conceived before there had been an elementary analysis of knowledge in the irrefragable evidence of its being” (Husserl, 1970b, p. 818/183). Phenomenological description must constantly proceed from an analysis of the sensible, from within the ‘pure stream of consciousness’ as it presents itself to lived experience. For Husserl, if we follow this methodological adherence to what gives itself in the formal

intuitions of the sensible, then what is given are the matters themselves, ultimately founded in perceptual intuition. In doing so, one does without the philosophical baggage of theorizing a ‘thing-in-itself’, and so:

One requires no metaphysical or other theories to explain the agreement of the course of nature and the ‘native’ regularities of the understanding. Instead of an explanation, one needs only a phenomenological clarification of meaning, thinking and knowing, and of the ideas and laws which spring from these (1970b, p. 830/200).

Towards this clarification of knowledge, Husserl describes a layering of categorial intuitions, entangled and always increasingly complex but, nevertheless, ultimately founded in sensuous intuition. This will later give rise to the methodological possibility of reduction or bracketing back from the sensible acts towards their founded idealities because “everything categorial ultimately rests upon sensuous intuition” (pp. 817-818/183), that is, all knowledge ultimately refers to or is meaningful in terms of the world. For Husserl, the problem of knowledge is based on the distinction between form and matter at the level of perception such that all meaning and expression is to be phenomenologically founded in intuition, and so Husserl asks; “*Are there parts and forms of perception corresponding to all parts and forms of meaning?*” (p. 774/129).

While this might seem to situate the problematic within a simple correspondence notion of truth, Husserl is careful to distinguish between mere sense percepts and the concept of intentionally structured perception. The latter, as in the ‘mere act of seeing’ something, as a simple perception it is itself an intentional act in which multiple sense impressions are brought together into the unity of a perceived ‘thing’. These individual perceptions are not merely sensory data but, rather, the perception of the thing itself as it naturally reveals itself over time. Within the flux of lived experience one tends to come across things as they present themselves in whatever business

is at hand, and so, as Heidegger points out concerning the intentionality of perception; “I do not perceive in order to perceive but in order to orient myself, to pave the way in dealing with something” (1985, p. 30/38). Natural perceptions of things are ways of comporting oneself within the world of everyday experience. In this sense, perception is “*intrinsically intentional ... intentionality constitutes the very structure of comportment itself*” (p. 31/40), and thus for Heidegger, Husserl’s notion of perception is intrinsically already a mode of comportment as a ‘directing-itself-toward’.

Perception is already, then, a meaningfully lived and directed experience and it is on the basis of this experience that meanings can be inferred or attributed to those perceptions. Given this distinction between meaning and intentionally structured perception, and against any simple correspondence theory of truth, “it is no longer a parallelism between the meaning intentions of expressions and the mere percepts which correspond to them: it is a parallelism between meaning-intentions and the above mentioned *perceptually founded acts*” (Husserl, 1970b, p. 776/132). These ‘perceptual acts’, or intentional relations, are the basis of Husserl’s phenomenology of meaning and expression. Perception is thus not merely sense perception but an intentionally structured relation that holds within it the distinction between categorial forms and matter or ‘sensuous stuff’.

What then is the phenomenological concept of perception? In the widest sense, it includes both the ‘seeing’ or understanding of ‘states of affairs’ as well as the perception of actual objects such that it “is said of every percept that it grasps its object *directly*, or grasps this object *itself*. But this direct grasping has a different sense and character according as we are concerned with a percept in the narrower or the wider sense” (p. 787/145). Perception, in the narrower sense, will be the basis on which all ‘states of affairs’, all

expressions and representations of the world, all knowledge and meaning in general are to be founded. This fundamental narrow sense is what Husserl calls 'straightforward' (*schlichter*) perception in which:

an object is directly apprehended or is itself present, if it is set up in an act of perception *in a straight forward (schlichter) manner....* the object is also an *immediately given object* in the sense that, as *this object perceived with this objective content*, it is not *constituted* in relational, connective, or otherwise articulated acts, *acts founded on other acts which bring other objects to perception*. Sensuous objects are present in perception *at a single act-level* (p. 787/145-146).

'Objectness', at the level of simple sensuous perceptions of objectively given things, belongs to a unique single intentional relation not founded on other acts. This objectness, as a categorial intuition at the level of simple straightforward perception, is not in any sense a form of representationalism, as if a meaning is assigned to a flux of perceptions by a thinking subject, for the intentional structure of perceptual intuitions are "opposed to *mere thinking, as merely significative reference*" (p. 832/202). Husserl explicitly distinguishes between 'signitive intentions' that point to or 'aim at' (*Abzielen*) an object, and an intuitive intention that "gives it 'presence' [*vorstellig*], in the pregnant sense of the word, it imports something of the fullness of the object itself" (p. 728/76). With this distinction between mere thinking and perception we arrive at the structure of phenomenological experience and its methodological access. For this distinction also introduces the difference between authentic and inauthentic intuitions. The possibility of phenomenological analysis, of access to the ideal objects of lived experience, lies in this authentic (*eigentlich*) difference.

Towards this 'authentic' problematic, Husserl distinguishes between sensuous abstraction which yields sensuous concepts and categorial abstraction and its concepts. Sensuous "concepts find their immediate basis in the data of sensuous intuition, categorial concepts in the data of categorial

intuition” (1970b, p. 818/184). Sensuous concepts would be those that abide in the sensuous, that is, colour, house, judgement, with or without categorial ‘admixture’. Categorial is then meant in an absolute sense, as being, unity, concept and so on. Authentic analysis is based on this ‘purely’ categorial or ‘transcendental’ conceptuality, in “the pure laws of *authentic thinking [eigentlichen Denkens]*, the laws, that is, of *categorial intuitions in virtue of their purely categorial forms*” (p. 823/191). Such purely theoretical thinking, as in the various forms of logic, mathematics and suchlike, would be pure in the sense that “*they contain no sensuous concept in their whole theoretical fabric*” (p. 819/184). In an authentic analysis of what is given in perception, the categories of ‘objective being’ (and its copula) are to be described according to their intentional structure. Authenticity is, here, a phenomenological notion based on the possibility of ‘purely categorial intuition’ as given in the constant ongoing flux of perceptual experience.

Furthermore, intuition as perception or imagination is also opposed to merely thinking as a ‘significative’ referring. Authentically categorial thinking is, therefore, concerned primarily with the ‘stream of consciousness’, that is, with the ‘intellectualising’ of sensuous intuitions themselves, whether that is manifested in the imagination or, more fundamentally, in perceptions. Authentic thinking is thus the fulfilment of an intuition in the “actual ‘making present’ (*Vergegenwärtigung*) of properties that pertain to the object [*Gegenstand*] itself” (1970b, p. 726/73) and in which the “object which appears intuitively also comes before us as *itself* meant in our act of meaning.... only then is a thought realized perceptually” (p. 727/74). Inauthentic thinking is related to an object which is given by way of an indirect representation, as in the intuiting of a sign. In this case, the object intended is indirectly ‘made present’ in an intuition which points beyond itself. Thus Husserl writes of a

reduction from symbolic content back to what is both imaginary and perceptual in an intuition of an object, and finally to the “*pure perceptual content*” (p. 733/82) itself. This is presentation (*Präsentation*) in the ‘strict sense’, in which the “object appears as itself given with and in this content” (p. 734/83). It is in this sense, that Husserl states “*all inauthentic fulfilment implies authentic fulfilments*” (p. 727/74), which means that all truth utterances, representations, meaning-intentions or signified presences ultimately imply an actual sensuous intuition, or straightforward perception, that fulfils those significations.

As an example, one might consider a picture hanging on a wall, perhaps it is a print of a pair of Van Gogh’s peasant shoes. What one has in mind in considering the picture is not, of course, the subjective representation of it but, rather, the picture itself. For Dreyfus, in his critique of Husserl’s ‘representational’ notion of intentionality, it would seem that one primarily relates to this picture in gazing at it, in admiring it without having to self-consciously think that ‘this is the picture’ or ‘I am now looking at the picture’. One sees the shoes depicted, and perhaps these speak about life in some way, as art tends to, but not necessarily in words. It seems obvious that the picture gives itself in the openness of a simple absorption which might perhaps be disrupted once one, for instance, finds it hanging askew. Husserl, however, would presumably not object to this aspect of the analysis of coping, for if we turn our back to the picture and represent it as such and such an artwork this would be an inauthentic mode of ‘making present’.

It is only when one either imagines the picture as a whole, or turns and perceives the actual picture in a properly authentic intuition, that it is given in its fulfilling ‘presence’. Such an authentic intuition will have two intentional moments; an explicit sensuous intuition of the colours, their

depth and play and so on; and an implicit categorial intuition of the objectivity of the picture itself, in which it endures as that self-same thing over time. It is this implicit categorial intuition that is to be made explicit in an authentic analysis, for the sensuous intuition of the picture primarily refers to something else, to life perhaps, or a financial investment, rather than itself as an objective thing. It is bodily present but one consciously perceives and reflects on what is pictured, whether that is a reproduction of a scene or perhaps an abstract play on perception and so on. In order to see the picture however, it must presumably be given to perception, implicitly or otherwise, as an enduring, objective thing.

It is, in this way, that Heidegger distinguishes between the perception of, for example, a chair in its given aspects, its colour, shape and so on, and its “*perceivedness*” (1985, p. 40/52) in the sense of its “*bodily presence*” (p. 40/53). This is the “*superlative mode of the self-giveness of an entity*” (p. 41/54), the ground on which ‘merely representing’ or imagining the chair is made possible. In imagination there is an ‘intuitive fulfilment’ which gives the thing itself but not in a bodily sense. These two, perception and imagination, are more originary than an ‘empty intending’ (signitive acts) which merely talks or thinks about the thing intended but without actually bringing it to an intuitive fulfilment. It is in this sense, then, that Heidegger states: “the most authentic moment in the perceivedness of the perceived is that *in perception the perceived entity is bodily there*” (p. 43/57), and this form of bodily presence is perhaps most readily given not in reproductions, or signification, or in a symbol, but in a simple straightforward perception of an actual thing. Therefore, whilst representing the picture (or the chair) is a way of relating to it concernfully, this representation can only make sense if the thing itself can objectively manifest itself in perception. What is authentically primary, in this

perceptual sense, is the actual objective perception, and yet the picture, as an aesthetic experience, reproduces something other than itself.

Authentic intuitions are thus those in which an object is given in perception in its immediacy, where authentic acts of intuition intuit the object itself, and, for Husserl, the most immediate way of doing so is simply to see, hear or feel the object itself as what it is. A hammer, for instance, is given authentically in actually perceiving it, in receiving it in a simple straightforward perception. As opposed to a picture of the hammer, however, a perception of the actual hammer is identical with itself, it reproduces nothing other than itself. In this sense, and ‘prior’ to any mere representation of the hammer, authentic perception gives the hammer itself in its ‘bodily presence’, and so one wields it, feels its heaviness and directs it to its mark. From a phenomenological perspective, it would be absurd to assume that practical comportments alone can account for the use of a hammer, for from moment to moment one must presumably be able to simply and implicitly see and feel the hammer as the ‘same as itself’ in order to use it. This is not to say, however, that perception is a representation of the object on the basis of which one then puts that thing to use. The perceptual problem of the intentionality of practice would, here, seem to be far more complicated than a simple representational or theoretical model would allow.

As Christensen (1993, p. 768) suggests, for Husserl “the perceiving subject is seen as intrinsically embodied in a world; perception only occurs against a backdrop of manipulative skills and abilities to act within the world of its object”. In an explicitly ‘anti-Cartesian’ critique of intentionality Husserl’s notion of perception is not one of a representational mediation, where one first thinks about ‘this objectively given object’ and then goes on to use it. Before mere representations of these things themselves one must have already

implicitly perceived the object, and this objectness is itself an intentionally structured comportment. One must be able to see, or hear, or at least to feel one's way about in the mundane everyday world, even 'unthinkingly', and in doing so one constantly returns to these same things and the practices they imply and which are meaningful within the intentionally directed totality that is everyday existence.

How is it that the basketball player, for instance, absorbed in a passage of play and relying solely on reflexes to block an opponent's throw, actually perceives the court as a court, and the ball as the same ball as a mere moment ago. As Dreyfus (1993, p. 28) suggests, this person has no time for thinking through some sort of calculative or 'representational' strategy, the time for thinking has passed. It is time to rely on perceptions as they present themselves, on vision and hearing, on the hardness of the court and the readiness of the body. Yet in doing so, this person is still accomplishing, in the Husserlian sense, a 'non-thematic', ongoing, intentional synthesis of perceptual intuitions that constantly 'present' the game play as what it is. So the game makes sense, no one from the crowd has run on court to disrupt the play, it remains a 'steady flow of skillful activity' more or less free of goal-oriented representations. Yet it still makes sense, the perceptions and the practical activity together, and also the intermittent calls of one's team mates and the opposition. This 'sense' is an ongoing play of meaningful perceptions, practical activity and representational strategies which come together in 'making present' a simple game of basketball. All of these are meaningful within the intentionality or 'directedness' of having to do with things in general, or within lived experience or life as a whole.

For Husserl, this intentional problematic is based on how objects given in ongoing natural perceptions can be given again as those very same things—the

problem of objective identity synthesis. Presumably, neither Dreyfus nor Heidegger would reject the notion that the picture or the hammer is implicitly perceived in a bodily given sense, on the basis of which these can then be represented as that particular thing with those particular qualities, or what Husserl calls the ‘interpretive sense’. In fact, Heidegger does not seem to outrightly reject the phenomenology of perception in his first draft of *Being and Time* given in the 1925 Marburg lecture course on the *History of the Concept of Time*. Instead of rejecting the analysis of the intentional structure of perception, Heidegger criticizes the phenomenological reduction that focuses on this problematic. For Heidegger, the problem with Husserl’s method arises in its starting point, in the ‘natural attitude’. He claims that Husserl does not start with an analysis of intentionality as it actually gives itself but proceeds to its abstraction as an act of consciousness: “in elaborating intentionality as the thematic field of phenomenology, *the question of the being of the intentional is left undiscussed*” (Heidegger, 1985, p. 113/157).

Husserl’s emphasis on the consciousness of perception is apparently problematic since it reduces intentionality solely to a problem of the intentional ego process. This temporal process itself does not seem to be a problem for Heidegger, and I will argue that it reappears within the existential analytic at the point where ecstatic temporality becomes a thematic concern. Yet it remains that, for Husserl, intentionality is solely an affair of the ego and its ‘immanent’ experiences as grounded in sense perceptions; therefore it remains a problem of consciousness itself. That is, the everyday world as an intentionally directed totality is reduced to the ideality of conscious processes, to the ideality of ‘mere’ perception and so (essentially in agreement with the intent if not the structure of Dreyfus’ argument) practical comportments as Heidegger envisages them are elided, at

least from the perspective of a critique of the natural attitude as posited in *Ideas 1*.

However, this is not to say that the problem of the intentional structure of perception is then somehow superfluous to the existential analytic, and even less that it falls prey to a practical critique of ‘representationalist’ intentionality. This critique may very well apply to various contemporary approaches to the philosophy of mind, as in Dreyfus’ critique of Searle’s account of intentionality. Yet Husserl’s phenomenology of perception has nothing to do with some sort of Cartesian representational ‘thought content’ that relates an ego to objects in the world (cf. Heidegger, 1985, p. 30/39). Representation, phenomenologically speaking, is not a fundamental mediating relation between a subject and the ‘external’ objective world. The problematic instead deals with the intentional constitution of both the ego and the objectivity of objects given in perceptions, on the basis of which these objects can then be represented as ‘this is the hammer’, or ‘now here is the picture’.

Within this intentionally directed play, representations, as a mere thinking about things, do not then come ‘before’ either perceptions or practices. In a simply absorbed perception of the everyday world, especially one free of any inner thoughtful activity or self-consciousness, one does not generally problematise the objectivity of the things that present themselves. For Husserl, objects implicitly give themselves within the ongoing flow of lived experience. That is, the objectness of these simple straightforward perceptions transcends the momentary flux of lived experience, and it is on the basis of this implicit, non-theoretical transcendence that one might then, in a phenomenological analysis, authentically problematise the categorial intuition of ‘objective being’ that it implies.

§8. *Perceptual holism and temporal being*

Given that the intentional structure of perception is the object of Husserl's authentic phenomenology, where the objectivity of things is an effect of intentional synthesis, what then is the structure of this perceptual identity synthesis? According to Lampert (1995, p. 10), the problem of synthesis is analysed at length only in the sixth investigation. He also claims that Husserl's later concerns, from "intersubjectivity, and the life-world, to science and the ego, continue to work within the problematics of synthesis worked out in the *Logical Investigations*" (p. 12). It would seem then, that this problematic, and its sixth investigation, is no merely contingent concern for Husserl but one that sets the scene for his entire life's work and also perhaps, at least in part, for Heidegger's existential interpretation of phenomenology. According to Husserl, the objectness of things is constituted in an intentional identity synthesis, where "perception terminates upon individual, and so upon temporal being [*zeitliches Sein*]" (Husserl, 1970b, p. 786/144). The problem of synthesis in the investigations is a temporal one, belonging to the ongoing flux of sensible perceptions.

As has already been suggested above, this flux is not an empirical flux of meaningless sensory data, for in "sense-perception, the 'external' thing appears 'in one blow', as soon as our glance falls upon it" (p. 788/147). What is given in one's own straightforward sense perception, from a phenomenological perspective, are the things themselves. Or in other words, in going about one's everyday concerns what is given in perception is the meaningful 'stuff' of everydayness; one does not tend to first be confronted by a torrent of raw sensations that are subsequently organized into a conceptual gestalt, for the whole precedes the individual, so to speak. Or as

Husserl says, in reference to the ‘straightforward’ (*schlichte*) perception of objects:

just as the thing does not appear before us as the mere sum of its countless individual features ... so the act of perception also is always a homogeneous unity, which gives the object ‘presence’ [*gegenwärtigt*] in a simple immediate way (1970b, p. 789/148).

Within the context of ongoing everyday experiences, what is given in perception is always something, perhaps an object such as a hammer, and even though what is seen are various aspects of that thing from various perspectives, one generally sees the self-same thing presented over time. As such, and in this simple and straightforward sense, the manifold individual perceptions or ‘part-intentions’ of an object give it ‘presence’, it endures in time, and so the “unity of perception comes into being as a *straightforward* unity, *as an immediate fusion of part-intentions, without the addition of new act-intentions*” (p. 789/148). A part-intention included, for example, in the ‘mere act of seeing’ might be first laying eyes on a hammer, followed perhaps by the sight of the hammer striking the nail and so on. One also, presumably, feels the heft of that same hammer, and all these perceptions go along with the use of the hammer and towards whatever task is being fulfilled. Yet as far as mundane everyday experience is concerned, at no point are these manifold perceptions unrelated to one another, neither are they assembled after the fact into a recognizable thing, rather, the ‘thingliness’ of that thing goes before all sensory impressions. It is in this sense that, for Husserl, “we may handle the thing from all sides in a *continuous perceptual series*, feeling it over as it were with our senses. But each single percept in this series is already a percept of the thing” (p. 789/148-149).

Husserl is careful to point out that the perception of a thing is not a second order act constituted in multiple individual percepts of various aspects of that thing, for “even a continuous perceptual flux involves a *fusion* of part-acts in

one act, *rather than a peculiar act founded upon such acts*” (p. 790/149). Perception is not, then, a concatenation of individual percepts that produces an objectively intuited thing, for each part-percept is itself meaningful only as a perception of that thing itself, and so in “the continuous running on of individual percepts we continuously perceive the single, selfsame object” (p. 790/149). The objective being of things, their ‘presence’ as given in straightforward perceptions, is in this sense a founding act, even though the categorial intuition of ‘bodily presence’ (as an object’s enduring over time) is originated in the temporal structure of the flux of lived experience.

Thus it is, for Husserl, that the peculiarity of perception “is that it necessarily rests on individual intuition, but does not for that reason mean what is individual in such intuition” (p. 818/183). When one comes across things in going about the mundane business of everyday life, what is given in the matters at hand are those very same things. These mundane things themselves, as opposed to sense data or a noumenal ‘thing in itself’, are philosophically primordial and constitute in part the unity of the flux of lived, everyday experiences. For Husserl, of course, the most fundamental mode of the unity of perception is given in the ongoing synthesis of the objectivity of objects. It is this ongoing synthesis of individual perceptions that phenomenologically accounts for the sense of the ‘bodily presence’ of the things themselves. Yet this ‘presence’, as the objective being of things, is not itself a second order act of intuition but must be understood as the ‘fusion’ of the flux of individual percepts for which:

the unification of these percepts into a continuous percept is not the performance of some peculiar act, through which a new consciousness of something objective is set up. We find, instead, that absolutely nothing new is objectively meant in the extended act, but that the same object is continuously meant in it (p. 790/150).

In this sense, each individual percept of a thing intends the whole thing itself, rather than that part-percept. According to this holistic analysis, the unity of perception thus ‘precedes’ or sets up each moment of the flux of lived experience. Furthermore, the ‘temporal being’ of perception is given in this flux for which the “individual percepts of our series have a continuous unity.... a phenomenological unity, in which the individual acts are fused. In this unity, our manifold acts are not merely fused into a phenomenological whole, but into *one act*, more precisely, into *one concept [Wahrnehmung]*” (p. 790/149). The fusion or unification of the perceptual flux of lived experience, is constituted in the ongoing categorial intuition of the objective being of the things themselves. This constant mode of intuition, which is implicitly a part of the sensible intuition of things, is not in any sense a construct of these acts, functions of thinking or of the subject, for the unity of perception does not “arise through *our own synthetic activity*, as if only a form of synthesis” (p. 789/148). For Husserl, it seems that such a synthetic unity is not the act of a human subject but a natural structure or ‘native regularity’ of human perception, within which something like a thinking subject and its objectivities are meaningfully constituted. It is the intentional structure of this unity that is to be uncovered in his descriptive analyses of lived experience.

The intentional unity of perception is constituted by way of an ‘identity synthesis’ where, in the flux of individual perceptual acts, an object is constantly given as identical to itself. From whatever aspect one perceives it, the self-same thing is apprehended, and in this temporally extended perception “an identification is performed, but no identity is meant” (p. 790/150). In a simple straightforward perception of something, that thing is implicitly identified with itself over a multiplicity of individual percepts. In this purely mundane sense, one constantly returns to the hammer, for

instance, as the same hammer as a mere moment ago, and in doing so the temporal flux of experience is unified. Such a categorial intuition of the objectness of that hammer is implicit in its use, even as the hammer itself is not the object of one's everyday concern which is presumably absorbed in the work at hand. Husserl also explicitly rejects any notion that this identity synthesis, as a fundamental intentional structure of perception, is in any sense a conscious representation of the objectivity of an object. The self-sameness of things is an implicit categorial intuition of the objective being (as the bodily presence) of those things given in everyday sensible intuitions. In this way, to say that the *"unity of identification is unavoidably distinct, does not say the same as the unity of an act of identification. An act means something, an act of identification means identity, presents it [stellt sie vor]"* (p. 790/150).

That is, in the unity of identification an object gives itself over a series of perceptions but this identity over time is not itself explicitly given in those perceptions. Given this, the categorial intuition of objective being, or presence, and what will become the 'system of noemata', is not in any sense a "meaning by virtue of which we refer to perceptual objects" (Dreyfus, 1982, p. 112). It is, rather, an intuition of the objectively given self-sameness of the things themselves, and this implicit and 'non-representational' identity belongs to the intentionally directed structure of human perception. Such categorial intuitions go largely unnoticed in the ongoing series of perceptions that constitute everyday life simply because "what is perceived in the series, what is rendered objective in it, is solely the sensible object, never its identity with self" (Husserl, 1970b, p. 790-791/150).

Husserl points out that the identity of the object as given to consciousness is not itself consciously constituted in this lived stream of experience. Yet neither is this identity in some sense a characteristic of the objective world

that cognition must somehow grasp for itself. There is no need for an ego to transcend its subjectivity in grasping what is ‘external’ to it, for identity, “it is clear, is not first dragged in through comparative, cogitatively mediated reflection: it is there from the start as experience [*Erlebnis*], as unexpressed, unconceptualized experience” (p. 696/34-35). Categorical intuitions of the bodily presence of things are, in this sense, an ongoing and implicit part of unconceptualized lived experience. Only when the individual percepts are thematically related to one another, such as in a phenomenological analysis, does the ‘unity of continuity’, as a fusion of those percepts into a selfsame object extended over time, become a thematic concern.

Such, then, is the phenomenological object of Husserl’s authentic analysis of perception; the identity synthesis belonging to categorical intuitions of the objective being or ‘bodily presence’ of things. This mode of presence is itself constituted in the constant transcendence of the flux of lived experiences, and as such it has an intentionally synthetic structure. As far as this unifying structure of perception is concerned, Lampert (1995, p. 11) claims that Husserl introduces, in the *Logical Investigations*, the problem of “implicit forward and backward referents ... which are presupposed by but never present in consciousness”. According to this interpretation, intentional synthesis has a temporal structure based on the constant transcendence of the flux of lived experience. In the movement of synthesis each just passed moment sets the basis for, or ‘anticipates’, what comes next, and these two modes of the past and future combine in continuously ‘making present’ whatever gives itself in lived experience.

In this sense, lived experience becomes an ongoing synthetic process of lived moments that are constantly dissolving into the past. On the basis of this constantly changing process, consciousness ‘anticipates’ the future. Thus

subsequent moments are constantly anticipated on the basis of the whole of lived experience that gives itself only in the present. It is in this way, that sensory data appears, not as mere data, but as something given within the horizon of a meaningfully lived life. In this lived temporal process, “consciousness as a self-propelling dynamic of synthetic activity” is based on the “ongoing system of backward and forward references in conscious activity itself” (Lampert, 1995, p. 185). In terms of the objective being of things given to perception, each part-percept of that thing constantly defers and ‘anticipates’ the next, and it is by way of the ongoing synthesis of these manifold intuitions in actual perceptions that something like an object comes to stand before us in its ‘bodily presence’ and thus endures over time. The temporal structure identity synthesis in perception is what Husserl calls the immanent “law of essence [*Wesensgesetz*]” (1970b, p. 461/259) for which:

each actual, fulfilled conscious-present necessarily and continuously passes over into one that *has* just existed, so that our present conscious state makes continuous demands on our conscious future. The law further requires that our retentive [*retentionale*] awareness of what has just been, which itself has the immanent character of being actually present, demands that the phenomenon we are aware of as having just existed should in fact just have existed. The time we are talking of in this context is of course the immanent temporality [*Zeitform*] which belongs to the phenomenological stream of consciousness itself.

A tentative outline of the retentional structure of the temporality of perception is already posited in the *Logical Investigations*, and is presented in the form of a constant synthetic process of anticipation in the ‘present’ aimed towards future intuitions, and based on a retention of past presences. The ‘past’ is, in this sense, immanently present as the basis on which anticipatory intentions intuit the dynamic flux of part-percepts of an object as referring to that same object. It is in this sense, that the enduring presence of an object is, for Husserl, constituted in an ongoing synthetic process of unification of aspects of that self-same thing; and this is the structure of the immanent

temporality of consciousness. Furthermore, the structure of retention and its implicit anticipation as a ‘making present’, cannot be simply reduced to the notion of the succession of a retentional moment followed next by its anticipation, which in its turn leads to a new retention and so on. In the immanent flux of lived temporality the ‘conscious-present’ is already a retentional ‘past’ and its anticipatory ‘future’.

Intentional synthesis is thus always caught in *media res*, in that it is always already proceeding on the basis of immediately past percepts that, at the level of categorial intuitions, are not themselves explicitly given. The major problem for Husserl, however, is just how retention refers back to such an ‘unconceptualized’ past in order to anticipate future intuitions; what gives this self-generative process its ongoing unity or identity? Lampert (1995, p. 182) argues that Husserl solves this problem of retention in the *Ideas 1*, by positing the pure ego as the ground of backward referring or retention. That is, the ego is both a product of synthesis and a “pure identity prior to and indifferent to its experiences, its synthesising interpretations, and its objective world” (p. 201). The ‘ego’ is posited as a ‘receptacle of experience’, and as a subject’s self-awareness “*of himself* [sic] as the controller of the stream of consciousness; the ego, as the self-identical ‘I’ who thinks, steps onto the scene of experience” (p. 197).

The ego, as phenomenologically conceived, is then both an object of one’s concern as well as, in some sense, a prior condition for that concern. Yet reverting to notions of the ego as some sort of ‘receptacle’ for experiences would seem to be a rather uncritical recourse to a reification of consciousness by way of metaphors of the ‘present-at-hand’. In what sense can the ego, as an intentional process, ‘contain’ experiences? And how might the self-reflexive awareness of the Cartesian *cogito* as a ‘controlling ego’ be

related to this lived stream of experiences? At the time of the *Logical Investigations* Husserl was still working through these questions and the problem of how intentional synthesis comes to have the unity and identity that more or less belongs to one's own mundane, everyday life. Nonetheless, it is in these investigations that he outlines the problematic that will consume the next decade of his descriptive analyses leading up to the publication of the *Ideas 1*; a problematic dealing with the intentional ego and its relation to the temporal flux of lived experience. To begin with, Husserl makes a very definite distinction between notions of the phenomenal and the phenomenological ego, for the:

*relation of the phenomenal object* (that we also like to call a 'conscious content') *to the phenomenal subject* (myself as an empirical person, a thing) must naturally be *kept apart from the relation of a conscious content, in the sense of an experience, to consciousness in the sense of a unity of such conscious contents* (the phenomenological subsistence of an empirical ego) (Husserl, 1970b, p. 539/350).

The phenomenal relation between sense data, or external objects, and the *ego cogito* is based on a Cartesian model of experience, whereas, for Husserl, what is given in lived experiences are the mundane things themselves. Yet this does not mean for Husserl that there is an ego-thing for which these lived experiences are meaningfully given in reflection. Whilst he rejects the phenomenal notion of sense data in favour of a holism of lived experiences, this phenomenological notion of experience does not then merely posit an ego in relation to these experiences. Or at least, this relation between a phenomenological ego and the things themselves is an intentional one in which something like an ego is itself constituted. As Husserl states above, this relation is between 'contents of consciousness' understood as the sensible matters themselves, and consciousness itself as the ongoing unity of those 'contents'. It is in this sense, as the unity of perception effected in intentional synthesis, that the ego is to be understood as a 'receptacle' for experience.

The phenomenological ego, therefore, inasmuch as it is a temporal or intentional process, does not itself have object or thinglike qualities; and yet we can still refer to an ‘I am’, and to particular embodied others, or to what Husserl calls the empirical ego. It is this latter ego-notion that itself can appear and be given as a ‘content of consciousness’, and where the “ego in the sense of common discourse is an empirical object ... the ego remains an individual, thinglike object” (1970b, p. 541/353). In common discourse, then, we generally refer to ourself and others as embodied egos, as an ‘I am’ or ‘they are’. For Husserl, this reference to an empirical ego is made possible only in that consciousness itself has its own ‘unconceptualised’ unity and identity. Thus, if “we cut out the ego-body from the empirical ego, and limit the purely mental ego to its phenomenological content, the latter reduces to a unity of consciousness, to a real experiential complex” (p. 541/353). The phenomenologically reduced ego becomes a complex unity of lived experience, and as such, it is “therefore nothing peculiar, floating above many experiences: it is simply identical with their own interconnected unity” (p. 541/353).

Husserl is here, even as early as his *Logical Investigations*, questioning the ‘self-evidence’ of the ego as a ground (as *subiectum* or *hypokeimenon*) for philosophical reflection. According to Husserl (and also Heidegger), this positing of the ego as subject is a problem in both Descartes’ and Kant’s philosophies; and as concerns the *Cogito, ergo sum*, “what here passes as ego cannot be the empirical ego.... In the judgement ‘I am’ self-evidence attaches to a certain central kernel of our empirical ego-notion which is not bounded by a perfectly clear concept” (Husserl, 1970b, p. 543-544/356). The phenomenological problems of intentionality in general, as ultimately grounded in the unity of perception, all come down to an analysis of this

unclarified ground of modern philosophy; that is, to a descriptive analysis of the phenomenological subsistence of the empirical ego. As to this unconceptualized ‘central kernel’ of the empirical ego, the complex unity of lived experience is constituted in ‘unities of coexistence’ that:

pass continuously into one another from one moment to the next, composing a unity of change, of the stream of consciousness, which in its turn demands the continuous persistence, or no continuous change, of at least one aspect essential for its total unity, and so inseparable from it as a whole. This part is played by the presentative form [*Darstellungsform*] of *time* which is immanent in the stream of consciousness, which latter appears as a unity in time (not in the time of the world of things, but in the time which appears together with the stream of consciousness itself, and in which the stream flows). Each instant of this time is given in a continuous projective [*Abschattung*] series of (so-to-speak) ‘time sensations’; in each actual phase of the stream of consciousness the *whole* time-horizon of the stream is presented, and it thereby possesses a form overreaching all its contents, which remains the same form continuously, though its content steadily alters (1970b, p. 545/358).

According to Husserl, then, all the possible contents of consciousness, understood as the things or sensible matters themselves met with in everyday lived experiences, and including references to an empirical ego, constitute a ‘unity of change’. Lived experience is, in this sense, an ongoing experiential flux, from day to day, and from moment to moment. The structure of this flux is given in the retentional projection of intentional synthesis, a projection that transcends each moment and unifies experience over time, and which at its most fundamental level Husserl calls the ‘unity of perception’. This unity is essentially a temporal unity of the flux of consciousness, or in other words, the phenomenological ego is the temporal form of consciousness. As such, it is not itself a ‘content of consciousness’ but, rather, the temporal condition for the presentation of ‘contents’ or things, including the self-reflexive relation to itself as an empirical ego. The method of phenomenological reduction or bracketing back from the self-

evidence of the empirical ego, and from the sensible matters to their categorial intuitions given in perception, is thus at its most fundamental level supposed to reveal or uncover “the really self-enclosed, temporally growing unity of the stream of experience” (1970b, p. 545/358).

It is this temporal unity that constitutes the phenomenological content of the empirical ego, which is itself intentionally constituted within this unified form of time; and so the ‘phenomenological ego’ becomes a unity of time consciousness. Rather than an empirical ego-thing’s relation to representational content, the ego is here understood as the temporal form of that content. The phenomenological ego is not itself a ‘content’, that is, an internal object of consciousness or inner perception, but it is the temporal form of perception, and so Husserl states; “I am quite unable to find this ego, this primitive, necessary centre of relations” (p. 549/361). The ego, as some sort of self-evident centre of relations to the world, dissolves into a ‘unity of change’, or into the intentionally structured unity of perception.

Husserl subsequently (in *Ideas 1*) apparently manages to find this relational centre but only after working through the “corrupt forms of ego-metaphysic” (1970b, note I, p. 549/361) that uncritically posit it as some sort of self-evident *sum*. This critical analysis of the metaphysics of the *ego cogito* is accomplished in the descriptive phenomenology of time, and accounts for much of Husserl’s work throughout the decade after the publication of his *Logical Investigations*. From this perspective, it is in his work on ‘inner time consciousness’ that the two themes outlined in this chapter (those of an authentic phenomenology of perception and the phenomenological ego as a temporal unity of intentional synthesis) come together to form the basis of Husserl’s analysis of the pure ego in *Ideas 1*<sup>38</sup>. Or in other words, it is the relation between the phenomenological ego, as the temporal form of

perception, and the unity of perception effected in the categorial intuition of the objective being (bodily presence) of things, that must be explicated in order to develop his phenomenological retrieval of the Cartesian tradition. In this way, the ego becomes inextricably related to perception as a unification of the flux of sensible experience.

In his review of Husserl's first volume 'Prolegomena' of the *Logical Investigations*, Natorp points to this temporal problem concerning the relation between categorial structures and sense experience. This problem is not answered in the second volume of six investigations, for these descriptive analyses merely formulate an outline of the problem in order to provide the ground for its working out. Perhaps this 'failure' is partly the reason for Natorp's subsequent dismissal of the second volume as merely a falling back into psychologism. Whatever his subsequent beliefs, Natorp's pre-emptive criticism perhaps sets the theme for the next decade of Husserl's thinking, in the analysis of the intentional structures belonging to internal time consciousness. For it remains, beyond these grounding investigations, that a bond:

a *logical* connection *must* be set up between the super-temporal being of the logical and its temporal actualization in the experience of the mind, if the words [quoting Husserl] 'Realization of the ideal', are not to remain an enigma, a metaphysical locution of the most suspicious sort (Natorp, 1977, p. 66).

*Phenomenology of Time**§9. Towards the pure ego*

To reiterate, and following the above interpretation, from the *Logical Investigations* onwards Husserl's phenomenology was set up as an attempt to provide a critical philosophical ground for the empirical sciences. Inasmuch as the natural sciences were in large part founded on the philosophies of Descartes and Kant, this attempt became one of a critical dismantling (*Abbau*) and retrieval of the Cartesian notion of the subject and its relation to the external world given in sensory experience. Empirical experience, as the relation of concepts to raw experience, is presupposed in these philosophies, and along with this presupposition goes the notion of an ego's conceptualization of that raw sensory flux. The ego or subject thus becomes the ground (as *hypokeimenon*) of experience. According to Husserl, however, what remains unquestioned in all empirically based philosophy and psychology, whether that be in Hume's scepticism or Kant's transcendentalism, is this recourse to a self-evident notion of the thinking subject or *ego cogito*, for whom raw sensory experience is to be organized according to concepts or beliefs, pragmatically or otherwise.

From the perspective of Husserl's early phenomenology, then, the history of the West as the history culminating in the scientific or Cartesian project of modernity, is problematically grounded in an unquestioned 'egometaphysic', or a metaphysics of the subjective relation to sensory experience. Accordingly, the empirical notion of experience is inadequate to the matter of philosophy, in that what is given in human experience in the first case are meaningfully lived experiences. At the level of 'straightforward' or simple everyday perceptions, what is given are the things themselves, and so one

always sees coloured things and hears worldly sounds rather than a flux of meaningless sense data. Which is to say that everyday perceptions already make sense to us in an unproblematically mundane way, and so things are already meaningfully given to lived experience without necessarily having to become a thematic or representational concern.

This is the fundamental basis of phenomenological analysis, as a reduction back to what is given in one's own straightforward sensible perceptions of the things themselves. It is only on this basis of what first gives itself in mundane everyday lived experiences, that one might then posit the philosophical abstraction of an ego's conceptual relation to meaningless sense data. Empirical philosophy, in this sense, works backwards from what is already given, to a theoretical or subjective dualism that elides the intentional unity of human experience for which consciousness is always consciousness of something. Phenomenology, on the other hand, problematises this holistic unity itself, and Husserl does this specifically in order to ground empiricism and the sciences in a more critically philosophical notion of the relation of a subject to its world.

Such a shift in philosophical perspective requires a shift in methodological focus, from theorizing about a subject's 'internal' ego or cognitive structure as a mediating process between external sense data input and behavioural outputs, to a 'demonstration' of the way in which these empirical facts are first given to the analyst's own perceptions. A psychological subject's 'internal' or mental processes can, in this sense, only be posited on the basis of the empirical analyst's own lived experience of the world. Given this, the phenomenological relation between the analyst's ego and their own 'external' or, rather, lived world, comes before any empirical subject/object dualism. Such is the early Husserl's phenomenological holism, and this 'pre-

empirical' method is laid out in the opening pages of the prolegomena to the *Logical Investigations*, setting the grounds for a temporal critique of Cartesian modernity.

According to this reading of the phenomenological project, Husserl thus questions both the ego as a self-evident ground and its relation to sense experience, such that it is the relation itself that structures both the ego and its experiences. Or in other words, intentionality as a directedness or comportment towards things is found to be the basis of both the ego process and holistically structured perceptions. The phenomenological ego is an ongoing intentional process of relation that transcends each moment of lived experience in constantly coming back to those self-same experiences, and in doing so it constitutes something of the continuity or sense of unity belonging to everyday existence. Lived experience is, in this way, always caught in *media res*, in that what constantly gives itself to perception is always understood in relation to what has just been. In this sense, the retentive past forms the horizon within which the future is constantly becoming present.

For Husserl, the intentional ego, as the form of this ongoing temporal process of relation, constitutes the sense of everyday life by way of constituting the unconceptualised objectivities of things given in 'straightforward' perceptions. The ego is, in this phenomenological sense, an ongoing, perceptual process of relation, rather than a 'thinking thing'. Intentionality understood phenomenologically is a far cry from any notion of a subject's thoughtful mediation of perceptions, as it seems to be in Dreyfus' cognitivist interpretation of Husserl. The perception of the objective being of things, understood as an effect of intentional identity synthesis, is not 'mere thinking' but, rather, a temporal process of relation, and as such, it is a basic

concept of phenomenological analysis. Which is to say, the objectivity of objects as enduring in time becomes the 'pre-empirical' basis for Husserl's retrieval of Cartesian modernity; this is his scientific bias, and it seems to characterise his early 'ahistorical' approach to philosophy.

In this attempt to provide a critical philosophical basis for science, Husserl was led towards the ego as an intentionally structured process of 'primary memory', through which the self-sameness of things appears, implicitly, for the consciousness of everyday lived experiences. In seeing something such as a chair, for example, one might have in mind certain representational strategies to do with whatever work is at hand, perhaps one is sitting down to read or write. What is reflectively given and conceptualized is the work at hand, or perhaps one even approaches that work in an 'unthinking' manner. Nonetheless, in order to effect that work one must presumably be able to perceive the chair itself as what it is, without necessarily making this an explicit theme of one's concerns. One simply sees and makes use of the chair, and this simple straightforward 'seeing' is a condition for accomplishing the work at hand. This mundane notion of straightforward perception requires no conceptual working out or theoretical representation of that chair itself; there is no self-reflexive ego giving meaning to disparate sensations, and organizing them into the concept 'chair' in order to then see and use it as what it already is. One simply sees and feels it and reclines one's bodily weight into it.

Yet for Husserl, this means that in using the chair in this way, it is implicitly perceived as 'identical to itself' from moment to moment. One sees its shape and colour, reclines bodily into it, and these (visual and tactile) sensible intuitions also imply the non-sensible or abstract categorial intuition of the 'objectness' of that self-same chair. It stands there in its bodily presence, as

part of the unconceptualised or non-thematic perceptual background within which lived experience and 'mere thinking' make sense. This bodily presence, as implicitly enduring from moment to moment within the flux of intentionally directed consciousness, is constituted in a categorial intuition of the objective being of that thing, in this case the chair. This is what Husserl calls an identity synthesis; an immanent intentional relation in which the chair is objectively given by way of a straightforward perception as a temporal 'unity in change'.

The aspects of the chair, the visual and bodily cues that are in constant flux, are nonetheless an organized perception of that self-same thing. Yet its 'objectness', in the sense of its enduring bodily presence, is not a concatenation of those seemingly raw percepts, simply because the very first aspect shows itself, not as a raw datum, but as the chair itself. The objective presence of the thing is intended ahead of, so to speak, all of its particular aspects. Furthermore, this ongoing sense of presence or identity is accomplished not in an explicitly self-reflective judgement but, rather, through an absorbed and even unthinking bodily involvement with the thing itself and in the context of whatever work is at hand. The difficult relation between this phenomenological notion of perception and the problem of practice (or Husserl's philosophical relation to Heidegger) is the central theme of this thesis and remains to be dealt with in the following chapters. It is a postulate of this thesis that such a relation exceeds any simple representational notion of perception, and in fact undermines the priority of a simple correspondence theory of truth.

What is given in the mental process of straightforward perceptions, and primarily in the context of one's own everyday concerns about getting on with whatever work is at hand, is this or that particular thing, its sensible

qualities. What is not generally made explicit in a simple absorption in the matter at hand is the, nonetheless prevalent, categorial intuition of objective being, in which things are generally perceived as the same as themselves from moment to moment. Which is to say that, obviously, these things endure in objective time. The constitution of the objective being or presence of things as they give themselves in perceptions is in part the focal point of the phenomenology of time. It is by way of the phenomenological reduction that Husserl, beyond his preparatory logical investigations, must demonstrate how the ego as a temporal process of relation comes to immanently constitute the objectivity of things. These three themes—the methodological reduction back from the ‘natural attitude’ that discloses the intentional ego and its immanent objectivities—characterise his analyses of internal time consciousness. Thus the “phenomenology of ‘authentic’ experience [*eigentlichen Erfahrung*]” (Husserl, 1964, p. 28/9<sup>39</sup>), that is of straightforward perceptions as ‘ultimately adequate’, is required for the analysis of phenomenological time. This authentic analysis is concerned with the categorial structures belonging to intentional synthesis, and thus also with the non-sensible or intelligible sense of “*lived experiences of time [Zeit erlebnisse]*” (p. 28/9).

The phenomenology of time was a constant and largely unpublished concern of Husserl’s from 1893 through into the 1930’s, and it more or less underpins his entire phenomenological career. The 1929 text, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, edited by Heidegger, is supposedly a lecture course given in 1905 but is also based on manuscripts dating from 1901-17. It includes not only much of the lecture course but also a collection of writings that span the move from the *Logical Investigations* through to the formative stages of Husserl’s development of transcendental phenomenology in the

*Ideas Book 1*, first published in 1913. This development, in which the necessity of the reduction and its relation to the transcendental or ‘controlling’ ego is first worked out, is elided in the original version of the manuscript handed to Heidegger. Although Heidegger received editorial credits in the published text, the original manuscript was actually compiled by Husserl’s assistant Dr. Edith Stein over several years and included editorial revisions by Husserl from as late as 1917, none of which are indicated in the 1929 text. So instead of a clear statement of Husserl’s notion of time, what is given is a confusion of ideas and an elision of their development towards the equation of retention with ‘reproduction’ that will mark a turning point in Husserl’s analysis.

Apparently Heidegger received the manuscript from his master in April 1926, just as *Being and Time* was in the final stages of writing, and Husserl’s work on time was then published later in 1928. Heidegger presented Husserl with the near final draft of *Being and Time*, complete to §77 (cf. Kisiel, 1993, p. 482), on the occasion of the latter’s birthday and in return Husserl gave Heidegger the document on time to publish (cf. Boehm in Husserl, 1966, p. xxiv). Beyond writing a short introduction, Heidegger’s involvement with the text does not seem to extend much beyond passing the manuscript on to the publishers. According to his editorial foreword, the “pervading theme of the present study is the temporal constitution of a pure datum of sensation and the self-constitution of ‘phenomenological’ time which underlies such a constitution” (in Husserl, 1964, p. 15).

Such a ‘pure datum’ is presumably a ‘straightforward’ or simple perception, which is itself objectively constituted in an intentional identity synthesis. The self-constitution of phenomenological time, as the intentional structure of the phenomenological ego, constitutes the objective being of mundane

perceptions. As already suggested, these temporal and perceptual themes can be seen in a developmental form in the *Logical Investigations*, and it is the problem of how the phenomenological ego process and its categorial objectivities are related to the flux of everyday lived experiences that drives Husserl towards the analysis of internal time consciousness. How can identity or bodily presence belong to lived experience, or rather, in what way is objective being constituted in the flux of everyday, straightforward perceptions? The intentional relation between presence and this perceptual flux has already been outlined as a problem in the sixth of the logical investigations, a problem which, as Natorp suggested, must be dealt with if phenomenology is to lay claim to some sort of new philosophical ground for the sciences. As Brough ('Translator's Introduction', in Husserl, 1991, p. XXIII) points out, if Husserl:

sorted out the method and the full range of what he will analyze in the phenomenology of time consciousness by the end of the first decade of the century, he simultaneously became aware that the very subject of his investigation might render the whole undertaking impossible—in fact, might jeopardize the very possibility of phenomenology as such.

I have suggested that Husserl's awareness of this problem already motivated his analysis of the phenomenology of time, and it is this analysis that intensified the problem. As Husserl himself says, "*all experiences flow away. Consciousness is a perpetual Heraclitean flux ... Nothing can return and be given in identity again*" (1991, p. 360/349). This is what Husserl calls the problem of 'transcendence'. How does consciousness transcend the flux of lived experience and constitute the sense of identity that it has, where things are obviously the same as themselves from moment to moment. Transcendence, in this phenomenological sense, does not refer to how an ego can transcend itself and relate to an 'external' world of objects. Rather, transcendence belongs to the temporal structure of consciousness itself and its immanently

constituted objectivities. Such a temporal problem threatens the entire edifice of Husserl's phenomenology of consciousness, for left unsolved it leads towards "*an extreme scepticism*" (p. 361/351) in which there would be no universal grounds for making scientifically objective statements. In order to solve this conundrum, Husserl will make use of the intentional structure of retention and the possibility of identity already implicit in the *Logical Investigations*<sup>40</sup>, in order to posit the temporal structure of intentionality as the unity of consciousness and objective being.

This notion of the ego as intentional process is to be demonstrated according to the methodology appropriate to it. According to Brough (in Husserl, 1991, p. xxii), by 1909 the phenomenological reduction, as a disclosure of the immanent temporal structure of consciousness, "emerges in a clear and coherent form". The reduction that opens up the temporality of the intentional ego, finds the "condition of its own possibility in the very thing it investigates" (p. xxiv), and in doing so the matter of philosophy is given in a self-reflexive disclosure of its own possibility. From this immanent perspective, consciousness is in constant flux and, as such, it is "there as slipping away, but it is there, available to me as something on which I can reflect" (p. xxiii). The intentional ego is this movement, or temporal structure, belonging to the flux of everyday consciousness and within which something like an 'I am', or what Husserl calls the empirical ego, can appear. Of course, this notion of the subject is not then to be conflated with that of an isolated or worldless ego-thing that conceptualizes an external world, for the phenomenological ego is an intentional process of relation where consciousness is always consciousness of something. The subject/object dualism is constituted in this relation, and it is the relation itself that is in question.

Given this, for Husserl, a phenomenological analysis of time “cannot clarify the constitution of time without considering the constitution of temporal objects” (1991, p. 24/23), that is, the constitution of the objective being of things. Intentionality becomes a process in which things are given as extended in objective time, which is to say the chair, for example, self-evidently remains what it is while one works. It has an implicitly objective duration extended over any number of moments, and only because of this can it fade into the perceptual background of consciousness. Duration in this sense, and the bodily presence belonging to things, has a temporal constitution where the “duration of the object, its temporal extension, is the object’s time. Husserl can therefore say of duration what he said of time: that it is the form of individual objects” (Brough, in Husserl, 1991, p. xxv). The duration of things is objectively constituted in consciousness, and this latter process has an ongoing, intentionally receptive structure. In this way, the phenomenological ego and the immanent constitution of bodily presence become the fundamental focus of the phenomenology of time.

#### *§10. Intentionality and transcendence*

What then is the temporal structure of intentionality? Husserl must first distinguish between time, as it is measured, and that ‘personal’ time that already constitutes consciousness as a meaningful continuity such that it can then measure time. Lived time is the time of phenomenological analysis, the living present in the sense of the constantly changing ‘now’ as it is given in one’s own lived experiences of the world. As Heidegger, in an early 1924 lecture, puts the question of time: “What is this now, this time now as I look at my watch? Now as I do this; now, as the light here goes out, for instance. What is the now? Is the now at my disposal? Am I the now?” (1992, p. 5E)<sup>41</sup>. It is only from the perspective of this lived time that things can give

themselves as objectivities that have a temporal duration for consciousness. It is the relation between these two notions of time, of lived and objective time, that structures the question of time from the beginning.

From a phenomenological perspective, calculative or objective time is measured first of all in respect to moments of consciousness, and is conceived as a linear succession of such moments. Thus one understands that there has been a past and will be a future, and the present 'now' is merely one in the ongoing succession of an incalculable number of such moments. This linearity is, nonetheless, open to calculation and can be calibrated against various objective standards such as the sun or subatomic processes. Things that appear to us in sense perceptions are understood to have a certain duration, they endure for a while as what they are and these objective durations can be empirically measured quite accurately nowadays, even down to the nano-second resolution of relativistic or quantum variations. The phases of psycho-physiological states occurring in a subject can also of course be measured, such as in EEG readouts, synaptic activity or behavioural patterns, and so on.

However, it is difficult to conceive of an empirical method that might objectively measure the movement of consciousness that is itself constitutive of what we understand as a duration, simply because such a movement is not for us an objective continuity that can be given to consciousness. Rather, what seems to be given in a phenomenology of consciousness is the way in which intentionally directed perceptions are constantly constituting things as objectivities that are extended in time. Which is to say that consciousness has its own unity and it is this unity, the way each moment constantly follows on and is meaningfully related to the next, that is the focus of the phenomenology of time. Thus for Husserl, consciousness has the character

of a temporally constitutive flux that is not to be thought of as itself a succession of nows, rather, it is “absolute subjectivity ... as a point of actuality, primal source point, that from which springs the ‘now’, and so on” (Husserl, 1964, p. 100/75). As the source, it constitutes the temporal process and succession of conscious moments within which things can appear to us as the ‘same as themselves’ from moment to moment.

This is not to say, of course, that it is the subject itself, that we ourselves, actively constitute time by relating one moment to the next. Phenomenological time is not a subjective accomplishment, as if we first relate the past with the present and a possible future by way of the concept of ‘time’. Husserl’s notion of intentionality, as the temporal structure of ‘absolute subjectivity’, is not merely the thoughtful reflection of a rational subject. It is, rather, the articulated structure of sense perceptions such that something like the concept of ‘things’ as enduring in linear time is made possible. Authentic analysis involves the non-thematic constitution of the ideal objectivities belonging to ‘straightforward’ percepts, that is, to perceptions of things that are given to us within a meaningfully lived context. These things endure within the stream of everyday consciousness, they have an ideal ‘unity in change’, and only in this endurance can they be something other than a chaotic barrage of disconnected impressions. For Husserl, the temporal structure of this constitutive intentionality, what he will call ‘pre-empirical temporality’ (*Zeitlichkeit*), is the source of our notions of identity, objectivity and calculative time, and yet it is as natural a phenomenon as planetary motion. Far from being a merely subjective construct, this originary temporality will be what makes possible any subjective experience of temporal change and continuity; it makes possible, at least in part, something like the unity of human being or ‘life’.

Absolute subjectivity, as the primal source point of actuality, in a certain sense means nothing more than the lived moment, the only moment one has, phenomenologically speaking, and which is constantly passing back over into itself. The perceptual content of this lived moment is, of course, always in flux, time does not stop for us, but still it remains that consciousness can reflect on itself and the world, and on the past and a possible future, only from within the lived moment and its perceptual flux. Furthermore, if one accepts the phenomenological notion that ‘pre-empirical’ temporality, as the ground of absolute subjectivity, is that which first makes possible a notion of the ‘now’, its ‘past’ and their ‘future’, then such a subjectivity, as the temporal source of the authentic present, cannot be thought in some sense as one of a sequence of nows occurring in time. Rather, it is the source from out of which sequential time itself becomes meaningful. The ‘primal source point’ is, in this sense, more the ‘living present’ within which one’s entire life flicks by, and where one always already finds oneself.

A phenomenologically authentic method thus discloses one’s own lived moment as a perceptual flux, and the problem of transcendence focuses on just how this momentary flux can have the continuity and sense of identity that it self-evidently has. According to Husserl, the “flux of consciousness constitutes its own unity” (1964, p. 106/80) by way of the intentional process of retention and protentional anticipation. This ‘primary memory’ process occurs at the level of straightforward perceptions of things and is not to be conflated with merely remembering and representing to oneself those things. Perhaps an object presents itself to one’s sense perception within the context of everyday work, a body of text in the sense of a paper one might be reading for instance. Its materiality presents any number of perceptual cues, such as its feel and weight, as well as its visible aspects. Within the lived moment

there is an ongoing flow of such perceptions, and yet what is unproblematically given to consciousness is the body of text itself. It endures through the flux of perceptions and remains more or less what it already is; this actual, self-same materiality. Its sensible aspects imply an ideal objectivity that endures through manifold percepts, and this perceptual identity synthesis, as a transcendence of the flux, is constituted in a straightforward manner without recourse to rational reflection; for in this instance one's rational reflection is of course already absorbed in reading the text itself.

Which is to say that, whilst one is reflectively absorbed in reading the text, or even in some non-reflective task at hand, the objective being of the body of text remains as an implicit ideal structure of the perceptual whole within which one finds oneself. The thing remains identical with itself, irrespective of whether it becomes an explicit object of one's concerns or remains as a familiar part of the background. From this perspective, there need be no rational subject floating above or behind the lived experience, who collates the various meaningless percepts and arrives at the meaningful conclusion that 'this perceptual flux is a book', for instance. One can recognize and reflect on the actual thing only because it has already given itself in a straightforward perception as something objectively self-same; the flux is already implicitly perceived as a thing extended over time.

Each individual percept of this thing comes to presence and fades away into the past, being constantly replaced by another similar percept in an ongoing series. In this way, a straightforward perception of something has a temporal duration extended over any number of sensible perceptions. Within this flux, what relates the individual impressions to one another is primary memory, in the sense of a non-thematic retention of what has just been. Even if only one aspect of the thing presents itself, this aspect still has a duration and,

therefore, a continuous series of retentions related to it as the lived moment progresses. Within this lived moment there is a continuous retention of the 'present primal sensation', of the actual aspect given in a straightforward perception, as it constantly passes over into the past. Retention thus forms the ongoing basis for recognizing the 'lived present' as a continuum, by constantly retaining each conscious moment as it passes into the next. The present is, in this way, constantly given only in relation to what has just been, and it is only in this relation that something like the 'living present' can have the unity that it seems to possess.

Furthermore, there is no room here for a piecing together of disparate sensations after the fact, and arriving at the conclusion that an object has been intuited. Rather, at the level of sense perception, a perceptual flux is already given as an objective duration within the ongoing context of one's own meaningfully lived life. It is only on the basis of such an ideal duration that one might then reflect on the various sensible aspects pertaining to a thing. Or in other words, presumably *something* is given to consciousness, whether implicitly as part of a perceptual background or in actually being concerned with the thing itself. The simple fact that something appears implies that it has an objective identity that transcends each moment of the perceptual flux within which it appears. For Husserl, such a transcendental duration, in the sense of the enduring presence or objective being of an intuited object, is achieved by way of a constant ongoing retention of the thing itself as it is given in the flux of the lived moment, and it is this retentional structure that constitutes "the unity of the flux itself" (Husserl, 1964, p. 108/82).

Yet retention is only one moment of intentionality at the level of straightforward perceptions, in that it pertains to the immediately given 'past'

as it constantly fades away. It is on the basis of this 'past' that one is "directed to what is coming" (p. 161/118) in an anticipation of the fulfilment of the retention. That is, on the basis of retention, consciousness is constantly anticipating or awaiting the fulfilment of what was already presented in the immediately given past moment. This futural protention, based in the retentional past, forms the ongoing temporal constitution of the 'lived present' within which one constantly finds oneself. Life, thought in terms of the stream of consciousness, is lived out in this present moment that has the intentionally articulated structures of the past and the future within it, and where, through "these retentions and protentions, the actual content of the stream is joined together" (p. 111/84).

The basic temporal structure of intentionally directed consciousness is a process in which objective things are constituted from within the constantly changing flux of perceptions. There are, thus, two notions of time at work here; one is associated with identity or objective being and the second with change or constant difference. The first is what Husserl calls authentic time and equates with properly objective time (1964, p. 109/83), in which there is the duration and alteration of things given to consciousness. This is the time that is associated with objective things given in sensible perceptions and, as such, it is "opposed to the temporal field of the stream of lived experience" (p. 157/116) or the lived moment itself as it flows and in which there is only constant change. It is from out of this constantly changing flux of sense perception that things come to presence and can endure for a while as what they are. For Husserl this originary, perceptual flux is "pre-empirical or pre-phenomenological time" (p. 170/124) which itself "is not in time" (p. 171/124). That is, being temporally constitutive of consciousness in an

originary sense, it does not itself occur to consciousness in objective time as a duration.

Constant difference or change, as pre-empirical temporality, is therefore, in a certain sense, the basic concept for any phenomenology of consciousness. It is evident in the constant fading away or dissolution of retentional memory. What was most important for Husserl, however, was not so much this originary time but, rather, the way in which identity “unites all temporal phases of the flux” (p. 171/125) and thus properly constitutes the objective being of things. The task he set for phenomenology in the *Logical Investigations*, and that more or less underwrites his career through to the ‘neo-Cartesianism’ of the *Cartesian Meditations* and beyond, was a phenomenological critique of empirical philosophy as a critical ground for the natural sciences, and through that to a renewal of modernity as a whole. In this sense, then, it was necessary to demonstrate how the flux constitutes identity, or in general, how psychological states are related to logical ideals; from the physical objects of empirical science through to purely ideal mathematical regularities.

In following this line of analysis, the question for Husserl then becomes one of just how the flux of consciousness constitutes ideal objectivities for itself. That is, how does this flux constitute its own sense of continuity such that objectively given things can appear to endure for it? Both the ego and its objects must be constituted in the flux of originary pre-empirical temporality. It became obvious, then, that identity cannot be something belonging only to the ‘external’ or transcendental world of objects, but that identity already belongs immanently to the flux itself as a “self-maintaining, continuous, common essence [*Wesen*] in its individuation” (Husserl, 1964, p. 172/125). In this way, transcendence becomes an immanent affair, such that the flux must

somehow constitute its own identity as a continuity, and in this constitution the intentional relation will then pertain to both the self and its objectively given world. From the intentional structure of retention that constitutes the objectivity of things, and thus the ‘succession of consciousness’ within the originary flux of pre-empirical temporality, Husserl moves on to the problem of the ‘consciousness of succession’:

This pre-phenomenal, pre-immanent temporality [*Zeitlichkeit*] is constituted intentionally as the form of temporally constitutive consciousness and in the latter itself. The flux of the immanent, temporally constitutive consciousness not only *is*, but is so remarkably and yet so intelligibly constituted that a self-appearance of the flux necessarily subsists in it, and hence the flux itself must necessarily be comprehensible in the flowing (Husserl, 1964, p. 109/83).

The above, then, is something of the general development of Husserl’s early problematic concerning time. Overall, the “*guiding problem*, which drove beyond the level of the cognition and science of nature, was the ‘*problem of transcendence*’, and above all the problem of the transcendence of nature” (Husserl, 1991, p. 356/345). Intentionality and transcendence are, therefore, the defining characteristics of the phenomenology of time, organized around “the enigma of how consciousness can validly transcend itself” (p. 362/351).

### *§11. Originary temporality as dissolution*

As already suggested, the problem of transcendence involves a problem concerning ‘primary memory’ or retention and just how the originary temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) of consciousness constitutes some sort of unified continuity from out of the constantly changing flux of lived experience. This primary memory, as an intentionally directed structure of perception, must also be distinguished from memory in the sense of mere recollection, or what Husserl termed ‘reproduction’ (*Reproduktion*). Primary memory, as retention, is associated with the flux of perception as it gives itself, while secondary

memory, or reproduction, is associated with representations of what appears in that flux. This distinction marks the difference between objective being and reproductions of that, in the sense of the difference between the “unity that is apprehended in the flow as one thing, as something identical throughout the phases of the flow, throughout the flow’s continuity”, and this unity towards which one’s regard is directed and held onto and that can be identified “again and again in repeated recollection” (Husserl, 1991, p. 366/355).

If something is given in a more or less continuous series of sense perceptions, perhaps in the use of a hammer where one feels its heft and wields it, what is also ideally given in that sensible series is the unproblematic self-sameness of the hammer. The non-thematic flux of perceptions that constitute the ideal unity that is the objective being of that hammer, are related one to the other by way of the intentionally directed flow of retention and protention as the lived moment progresses. In the downward stroke of the hammer, for instance, there is a fluid arc of motion and a bodily sense of balance that presumably must continue right up to the head of the nail that is being struck. There is no time here for recollecting how one is supposed to use the hammer or how it was once used. There is only the flow of actual bodily and visual perceptions that constitute the lived experience of actually using that hammer. Within that momentary experience, the hammer maintains its ideal unity for consciousness. Once the hammer stroke is completed, one might then reflect on the bent nail and perhaps on the use of ‘this same hammer’. In this way, for Husserl, “I have the unity that lives in and through the flow; and secondly, in reproduction [*Reproduktion*] I can establish this unity, as I can any unity, as <the> same” (1991, p. 366/356).

Here, then, Husserl underlines the difference between the retentional flow of straightforward perceptions and subsequent representations (as recollections or reproductions) of those perceptions. From this perspective, one can represent an object on the basis of a lived experience of the 'objectness' belonging to the thing itself. Similarly, one can represent oneself as the subject of these experiences, yet in what way might one's own 'subjectness' be experienced or lived through? The ego, thought as the unity of consciousness, is an intentionally directed process that can of course reflect on itself, and represent itself to itself. The self-reflexivity of the flow can be represented in Descartes' proposition *cogito ergo sum*. While one might doubt the absolute validity of judgements, such as 'this is a chair', since it is possible I might be mistaken, and while one might also doubt the actual sense perceptions pertaining to that judgement, for I might be dreaming, one cannot presumably doubt that there is a doubter. That is, there must be an existent human subject for whom these experiences are meaningfully given, irrespective of whether they are absolutely true or not. Yet, as Husserl is often at pains to point out, although seemingly self-evident, the Cartesian proposition leaves unquestioned the way in which the ego 'is', and so the 'sum' remains an enigma. For phenomenology, however, the problem of scepticism must first be worked out by way of the things themselves, which means by way of phenomena as they appear to consciousness and its lived experiences.

Descartes' first meditation was supposed to deliver a proof for the certainty of the existence of the modern subject. While scepticism calls into question the validity of all sense data given to the subject, and therefore of any beliefs or representations concerning that data, what is of course certain is that there is this ego who doubts. As Husserl says, "if I doubt and if I am reflectively

aware that I am doubting, the being-given of the doubt is absolutely certain” (1991, p. 360/349). Yet while the sceptical cogitation is given “absolutely *in the moment* in which it is given reflectively” (p. 361/350), the *cogito* itself still remains unquestioned. Sceptical doubt can be experienced in the actual moment of doubting, and yet the nature of the ego itself remains ambiguous. Given this, phenomenologically speaking, the “*absolute givenness of the cogitatio does not imply ‘cogito sum’* and also does *not* signify *the existence of the so-called psychic phenomenon in the sense of psychology*” (p. 357/346). Again, Husserl’s strident anti-Cartesianism is brought to bear on the question of the status of the ego, and he rejects any philosophical recourse to the apparent self-evidence of the thinking ego in the sense of the empirical or psychological subject.

So just how can the phenomenological ego give itself as an object of its own consciousness? As the ongoing intentional structure of retention and protention that constantly ‘makes present’ the perceptible world, this ego is a temporally articulated continuity whose unity can be represented in the assertion ‘I am’. The latter, following Descartes and Kant, has generally been thought as the supporting ground for human understanding. Yet, for Husserl, this dynamic ground is an intentional process and never an isolated ego-thing nor merely a logical subject. Such a process never has an ego behind the scenes mediating and giving meaning to sensible perceptions of the world, it is, rather, always already an ongoing intentionally directed flow of retentive consciousness. Furthermore, as a directed process, consciousness never is ‘in itself’, it is always consciousness of something, of some object given to it in a perceived presence or in representations of that, and within a lived experience of the world. The intentional relation inhabits both the subject and its objectivities, and therefore any self-reflexive positing of this subject

for itself, must disclose the ego in its relation to ideal objects of consciousness.

Given this, there can be no positing of the ego as process that does not take into account the intentional constitution of objective being. Obviously, merely representing the ego as in some sense an 'existent' representational mediation of sense data, or as the cognitive structure of an empirically embodied subject, would fall short of the goal of phenomenology. Invoking Brentano's initial conception of intentionality against the notion of ego as substance, the ego is not merely an 'I think' but an 'I think something'. The phenomenological ego as process, becomes a continuously re-enacted intentional relation in which the everyday flow of consciousness is constantly returning to itself and its perceptible world. Therefore, and from the perspective of phenomenology, it is within this lived world that the problem of scepticism and the structure of the ego must be worked out.

For Husserl, sceptical doubt first arises with the validity of representations as recollections or reproductions of earlier perceptions. The phenomenal structure of representation is such that it must always follow after the lived experience that it is representing. Given this structural deferral, a recollection never gives the matter itself in its 'actual presence' but, rather, merely refers to it. The act of representing something, however, is also of course an 'actually present phenomenon', in the sense that it is a present intuitive act that refers to an earlier perception. The chair, for instance, can be seen for what it is and so be represented as 'this particular chair'. The representation finds 'fulfilment' in actually apprehending the chair itself but, for Husserl, these two acts, reproduction and straightforward perception, are nonetheless two separate moments of the flux of consciousness. Given this temporal displacement, the object of the representation is not itself given 'absolutely'

in its 'actual presence' for consciousness. Recollection, in this re-presentative sense, can not then be 'apodictic' evidence, for the judgement that 'this is a chair' can only find justification in something other than its own act of intuition. It does not give itself absolutely. As Husserl says, the validity of recollection must be bracketed since its object "transcends the phenomenon of recollection and can turn into an enigma for us" (p. 352/341).

If recollection cannot provide an absolutely certain ground for phenomenologically derived truths, then it must fall to the perceived phenomena themselves "in their *actual presence*" (p. 352/341) to provide such a ground. In this sense, it might seem that the ideal 'presence' of things to consciousness is an absolutely given intuition that lends support to an analysis of the intentional ego. However, when things appear in a straightforward manner to consciousness, they do so by enduring for a while as what they are. The chair, for instance, can be seen and felt to be what it is without actually becoming a thematic concern for consciousness. It is an objective being that gives itself, and so endures throughout the constantly changing flux of conscious moments, and in doing so it also has a duration for that consciousness; which is to say it exists in time. In these durations, as already suggested, the individual percepts of the thing are constantly fading away into the retentive past of the lived moment. A duration is thus in constant flux, and it is in this perceptual flux that we "always have only a point that, in arriving, immediately escapes again" (Husserl, 1991, p. 360/349). It is at this point of his analysis that Husserl confronts the central problem facing his phenomenology of time. In calling the absolute certainty of the modern Cartesian subject into question, the analysis threatens to undermine his entire project for it then seems that "*all experiences flow away. Consciousness is a perpetual Heraclitean flux*; what has just been given sinks into the abyss of the

phenomenological past and then is gone forever. Nothing can return and be given in identity a second time” (p. 360/349).

What seems to have alarmed Husserl at this stage is that the sceptical problem infects not only the certainty of the *cogito* but also the intentional structure of identity synthesis itself. The structural constitution of objective being, as a new foundation for empirical science, is called into question. For if the recollection and representation of what is past can be doubted, then it seems that all that one can be sure of is the phenomena in their “*actual presence [wirklichen Präsenz]*” (Husserl, 1991, p. 352/341). Yet, as already suggested, the presence of phenomena, intentionally founded in the originary flux of sensory perceptions, is also constantly subject to change in the constant dissolution of retentional memory. It therefore seems that what is “*true of the recollection* also seems to be true *of the consciousness that immediately follows upon the ebbing phenomenon and that we call retention*” (p. 352/341). The bodily presence of a thing, as much as the immanent presence of any matter at hand, are given to consciousness as a duration, and in that duration the present perception of the matter is constantly fading away and being replaced by similar percepts. Yet consciousness constantly retains a memory of the just past percept that sets up or anticipates, and thus is intentionally related to, the present percept that is itself already fading into primary memory. Retention thus forms a constantly fading flow of primary memory or consciousness. Or as Husserl says:

A perception might begin. But already the now is passing over into the not-now and a new now is there. We say that the perception endures. This duration has a terminus, the flowing now, and an extent of nows that have been—an extension into the past, therefore. Thus we have retention throughout (1991, p. 353/342).

The presence of phenomena, their objective being as a duration, is founded in the constant dissolution of retentional consciousness, where every

“grasping of an enduring phenomenon also implies retention in company with the grasping of the duration” (p. 361/350). The immanent intentional structure of presence, as a unity in change, implies that the ‘actual presence’ of things is never itself given absolutely in the lived moment. As soon as it is given, it passes into the retentional past that already intentionally forms the present. And so, if “*we are not able to stay with the unity throughout its duration, with the unity understood as unity in change and constancy extending throughout the continuity of just-past nows*, then nothing whatever can be asserted” (p. 353/342).

With the constant dissolution of the ‘actual presence’ of phenomena in retentional consciousness, the process of retention itself becomes subject to constant change, and so we “therefore fall into an *extreme scepticism*. Finally, *we may not even presume to speak of a flow of consciousness*, indeed, to speak of anything at all” (p. 361/350-351). The phenomenological ego, as the temporal form of consciousness, in the sense of intentionally directed retention and protention, falls victim to its own originary structure. The absolute flux of the temporality of consciousness ensures that nothing can be absolutely given to consciousness, neither the presence of things or matters at hand, nor the intentional unity of consciousness that makes this possible. In other words, for phenomenology, all identity, in the sense of all presence and self-presence, is founded on and thus undermined by originary temporality and its constant dissolution of the present. This difficulty is what Husserl calls “*absolute scepticism*” (p. 354/342).

It might seem, then, that Natorp’s challenge to set up a logical relation between the ‘super-temporal being of the logical and its temporal actualization in the experience of the mind’, cannot be met. Husserlian phenomenology would, then, be in the same untenable position as Russell’s dogmatic insistence on realism. The problem of lived time, or the flux of

consciousness, undermines any attempt to assign ideal objectivities to individual sense perceptions. For example, in the simple equation  $A = A$ , what is given is the identity of A with itself, and this seems unproblematic. However, from a phenomenological perspective, the equation is itself given over three separate moments and, as such, it is an articulated identity constituted in a flux of consciousness. In other words, three temporal moments are given such that the first moment,  $A_1$ , is only in principle equal to the third,  $A_2$ . The principle of identity is founded on a temporal difference, and in this ordinary lived sense,  $A_1 \neq A_2$ . Rather,  $A_x$  can only be identical with its own actual intuition that immediately fades into retentional consciousness, and so this holds for all lived instances of A, of which there are now at least nine within this paragraph. How, then, can objective identities be logically related to the flux of sense perceptions, apart from merely holding to some sort of pragmatic belief in the system and principles of mathematics and the empirical sciences as Quine suggests?

Husserl's answer to this problem of absolute scepticism follows the line of reasoning he first worked out in the *Logical Investigations*<sup>42</sup>. What is given to the flux of consciousness is not merely a flux of sensible perceptions but the things themselves. Lived experience is, first and foremost, an experience of unified perceptions, of things as given in manifold percepts, rather than of a pure flux. For phenomenology, straightforward perceptions of things are the authentic phenomena of lived experience. These things already endure for perception and thus the phenomenologist's "*thematizing regard, in being directed, for example, toward the perceptual appearance and what is perceived as perceived, immanently apprehends the latter in its duration as something given itself, absolutely*" (Husserl, 1991, p. 354/343). Thus, if one restricts the problem of scepticism to the flux of the constantly changing moment, within

which perceptions come to presence, one risks falling prey to a philosophical ‘fiction’. For within this lived moment, what is first given to consciousness is the thing itself in its objective being as it endures over time. Or as Husserl points out:

*retention ... already inheres in the perception. If we scan the flowering tree, the tree becomes given in a temporal form. And if we hear a bit of a melody, we do not hear merely single tones, even less moments of single tones or mathematical tone-nows ... We rather hear enduring tones* (p. 355/343-344).

Husserl’s perceptual holism reasserts itself here, through an insistence on remaining with the phenomena as they present themselves to consciousness. Within the flux of the lived moment perhaps one hears a melody, what is heard in the flux is not so much the present isolated tone but, rather, its relation to what has already been given; in a certain sense one hears the whole melody itself as it flows. Thus “*we grasp the unity of the total perceptual appearance of this tone-formation as something absolutely given itself. And if the whole tone-phase is finished, retention still apprehends the just-having-been of the total phase that has there elapsed*” (p. 355/344). The total phase of the melody itself, or of any apprehended thing or matter that endures for consciousness, is what is given in the moment as a flux of ‘nows’. Against phenomenalism, Husserl will argue that if “*someone says that only the now is given in genuine actuality, we answer ... we only want to acquire absolute ascertainments, true givenness of the things themselves*” (p. 355/344).

In this way, the ideal unity (or presence as objective being) belonging to straightforward perceptions becomes a constituted ground for the phenomenology of time, where each “individual object endures, and necessarily endures; that is to say, it continuously exists in time and is something identical in this continuous existence, which at the same time can be regarded as a process” (Husserl, 1991, p. 380/369). The constitutive

process of originary temporality is still fundamental, in that it belongs to or is the source of objective being. Presence is thus thought phenomenologically, as an originary yet, nonetheless, temporally constituted ground in that “what exists in time continuously exists in time and exists as the unity belonging to the process” (p. 380/369).

The temporal unity belonging to the ideal bodily presence of things is thus a unity constituted in constant change. Which is to say that, while the lived moment is one of a continuous perceptual flux, any moment of that flux is meaningful only in the context of the perceived thing itself as it endures. For Husserl, in the lived context of hearing a tone of a melody, “the unity of the tone is unity in the filled duration, that is, in the process. Therefore, if anything at all is defined as existing in a time-point, it is conceivable only as the phase of a process, a phase in which the duration of an individual being also has its point” (p. 381/370). It is at this point of the analysis of the phenomenology of time that the emphasis shifts away from the intentional structure of the flow of perceptions as such, to the intentionality of the flow itself. This is a subtle shift in the focus of Husserl’s problematic that now takes on the problem of ‘inner time consciousness’, or the way in which the flow of consciousness becomes a unity for itself. Such a self-constituting unity is, of course, nothing apart from the flow of perceptions but is constituted within this flow. This analysis of the flow of lived time—within which perceptions are constantly appearing and fading away into retentive consciousness—thus concerns the “constituting appearances of the consciousness of internal time” (p. 381/370). In shifting one’s own phenomenological regard back to the way in which consciousness constantly moves along with the flux of perception, we:

necessarily find the flow of continuous ‘change’; but this change has the absurd character that it flows precisely as it

flows and can flow neither ‘faster’ nor ‘slower’.... here nothing runs its course. The change is not a change (p. 381/370).

That is to say, from the perspective of the lived moment as it flows, there is no time-object that changes, as if one might be able to objectively look on the flow itself as a process with a particular duration. For this ‘living present’ there is only the flow of lived time within which perceptual objects are constituted in their objectively measurable durations. Thus it is that, “time-constituting appearances are objectivities fundamentally different from those constituted in time” (p. 381/370). Yet for this temporally constitutive flow, a “certain continuity of appearance—that is, a continuity that is a phase of the time-constituting flow—*belongs* to a now, namely, to a now that it *constitutes*” (p. 382/371). This notion of flow is not, then, to be thought as a succession of nows, and yet it nonetheless appears to itself in the ‘now’ that it constantly constitutes. We have this particular ‘now’, for instance, a now that immediately fades into the retentional past to be replaced by another ‘now’, and yet each separate moment is a concrete instance of the originary temporality that constitutes it. This originary temporality, as the dynamics of the intentionally directed structure of perception, remains with the lived moment as its flow:

This flow is something we speak of *in conformity with what is constituted*, but it is not ‘something in objective time’. It is *absolute subjectivity* and has the absolute properties of something to be designated as ‘flow’; the absolute properties of a point in actuality, of the primal source-point ‘now’, etc. In the actuality-experience we have the primal source-point and a continuity of moments of reverberation. For all this, we have no names (Husserl, 1991, p. 382/371).

The absolute subject, as an intentionally structured process, is not in objective time, it is, rather, the temporal form of perceptual consciousness as it constantly flows on. So one has the unity belonging to perceptible things, an ideal unity of objective being that is constituted in the constantly dissolving retention of the flow of perceptions pertaining to that thing. The

content of this flow of consciousness is thus in constant change, and the originating source of this momentary change is the temporality of consciousness. The originary temporality of human perception, which, in a sense, is as natural a phenomenon as say the atomic processes that provide us with an objective time standard, is not itself in objective time but, rather, belongs to the moment of actuality in which things are constantly given to consciousness. According to Husserl, a 'primal sensation' is, in this temporal sense, the actual moment of, for example, hearing a musical tone. The tone begins and has a duration but its primal sensation is the actual hearing of that tone as it progresses. In the lived moment, which is a unity of change or the actual flowing 'now' of consciousness, "primal sensation is distinguished from primal sensation only by means of content: the now is the same—not what now exists objectively but the now of consciousness. The consciousness, in its form as primal sensation-consciousness, is identical" (p. 386/375).

In lived experience the content changes constantly and along with it one's life passes, and yet this life is still lived out nowhere else than in the moment of actuality as it constantly dissolves. We are our own time, and in this abstract, temporal sense, all one has is this present moment as a unity in change. As such a unity, the intentional structure of the lived moment is constantly identical with itself. It is the intentional constitution of this unity, or the temporal continuity belonging to the flux of consciousness such that it can represent itself as 'I am', that Husserl must describe in order to show how consciousness transcends its own flux. Identity will then belong to the intentional structure of the perception of objective being, and a 'psychological' basis for the physicality of things will have been demonstrated.

Towards this end, Husserl returns to the problem of retention and the intentionality of perceptions of a thing as enduring in objective time. As to this extension over time, each actual moment in the succession of percepts is also “consciousness of the earlier now, ‘original memory’ of it” (1991, p. 387/376). In a straightforward perception of something, that thing endures as a flow of perception, and this flow gives itself in the lived moment as the constantly fading retention of the immediately past percept. According to Husserl, not only is there a fading retention of that percept but also of the immediately past consciousness of that percept. This is the retention belonging to inner time consciousness, which nonetheless still belongs to the intentional structure of perception. As in perceptual retention, it “does not ‘re-present’ [*vergegenwärtigt*] in the manner in which a recollection would; it instead re-presents or holds back [*hält zurück*] what was previously intended in the mode of the now in a primal sensation” (p. 387/376).

Where recollection is an intuitive act in itself that belatedly represents something that is past, a retention of the immediately past consciousness belongs to the temporal structure of the present. The present, in the sense of the lived moment as it flows, is constituted in this flow of fading retentions. Retention holds onto a ‘primal sensation’ as it fades away, and in doing so it “holds it back in the form of a new mode, which continuously issues forth from the primal sensing” (p. 387/376). In this constant ‘holding back’ of the consciousness of perceptions, what is constituted for consciousness is the perception of the thing itself as occurring in lived time. Husserl now distinguishes between retention in its constitution of the objective being or presence of things, and in this ‘holding back’ of the time consciousness of immediately past perception. For as regards this time consciousness, in a “certain sense, however, it re-presents the earlier time-point intended in the

mode of the now by making the primal sensation present [*vorstellig*]” (p. 387/376). The retention belonging to internal time consciousness is, in a restricted sense, similar to representation in that as an act of retention it re-presents the immediately earlier ‘now’ on the basis of which the actual now is perceived. Thus as Husserl states:

We call the consciousness of the object in immanent time *memory* insofar as the object is intended as having just been given. Perhaps better still, we call it *consciousness of the past* (with the distinction between the ‘retentional’ consciousness and the consciousness that ‘re-presents’ something ‘again’, the ‘remembering’ consciousness). *On the other hand*, we *never* call the consciousness of the past of *the earlier primal sensation* (now-consciousness) ‘consciousness of the past’. We rather call it the *retention of the earlier primal sensation*, when it is a question of a consciousness in the original flow of the modifications of sensation; otherwise we call it a *reproduction of the earlier sensation* (1991, p. 388/377).

Husserl equates the retention of inner time consciousness with reproduction of the immediately past ‘now’. This is reproduction in the sense that, as a ‘holding onto’ the past time consciousness as it fades, it constantly reproduces the actual ‘now’ as something new. Yet as something constantly new, the ‘now’ is constituted as a continuity by way of this non-thematic reproduction of the constantly dissolving past. Along with this flow of immanent time there is retention in the sense of a ‘holding onto’ the perception itself as it dissolves; this is not reproduction in that what is made present in each moment is the enduring thing itself. Based on these two ongoing moments of intentionality, perception and its immanent flow of time, there is the possibility of remembrance and thematic representations or reproductions of the past. Retention thus belongs to the tone, for instance, as it is heard (as opposed to remembering having heard a tone), for this tone is not merely a succession of tonal vibrations but a tone, within a melody perhaps, that is constantly given as a whole. In the moment of hearing it the tone itself is intended such that retention of the just past moment of the tone

relates the present moment to the tone as a whole. This “whole ‘being-all-at-once’ [*Zugleich*] ... makes up the moving moment of the actuality of consciousness that, in unceasing change, constitutes the immanent object” (p. 389/378).

For Husserl, the “flow of consciousness constitutes its own unity” (p. 390/378) in the constitution of the objective thing, such as that tone. The tone is constituted as a tone in the intentional process of retention and protention, and it is on this basis that one experiences a tone as opposed to a concatenation of sense data, a tone that can subsequently be remembered and represented as such. Yet in this representation, it is not merely a past object that is remembered but the temporal movement of consciousness as well. Representation remembers the past thing as a past object of consciousness, within a continuity of consciousness that one might call one’s own life. This ability to remember the past as past is, for Husserl, grounded in the possibility of retention in the present lived moment as it flows. For retention has “a *double* intentionality: one serves for the constitution of the immanent object ... The other intentionality is constitutive of the *unity* of this primary memory in the flow” (p. 390/379). The phenomenological ego, as the temporal form of inner time consciousness, is this fading retention of the immediately past moment, a retention that constitutes the unity of the flux of consciousness. In the lived moment the flow of perceptions is, in this sense, implicitly perceived as a continuity of consciousness. Inner time consciousness is this constantly fading retention of the past moment of perception and, as such, “it is *continuous reproduction* [*Reproduktion*] of the continuously preceding phases” (p. 390/379).

The self-identity or unity of the flux of consciousness is a constant process of reproduction in which the ego is never given in its own self-presence. The

intentional ego is only the constant reproduction of the retentive past, where in the “absolute passing on, in the flowing process, the first primal impression becomes changed into a reproduction of itself, this reproduction becomes changed into a reproduction, and so on” (p. 391/379). The flowing ‘now’ of the lived moment, in which the ego can represent itself to itself as ‘I am’ or as a moment of self-presence, is constituted in constant reproduction such that “the flow is primal sensation of the new now and reproduction of the earlier now” (p. 391/379-380). From a phenomenological perspective, the self-presence of the *ego cogito* is thus founded in constant change, as an ongoing unity of time consciousness. This conscious continuity, as a process of primary memory, belongs to everyday sensible perceptions of the things themselves. Or as Husserl says; “it is analogous to a memory of a memory of A, which makes us conscious not only of the memory but also of the A as what is remembered in the memory” (p. 391/380). Since the intentional ego is this constant process of time consciousness, there is no subjective substrate, no primordial self-presence, no self-evident ego-thing as *hypokeimenon*. There is only the ongoing, dynamic unity of the flow itself that is:

constituted in the flow of consciousness as a one-dimensional *quasi*-temporal order by virtue of the continuity of reproductive modifications and by virtue of the circumstances that these modifications are, continuously, reproductions *of* one another, of the reproductions that have continuously preceded them (1991, p. 392/380).

The originary temporality of consciousness, in the sense of the constant change inherent to human sense perception, is the driving force behind the intentional or directed structure of those perceptions. Human perception is not, in this phenomenological sense, primarily the relation between a representing subject and its phenomenal flux of meaningless sense data but, rather, the ongoing continuity of lived experience. The stream of perceptions as they give themselves to consciousness, are given in a lived context and, as

such, are already meaningfully situated, in a non-thematic sense, within the ongoing continuity of that consciousness.

Which is to say, straightforward perceptions of things are unproblematic, as in, for example, the hammer as it is being used. It gives itself to manifold sensible perceptions as this self-same particular hammer, without having to be explicitly represented as such. In the downward stroke of the hammer, as one guides it to its mark, there is a flow of tactile and visual perceptions such that the hammer prescribes a fluid arc. In that momentary arc, the flow of percepts are united in a straightforward and non-thematic perception of the thing itself, the hammer, and within the context of the work at hand. This perceptual unity is that hammer's objective being, it persists as what it is throughout the lived moment of its arc and so endures in objective time through the duration of that hammer stroke. Husserl's account of the retentional flow of consciousness suggests that this purely receptive ideal unity is constituted in the constant dissolution of primary memory as the hammer progresses through its arc. The 'present' position of the hammer at the beginning of that arc immediately fades into a retention of that moment as the perceived (that is hefted) hammer moves on. In this way, retentional memory provides the 'present' context for the flow of perceptions that constantly replace what gives itself in the lived moment. And so the hammer prescribes an arc, and this arc is seen and felt unproblematically as what it already is, the arc of a hammer in use.

This is the intentional structure belonging to a straightforward perception of the hammer, and along with that simple seeing and bodily interaction there also goes the unity of the consciousness of that flow of perceptions. The hammer stroke is always already meaningful, not only as a perception of that hammer, but also as a flow of consciousness within the lived context of a life

that is one's own. This second moment of intentionality is not in any sense that of a subject meaningfully representing itself to itself but, rather, belongs to the downward stroke of the hammer itself as a meaningfully lived experience. There is no time here to theorize 'I am the one using this hammer', there is only the momentary duration of the hammer stroke as an un-thematised flow of straightforward sensible perception. In this simple stroke, the constantly dissolving flow of retentional consciousness is also a retention of the immediately past moment of consciousness such that, as the hammer moves through its arc, each new moment of that arc is reproduced as the 'now' of lived experience.

Inner time consciousness thus constitutes the flux of perceptions as an ongoing unity of consciousness that will always find itself in this lived moment as it constantly passes on; for this unity, as the self-identity of consciousness, always "possesses the flowing 'now'-point, the phase of actuality" (Husserl, 1991, p. 393/381). It is only on the basis of the retentional unity of human perception that only ever finds itself in the actuality of the 'now' as it flows, that such a unity can represent itself as existent 'in time', with a past that has been and a possible future towards which it is always moving. Objective time is here a linear representation of that originary lived time that presents itself to the flow of consciousness. From a phenomenological perspective, this non-objective lived time is a constantly dissolving flux of consciousness, fixed in the lived moment or 'now' as it flows.

This flux is what Husserl calls pre-empirical temporality which gives itself as the constant dissolution of retentional memory. In this originary lived sense, time does not flow from some future 'ahead' of us into a past that is constantly falling further 'behind', for there is only the constant dissolution of

objectively given perceptions and the unity of the flow of consciousness. In this dissolution belonging to the flux of consciousness, there nonetheless belongs a unity; the unity of inner time consciousness as a constant reproduction of the ‘now’. In this way the flux as “prephenomenal, preimmanent temporality [*Zeitlichkeit*] becomes constituted intentionally as the form of the time-constituting consciousness and in it itself” (p. 393/381).

The self-identity of the intentional ego is, then, not the product of a mere representation, as in the assertion ‘*cogito ergo sum*’. Self-identity, as a unity in change, is constituted in the temporal process of reproduction. As such, it structurally belongs to the flux of perceptions, in that “what is one and identical receives and maintains a continuous mode of being-pushed-back; something new is always being added ‘in front’, in order to flow away immediately in its turn, together with what is connected with it in that moment” (p. 393/381). Two aspects or moments of intentionality—one constitutes objective being, the other constitutes the ‘quasi-temporal’ continuity of the flow—make up the temporal structure of intentional synthesis<sup>43</sup>. Neither of these intentional moments are merely the action of a representing subject because, for Husserl, both the subject and its objects are founded in the originary temporality of perception, which is itself a self-reflexively observable, and in this ‘pre-empirical’ sense, natural phenomenon of human consciousness:

The flow of the consciousness that constitutes immanent time *not only exists* but is so remarkably and yet intelligibly fashioned that a self-appearance of the flow necessarily exists in it, and therefore the flow itself must necessarily be apprehensible in the flowing. The self-appearance of the flow does not require a second flow; on the contrary, it constitutes itself as a phenomenon in itself (Husserl, 1991, p. 393/381).

Such then, at least in an abridged form, is the phenomenology of time. As an authentic analysis of straightforward or simple (*schlichte*) sensory perception,

the phenomenological reduction discloses one's own lived experience as a 'unity in change'. In this analysis the bodily presence, or objective being, of things is conceived phenomenologically as a temporal process of relation, and this process is also what constitutes the unity of that consciousness. The intentional ego is, in this sense, no 'self-persisting subject', nor can it be some sort of 'pure self-presence'. It is, rather, a temporal process founded in *Zeitlichkeit* or the originary temporality of the flux of human consciousness. This receptive process has a threefold structure in retention, protention and 'making present'. A retention of the present moment of perception, as it constantly fades into the immediate past, forms the context of an anticipative protention of the next percept, and the ongoing series of retentive protentions constantly 'make present' the actuality of the lived moment. Actuality is, in this phenomenological sense, a dynamic temporal process grounded in the constant dissolution of originary temporality.

It is on this basis that Husserl might seem to have solved the problem of intentionality and its transcendence of the flux of lived sense experience (as opposed to a phenomenal flux of sense data). He can now show how it is that ideal objects and self-identity structurally belong to the constantly changing flow of perceptions. Transcendence, and its sense of objective being, is an immanent intentional process of consciousness, and it is on this ultimately temporal basis that the analyses of *Ideas 1* were to be conducted in the years following the phenomenology of time, from 1911-13. However, in the concluding page of Boehm's edition of the 'Phenomenology of Inner Time Consciousness', Husserl posits a rather perplexing question, one that seems to re-open the problem of transcendence, as well as perhaps indicate a possible point of departure for Heidegger's existential critique. Whether or not Husserl is driven to consider this question because there remains for him

a problem in how the sense of everydayness can be constituted solely in the actual flux of consciousness is not clear, yet he suggests that there might be “an *ultimate consciousness* that controls all consciousness in the flow” (Husserl, 1991, p. 394/382).

The ultimate controlling consciousness would presumably, in some sense, oversee and direct the unity of consciousness, the intentional ego, that remains caught up in the ‘now’. For as Husserl points out, when one comes across things in the context of everyday life “something is always already ‘appearing’ [*erscheint*]—the style of attention always runs through and across an intentionality” (p. 394/382). That is, in some way the flux of perceptions is already organized and ordered in advance. This advance ‘horizontal’ intentionality runs through and across the momentary flux, and constitutes the overall direction that we meet with in our everyday dealings with the things themselves. Yet, in that it is not given in the flux itself but extends through it, from the perspective of this early phenomenology of consciousness it remains something outside of the flux of perception, therefore, “we should seriously consider whether we must assume such an ultimate consciousness” for as “ultimate intentionality it cannot be an object of attention” (p. 394/382).

The notion of a controlling mode of intentionality will perhaps go on to inform much of the analyses of the pure ego and its empirical objectivities in *Ideas 1*. This work represents Husserl’s first systematic attempt to fulfil the program of a phenomenological retrieval of Cartesian modernity. Based on the foundational analysis of temporality prepared for in the *Logical Investigations*, and given in the phenomenology of time, the problems of noetic process and the noematic core as the ground of judgements, give the transcendental absolute and its pure ego as the self-grounding representation

of the *cogito*. This transcendental analysis represents, for Heidegger, the beginnings of Husserl's erroneous 'Cartesianism', and I would like to suggest at this point, that the 'ultimate intentionality' that directs and orders the intentionality of perception, and whose possibility concludes the phenomenology of time, is the subject of Heidegger's critique of Husserlian intentionality, and thus also the apparent point of departure for the existential analytic from the Husserl's phenomenology.

In a very general sense, the ultimate intentionality will be, for Heidegger, the practical compartments belonging to the equipmental setup of the world, within which the unity of consciousness, the flux of perception, and its rational ego are meaningfully constituted. The pure ego, as a temporal process of relation, must therefore already be open to the factual world within which it lives. In this way, the problem of shared background practices, returning to Dreyfus' interpretation of Heidegger, undermines any notion of a controlling ego, by displacing the realm within which intentionality works, away from pure consciousness and towards its openness to the factual world. Against Husserl's emphasis on consciousness, the existential critique of phenomenology is founded on a practical re-interpretation of the 'ultimate intentionality' that oversees and directs the intentionality of perception.

However, it remains to be seen whether the problematic of *Ideas 1* is actually the most fundamental statement of Husserl's early phenomenology, as both Heidegger and Dreyfus seem to suggest. It is certainly the case that the problem of originary temporality that underlies Husserl's avowed 'neo-Cartesianism', and forms the fundamental basis of his early phenomenology of perception, refutes any simple equation, as Dreyfus puts forward, of Husserl with representational or Cartesian intentionality. Whatever

Heidegger's philosophical relation to phenomenology might be, the practical critique of Husserlian intentionality can have nothing to do with any simple reduction of the latter to a naïve Cartesianism. For as Husserl himself points out with regard to the fundamental foundation of his transcendental analyses in *Ideas 1*:

Time is the name for a completely *self-contained sphere of problems* and one of exceptional difficulty. It will be seen that in a certain sense our previous exposition has been silent, and necessarily so, concerning a whole dimension, so as to maintain free of confusion what first becomes transparent from the phenomenological standpoint alone, and quite apart from the new dimension constitutes a self-contained field of investigation. The transcendental 'Absolute' which we have laid bare through the reductions is in truth not ultimate; it is something which in a certain profound and wholly unique sense constitutes itself, and has its primeval source in what is ultimately and truly absolute (Husserl, 1931, p. 236/162-163).

*III—Heidegger and Husserl**§12. Practice and perception*

With Dreyfus, we have an interpretation of the first division of Heidegger's *Being and Time* that posits human understanding and its world in a non-rationalist sense, as the non-thematic meaningfulness of background practices. Absorbed practical activity is what first throws us into the world and it is on the meaningful basis of this unthought background network or totality of shared practices that we can analyze things or beings in general and form theories about them. As a shared totality of practical relations, any absorbed activity we take part in, any work as such, implies a communal relation to the other. This notion of practice undermines empirical and rationalist theories of human understanding by relocating the origin of truth away from the individual subject and its rational mediation of sense data. The world is no longer an essentially chaotic barrage of empirical impressions to be made sense of by way of systems of belief or transcendental concepts, for it has already been implicitly understood in practice.

Practical understanding is what first gives us an already meaningful world of sense perceptions, a mundane world that is already understood as a whole and in which we never come across a mere sense-datum, only the things themselves. Naïve Cartesian theories must, then, start with this shared, mundane world, with what simply gives itself as such, and on this unthought practical basis they posit the philosophical abstraction of a subject's cognitive mediation of an, in some sense, 'external' objective reality given in sense perception. In this way, Dreyfus reinforces the view that individual reason can no longer be seen as the most fundamental originary source of human understanding.

On the way to his theory of practice, Dreyfus uses Husserl's phenomenology as an exemplary case of naïve Cartesianism, and on the face of it this critique might seem to work. The pure ego is set up by Husserl in *Ideas 1* as the ultimate or controlling mode of intentionality, at least with respect to the natural attitude of the physical sciences. From this perspective it is Reason that orders and gives meaning to the intentionality of perception, to the objective presence of the things themselves, and so the system of noemata (or what Dreyfus also calls beliefs) apparently becomes, for Husserl, the fundamental human relation to truth. With respect to the transcendental phenomenology of *Ideas 1*, Dreyfus' practical critique would seem to undermine Husserl's attempt to provide a critical philosophical basis for empiricism, while also calling into question the foundational character of any form of intentional realism.

This critique also follows something of Heidegger's own critique of phenomenology, however, as I hope I have shown with respect to the problem of time, Husserl is nonetheless anything but a naïve Cartesian theorist. The early Husserl's phenomenology is based on a phenomenological critique of the Cartesian ego and Kantian subject, and the route he traces through to the pure ego and the natural scientific attitude in *Ideas 1*, problematises any simple notion of subjectivity. These early phenomenological problematics are founded on a temporal analysis of the Cartesian ego and its intentional relation to objects, where both the subject and its objectivities are co-constituted in that relation. In this sense, Husserl also starts with the world as a lived context, and this context is a non-thematic, 'pre-theoretical', perceptual whole.

Furthermore, Husserl's perceptual holism comes to some of the same conclusions as Dreyfus' practical holism, in that the former also radically

undermines the notion that objectivity is the result of a rational subject giving meaning to sense data. In Husserl's early phenomenology there is no sense whatsoever to the notion that a subject must transcend its immanence in order to reach out to some sort of external reality. The problem of transcendence is brought back to the things themselves, back to the lived context within which perceptual objects are already the 'same as themselves' and on the basis of which the rational subject can reflect on, and represent them as, objectively given things. Representational or theoretical knowledge, and its self-same *ego cogito*, is founded on the non-representational, pre-empirical intentionality of perception. In terms of the phenomenology of time, the subject/object relation is itself constituted in originary temporality, in the temporal structure of lived human perception. It is from this pre-theoretical or pre-egological basis that Husserl then goes on to posit the pure ego as a form of self-reflexive controlling intentionality that gives meaning to the objective things that it encounters in the natural world. This is his neo-Cartesian project, a phenomenological retrieval of Cartesian metaphysics, for which the subject is no longer something existing in itself, for it is already co-constituted, along with the ideal objectivity of things, in the temporality of perception.

It is on this temporal basis in straightforward perception that Husserl then posits his retrieval of empiricism and the rational subject. Yet Husserl's early transcendentalism leaves him open to the practical critique of reason, for practice is apparently still something mediated by rational planning and calculation. This emphasis on rationality reflects Husserl's main pre-occupation in *Ideas 1*; his attempt to rethink rationalism in its own terms and to give a more fundamental philosophical account of the Cartesian ego and its relation to the natural world. Nevertheless, this neo-Cartesianism in no

way posits a naïve theory of the subject as some sort of existent thing, nor merely a *flatus vocis* that is related to actual objects by way of concepts or beliefs.

From the perspective of the early Husserl's analysis of perception, the grounds of transcendental phenomenology from the *Ideas 1* through to the *Cartesian Meditations* and beyond, are founded in the phenomenology of time where the immanence of subjectivity is also the realm in which the objectivity of things is constituted. Yet there is no internal/external problem here, for the subject and object are both given 'immanently', and it is this notion of immanence that makes any talk of external transcendence, or of a subject's internality over against the external world, redundant. From a phenomenological perspective, we are already in the lived world, amongst the objectively given things themselves, and this being-in and its objectivity are not the products of an ego's representation or belief. They are constituted in the intentionality of straightforward perception. So when Husserl talks of a 'pure psychology' or even of a transcendental subject these are not meant in terms of an empirical ego-thing but, rather, in terms of the fundamental temporal structure of perception which is 'pre-theoretical'.

Accordingly, consciousness and perception must here be understood in a non-representational sense, where to be conscious of something, to perceive something, means that it is intentionally constituted as a temporal continuity on the basis of which we can then analyze that thing and form theories about it. This distinction between the phenomenological ego as a temporal process of perceptual intentionality, or primary memory, and the empirical ego as something existing for itself, is made all the more difficult by the way in which Husserl is determined to stay with the language of Cartesian metaphysics. Yet even as late as the *Cartesian Meditations*, he underlines this

fundamental pre-empirical basis of his thinking. The objectivity or temporal continuity of things, as met with in the process of consciousness, “does not come into the process from outside” (Husserl, 1960, p. 42/80), on the contrary it is “an *‘intentional effect’ produced by the synthesis of consciousness*” (ibid). This intentional synthesis, as an objective unity of consciousness, is at the same time a “*connectedness that makes the unity of one consciousness*” (p. 41/79)<sup>44</sup>. The subject and its objectivities must be thought, together, as a temporal unity of the intentionality of perception, and it is on this basis that any active or passive synthesis, any noematic core, and all forms of representation are founded. The fundamental basis of Husserl’s phenomenology is time, as lived time, which is not yet objective or calculative time but, rather, the intentional synthesis of perception belonging to originary temporality.

What, then, is Husserl’s relation to the problem of practice? If his apparently representationalist theory of the pure ego in *Ideas 1* merely reiterates the same Cartesian relation to practice, notwithstanding the fundamental role of time, then phenomenology remains within the traditional sphere of rationalist philosophy with respect to practice. At the very least, then, we might insist on a more critical reading of Husserl’s neo-Cartesianism and defend him from the widespread misreading that relegates his thoughtful analysis to the naïve subject/object theory that he himself set out to dismantle. Yet this would not then necessarily implicate the earlier non-representationalist phenomenology of time and perception. These early analyses are concerned primarily with the process of lived perception itself, with the objective presence of things and the temporal continuity of consciousness, and as such, represent a critique of the self-evident ego or rational subject posited in both Descartes’ and Kant’s philosophies. This critique was supposed to form the basis of Husserl’s neo-Cartesian retrieval of the tradition, yet if the

fundamental problem of practice is conceived on the basis of the natural attitude of the *Ideas 1*, and practice is thus simply mediated by reason, then this attempt at fundamental philosophy would obviously fail. The phenomenology of time would, therefore, be an insufficient critique of Cartesianism, on the basis of which Husserl's entire program of transcendental phenomenology would also fail, at least from the perspective of practice.

However, both Heidegger and Dreyfus seem to understand Husserl's phenomenology primarily from the perspective of *Ideas 1*, and Dreyfus in particular sees in Husserl nothing less than a naïvely Cartesian intentional realist for whom all perception and practice is mediated by beliefs<sup>45</sup>. Now, whilst Husserl's notion of straightforward perception is clearly not mediated by beliefs, it might appear to be the case that any notion of practical understanding would have to be rationally mediated by the 'natural attitude', that is, if we take *Ideas 1* as the basis for Husserl's ontology. Yet immediately following the completion of the transcendental analysis of the natural attitude in this work, Husserl set out to write the second book of the *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy*. In this work, Husserl expressly states that practice is not mediated by reason or its natural attitude but, rather, belongs to the personalistic or practical attitude which is itself non-theoretical. This was written around 1912-15, although re-edited right up until 1928. Heidegger received a copy in 1925 while at Marburg and had unlimited access to the archives while working with Husserl from 1919 (and probably earlier). The third section of *Ideas 2*, 'The constitution of the spiritual world', clearly shows that the transcendental analysis of *Ideas 1* accounts only for the natural scientific attitude, while the analysis of the

practical attitude deals with the “Ego as person or as member of a social world” (Husserl, 1989, 184/175<sup>40</sup>).

One of the distinguishing features of Heidegger’s critique of Husserl is the claim that, for Husserl, reason is the primary mediating factor in his theories of perception, time and practice. This is certainly the interpretation that Dreyfus seems to follow as well. Yet in *Ideas 2* Husserl moves on from the analysis of the relation between the pure ego (ultimately constituted in originary temporality) and the natural scientific or objectifying attitude, towards an analysis of our everyday involvement with the world of the personalistic attitude. From the temporal co-constitution of objectivity and the phenomenological ego, through an analysis of the logic of objectivity, Husserl is now concerned with a fundamental analysis of the wider context of lived experience or ‘social being’, and precisely with practical understanding, given that “we can also denote the personal or motivational attitude as the *practical* attitude” (p. 199/190). It is this practical attitude and its everyday context that is ‘ontologically prior’ to the natural attitude of science and the logic of objectivity.

The ‘flux of the stream of lived experience’, and its phenomenological ego, is still the temporal “point of identity, on which ‘stimuli’ operate, from which acts issue forth, which is active or which is passive, which turns to or turns away from, which follows tendencies or resists them; i.e., it is the Ego of the intentionalities” (p. 296/283). Again, it would seem that for both Dreyfus and Heidegger this Husserlian ‘ego’ is simply a thinking subject that mediates all action and perception. While such a simple misreading of phenomenology is perhaps an easy one to make, given Husserl’s use of various traditional terms such as ‘spirit’, subjectivity, ego and so on, it is a reading that is actually very difficult to sustain in Husserl’s texts themselves. This difficulty is emphasized

in *Ideas 2*, in that practical understanding, which forms the basis of ‘social being’, is a non-theoretical or ‘background’ mode of shared understanding.

Arp (1996, p. 162) specifically takes Dreyfus to task over his rationalist interpretation of Husserl and makes the claim that the notion of everyday coping skills is well within the scope of Husserl’s early phenomenology. As a possible example of practical coping in *Ideas 2*, Arp describes the simple act of walking and stepping over a stone along a path. The stone does not need to be recognised in an explicitly thematic act of consciousness, for it is part of the unproblematically given perceptual background, yet without thinking about it we usually just simply step over the obstruction and continue along our way. Presumably the stone has to be perceived, at the very least ‘subliminally’, in order to avoid tripping over it, and this simple straightforward perception of the stone motivates the ‘stepping over’. Yet the perception, its motivating tendency, and the practical act itself, need not become explicit concerns, rather, it is all accomplished ‘unconsciously’ in the background of consciousness by way of ‘hidden’ or habitual motivations associated with the straightforward perception of the path and the everyday activity of walking. There is, for Husserl, no necessity whatsoever for an intervening rationalisation of the perception and its associated act, yet there is a ‘sensuous feeling’ associated with the straightforward perception of the stone, and an associated inherent tendency or non-thematic motivation to step over it in order to continue with the activity at hand, which is walking. Everything takes place within the background meaningfulness of the everyday activity, and its practical attitude is one that does not need to be continually reflecting on the things encountered perceptually along the way.

In *Ideas 2* Husserl is investigating the difference between the empirical ego of science and the ego of the everyday world, or in other words, the “distinction

between this [natural] Ego and the *Ego as person or as member of a social world*" (1989, p. 184/175). He characterises this difference between the natural and the social as a shift in analytic focus "from the natural sciences into the *human sciences*" (p. 190/180), where the ego of the natural scientific attitude is to be founded in its wider social context. "As subject of the naturalistic attitude we have then the pure Ego.... The ultimate subject, the phenomenological one, which can never be bracketed and is the very subject doing all eidetic phenomenological research, is the pure Ego" (p. 183/174). The pure ego or phenomenological subject remains the temporal focus of his practical analysis, while "the whole world of the naturalistic attitude, 'nature' in the broadest sense of the term" (p. 183/174) is to be bracketed. Again, the pure ego is here not simply a self-evident 'ego-thing', rather, it is founded in the phenomenology of time for which "Pure consciousness is a genuine temporal field, a field of 'phenomenological' time. This must not be confused with 'Objective' time, which is constituted, along with nature, by consciousness" (p. 188/178). The pure ego is not something 'in time', and as the continuity of lived time constituted in ordinary temporality it is still, here, the fundamental basis of Husserl's phenomenological research.

The progression of Husserl's analysis from the natural to the practical attitude does not mark a progression from a fundamental basis of human understanding (reason and its natural scientific attitude) to a higher level or founded mode of understanding. On the contrary, Husserl emphasizes the fact that for him the natural attitude is founded in the practical, for "the naturalistic attitude is in fact subordinated to the personalistic ... the former only acquires by means of an abstraction or, rather, by means of a kind of self-forgetfulness of the personal Ego, a certain autonomy—whereby it proceeds illegitimately to absolutize its world, i.e., nature" (p. 193/183-184).

The natural scientific understanding of the world is first posited from the perspective of one's own personal everyday world of practical interactions. If the wider meaningful context of this social world remains merely self-evident and unquestioned, then for Husserl, the philosophical basis of the natural sciences will remain unclear and unfounded. Given this ontological priority of the practical over the natural attitude, the phenomenological reduction as it is employed in *Ideas 2* "frees us from the sense-restrictions of the natural attitude and of everyday relative attitude" (p. 189/179). Both our everyday common sense understanding of the world, and the objectifications of the natural scientific attitude, must now be 'put in brackets'.

The object of this phenomenological reduction is to uncover the fundamental social context within which all human understanding operates. To begin with, Husserl situates the phenomenological subject within its personal situation such that as a "person, I am what I am ... *as subject of a surrounding world [Umwelt]*" (1989, p. 195/185). The 'surrounding world' is always in each case one's own lived situation as given in the immediacy of one's present perceptions. This personal world is not simply the material world of nature, although it is also nothing apart from nature, for it is the world as given to sense perception within the practical context of a meaningfully lived life. Thus, as Husserl states, "the actual surrounding world of any person whatsoever is not physical reality pure and simple and without qualification, but instead it is the surrounding world only to the extent he [sic] 'knows' of it, insofar as he grasps it by apperception and positing or is conscious of it in the horizon of his existence [*Daseinshorizont*] as co-given and offered to his grasp" (p. 195/186). Again, and true to Husserl's initial projection of phenomenological analysis, the world is never first something given empirically to analytic concern, for it can only give itself

as ‘nature’ from within the already meaningful context of the analyst’s own self-evident, and therefore unquestioned, personal world or lived experience.

Such a personal, lived world is never simply ‘there’, never simply given in itself but, instead, is constituted in the dynamic structure of intentional relations for which the “surrounding world is in a certain way always in the process of becoming, constantly producing itself by means of transformations of sense ... the world is, in its *core*, a world appearing to the senses and characterized as ‘on hand’ [*vorhanden*], a world given in straightforward empirical intuitions [*schlichten Erfahrungsanschauungen*] and perhaps grasped actively” (p. 196/186). The basis of the surrounding world, as a process of constant becoming, is still to be found in the immediacy of the intentional structure of consciousness and its sense perceptions, none of which need be ‘actively grasped’ or rationally mediated as such. Furthermore, where our interactions with things and others are concerned, this founding personal world is not fundamentally a world of natural causality. Inasmuch as it is one’s own ongoing lived context or personal existence within which things and others come into play, our social interaction with these is then a function of that lived context and its meaningful relations. Husserl claims that these personal relations to things are motivational, rather than causal, insofar as what is in question here is the ontologically more fundamental social, rather than empirical or natural scientific, reality. Instead “of the causal relation between things and men [sic] as natural realities, there is substituted the *relation of motivation* between persons and things, and these things are not the things of nature” (p. 199/189).

The lived context of all experience, and the basis of human understanding, is for Husserl structured by relations of motivation, and these motivations are primarily practical relations of sense such that “we can also denote the

personal or motivational attitude as the *practical* attitude” (p. 199/190). One of the major characteristics of these fundamental practical relations is that they are not the actions of an isolated subject but, rather, occur as part of the meaningful context of a shared social world and in an interaction with others. One’s personal world is shared with others such that the “*common* surrounding world acquires communal characteristics ... a parallel and mutually understood comportment to objects as the ones of the community’s surrounding world but also for a joint-unitary comportment of persons to such objects, a comportment in which they participate communally as members of a whole that binds them together” (p. 201-202/191-192).

All practical relations and their motivations can be meaningful only as shared relations of sense. Husserl thus distinguishes between “a *subject and its surrounding world*.... [or] an *association of persons and its surrounding world*. But the subject, as Objectivable and as Objectivated for itself, is included at the same time in the surrounding world. Thus the former distinction is not sufficient, however necessary it may be” (p. 205/195). A subject’s surrounding world, in this case, already means a person’s practical relation to others and the community, and therefore any pure ego is already a “social subjectivity” (p. 206/196). The phenomenological subject is not merely an ego in and for itself, for it already, and at a fundamental level, implies a shared intentional relation to the surrounding world, and to others within that world.

Husserl’s notion of shared relations of sense extends as far back as the perceptual flux of lived experience itself. He underlines the phenomenological fact that at the very foundation of human being, at the level of the temporality of perception, there is no chaotic barrage of impressions which must then be identified and meaningfully related to a shared world of common sense. Rather, originary temporality, as constitutive

genesis, belongs to “immediate originary existence (primal presence) [*Dasein (Urpräsenz)*]” (1989, p. 208/198) on which social subjectivity is founded. ‘One’s own’ temporally constituted straightforward perceptions are still the basis of Husserl’s analysis here, where it would “never be possible for different subjects to have the same appearances at the same temporal point of intersubjective (‘Objective’) time” (p. 211/201). Yet this originary presence is still only meaningful in its relation to shared lived experience; we may each perceive different facets of the things themselves, yet what is given to one’s ‘ownmost’ perception is first and foremost those self-same things that we all find in the surrounding world: “In the stream of subjective lived experiences the subject manifests himself [sic] as a real person, and the lived experiences are at the same time his states. On the other hand, the subject does not manifest himself in the sensory schemata, in the subjective appearance of things; instead, what is manifested there are the things of his surrounding world” (p. 212/201).

The meaningfulness of our shared, surrounding world is not something added on after the fact, rather, it forms a fundamental part of the lived context of everydayness. As Husserl says, “every person as such (essentially) has his surrounding world, first of all his subjective world of appearances and then, by means of a relation to a nexus of persons, at the same time a relation to the common Objective surrounding world” (p. 213/203). It is on the basis of this surrounding world of originary everyday existence that the natural scientific attitude posits its objective truths, where natural “science brings to cognition ‘Objective’ nature, which henceforth belongs for its part to the surrounding world of the communal spirit... This naturalistically considered world is of course not *the* world. Rather, given prior is the world as the everyday world” (p. 219/208). Husserl, here, clearly indicates that the

analyses of *Ideas 1* are founded in the practical attitude of *Ideas 2*, for which “nature presented itself as something constituted in an intersubjective association of persons, hence presupposing it” (p. 220/210).

Given that the intentional structure of the everyday world and its practical attitude, based on the constitutive genesis of originary temporality, is the fundamental ground of phenomenological analysis, how then is this structure of relations constituted in itself? According to Husserl, we must first start with perception and the temporal unity of the things themselves since the “unities of things (the noematic unities) are points of departure for more or less ‘strong’ tendencies. Already as conscious but not yet grasped (hovering in the background of consciousness)” (p. 199/189). The surrounding world, that of everydayness, is given as a perceptual whole in which the things themselves are present for consciousness. This conscious presentation is not, however, primarily a rational identification of things, we are not generally attentive of the whole but rather concern ourselves with the specific things or matters at hand. The activity of reading, for instance, involves an absorption in the text at hand and would be rather difficult if one had to constantly think about actually holding the book, or using the chair on which one sits, or the walls of the room, and so on. Yet all these things are still ‘there’ to be used in an unproblematic sense, and as such form the perceptual background of consciousness within which the work at hand, in this case reading, can make sense.

That something can give itself to perception, in a background sense, without actually becoming a thematic concern, does not then mean that it has no effect on consciousness. For Husserl, background consciousness gives rise to “sensuous feelings and drives [that] arrange themselves under sense experience” (p. 207/197). To continue with the reading example, the chair is

perceived non-thematically, both visually and in a tactile sense, as the 'same as itself' in that as a temporal unity it endures over time in the background of consciousness. Within the context of the work at hand as it unfolds, there belongs a 'sensuous feeling' associated with the perceived chair that gives rise to a tendency to use it in order to read. Similarly for the book that lies on the table, one need not actively identify these things and formulate a strategy in order to simply sit and read a book; all these perceptions, their associated feelings and motivational tendencies to act, are accomplished in the background of consciousness. One simply enters the room with the intention of reading, picks up the book and sits down to read.

Thus it is that, within the ongoing context of one's own everyday lived experience as a temporal process of becoming, with its constant transformations of sense, Husserl posits an intentionally structured link between straightforward perception and practical activity. The immediate perceptual space within which we work has things and matters that are the object of our present concerns, yet these are only meaningful within the whole perceptual background of consciousness, which also means within the meaningful context of everyday lived experience or one's life as it constantly unfolds. Such a lived perceptual whole gives rise to a multiplicity of constantly changing 'sensuous feelings' that are themselves directed by that work and its concerns, yet in a practical rather than an explicitly rational sense. Associated with these sensuous feelings is an ongoing process of inherent motivational tendencies that constantly give rise to their relevant actions and thus bridge the gap between perception and its practical activity.

It might seem then, that Husserl is suggesting a causal relation between material reality, via the body and its organs of sense, and the lived world of practical activity; or between the empirical and the phenomenological.

However, he goes on to distinguish ‘motivational causality’ from natural causality in the sense that the “spirit is conditioned by nature, though it does not for all that stand toward nature in a relationship of causality” (p. 295/281). The body and its sense apparatus is a condition for the possibility of ‘spirit’, of lived experience; this is not a causal relation, however, but one of co-dependence, “a relation of conditionality yet not of causality in the general sense” (p. 297/283), where the “relation between sensation and Corporeality must be thought of as simultaneous” (p. 309/295). On the one hand, we have the empirical, physiological reality of the corporeal body and its organs of sense, and on the other we have the phenomenological reality of consciousness, of the actual world we live in, or ‘mere subjective appearance’.

However, to suggest that consciousness is dependent on physical processes is not to affirm a causal relation between the two. There is an associative relation, yet no causal mechanism has yet been demonstrated, probably due to the fact that what is in question here is the demarcation between two entirely separate realms of analytic experience; the empirical and the phenomenological. Empirical theories of consciousness tend to remove this distinction altogether, reducing lived experience down to merely subjective experience that is in turn an effect of empirically observable neurobiological processes which can be modelled in terms of, for example, cognitive function and artificial intelligence.

Such an approach, however, takes consciousness as something self-evident, and it is difficult to see how any causal relation could be proved if one side of the equation remains unquestioned, or simply a function of ‘self-evident’ common sense. This is especially so given that it is in consciousness, as lived experience, where empirical reality first shows itself. From the perspective of

phenomenology as fundamental ontology, it is the self-evident basis of human understanding that must first be explicated if the sciences are to have a firm philosophical understanding of the phenomena they are investigating in the mind-body problem. Thus, for Husserl, a “univocal determination of spirit through merely natural dependencies is unthinkable, i.e., as reduction to something like physical nature” (p. 311/297), quite the contrary, for from the perspective of the phenomenology of practice “all of nature, with space, time, causality, etc., is completely dissolved into a web of immanent motivations” (p. 238/226).

So there is a relation of simultaneous conditionality between nature and consciousness. Or in other words, a condition of the possibility of lived experience is a body in ongoing contact with its material world. This contact is inherently associated with the whole perceptual background of shared lived experience that is itself intentionally structured by motivational causality. The things or matters that are given in perception, and in the course of our everyday activities, give rise to (are a condition for the possibility of) their associated sensuous feelings and thereby “‘arouse’ an interest, a tendency to turn towards them. This tendency then freely unfolds in the turning” (p. 227/216). Sensuous feeling is therefore, in its turn, a condition for the inherent tendency or motivation to act. Thus for Husserl, “I experience the stimulus of the beautiful, and I am motivated to turn to it, to pay attention to it, to take pleasure in regarding it” (p. 229/217). Similarly with more ‘obscure’ stimuli there is a “being *passively* determined by something, and an *active reaction to it*, a transition into action” (ibid).

The transition towards action does not require a rational identification of the thing perceived, nor of the sensuous feeling it arouses and the motivation to act. The thing perceived need not even be an explicit object of consciousness

but something acting passively in the background. The stone on the path, for instance, can only be meaningful in relation to the whole perceptual context in which it is given; the path itself, sky and earth, all form the perceptual background within which one walks, and none of these need become a thematic concern for consciousness. Within this whole, and in the lived context of walking along a path, a fleeting passive stimulus arises in the perception of the obstructing stone, and this stimulus is a condition for its motivational tendency to react.

So one merely steps over the stone and continues walking, whilst absorbed in the practical activity itself, and perhaps thinking over a philosophical problem or just quietly taking in the scenery. Then along the way there arises a 'stimulus of the beautiful', a wild orchid in flower perhaps, that motivates one to stop and look. Such a pleasurable stimulus brings the orchid into view as an explicit perceptual object for consciousness, one that can be recognised and reflected on as such and such a thing. Yet this object does not appear in a perceptual void, the path and its environs are still 'there' in the perceptual background, in the auditory and visual fields, in the warmth of the sun and the crunch of the gravel underfoot. The whole everyday practical and perceptual context of the lived experience is already understood, and it is on the basis of this non-thematic understanding that something beautiful can simply give itself as an explicit object of one's concern.

This holism is already evident in Husserl's earlier analyses of straightforward perception, and as already stated, it does not require a continual rational mediation of every sense datum that enters the field of consciousness. Every perception and its motivational tendency to act is itself meaningful only within the context of its lived experience, and this wider ongoing practical context is constantly setting up the meaningfulness of what is perceived by

virtue of the retentional/protentional structure of lived time. We are always already caught in *media res*, so to speak, or in a temporal circle of the co-dependent conditions of motivational causality. Yet from straightforward perception, through sensuous feeling and its motivational tendencies towards practical activity and theoretical reflection, it would seem that we have a linear series of events that unfold over time and so produce an outcome in activity. Such a conclusion would, however, neglect to take into account the dynamic temporal structure of the surrounding world within which the “*Ego of ‘tendencies’*” (p. 225/213) goes about its business. A linear notion of causality will not be sufficient to explain the motivational relation between straightforward perception and practical activity. To start with the problem of the temporal structure of motivational causality, Husserl posits the notion of non-thematic or a-rational motivations as associations or habits. How are past lived experiences, past practical or theoretical activity, related to one’s present perceptions and their inherent tendency towards action? According to Husserl the connection lies in habituation or ‘passive beliefs’ which are:

relations established between an earlier and a later segment of consciousness within one Ego-consciousness. But motivation occurs in the ‘present’ consciousness, namely in the unity of the conscious stream, characterized as time consciousness (originary consciousness) in act. Here it is not a matter of a motivation of position takings by other position takings (active theses by active theses) but of lived experiences of any sort whatsoever. These are, specifically, either ‘sediments’ of earlier acts and accomplishments of reason, or ones which emerge, in ‘analogy’ with the former, as apperceptive unities without actually being formed out of acts of reason, or else they are completely a-rational: sensibility, what imposes itself, the pre-given, the driven in the sphere of passivity. What is specific therein is motivated in the obscure background (p. 233-234/222).

Husserl is explicitly dealing here with the “contrast between associative motivations and motivations in the pregnant sense of Ego-motivation (motivation of reason)” where in most cases the “motivation is indeed actually present in consciousness, but it does not stand out; it is unnoticed or

unnoticeable (‘unconscious’)” (p. 234/222-223). Non-thematic, ‘unconscious’ motivations are the rule rather than the exception. More than that, beliefs or any acts of reason, as founded in the stream of consciousness, are “subject to the first law (of motivation), that of habit” (p. 235/223). Again, Husserl expressly undermines any notion that reason or rationality can play an overriding, fundamental role in the structure of lived experience at the level of originary temporality and its motivational tendencies. This further contradicts Dreyfus’ claim that belief mediates all Husserlian intentionality, for the more fundamental phenomena are those “unnoticed, ‘hidden’ motivations, which are to be found in habit, in the events of the stream of consciousness” (p. 235-236/224). There is still room, here, for the notion of habitual beliefs that, once held, need not then be explicitly brought to mind but that still produce a habitual tendency to act. Yet there are still other habits that are not ‘formed out of acts of reason’, are a-rational, belonging to sensibility and the motivational tendencies of the ‘obscure background’ of lived experience. Husserl’s critique of traditional rationalist philosophy is still clearly at the forefront of his project here:

*Reflection* on a lived experience is originally a positing consciousness. But is the *lived experience* itself something given or constituted in a positing consciousness? If that were the case, then could we not always go back a step in reflection, and would we not then fall into an infinite regress?... there are hidden motivations. Even without our performing acts of belief, they enter into motivations (1989, p. 236/ 224).

Husserl’s notion of motivational causality, and thus the entirety of intentionally structured lived experience, is obviously not dependent on acts of belief, even habitual beliefs. Phenomenologically speaking, our motivations to act are founded in sensuous feelings associated with the flux of perception, and these motivations need not necessarily be explicitly thought out and cognised as such. Rather, they belong to our bodily or

practical interaction with the world, where “all life of the spirit is permeated by the ‘blind’ operation of associations, drives, feelings which are stimuli for drives and determining grounds for drives, tendencies which emerge in obscurity, etc., all of which determine the subsequent course of consciousness according to ‘blind’ rules. To these laws correspond *habitual modes of behavior*” (p. 289/277). Practical activity, such as for instance reclining into a chair, walking across a street, or simply waking and rising in the morning, is something most of us would presumably consider a mundane habitual form of behaviour. In fact, most of the everyday activity involved in our waking hours, from moment to moment, is generally not something that needs to become a thematic concern since, by definition, it is familiar and everyday and one is instead absorbed in whatever business is at hand, such as that book to be read, the meeting to attend, or this life to be lived.

Mundane, habitual practical activity is that which conjoins the flux of lived experience. Past lived experience, and its habitual behaviour, constantly throws us into the present situation and its perceptual flux, with the associated feelings and motivational tendency towards yet more activity, which in turn brings us back to the ‘present’. If this cycle is thought in terms of a linear progression of acts, perception, feelings and motivations to act, then lived experience can be reconstructed into a series of present moments of perception preceded by practical activity and resulting in yet more activity. However, Husserl’s notion of time precludes such a simple account, for past activity is not something ‘behind’ us, and presence is not a temporal progression of ‘nows’. If life is a single dynamic moment of presence, then the past is always itself ‘present’ such that all habitual behaviour is, “in the background consciousness, not an expecting in the proper sense but a

*protention* directed toward the future occurrence, a protention which can become an expectation with a shift in the attention of the Ego” (p. 268/256).

Here, Husserl is attempting to sketch out the relation between everyday practical activity and the retentional-protentional structure of time and perceptual presence. In terms of the horizon of the future, any present activity has this temporal structure in that, as a directed mode of intentionality, it constantly projects future activity. Yet as an ongoing present activity, it is always already fading away as something past. That is, when absorbed in the work at hand, one usually comes across something to be dealt with, and that thing or matter will be meaningful in terms of its relationship to that work, it will have a number of intentional relations for which “each feature of the intentional object refers back to earlier similar experiences” (p. 278/266). It is this ‘referral back’ that links present ongoing practical activity to the horizon of the past, and constitutes the background of habitual behaviour. Yet this retention, and its protention, as the structure of lived time, is characteristic of all the intentional modes of lived experience and of lived experience as a whole. Or as Husserl states, “every lived experience has its background, its environment in the order of coexistence as well as its environment in the sinking down into the past (through which it is constituted as a unity of the living past precisely in the sinking down)” (p. 307/294).

All the co-dependent conditions of lived experience; from practical activity to perception, feeling and motivation; must be thought here as simultaneous, both in relation to one another and in terms of time. From the perspective of the past, present and future, as an originary temporal structure, any one condition implies all the others. There is no perception without feeling, motivation and practical activity. What constantly binds these together and

constitutes the sense of ongoing everyday life is the intentional structure of originary temporality and the constantly dissolving primary memory of consciousness: “In the now, consciousness has a content of originary lived experiences and a horizon of past ones which is represented in the now in the form of a lived horizon of ‘primary memory’, of retention, and the originary and the horizontal are continuously transformed into one another” (1989, p. 314/300).

Past lived experience, as habitual practical (and also theoretical) intentionality, is ‘present’ as the past horizon of perceptual presence, and this horizon is a condition for the possibility of that perception. Past lived experience is what brings us to the present. Along with perception there goes the associated feelings and their inherent motivations to act, and all of these are constantly fading away into the horizon of the past. Yet these present motivational tendencies are also a condition for practical activity and whatever theoretical intentionality might be associated with that. Yet as with perception, feeling and motivation, all present activity is already fading into the horizon of the past, even as it protends or ‘anticipates’ the future. Present activity bridges the past and future horizons of lived experience and is a condition for the possibility of future lived experiences, for as present activity it is always already fading into the past horizon of presence, and thus constantly brings us back to perception whilst projecting future activity; and so on until death.

Husserl’s outline, in *Ideas 2*, of the relation between the temporality of perception and the problem of practice, raises a number of interesting difficulties for both Dreyfus’ and Heidegger’s critiques of Husserl, and at the same time opens up the possibility of a phenomenological interpretation of their notions of practice, perception and time. Such an interpretation will

need to keep in mind the originality of Husserl's non-subjectivist account of time and perception, as well as reiterate the ontological priority of his notion of practice with respect to the natural scientific problematic of *Ideas 1*. This interpretation so far, from the *Logical Investigations* through the phenomenology of time and perception, and on to *Ideas 2*, rather than demonstrating any clear break between Heidegger's and Husserl's phenomenologies, on the contrary seems to me to point to a fundamental convergence in their thinking, a convergence centred on the intentional structure of originary temporality<sup>47</sup>.

### *§13. Practice and bodily presence*

Heidegger's existential phenomenology develops, in large part, out of his work with Husserl in the early 1920's, and on taking up a teaching position at Marburg University an early draft of *Being and Time* was presented in the 1925 lecture course entitled *History of the Concept of Time*<sup>48</sup>. In this course, Heidegger presents the development of phenomenology through an interpretation of the work of Brentano and Husserl, and on towards his own practical intervention. The emphasis on perception and presence in this early lecture clearly connects the intentionality of perception with what Heidegger sees as the structure of intentional comportments in general, and specifically with the practical comportments that characterize the first division of the existential analytic. On the intentionality of 'natural perception' [*natürliche Wahrnehmung*] Heidegger states that "I do not perceive in order to perceive but in order to orient myself, to pave the way in dealing with something" (Heidegger, 1985, p. 30/38<sup>49</sup>). As with Husserl, perception takes place within the lived context of everydayness, although Heidegger will apparently disagree on what constitutes this context. Suffice it to say, for the moment, that perception is intrinsically related to the intentional comportments that

constitute the general sense and direction that, to varying degrees, life obviously has. And so for Heidegger perception is “*intrinsically intentional ... intentionality constitutes the very structure of comportment [Verhaltens] itself*” (p. 31/40), in the sense that our everyday perception is always a ‘directing-itself-toward’ something. Perception is seen here as a part of intentional comportments in general.

In an exposition of this Husserlian notion of perception, Heidegger goes on to distinguish between the perception of a chair in its various given sensuous aspects (its colour, shape and so on) and its “*perceivedness [Wahrgenommenheit]*” (p. 40/52), in the sense of its “*bodily presence [Leibhaftigkeit]*” (p.40/53). The bodily presence of things given in perceptions, is the “*superlative mode of the self-giveness of an entity*” (p. 41/54), and the ground on which ‘merely representing’ or imagining that thing is made possible. In imagination there is an ‘intuitive fulfillment’ which gives the entity itself but obviously not in a bodily sense, and these two are more originary than ‘empty intending’ (signitive acts), as in talking about the thing intended but without actually bringing it to an intuitive fulfillment in the imagination or in actually perceiving the thing itself. To illustrate this, Heidegger distinguishes between seeing, in the ‘natural attitude’ of everydayness, a picture of a thing and the thing itself. In a simple perception [*schlichte Wahrnehmung*] of the picture one sees the thing depicted rather than the ‘picture-thing’ (the postcard itself as an object for instance). The picture reproduces a meaningful relation to the thing depicted, yet the most fundamental form of this relation is to experience that thing itself in a bodily sense. Reproduction, as simply representing something, has a “structure totally different from that of a direct [*schlichte*] perception” (p. 42/56). This is more or less a restatement of the basic distinctions Husserl makes in his sixth logical investigation<sup>50</sup>.

Heidegger, at this early stage in his exposition of phenomenology, is also more or less in line with Husserl's use of authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) for which "the authentic moment in the perceivedness of the perceived is that *in perception the perceived entity is bodily there*" (p. 43/57). For phenomenology, the actual objective presence of a thing for perception, that something is 'there' in a bodily sense, is the most fundamental way in which the things themselves give themselves. However, in Husserl's analysis of internal time consciousness, the 'authentic moment in the perceivedness of the perceived' is not merely the 'bodily presence' of a thing but, rather, its temporal constitution as an objectively enduring thing. Presence, in Husserl's most fundamental sense as objective being, must also be thought in terms of originary temporality. Yet Heidegger is not yet ready to introduce the problem of time so early in the lecture course. First, Husserl's notion of presence must be thought through, both in terms of what Heidegger sees as its overriding theme and the methodology appropriate to that.

Towards this end, Heidegger points out that phenomenology is first posited as providing a properly philosophical basis for the theoretical tradition in that "Husserl conceives intentionality as the universal structure of reason (where reason is not understood as the psychic but as differentiated from the psychic)" (p. 46/62). Reason is the guiding principle of Husserl's phenomenology from its inception in the inadequacy of the traditional approach to subjectivity and the necessity of a renewal of the philosophical ground of the empirical sciences. Intentionality is first sketched out from this perspective, as the fundamental ground of reason, and this basic starting point might seem to undermine Husserl's attempt at fundamental philosophy. As Heidegger suggests, given that intentionality as a 'directing-

itself-toward' is seen primarily as the basis for reason then "any exposition of the practical sphere here is drawn from the theoretical" (p. 45/61).

From this perspective, Husserl's notion of perceptual intentionality is, therefore, not itself 'theoretical', but it may be limited to being a ground for that. As such a ground, the intentionality of perception is not a rational relation but more a condition for the possibility of reason. Thus for Heidegger, Husserl's notion of truth within the supposed limits set by the latter's emphasis on reason, is firstly a lived, non-thematic, intentional relation, where "being-true is experienced [*erfahren*] as a distinctive *relation*, a *comportmental* relation [*Verhalt*]" (p. 52/70), in an identity synthesis and its fulfilling intuition, that is, in a natural perception of a thing in its bodily presence. Truth, in the phenomenological sense, comes back to the things themselves and is not grounded in assertions about the matter at hand but, rather, in the lived experiential relation to the intuited thing itself. All truth statements about things imply just such an originary intentional relation to those things, a relation that "*makes knowledge true*" (p. 53/71).

Heidegger develops, here, his interpretation of the sixth chapter of the sixth Logical Investigation, sketching the distinction between sensuous and categorial intuition<sup>51</sup>. It is this distinction that apparently led Heidegger, at least in retrospect, through to the determination of the 'manifold meaning of being' (Heidegger, 1972, p. 72). As to this distinction, according to Heidegger "intuitions which exclude not only everything individual but also everything sensory from their objective content are *pure categorial intuitions*" (1985, p. 69/95), as opposed to "*sense intuition, sense abstraction, the abstractive seeing of a pure sensory idea*" (p. 69-70/95) such as colour in general. Sensuousness, as the bodily presence of things in general or objective presence as such, is the ground of this distinction between the sensuous and categorial intuitions

where sensuousness (*Sinnlichkeit*) is “*the total constellation of entities which are given beforehand in their material content*” (p. 70/96). Materiality and its spatiality are thus abstract “*sensory concepts*” (ibid), where categorial intuition is nothing apart from the sensuous, for it is the ideal form of presence.

Furthermore, for Heidegger, categorial intuition is not the imposition of a subject’s intellect on the sensory world, thus rationally constituting objectivity. This mode of intuition is itself founded on intentional comportments in general and means “*letting the entity be seen in its objectivity*” (p. 71/97). That is, objective presence gives itself in the intentionality of perception, it is not the formal construct of a subject but, rather, a mode of intentional comportment, or ‘intentionality through and through’. The most significant consequence of this phenomenological analysis lies, for Heidegger, in the notion that there are intentional acts “in which ideal constituents show themselves in themselves, which are not constructs of these acts, functions of thinking or of the subject” (p. 71/97). Nonetheless, for Husserl, the intended as the idea (or later noema) given in categorial intuition was the important discovery of his *Logical Investigations*, insofar as it provided a way of unifying pure reason with the sensuous.

Keeping this emphasis on the guiding role of reason in mind, Heidegger sets up his inversion of Husserlian phenomenology in the assertion that “categorial intuition is just a concretion of the basic constitution of intentionality” (p. 72/98-99). From an existential phenomenological perspective, the intentionality of objective presence is a necessary but not a sufficient basis for understanding the lived meaningfulness of the things themselves. From Heidegger’s point of view, in apparent contrast to Husserl, perceptual intentionality can itself only be meaningful in its relation to an intentional comportment that lies beyond that of rational consciousness and

its theoretical compartments. Thus the “so-called logical compartments of thinking or objective theoretical knowing represent only a particular and narrow sphere within the domain of intentionality” (p. 78/106-107). Heidegger’s ‘wider’ understanding of intentionality includes practical compartments, and in one simple move he calls into question both Husserl’s emphasis on the intentionality of perception as a fundamental ground, as well as the entire phenomenology of transcendental subjectivity.

Yet there are two related problems here for Heidegger’s critique of Husserl. Firstly, he does not seem to clearly distinguish between these two major problematics of phenomenology, those of time and reason, and in fact emphasizes ‘theoretical knowing’ over simple, non-theoretical, straightforward perceptions. This interesting ambiguity in Heidegger’s interpretation remains throughout his critique of Husserl, and is centred on the assumption that *Ideas 1* and its rational subject are fundamental for all phenomenological analysis. Secondly, this emphasis on reason and the transcendental subject completely overlooks the ontological priority of the practical attitude that Husserl outlines in *Ideas 2*.

To continue with Heidegger’s critique, having circumscribed Husserl’s understanding of intentionality, without as yet engaging with its fundamentally temporal structure, Heidegger proceeds to a critique of the methodology that gives access to natural perception and the categorial intuition of objective presence. The phenomenological maxim, ‘back to the things themselves’, takes fundamental ontology back to where it must always already start if it is to lay open its most basic concepts. And where do we already start from? We start from within our own un-thematised, lived experience of the world, our own absorption in the everyday work at hand, which means we start with the present moment and with the unproblematic

perceptual whole of our present situation. Straightforward sensory perception (*schlichte Sinnliche Wahrnehmung*) is a “simple apprehension of what is itself bodily found just as it shows itself” (Heidegger, 1985, p. 47/64). According to Heidegger, and with regards to this simple mode of perception, Husserl starts his analysis with a description of the ‘natural attitude’. This is the attitude of everyday absorbed activity, of having to deal with things in general, an attitude that Heidegger simply equates with natural scientific objectivity as laid out in *Ideas 1*. On the basis of this questionable assumption, Heidegger then points out that everydayness and its lived context is thus already preconceived by Husserl as an objectifying ‘attitude’, which means it is already understood as involving only the lived stream of consciousness and its rationality. Such a starting point, based on the problematic of *Ideas 1*, has already then effectively ruled out any fundamental role for practical activity.

Within this lived context, limited as it is to simple perceptions and reason, Heidegger names two methodological reductions in relation to natural consciousness; the transcendental followed by the eidetic reduction. The first turns the analyst’s attention back from its absorption in ‘going along with’ the natural intentional acts, so that one can analyze those acts and their intended objects themselves. From an absorption in the work at hand, the phenomenologist must attempt to bracket that everyday absorption and yet still make it a thematic concern for descriptive analysis. The eidetic reduction then subjects this abstracted everyday stream of consciousness to an analysis in terms of “the structure belonging to a perception, representation, or judgement as such” (p. 100/137). These reductions distinguish between the reality of the thing, and the meaningfully lived experience of that thing. It is only in the latter, in the immanence of natural perception, that the objectivity of things is constituted meaningfully, and so the ideal sphere of immanence,

or pure consciousness, becomes “for Husserl the sphere of absolute being” (p. 101/not given in GA 20<sup>52</sup>). Following this particular interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology, being means objective presence, and so perceptual consciousness is the most fundamental lived context for phenomenological inquiry. Thus consciousness, as objective being, “means the priority of subjectivity over every objectivity” (p. 105/145).

What this means for Heidegger, even given the radical nature of Husserl’s analyses, is that phenomenology falls back in line with the tradition as merely an analysis of subjective lived experience, for which the context of human understanding remains a function of rational consciousness. The analysis of lived experience thus excludes “every real object, beginning with the entire material world” (p. 97/133). Heidegger sees this as analogous to the separation of *res cogitans/extensa* in Descartes, and claims that the transcendental world for Husserl “is to be found in the basic stratum of the material world of things” (p. 101/138). In this way, Heidegger can then ask the question of how consciousness can transcend itself in order to reach the objectively real world, for that “is the line of questioning motivating the elaboration of the phenomenological field of pure consciousness in Husserl” (p. 101/139). That is, Heidegger understands Husserl’s philosophy not only from the perspective of the natural attitude but also in terms of Descartes’ subjectivism, and so phenomenology becomes merely another form of naïve Cartesianism.

Caputo (1992) also seems to follow this line of reasoning, in that for “Husserl the reduction means a ‘leading back’ from a naïve consciousness ... to a critical consciousness which understands the hitherto anonymous life of consciousness which ‘constitutes’ the object” (p. 329). In contrast to the ‘constitutive’ operation of transcendental consciousness, Caputo claims that

for Heidegger “the reduction discloses the hitherto anonymous operation of being by which the being emerges as a being” (ibid), and in this way, the latter “has radically altered the terms of Husserl’s reduction and recast it in the likeness of his own ‘ontological difference’” (p. 332). The receptivity of being is opposed, here, to the constitutive character of consciousness. Yet all ‘constituting’, for Husserl, is not something merely subjective, and in a fundamental way, it is founded in the receptivity of straightforward perception and the temporal structure of lived experience. Furthermore, and contrary to any radical break with phenomenology, the reduction as a ‘looking away’ from beings to being, is not only found in Husserl’s distinction between the sensuous and supersensuous, but also in the bracketing of everyday ‘inauthentic’ understanding in favour of one’s ownmost ‘authentic’ relation to lived experience. Any claim that Heidegger’s existential analytic is a radical departure from Husserl must also take into account the radical continuity of their projects, and especially where Heidegger insists on reducing phenomenology down to merely a form of subjectivism.

For example, Heidegger interprets immanence as a relation between “reflective experience and the reflected.... [and thus] a relationship of being between entities, and not the being as such is determined here” (p. 103/141). The reflective act and its object are apparently presupposed in the relation, and so it follows that Husserl never questioned the being of consciousness itself, since his analysis and conclusions are aimed at “working out the context of lived experience as a region for absolute scientific consideration” (p. 107/146). Accordingly, the being of consciousness is already determined by the natural attitude, and given this, the transcendental reduction describes only the natural scientific comportment towards beings as objects of the

material world, which is in fact more or less the case in *Ideas 1*. Yet Heidegger also claims that for Husserl this means human being is fundamentally defined in terms of the zoological thing of nature, as merely “being on hand as a thing, *to which* compartments are perhaps added as ‘appendages’” (p. 113/157), and that therefore “in the background of all questions about the intentional, the psychic, about consciousness, lived experience, life, man, reason, spirit, person, ego, subject, there stands the old definition of man [sic] as *animal rationale*” (p. 125/174). Thus Heidegger contends that Husserl does not start with an analysis of intentionality as it actually gives itself but just proceeds to its abstraction as an act of consciousness, and so “in elaborating intentionality as the thematic field of phenomenology, *the question of the being of the intentional is left undiscussed*” (p. 113/157).

This critique of Husserl is dependent on Heidegger’s selective reading of *Ideas 1*, for which the pure ego has become a self-evident ‘thing’ that must transcend its subjective immanence in order to reach out to the real material world of objects. Neither this subjectivity nor the objectivity of things are questioned, only their intentional relation is described, and this relation is mediated by reason. At its most fundamental or authentic level, phenomenology now merely accounts for a self-evident subject’s rational understanding of an objective thing as perceived in its bodily presence. This wholesale abridgement of Husserl’s phenomenology down to a form of naïve Cartesianism is also more or less followed by Dreyfus<sup>53</sup>. However, Heidegger accomplishes this selective interpretation without investigating either the temporal constitution of the phenomenological ego and objective being, or the priority of the practical attitude over the natural. As concerns the latter problem of practice, for Husserl then, at least from the perspective of

Heidegger's critique, it might seem that the lived context within which perceptions can make sense, is the domain of the pure ego as a self-apprehending, representing and rational subject. Yet practical comportments, in Husserl's sense, are not merely the effect of rational (or irrational) thought, and so as a way of understanding the world the practical mode of intentionality, as outlined in *Ideas 2*, definitely seems to undermine the fundamentality of Heidegger's critique of Husserl, in that it calls into question the autonomy of the rational subject.

During the lecture course, Heidegger does acknowledge receipt of the 1925 manuscript of *Ideas 2*, dating back to Husserl's 'pencil manuscript' written in 'one stroke' in 1912 after the completion of *Ideas 1*. This early manuscript was reworked and expanded upon by Husserl in 1915 and the manuscript as a whole, including the addition of the third section on the personalistic attitude (written in 1913) as well as notes dating back to 1908, was compiled by Edith Stein in 1918. Another reworking followed in 1923, with extensive editing by Husserl including a revision of the third section, and a manuscript ready for publication was compiled by Husserl's assistant Ludwig Landgrebe in 1925<sup>54</sup>. In reference to this last manuscript, Heidegger states "I am not sufficiently conversant with the contents of the present stance of his investigations. But let me say that Husserl is aware of my objections from my lecture courses in Freiburg as well as here in Marburg and from personal conversations, and is essentially making allowances for them, so that my critique today no longer applies in its full trenchancy" (1985, p. 121/167). According to Heidegger, the earliest versions of *Ideas 2* from 1914-15 "worked along the lines set by the first part of the just published *Ideas toward a Pure Phenomenology [Ideas 1]*" (p. 121/167), that is, in terms of the natural attitude. Presumably, the distinction between the natural and practical attitude, as set out in *Ideas 2*, is the result of

Heidegger's own intervention in the development of phenomenology, or at least that seems to be what he is implying here.

Nonetheless, what is certain is that Heidegger received *Ideas 2* at a critical time in the development of his own practical critique of phenomenology and the first draft of what becomes the existential analytic of Dasein. He goes on to acknowledge that, for Husserl, the overall meaningful context of lived experience is not itself grounded in objectivity, in the natural attitude, since "the attitudes are not even on the same plane, for the naturalistic is *subordinated* to the personalistic" (p. 122/169). Yet Heidegger still insists that the problematic as a whole is founded on the same ontological presuppositions as *Ideas 1*, specifically Descartes' "old definition of man as *animal rationale*" (p. 125/174). Now while Husserl is definitely oriented towards a phenomenological re-interpretation of the *ego cogito*, it is simply not the case that he remains with Descartes' self-evident notion of the *cogito sum*. On the contrary, one of the most basic themes of phenomenology, from the Prolegomena of the *Logical Investigations* on, is the critique of the traditional definition of human being as the 'thinking animal' and its self-evident *ego cogito*. Yet Heidegger insists, in this cursory examination of Husserl's notion of practice, that it is still in some unexplained sense founded in rationality<sup>55</sup>.

Having demarcated the apparently subjective limitations of Husserl's phenomenology, Heidegger goes on to posit a more fundamental account, one that includes both the problem of practice and its relation to a more original concept of time. These sections dealing with practice form the basis of the first division of *Being and Time*, and also outline the relation to Husserl's phenomenology. Starting from Husserl's notion of a surrounding world, Heidegger's analysis will now call into question the "world as *environing world [Umwelt]* with respect to its worldhood" (p. 170/229). The

‘world’ is now something questionable in itself with respect to those constitutive conditions that make it possible, its ‘worldhood’. The world is not to be presupposed as ‘external’ material reality but is understood in everyday existence, or rather, it is ‘preunderstood’ in our absorbed concerned commerce with things and others.

In this sense, human understanding finds its provenance in the inexplicit, average, everyday familiarity with which we deal with life, in the world of mundane everyday existence. This question thus involves “how the world shows itself in everyday concern” (1985, p. 186/252), and it attempts to “get close to the peculiar presence [*Präsenz*] of the world around us” (ibid). As in Husserl, the lived context of this analysis is our everyday understanding and its relation to presence. Furthermore, this understanding is not fundamentally rational, rather, it is non-theoretical practical understanding. Heidegger calls this practical involvement with things, ‘concern’, rather than a practical attitude. Concernful circumspection characterises our dealings with things, where “it is the presence of what is of concern which first and foremost brings to light what we in the context of theoretical apprehension designate as the immediately given” (p. 194/264).

In any absorbed practical activity, one deals with things that are ‘at hand’. These things do not need to be identified as such and such a thing useful for this particular work at hand, yet they still have a form of presence. Heidegger, here, begins his positive interpretation of phenomenology by recontextualising what he sees as Husserl’s notion of presence. While absorbed in work we tend not to perceive simple objects but, rather, we use what is at hand, without having to take it out of its lived practical context. Phenomenological analysis, at least according to Heidegger, requires the analyst to bracket this everyday context in order to isolate a thing and reflect

on its objective bodily presence. Bodily presence is itself, in this sense, a mode of restricted analytic concern, as a “state of solely *looking*, a mere looking which *interprets*” (1985, p. 195/266), and as such, it is founded in the presence of handy things. The analyst must first take the thing out of its relation to the work at hand, out of the meaningful context of its environing world (*Umwelt*), in order to simply look at it and interpret it as an object of natural science. In doing so, phenomenology as Heidegger understands it, obliterates the fundamental practical context in which things are given to perception, in favour of the intentional relation between a self-evident subject and its rational identification of an objective thing. All the practical relations of sense belonging to that thing and its relation to the work are lost, and the practical context of all everyday straightforward perception is overlooked.

In an analysis of the worldhood of the world, reality is not to be understood as the bodily presence of the perceived, as merely the totality of real material objects, rather, what must first be questioned is the ‘perceivedness’ of the perceived. This question takes a step back from the perceived thing itself, as it stands there in its objective presence, in order to uncover the context in which it is first given. The rationally understood objectivity of the thing is a way of understanding something that has already been made present to one’s perception, and it is this non-objective mode of presence that constitutes the reality of material objects. It is in this prior lived, everyday sense that reality can now mean “non-objectivity” (Heidegger, 1985, p. 194/263).

According to Heidegger, phenomenology never asks this question concerning the lived context of reality, that of the being of intentionality itself, and instead merely reaffirms the traditional notion of a subject’s perceptions of objective things, without investigating their unitary constitution. From the perspective of the question of being, the

subject/object dichotomy in fact characterises all modern philosophy, and Heidegger traces the genesis of this error back to the ancient Greek philosophy of Aristotle and Plato. It is only with the Presocratic ‘great beginning’ that Parmenides first asks the question about being and “expressly includes the act of experiencing what is interrogated” (p. 148/201). Here, *noein* is a mode of uncovering as well as a disclosure of what is uncovered. Modern philosophy, on the other hand, presupposes the uncovering as merely ‘subjectivity’, thus overlooking the fundamental lived context of perception in favour of the uncovered itself as the object of a rational subject’s judgement (as in Descartes).

For existential phenomenology then, the ‘perceivedness of the perceived’ and the ‘worldhood of the world’ are notions that explicitly call into question the meaningful context within which any object is first uncovered. This context is the everyday work world where objects are, first, familiar things that are ready to hand and, as such, are already understood in our practical interaction with them. In the immediate context of work, such as for instance making a cup of coffee in the morning, one enters the kitchen and in doing so enters into a lived complex of meaningful practical relations to equipmental things such as the coffee maker, the cup and the stove, and so on. All these are present, or have a mode of presence, that is subsumed in the immediate context of what is of concern. Yet one presumably need not explicitly take all these handy things out of their familiar context and identify them as objects with various use values in order to simply make that coffee. Theoretical concerns, in this situation, take second place to the practical concern of drinking a coffee and getting to work on time. In this sense, there is a multiplicity of possible meaningful relations in, for instance, reaching for a cup off the shelf. There is the immediate concern of the practical relations

of getting a spoon ‘in order to’ measure out the coffee ‘in order to’ ... and so on. All these relations are constituted, in an ongoing sense, as the immediate presence of the kitchen.

Yet the handiness of the handy, what is given in the immediacy of concern, is itself a “founded presence. It is not something original but grounded in the presence of that which is placed under care” (p. 194/264). If concern has to do with what immediately presents itself, that immediacy also has its ownmost context, a wider context to do with one’s own life that must be lived. In this way, the immediate presence of the handiness of the handy is already meaningfully related to everyday life as a whole, so one makes coffee in order to get on with the day ahead, in the context of working for a living and simply having a life to lead, which is ultimately bounded by the future horizon of all life, that of death. Concern, as a practical absorption in the work at hand, is merely a founded mode of what Heidegger calls ‘care’. The everyday context of presence, within which one might rationally reflect on the objective presence of the things around us, thus calls into question one’s own lived experience as a whole. This context is being in the world, that, as an understanding of being, discloses the world as ‘meaningfulness’ which is *“first of all a mode of presence”* (p. 210/286). Presence, in Heidegger’s sense, now stands for the meaningful context of lived experience as a whole, for which *“Presence of the world is the worldhood of the world as meaningfulness”* (p. 213/292).

The notion of ‘presence’ is, at least from the perspective of a phenomenological reading of early Heidegger, a basic concept of his own positive interpretation of phenomenology. From a critique of the traditional notion of presence and its subject/object dualism, Heidegger attempts to recontextualise what presence means in relation to practice, perception and being in the world. In many ways, the question concerning presence simply

is the question of being, and this centrality of the notion of ‘presence’ is evident in his early writings from around *Being and Time* right through to the late sixties account of *Time and Being* where “being means presencing” (Heidegger, 1972, p. 5). Such a formulation is perhaps inescapable, yet rather than saying anything definitive, it first opens up the whole question of the relation of being to presence and time. In later Heidegger as well as early, this relation is what is in question, where the unobtrusive presence of the ‘work world’ is related to the “phenomenon of the presence of what is of concern in the authentic sense, to the analysis of being-in-the-world in its particular sense as concern, which has the mode of being of pure *letting-become-present*—a remarkable kind of being which is understood only when it is seen that this *making present and appresenting is nothing other than time itself*” (1985, p. 213/292).

If one takes Heidegger’s critique of Husserl at face value, then the latter’s thought would certainly appear to belong with the passing history of philosophy, and although his phenomenology is obviously an important marker on the way to contemporary thinking, it would be relegated to a form of early twentieth century ‘life philosophy’. I personally agree that Husserl’s work is open to a number of different interpretations, especially given the wide range of his exploratory investigations, such as Dreyfus’ account for instance. Yet given this openness, the interpretation I have attempted to follow here, using a number of basic phenomenological themes in Heidegger’s *Being and Time* to mark out a way through Husserl’s early descriptive phenomenology, would seem to me to situate the latter squarely within the problematics of both Dreyfus and Heidegger.

The notion that Husserl failed to investigate the ‘being of intentionality’ as such, that he presupposes a self-evident subject, and that all intentionality is

mediated by rational thought, belongs to an interpretation of his phenomenology for which *Ideas 1* is taken to be fundamental to Husserl's ontology. If, on the other hand, we follow Husserl's analyses in the phenomenology of time and *Ideas 2*, then the natural scientific attitude is founded in not only the temporality of perception but also in the personalistic attitude and its practical understanding. In these works, Husserl is concerned with the originary temporal structure of the 'lifeworld' at the level of perceptual presence, where both the subject and temporally enduring objectivities are constituted. From this alternative perspective, phenomenology does not presume a self-evident ego-thing in relation to objects, rather, intentionality itself is questioned in regards to its temporal structure, from out of which the subject and objects co-arise as ongoing temporal relations of sense. Furthermore, the lived meaningful context of these relations is the surrounding or environing world of mundane everydayness and its practical attitude, a non-theoretical attitude that is 'motivational' in relation to straightforward sensory perception, and thus also founded in the structure of originary temporality. It is on the basis of these fundamental ontological grounds that Husserl attempts his neo-Cartesian critique of traditional empirical philosophy in order to renegotiate the basic concepts that inform the natural sciences.

Where then might we situate Husserl's notion of 'bodily presence' from the *Logical Investigations*, in relation to his fundamental ontology of practice and perception? According to Heidegger, the bodily presence of an object is given only in a natural scientific or theoretical sense, in taking an object out of its work context and merely looking at it as a material thing of nature. This analytic abstraction has already interpreted objectivity as something over against a subject and devoid of any everyday or practical meaning. These

latter relations then belong to subjective judgements about that thing, its usefulness for a task for instance, which are thus based on the prior identification of the thing as a material object.

Much of Heidegger's critique of traditional philosophy relies on this subject/object distinction, where the being of the subject remains unquestioned and the object is something atemporal in that it endures 'in time' rather than being temporally constituted. Husserl's understanding of presence, however, in a rough schematic form in the *Logical Investigations*, and more radically in the phenomenology of time, is both 'pre-theoretical' and wholly a function of originary temporality. In turn, the practical understanding and its everyday context, as outlined in *Ideas 2*, is founded in this temporal structure. Now while Heidegger relates presence and authentic time to the 'pure letting become present' of concern and its practical understanding, he does not deal with Husserl's account of originary temporality, nor specifically with time in general, in the lecture course on the 'History of the concept of time'. What he does say concerning Husserl and time is that:

Acts are performed; the ego is the pole of the acts, the self-persisting subject. This is certainly not the last step taken by Husserl in the elucidation of the unity of the stream of lived experience. We shall discuss this more appropriately first in the analysis of time under the caption 'Stream of Lived Experience and Absolute Time-Consciousness' (1985, p. 124/172).

This section is not dealt with yet (circa mid 1925) but obviously an engagement with Husserl's work on time is projected, in which the latter deals precisely with the intentional (temporal) structures of this, in some sense, 'self-persisting' subject. The Gesamtausgabe volume devoted to Heidegger's lecture course was re-titled as a prolegomena to that history, and while Heidegger intended to cover the problem of time here, he obviously ran out of it. There is a gap in the published archives between this early draft

of *Being and Time* and the publication of the magnum opus itself in 1926, and Heidegger's interpretation of Husserl's account of the temporality of perception and its relation to practice remains a mystery. Yet by 1925 it seems clear that Heidegger already understands Husserl's phenomenology of time in terms of *Ideas 1* and its 'ego pole', as the self-persisting centre of intentional acts. Again, the ambiguity in Heidegger's understanding of Husserl threatens to conflate the latter's neo-Cartesian retrieval of the tradition with the descriptive analysis of time that provides the basis for that neo-Cartesianism, whilst completely overlooking the priority of practical over theoretical intentionality<sup>56</sup>.

#### *§14. Perception and ecstatic temporality*

In Heidegger's last lecture course given at Marburg University in the summer of 1928, entitled *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Husserl's account of time is dealt with in somewhat more detail. According to this post *Being and Time* perspective, Husserl, amongst others, apparently understood ontology as:

an inquiry that problematises the being-in-itself of things in their so-called independence of the subject.... Ontology is taken to mean an emphasis on the object, after the subject alone has been emphasized heretofore. In this sense, ontology is linked with the epistemological position of realism—in opposition to idealism (Heidegger, 1984, 150/190<sup>57</sup>).

This is perhaps generally true of transcendental phenomenology, in that it problematises the relation between the pure ego and its objectivities. However, that transcendentalism is founded in the phenomenology of time in which both the subject and object are co-constituted in originary temporality. As already stated, in this early work, objectness is in no way something independent of the subject, nor is that subject something that exists 'in itself'. So Heidegger's understanding of Husserl seems here, again, to be based on the problematic of *Ideas 1*. Following this line of reasoning,

for the phenomenology of time, ontic transcendence, that is, a subject's relation to beings "as it occurs in intentionality ... presupposes an understanding of being" (p. 153/193). So far so good, for Husserl's notion of intentionality and objective being must presuppose a world that has already been understood by way of practical compartments, and compartments in general presuppose an understanding of being (in the existential sense).

However, Heidegger then goes on to state that one may not "stop or start with a subject-object relation, as if it somehow fell from heaven; but for transcendence, as for the problem of being, it is the subjectivity of the subject which is itself the central question" (p. 153/194). Again, in the phenomenology of time the subjectivity of the subject is very much in question, albeit only in terms of the temporality of perception. Yet to suggest that Husserl proceeds on the basis of an uncritical assumption of the subject-object relation tends to imply a naïve Cartesianism on his behalf, for which any intuitive access to perception/presence means 'realism' and an unquestioned notion of subjectivity. In this vein, Heidegger understands Husserl's notion of intentionality as merely an "ontic transcending compartment" (p. 134/168), which means as an:

active relating to something on hand.... For example, in Husserl, who describes the basic structure of all intentionality as νόησις (thinking); thus all intentionality is first a cognitive intending, upon which other modes of active relation to beings are later built (1984, p. 134/169).

That is, Husserl's account of intentionality is supposedly based on a cognizing subject's relation to beings, upon which all other relations, practical or otherwise, are based. There are two ways in which this notion of 'cognitive intending' [*erkennendes Meinen*] might be taken, however. Does Heidegger mean here the non-representational intentionality of

consciousness in terms of the phenomenology of time, or is cognition a transcendental subject's thoughtful mediation of its ideal objectivities?

Now, if cognition or thinking as νόησις can mean 'understanding', in the sense of the intentionality of consciousness in general, and based on straightforward perception in particular, then Heidegger's assertion that underneath "the entire earlier problem of the 'relation' of 'subject' to 'object' is the undiscussed problem of *transcendence*" (p. 135/169), is still correct if only from the perspective of his existential analytic. For from this existential phenomenological perspective, the "phenomenon of transcendence is not identical with the problem of the subject-object relation ... it is directly connected with the problem of being as such" (p. 135/170). This assertion is correct insofar as transcendence is related to the temporal problem of objective being in Husserl, and this is obviously not yet an understanding of being, as Dasein's transcendence or being in the world, in Heidegger's practical sense. This also holds true, at least from the perspective of *Ideas 1*, if by 'cognitive intending' Heidegger is implying that Husserlian intentionality is founded on a subject's merely theoretical relation to objects, as it might seem to be for transcendental subjectivity. Yet the intentionality of the transcendental subject is not the most basic structure of Husserlian intentionality. As Husserl himself states in *Ideas 1*, the:

transcendental 'Absolute' which we have laid bare through the reductions is in truth not ultimate; it is something which in a certain profound and wholly unique sense constitutes itself, and has its primeval source in what is ultimately and truly absolute (Husserl, 1931, p. 236/162-163).

What remains 'ultimate and truly absolute' for Husserl is that on which transcendental subjectivity and its objectivities are founded, which is time as the temporality of perception and its phenomenological ego. To suggest that Husserl's understanding of intentionality is based on a naïve or even neo-

Cartesian notion of a subject's merely cognitive or thoughtful relation to objects, completely elides the problem of transcendence in the phenomenology of time in which the subject and its objectivities are both co-constituted in originary temporality<sup>58</sup>. The early Husserl's temporal notion of transcendence, while it is in a constitutive sense concerned with the relation of subject and object, is not founded on a self-evident subject's rational transcendence to externally given things. Further to this, the temporal structure of transcendence, although still definitely related to the subject/object problem, finds its provenance in originary temporality, just as it does in the existential analytic of Dasein. If Heidegger is dealing with the pre-*Ideas* Husserl, for whom the basic structure of all intentionality is founded in temporality, then although it is correct to assert that his account of transcendence is insufficient as far as the questions of being and of practice are concerned, this assertion does tend to elide Husserl's fundamental phenomenological problem of time.

Heidegger goes on to say that intentionality and its ontic transcendence, in the sense of a self-evident subject's theoretical relation to objects, is only possible "on the basis of *being-in-the-world*", and thus "primal transcendence makes possible every intentional relation to beings" (Heidegger, 1984, p. 135/170). Primal transcendence, in Heidegger's sense, makes possible the 'ontic' transcendence of both theoretical and practical intentionality. This fundamental mode of transcendence is an understanding of the world that finds its provenance 'outside' the rational subject and its perceptions, or 'outside' of intuition in general, and is to be found in the originary temporal structure of the understanding of being. Furthermore, in any philosophy of intuition based on the subject/object distinction, "recourse is had to a consciousness that looks, a recourse so incapable of solving the problem of

transcendence, that it is not even capable of seeing the phenomenon of transcendence” (p. 182/234-235). Subjective perception in general, and its theoretical mode of understanding, is obviously an inadequate basis for understanding Heidegger’s notion of transcendence. Straightforward perception for Husserl, however, although uncovered in an analysis of intuition, is not only a non-theoretical understanding belonging to ‘merely looking’ at something but also includes the other auditory, olfactory and somatic senses. Lived perceptions as a whole, as the constantly changing perceptual background belonging to presence, are included here as ‘aesthetic’ activity, and these are all structurally constituted in originary temporality.

So for a basic comparison, we have primal transcendence, in Heidegger’s temporal sense, which means an understanding of being that is constitutive for practical understanding and originates in ecstatic temporality, while for Husserl there is a non-subjective objectifying transcendence of the flux of perception founded in originary temporality. These notions of transcendence are both posited in opposition to the traditional notion of the ego’s transcendence as a rational mediation of its objectively external world. Yet Heidegger definitely seems to understand Husserl only in the latter sense, and would presumably still discount any fundamental role for practical activity in relation to time and perception as set out in *Ideas 2*. Nevertheless, transcendence is not merely practical understanding either, for one “cannot pack transcendence into intuition, in either the theoretical or the aesthetic sense ... Even less can it be packed into a practical compartment” (p. 183/235). All compartments or intentional relations must have a ‘common root’ since transcendence “precedes every possible mode of activity in general” (p. 183/236).

Clearly, Heidegger's difficult notion of primal transcendence precedes any form of intentionality, for the understanding of being is that which sets up meaningful activity in general, be that practical, theoretical or 'aesthetic' in the natural scientific sense of 'merely looking' at things. Whilst his treatment of Husserl displays some ambiguities concerned with the problem of time, Heidegger does state that his mentor "prepares a new stage, insofar as he shows that intentionality determines the essence of consciousness as such, the essence of reason" (1984, p. 133/167). Yet he goes on to state that Husserl "does not further ask the question about the being constituted as consciousness" (ibid). Again, this seems to me to be a rather contentious assertion, on the basis of which Heidegger then claims that the "insight into intentionality does not go far enough to see that grasping this structure as the essential structure of Dasein must revolutionize the whole concept of human being" (p. 133/167). Now while Husserl's early phenomenology of time did not yet have anything like a concept of Dasein in Heidegger's practical sense, his analysis of consciousness most certainly delves into the question about the temporal constitution of objective being and its co-constituted phenomenological ego as a unity of time consciousness. Heidegger seems here to constantly simplify his critique of Husserl by simply eliding the latter's fundamental emphasis on time and temporality as the origin of subjectivity and its objectivities.

This elision is also apparent when Heidegger explicitly deals with the phenomenology of time, for he also follows this subjectivist account of Husserl as far as the 'common conception of time' is concerned. The common understanding sees time as something 'extant' or present at hand, and as such it is something that is "in motion, and it flows away" (p. 197/254). Time is "something 'in the soul', in the subject, inside consciousness; thus to

have time requires an internal consciousness” (ibid). Heidegger attempts to tie the common way of talking about time, and its metaphorical reification as some sort of ‘thing’, to Husserl’s notion of internality, as if time can be something subjective, something that belongs to a rationally calculative subject. ‘Internality’ in Husserl, however, refers to the analyst’s regard rather than any naïve reification of either time or consciousness. To suggest that consciousness can be thought in a phenomenological manner as some sort of receptacle over against the objective world, seems again to imply a very naïve form of Cartesianism on Husserl’s behalf. To reiterate, time in the phenomenological sense is related to consciousness as a perceptual process within which both the subject and its ‘external’ objectivities are constituted. The internality of consciousness in this sense is related to the way our common linear conception of time is itself constituted in regard to the conscious process itself, in the temporal structure of the intentionality of perception.

Yet, in spite of these phenomenological complexities, Heidegger goes on to state that although time, as commonly understood, is something passing ‘in’ the soul, it is also something directly related to spatiality and therefore to our senses. The common conception of time then “belongs to our sensibility (still the case also in the phenomenological conception in Husserl and Scheler). However one may understand sensibility, it remains distinct from mind and reason, which is not itself temporal but outside of time” (p. 197/255). This is a rather strange statement to make about Husserl considering Heidegger understands the intrinsic relation between sensibility and categorial intuition in the *Logical Investigations* and, presumably, also its foundation in originary temporality in the text on the internal consciousness of time that he himself edited. Consciousness, in Husserl’s sense, is founded on lived time and, as

such, it has a fundamentally temporal structure. Reason and its pure ego are not then simply atemporal phenomena existing in themselves ‘outside of time’ but must also be understood in terms of temporality.

Furthermore, Husserl explicitly distinguishes between the common notion of time, as a succession of ‘nows’, and time as the ‘primal source point’ or temporal flux. The temporal structure of consciousness is not a subjective activity but, rather, the constituting and unifying source of the subject and its objectivities. Yet Heidegger does not seem to acknowledge this here, although according to him the “classical texts on time are [amongst others]... Husserl, in *Ideas zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Book One, only brief comments” (p. 198-199/256) as well as the soon to appear work on ‘internal time consciousness’ to be published in Volume IX of the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, 1928.

It still seems to be the case that Heidegger understands Husserl from the perspective of *Ideas 1* and the pure ego, and his interpretation of the early pre-*Ideas* Husserl and his phenomenology of time is based on this perspective. Accordingly then, for Heidegger the most important texts on time are the works by Aristotle and Augustine, as well as Kant who “later pushed the problem furthest into the dimension of the truly philosophical problematic” (p. 199/257). It may well be that Heidegger’s temporal interpretation of Kant is itself remarkably ‘phenomenological’ in certain respects, but what seems clear, however, is that the phenomenology of time is definitely not regarded by him as a fundamental ‘truly philosophical problematic’. As far as Heidegger’s interpretation of Husserl is concerned in regards to the structure of time:

expectancy, retention, and making present are not merely the way we grasp the then, the formerly, and the now, not merely modes of being conscious of them; they are rather the very origin of the then, the formerly, and the now.

Expectancy is not a mode of being conscious of time but, in a primordial and genuine sense is time itself (Heidegger, 1984, p. 203/263).

The retentive structure of expectancy, in the intentionality of straightforward perception, is here at last recognised as the structure of ‘primordial time’ or temporality itself. What follows this recognition, however, in the text of Heidegger’s lecture, is a brief precis of Husserl’s phenomenology of internal time consciousness which seems to suggest that retention and expectancy, although related to primordial time, are nonetheless still thought in terms of a subject’s merely being conscious of time. Retention is the basic intentional structure of memory, and from Heidegger’s perspective, Husserl’s fundamental concept of primary memory “gets conceived as a particular knowledge about what is past. So here too time still remains an efflux of the nows, just thens, and right aways, to which a quite definite sort of knowledge of them corresponds” (204/263). The ‘knowledge’ here referred to would presumably be that of the temporally constituted sense of objective being or presence belonging to things that endure as what they are for lived human perception. Yet this knowledge is not something that simply belongs to a subject, it is not a transcendental concept nor a system of beliefs that organizes a stream of meaningless percepts into an objective ‘thing’. Objective being is constituted in the retentive structure of lived perception in such a way that, as a temporal unity, it is co-constituted along with the unity of consciousness itself, and it is this unity that provides the basis for a self-representing subject, the *ego cogito*.

Furthermore, it is this temporal unity of consciousness itself that is apprehended ‘internally’ by the analyst as opposed to the ‘external’ unity belonging to objective presence, and all of this occurs within the immanence of consciousness as understood in a phenomenological rather than an empirical sense. The ‘internality’ of the consciousness of time refers to the

direction of the analyst's regard rather than a subjective construct. This unity belonging to both consciousness and objective being is itself 'one', simply because memory in Husserl's retentive sense belongs to the horizontal structure of originary temporality, or primordial time, as the foundation of the intentional structure of perception. Yet according to Heidegger, while the phenomenology of time is an analysis of "intentionality as such, i.e., an analysis of consciousness as consciousness-of" (1984, p. 204/263), Husserl nonetheless remains within the traditional concept of time in that time "remains something internal, 'in the subject'. Hence the title, 'internal time consciousness'" (p. 204/264). Heidegger's ambiguous understanding of Husserl's notion of time continues to conflate the neo-Cartesian concerns of *Ideas 1* with the decidedly 'pre-egological' analysis of time in the *Jahrbuch*, so much so that even as Husserl stumbles about with a seemingly subjectivist account of time, for Heidegger there is still something in the account of intentionality in the phenomenology of time such that what:

Husserl still calls time-consciousness, i.e., consciousness of time, is precisely time, itself, in the primordial sense.... [where] Temporality [*Zeitlichkeit*] in its temporalizing is the primordially self-unifying unity of expectancy, retention, and making present (p. 204/264).

This much Heidegger concedes to his mentor, even as he relegates Husserl's phenomenology of time to the irrelevance of a simple subjectivism. Following on this critique of 'internal time consciousness', Heidegger gives a non-subjectivist account of the intentional structure of time for which the relation between 'what has been' (as the past) and the future to the present is not first one of a self-reflexive ego's relating to past and possible future events. The past is not first something on hand that one can reflect on, for it already forms the present basis on which futural anticipation is constantly unfolding itself into 'what has been'. The present moment is, in this sense, constantly formed by the "immanent connection of future and having-been-

ness” (p. 206/267), where past and future must be thought in a dynamic temporal relation to one another rather than as modes of time in themselves. It is only on the basis of the temporal unity of these three modes of time that a subject might then in the present moment come to reflect on time and represent it as past and possible future events. Such a lived present, however, is already an ongoing temporal relation of the past and future, a relation that already constantly constitutes subjectivity itself. Thus “*making-present* first temporalizes itself in the ecstatic unity of future and having-been-ness. This basic sort of temporalization is the result of interpreting temporality in itself” (p. 207/267).

This much seems clear then, that Husserl’s intuitive account of time, as the dynamic intentional relation of retentional anticipation, has the temporalising structure of ecstatic temporality. Whether Husserl himself understood this or not remains questionable for Heidegger, for he goes on to insist that this notion of time as ecstasis must be understood in a non-subjective sense. The common subjective notion of time requires an ego’s relation to a past and future that are in constant flux, while the ego as a unity remains in the present as “something present on hand unecstatically and which would be the common center for initiating and unfolding the ecstases” (p. 207/268). The common way of talking about time, our common metaphors for this phenomenon, tend to posit it as a linear timeline along which we travel. The past becomes something falling away ‘behind’ us and the future is ‘ahead’, and all the while we are somehow here ‘in’ the present. These metaphors seem to suggest that time is something that happens to ourselves, something we merely experience in the way the world is constantly changing, in the ageing of the body and the accumulation of life experiences.

Both Husserl and Heidegger, on the other hand, seem to make the point that time is also an essential factor in how lived experience itself, as straightforward perception and in a wider sense as Dasein, is structured. We are our own time in a lived sense and, as such, temporality is what makes possible any representation of time in the first place. As Heidegger points out, with regard to the unity of past and future in lived time, “the unity of the ecstases is itself ecstatic” (1984, p. 207/268). Any recourse to something “thing-like, present on hand, which is between, as it were, having-been-ness and the future.... [or] any sort of personal center, an I-nucleus” (p. 208/268) will therefore miss the ecstatic character of the self that finds its provenance in primordial time as originary temporality. Presumably Husserl is the target here, and so the “ecstases are, of course, not an awareness of, not a consciousness, and even less a looking” (p. 208/269).

If one accepts Heidegger’s interpretation of the phenomenology of time then it becomes necessary to suppose that Husserl’s theory is operating merely in terms of a self-evident subject’s rational experience of time. Yet it is precisely the possibility of a phenomenological critique of the self-evident character of the ‘ego-thing’ in the philosophies of Descartes and Kant that motivates the early Husserl, from the *Logical Investigations* onward, to develop a phenomenology of the internal consciousness of time. It is only on the basis of this latter dynamic, pre-egological account of time that Husserl then proceeds to his neo-Cartesian retrieval of traditional metaphysics. Heidegger, however, seems to understand the early Husserl only on the basis of the latter’s neo-Cartesianism and so the temporal unity of consciousness becomes the transcendental subject’s ‘mere awareness’ of or being ‘conscious-of’ time. It is as if Husserl first worked out the intentionality of the pure ego as a self-apprehending ‘atemporal unity’ and then merely applied

this to the analysis of our lived experience of time. The reverse is demonstrably the case, that is, the phenomenology of time is a pre-egological account of originary temporality, and as such, the transcendentalism of *Ideas 1* and beyond has a non-subjective, temporal basis, even though, as an analysis of perception, this basis still belongs within the intuitive tradition. To suggest otherwise would seem to me to completely misrepresent the case.

Now if one accepts that Husserl's theory of time is not a simple subjectivism then, according to Heidegger, the retentive structure of the intentionality of perception, as the structural relation between 'what has been' and the future in 'making present', is already explicitly an 'ecstatic' phenomenon. What Husserl observed in the structure of straightforward perception, as "prephenomenal, preimmanent temporality [*Zeitlichkeit*]" (Husserl, 1991, 393/381), would therefore be nothing other than the temporalizing structure of ecstatic temporality. This is not to say that Husserl's temporal understanding of transcendence is what Heidegger calls 'primal transcendence', however, although the two are definitely related by virtue of their relation to originary temporality. While primal transcendence "has its possibility in the unity of ecstatic momentum" (Heidegger, 1984, p. 208/270), it is nonetheless that mode of transcendence belonging to being in the world. As already stated, Husserl limits his early analysis of time to the intentionality of perception, or intuition in general, and this limitation precedes the fundamental problem of practical understanding outlined in *Ideas 2*. Yet given this convergence of the various problematics concerning time, presence and practice, it seems possible now that for both Heidegger and Husserl, the concrete relation between straightforward perception and practical activity is to be found in their originary relation to ecstatic temporality.

§15. *Presence and the temporality of practice*

Just such an originary relation is apparently set out in Heidegger's lecture course at Marburg University in the preceding summer of 1927 and entitled the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Given the year after the publication of his magnum opus, this course was intended as "a new elaboration of division 3 of part 1 of *Being and Time*" (Heidegger, 1982, p. 1/1<sup>59</sup>). The third division was to be a treatise on time and being, and in this lecture course it deals with the relation of the traditional notion of being, as perception or presence, to practical comportments, and with regard to the temporality of Dasein (*Zeitlichkeit*) and temporality (*Temporalität*) in general<sup>60</sup>. The first two chapters of part one of the lecture course deal with the relation between perception and productive or practical comportments, where the latter is seen as the unthought basis for the traditional philosophical way of understanding the being of things in terms of objectivity.

As far as this traditional notion of being is concerned, according to Heidegger "Kant interprets existence—we say, in our terminology, extantness [*Vorhandenheit*] ... as perception" (p. 56/78). In this sense, the traditional notion of perception is a perceiving of something as present at hand. That is, things are given in their 'objectness', in being bodily present as an object lying before us. In our everyday commerce with things perception involves a relation between the perceiver and what is perceived, and these perceptual comportments involve an intentional relation as a "directing-itself-towards" (p. 57/79) the thing perceived. Yet this simple relation is subject to a number of metaphysical preconceptions concerning just how we first approach the things themselves, and so we "must make the attempt to see the phenomenon of intentionality straightforwardly" (p. 59/82). Heidegger thus sets up the problematic for this lecture course as the pursuit of the:

structure of Dasein's comportments with particular regard to perception and to ask how this structure of intentionality itself looks, but above all *how it is grounded ontologically in the basic constitution of the Dasein* (1982, p. 59/82).

Accordingly, there are two major 'errors of thinking' or preconceptions as regards the traditional notion of perception. The first involves an 'erroneous objectivizing' of the relation between perceiver and perceived. Here, the intentional relation is set up as that between an extant ego and equally extant objects. For this simple Cartesianism, the ego is posited as in some sense a 'thing' or as 'present at hand', like the objects that it senses.

Heidegger thus starts with the problem of subjectivity precisely as Husserl himself sets up the problematic of the *Logical Investigations*, in a critique of the philosophical limitations of Cartesian and Kantian terminology as regards the ego or subject in relation to perception. As in Husserl, it is the relation itself that must be questioned, without recourse to reifying metaphors, and so for phenomenology "intentionality is not an extant relation between an extant subject and object" (p. 65/91), for "the subject is structured intentionally within itself" (p. 60/84).

A related problem can arise with this formulation of the question however, in the sense of an 'erroneous subjectivizing' of the intentional relation. Heidegger identifies this error with the Kantian problem of how an ego's internal experience can transcend its immanence in a meaningful relation to external objects. This 'non-phenomenological' approach does not take into account the possibility that if the meaningfulness of objects, their objectivity, is also constituted intentionally then the whole distinction between the internal/external may become superfluous. Heidegger therefore rejects the notion of an ego's internal mediation, by way of concepts, representations or beliefs, of an external reality given in sense perceptions, for "it is precisely intentionality and nothing else in which *transcendence* consists" (p. 63/89)<sup>61</sup>.

Again, as in Husserl, the subjectivity of the subject and the ideal objectivity of objects are both meaningfully constituted in intentional comportments, in our meaningfully lived relation to the things themselves, on the basis of which we can represent those things and ourselves as what they already are.

These two traditional problems overlook the role of intentionality in the relation of the subject/object, whereas for both Heidegger and Husserl this dualism is first constituted intentionally. The relational character of comportment is identified with the phenomenological notion of intentionality since it is precisely this “relation, which we signify by intentionality, [that] is the *apriori comportmental character* of what we call comporting” (p. 61/85). The intentional relation between a subject and its objects is what first constitutes subjectivity and its objectivities, and it is this relation that links existential phenomenology to Husserlian intentionality such that “the intentional constitution of the Dasein’s comportments is precisely the *ontological condition of the possibility of every and any transcendence*” (p. 65/91).

As in the early Husserl, intentionality is neither subjective nor objective. It is not something extant in the world nor does it exist ‘in’ a subject, for the subject and object are themselves meaningfully constituted in the intentional relation itself such that “intentionality, as belonging to Dasein’s existence, makes it possible that this being, the Dasein, comports existentially toward the extant” (1982, p. 65/92). As we have seen, Husserl’s perceptual holism critically dismantles the Kantian subjectivist problem of external transcendence, and it is here that Heidegger is in agreement with Husserl’s critique of the tradition in that for “Dasein there is no outside, for which reason it is also absurd to talk about an inside” (p. 66/93). Likewise, in working against the traditional subject/object distinction the act of

perceiving, understood phenomenologically “as intentional, falls so little into a subjective sphere that, as soon as we wish to talk about such a sphere, perceiving immediately transcends it” (p. 69/97).

Rather than being the act of an ego-thing or rational subject, perceiving “uncovers the extant and lets it be encountered in the manner of a specific *uncovering [Entdeckens]*” (p. 69/98). Extantness here must be understood ‘pre-conceptually’ where perceptual uncovering gives the extant or present at hand in its “*disclosedness [Erschlossenheit]*” (p. 71/100). Perception is a mode of uncovering that discloses, and as such, it is ‘prior’ to merely representing what has been disclosed in a ‘natural’ or ‘straightforward’ perception of something, yet this temporal priority is not linear. The understanding belonging to the perceptual disclosedness of things is not itself an act performed on sensations, and it is not “prior in the order of measured clock time” (p. 71/100), for it belongs to the intentionality of perception such that “in existing, the Dasein also already understands the mode of being of the extant, to which it comports existingly” (p. 71/100). In our everyday commerce with things, perception uncovers those things that are present at hand, such as when we see or handle an object, and this uncovering is not first a conceptual act. In order to represent an object as ‘this object’, as something which is simply on hand and can be represented as such, its ideal objectivity must first be given ‘non-conceptually’ in perception where the thing appears objectively as something enduring over time, as a temporal continuity of perceptions.

Yet this uncovered continuity is for Heidegger also dependent on the disclosedness of things in general and thus “*perceivedness is grounded in the understanding of extantness*” (p. 71/101), which is to say, the perceptual uncovering of actual things presupposes the disclosedness or an

understanding of the present at hand in general. In this way, not “only does its uncoveredness—that it is uncovered—belong to the entity which is perceived in perception, but also the being-understood, that is the disclosedness of that uncovered entities mode of being” (p. 72/101-102). The ontological difference is here prefigured in the difference between the uncoveredness of a thing and the understanding or disclosedness of its mode of being that ‘goes before’ any actual uncovering. Thus the question of being, in terms of an exposition of the disclosedness of the understanding of being, is ‘clearly interconnected’ with that of intentionality, although this will not be solely a matter of perception, and most certainly not merely a subject’s rational belief in objectivity.

In perceiving and uncovering an object as something that is simply on hand, and this is also more or less the concluding question of Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, what mode of understanding first brings us into such a perceptual relation to the perceived thing? What ‘horizontal mode of intentionality’ brings us into the ongoing moment of perception or presence? In the phenomenology of time, Husserl works through the intentional constitution of objective being such that it is the temporal structure of straightforward perception itself that constitutes the continuity of subjective experience and its ideal objectivities. This analysis stays with perception as an ongoing ‘pre-egological’ temporal process, and at the conclusion of his analysis Husserl asks the wider question concerning that mode of ‘ultimate’ or ‘controlling’ intentionality that brings us into a relation to this perceptual moment and its flux of ideal objectivities. For Husserl this question opens onto the transcendental problematic of *Ideas 1* as well as the personal/practical analysis of *Ideas 2*, and these form, at least in part, the basis of his neo-Cartesian retrieval of the intuitive tradition. For both Husserl and

Heidegger, such a question requires a fundamental critique of the basic presuppositions that inform Kant's account of human understanding.

Towards this critique, Heidegger asserts that "Being, being-actual, or existing, in the traditional sense, means presence-at-hand" (1982, p. 109/153), thus perception means an understanding of things as objects in terms of presence. For Heidegger, this traditional understanding of being as presence has its historical provenance in ancient Greek thinking whose access to the extant was, from a phenomenological perspective, by way of an "intuitive finding present, a beholding perception [*anschauende Vernahmen*], *noein*, or even *theorein*. This activity is also called *aisthesis*, aesthetic beholding in the proper sense, just as Kant still employs the expression 'aesthetics', purely contemplative perception of the extant" (p. 109-110/154). According to this account, the entire Western tradition of modern philosophy, originating in ancient Greek thinking, is founded on the assumption that the fundamental being of beings is disclosed as the present at hand, as the bodily presence of things given in *noein*, *aisthesis* or beholding perception.

According to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, this understanding of presence means that 'actuality is perception', where access to the objectivity of things is guaranteed by taking those things out of their lived everyday context and merely staring at them. A methodological error arises here for traditional philosophy in that objectivity is taken as a basic concept of being, and perception is its subjective mode of actuality. This traditional understanding of perception, based on the correctness of subjective judgements about objective things, where truth is defined in terms of beliefs or transcendental concepts, is itself derived from the ancient Greek concepts of *aisthesis* and *noein* which mean a 'pure beholding perception'. Heidegger's critique then must start with the ancient Greek notion of

presence, and this starting point is not merely a negative critique but, rather, a retrieval:

We not only wish to but must understand the Greeks better than they understood themselves.... Matters of no importance need no higher intelligibility. Ancient ontology, however, is fundamentally not unimportant and can never be overcome, because it represents the first necessary step that any philosophy at all has to take, so that this step must always be repeated by every actual philosophy (1982, p. 111/157)

In any lived context, if a thing is uncovered or brought to objective presence by way of simply perceiving it then is that uncoveredness necessarily the most fundamental way in which we come to understand the world? For Heidegger, the disclosedness belonging to perception, and the meaningfulness of the lived context as a whole in which we always already find ourselves, involves another intentional relation that is not itself perceptual, nor is it merely the action of a rational subject. For what is present at hand must be first brought to presence in perception by way of a “*basic comportment of the Dasein* which we can concisely call *producing [Herstellen]*” (p. 108/152). In seeing or handling an object, that object is produced for perception as something to perceive, yet in taking the object itself as the most fundamental way in which we can understand things in general, the act of producing is itself overlooked.

In productive comportment, traditional ontology, while it “*seeks to conceive beings with respect to their being by having regard to the Dasein* (psuche, nous, logos)” (p. 110/155), it thematises what is produced, or rather its ‘producedness’ (presence), rather than the originary productive comportments themselves. Thus the traditional notions of being as presence, *essentia*, *ousia*, uncritically “refer back to productive comportment toward beings, while pure beholding is fixed as the proper access to a being in its being-in-itself” (p. 110/155). Heidegger’s task is, therefore, to show that

“essentia and existentia have a common origin in productive comportment” (p. 110/155), an origin not explicitly addressed in the ‘naïve ontology’ of the ancient Greeks and apparently completely overlooked in modern thought. What then is this “productive or perceptual-intuitive comportment” (p. 117/165) and what is its relation to practice?

Firstly, while Dasein and its productive comportments are not explicitly dealt with in any traditional ontology, Dasein still “belongs to the essential nature of ontological inquiry and interpretation” (p. 111/156). Perception and presence are not superfluous to the analytic of Dasein, rather these themes still occupy centre stage while the lived context in which they are meaningfully produced is now in question. ‘Pure beholding perception’, *noein* or *aesthesis*, in which the ‘actuality of the actual is manifested’, are themselves “only a modification of seeing in the sense of circumspection, of productive behaviour” (p. 109-110/154). For Heidegger, the necessity of the analytic of Dasein is built into the traditional ontology of presence as productive/perceptual comportment. From this perspective, the question of being now means a recontextualisation of the ancient Greek notion of presence. In its failure to take account of the productive context of presence, and the resultant ‘erroneous’ emphasis on objective being, ontology must now return to Dasein, return to our lived human experience of the world. Yet this “return is at bottom no return at all, since the Dasein ... is always already consciously with its own self, is disclosed for itself, and as such always understands something like the being of a being” (p. 111/156). Such a return requires an analysis of those unquestioned productive comportments that first guided traditional ontology towards interpreting being as presence. Thus the task of a more originary interpretation of traditional ontology is

given in what already belongs to it, by “going back to the *intentional structure of the productive mode of comportment*” (p. 112/159).

Productive comportments belong to the traditional method of ontology in thematising what gives itself in perception as something objectively present at hand, and in this sense Heidegger’s analysis will open up a methodological error in traditional thinking that precludes any consideration of the fundamental role of practical comportments in human understanding as a whole. What is in question here, is the structure of the meaningfulness of lived experience as it gives itself in mundane everydayness. The phenomenological maxim ‘back to the things (the matters, states of affairs) themselves’ is a call back to where human understanding first engages with the world. For Husserl, this means going back to the lived experience of things in a descriptive analysis of the temporality of perception and the directional sense of the practical or motivational ego. Within this practical context, and in stark opposition to traditional intuitive/rational ontology, it is the relation between practical activity and ‘pre-theoretical’ presence as the temporal constitution of objective being that is seen as the fundamental basis for all lived experience. The tradition, on the other hand, has neglected the lived context of perception in favour of the perceptual presence of the thing itself.

For both Husserl and Heidegger, this traditional approach to the problem of lived experience has already pre-judged what is fundamental to the meaningfulness of everyday experience. For there is an unthematized directional sense in the philosophical activity of taking something out of its lived context and contemplating it in terms of its presence to perception as something extant or present at hand. As Heidegger states, “implicit in the directed sense of the perceiving there is an intending of the perceived as

extant in itself” (p. 68/95). Such a directional sense “belongs to intentional comportment as the *understanding of being* belonging to intentionality” (p. 113/159). As such an understanding of being, any productive/analytic comportment that brings something to presence as simply present at hand, has already understood being as merely presence at hand. What traditional ontology takes as a fundamental object for thinking, turns out to be a mere product of its own method, a method that occludes any understanding of the familiar, everyday, lived context within which it makes sense.

Thus in everyday production, as opposed to analytic reduction, a thing is released to its ‘being-in-itself’, which means not merely as extant but, rather, to its ‘useful availability’. The product, as an objective thing, has its place amongst the ordered functional totality of the ready to hand, amongst artefacts in general. The merely present at hand thing, the object of traditional ontological contemplation and its productive comportments, has been taken out of its originary lived context, which for Heidegger means out of its “equipmental contexture [*Zeugzusammenhangs*]” (p. 292/414). Traditional ontology has thematised the product of its own methodology rather than the everyday practical context in which that product originally gives itself. This practical holism is the basis for Heidegger’s critique of the traditional theoretical emphasis on aesthetic perception and the present at hand. This critique is not, however, something apart from the old ontology. The notion of objective presence as given in perception is not just given up like some simple opinion, it remains while the practical context of any perception is emphasized, and Heidegger underlines this relation in that all “producing is oriented by visual awareness; it is perceptual in the broadest sense” (p. 122/172). We stay with the hammer, so to speak, as it gives itself in itself, and

any hammer-object is itself meaningful only in relation to the whole non-thematic practical and perceptual context within which it is put into play.

Thus, in order to interpret beings as present at hand, as ‘there’, those things first have to be given in the perception belonging to practical comportments. This perception is meaningful in the context of the work at hand, or what Heidegger calls the “equipmental contexture” (p. 162/231). He quotes Fichte as an example of the traditional emphasis on theoretical perception: “Gentlemen, think the wall, then think the one who thinks the wall” (cited p. 162/231), and then points out that a wall is never first given by itself, since it is already meaningful only within the whole perceptual context along with the other walls, the roof, the auditorium itself and the lived context of a philosophical lecture. And how else could one think it, unless it was already understood in some sense? This theoretical way of taking a thing out of its “thing-contexture” (p. 163/232) in order to understand it as merely present at hand first isolates an object in order to think about its objectivity.

Yet the objective thing first gives itself in the whole perceptual context belonging to all things met with in concerned circumspection, and this perceptual whole is not something constructed by identifying a multiplicity of individual percepts. Rather, it is already meaningful within the functional context of our embodied, practical interaction with the world. The functional context of work relations has already meaningfully disclosed the perceptual whole within which the wall can then be singled out as something present at hand. What goes before and sets up any theoretical apprehension of an objective thing is this ‘functionality whole’ of the equipmental contexture. Such a lived context is ‘preunderstood’, where “as we exist factually we are always already in an enviroing world [*Umwelt*]” (1982, p. 164/234). Thus, “the world is not nature” (p. 165/235) for we “always already

understand world in holding ourselves in a contexture of functionality ... the contexture of significance [*Bedeutsamkeit*]" (p. 165/236). The phenomenological concept of 'world' is thought, here, as an understanding of being, in the sense of lived experience and the practical context of perceptual presence. It is only in this fundamental context that the world can then be thought as nature, and this natural attitude must presuppose the lived practical context of perception.

Neither naïve subjectivist ontologies nor Husserl's phenomenology of perception take practical activity into account as a fundamental mode of human understanding, and in this sense, the early phenomenology of time still belongs within the intuitive tradition. Yet Husserl's analysis of perception bypasses the two traditional errors in thinking by way of a critical dismantling of the Cartesian and Kantian ontologies concerning the subject/object relation, and in doing so his phenomenology exceeds any simple subjectivist interpretation. Furthermore, in linking non-rational practical relations, in a shared holistic sense, to the intentionality of non-theoretical perception Husserl fundamentally concurs with Heidegger in the practical interpretation of the lived context of perception. In terms of the relation between practical and perceptual compartments, the turning point in what has been assumed to be Heidegger's critique of Husserlian phenomenology was this notion of the equipmental or practical context of any productive-intuitive compartment. Yet practice, in Heidegger's sense, situates the intentionality of perception within a practical mode of understanding that is not subject to the pure ego's rational planning and calculation. This conclusion, in which the natural scientific attitude is founded in practice, does seem to be in complete agreement with Husserl's own analyses.

It is precisely this practical agreement with the Husserlian problematic that ensures the continuity of Heidegger's analysis with Husserl's phenomenology of perception, and this continuity is found in the temporal structure of practice that originates in ecstatic temporality. Practical comportments, as intentional, also have a directional sense and this sense is a practical understanding of equipment in "its specific functionality relation" (p. 293/416). When putting a hammer to use, for example, what first brings us to straightforwardly perceive that hammer is the practical context of the work at hand, and this is as true for Husserl's as it is for Heidegger's interpretation of everyday lived experience and its surrounding world. For Heidegger, this functional relation has a temporal structure in that one retains the 'with which' relation of the thing—this hammer works with these nails and so on. Similarly, one expects the 'for which' relation where the hammer works towards nailing something together, and as Dreyfus points out, these practical relations do not require the constant guidance of a rational or controlling ego. In the functional relations of retention and expectance, the hammer is understood by simply using it in the practical context of the work at hand, and as an ongoing activity these relations have a dynamic temporal structure. Functionality, as practical understanding, is a "retentive expectance [*behaltendes Gewärtigen*], in which the equipment is *enpresented* [*gegenwärtigt*]. In expectant-retentive enpresenting [*gewärtigend-behaltenden Gegenwärtigen*] the equipment comes into play, becomes present [*anwesend*], enters into a present [*Gegen-wart*]" (p. 293/416).

Expectance and retention, as in Husserl's account of the temporality of perception and thus of practice, are not meant here in any rationalist sense but are the non-thematic intentional/temporal relations belonging to the actual use of artefacts such as the hammer. As functional relations, these

modes of practical comportment constantly set up or ‘make present’ what actually gives itself to one’s circumspect perception. In this way, these relations form a fundamental part of the meaningfulness of the lived context of whatever work one may be engaged in, whether that be using a hammer or simply sitting down to read, or in the work involved in getting on with life in general. In constantly ‘making present’ what gives itself in presence, the functionality of retentive expectance is not then to be thought in terms of a linear progression of practical relations. The ‘with-which’ and the ‘for-which’ as meaningful relations belong together in constituting the practical meaningfulness of any present artefact. Retentive-expectance brings us to the hammer but it also belongs to the use of that hammer and to the completion of the work at hand. Functionality, as an ongoing dynamically relational whole, thus has a “*temporal constitution*. But it itself *points back to a still more original temporality [Zeitlichkeit]*” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 293-294/416).

It is the exposition of this originary ecstatic temporality in relation to intentional comportments in general, both practical and theoretical as well as perceptual, that Heidegger hopes will make clear the relation of being to time. This wider understanding of being, beyond the existential analytic of Dasein, is the understanding of temporality (*Temporalität*) in general, and is the crux of Heidegger’s early transcendental-existential analytic, at least from the perspective of his phenomenology. The broad outline of this problematic is also present in Husserl’s early phenomenological investigations up to and including *Ideas 2*, and irrespective of who influenced whom, the various shared themes revolving around perception, practice and time demonstrate a fundamental convergence in their thinking, a convergence centred on the structure of originary temporality.

The meaningfulness of the world we live in is, in part, constituted in a practical understanding of the functional relations belonging to our bodily engagement with things. Any single practical activity is itself meaningful only in relation to the whole context of functional relations that, as Dreyfus claims, form an un-thematised background network of shared practices. It is this background of practical understanding that ‘goes before’ any perception of actually occurring things. In this practical-temporal sense, the world is a meaningfully lived context that ‘precedes’ objects and is therefore “more objective than all objects but, nevertheless, does not have the mode of being of objects” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 299/424). We encounter objects only in such a lived context and so as “intra-worldly beings” (p. 299/424). This world significance or lived context is what is transcendent, which means that Dasein, as being in the world, is “what is *truly transcendent*” (p. 299/425). Instead of a self-contained rational subject transcending its immanence to perceive objective transcendental regularities in sense data, that subject and its sensibility are already given in an understanding of being that is temporally constituted prior to any subject/object distinction.

More than this, from the perspective of existential phenomenology human understanding now finds its provenance in meaningful relations that have already transcended the subject, for these relations already belong to our practical engagement with the world at large and form the basis for an understanding of the subject and its objectivities. Selfhood, and the unity of perception, is founded on Dasein’s transcendence, which means “*to understand oneself from a world*” (p. 300/425). The unity of perception is already open to a lived world, and its fundamental directional sense is not merely the self-awareness of a rational ego but practical commitments. This is not to say, however, that Dasein’s transcendence is merely practical understanding,

and the limits of Heidegger's supposed pragmatism are met in the assertion that transcendence and the understanding of being belong to the ecstatic structure of time which forms the basis for all the modes of intentionality. The understanding of being, as the disclosedness of the world we live in, is given in the temporal structure of intentionality in general. What practical comportments demonstrate is that this understanding already belongs to our engagement with the world, to Dasein as being in the world, and cannot be reduced to a subject's rational mediation of sense perceptions.

Given that human understanding must now include a relation to the world that exceeds the subject/object distinction Heidegger proceeds to re-interpret the traditional notion of presence in terms of ec-stasis, where the knowing/perceiving subject already stands 'outside of itself' as being in the world. Presence is now to be thought as *Praesens*, in the temporal sense of the horizon of the ecstatic present which first allows the things themselves to appear as present at hand. Yet in giving something to presence as an objectively occurring thing, in the 'making present' of productive comportment, the temporal horizon of *Praesens*, as the ecstasis of our understanding of being, withdraws in favour of what it gives. And so everything "that is encountered in the enpresenting is understood as a presencing entity [*Anwesendes*]-that is, it is understood upon presence-on the basis of the horizon, *Praesens*, already removed in the ecstasis" (1982, p. 307/436). The traditional understanding of being, as objective presence, remains as a product of what is given in the present, whilst its provenance in the temporality of Dasein and our fundamental lived relation to the world remains unthought. The gift of being as presence remains while the horizon of giving constantly withdraws.

It is in this wider horizontal sense, inclusive of both perception and practice, that the temporality (*Temporalität*) of being “is temporality [*Zeitlichkeit*] with regard to the unity of the horizontal schemata belonging to it” (p. 307/436). Practical comportments bring an ecstatic relation to the temporality of presence/perception, and the subject can no longer be thought on individual terms as existing in itself but, rather, as *Dasein*. Yet conversely, *Dasein* and its practical comportments now have a concrete relation to the traditional notion of presence in that the ‘handiness’ of things “formally implies *Praesens*, presence [*Anwesenheit*], but a *Praesens* of a peculiar sort ... as non-conceptually understandable” (p. 309/439). The ready to hand (as equipment or artefacts in general) has an ‘unobtrusive presence’ that is not an explicit or thematic concern for anyone absorbed in the work at hand. This unobtrusive presence is given by way of the functional totality of relations within which any artefact is already understood as something useful. The hammer is still ‘there’ even when not in actual use and not given in a straightforward perception, its presence is understood in its functional relation to the work at hand, and how else could we simply reach for it when it is needed?

Just as objectively present things are meaningfully given only within the horizon of *Praesens* and the ongoing temporality of being in the world, so too the “handiness of the handy is determined by way of a *Praesens*. *Praesens* belongs as a horizontal schema to a present, which temporalizes itself as an ecstasis in the unity of a temporality which ... makes possible commerce with the handy” (p. 312/443)<sup>62</sup>. So along with the perception belonging to circumspect concern, we have the ‘unobtrusive presence’ of equipmental things, and while that perceptual presence is non-representational it is still meaningful in its equipmental contexture, the context of the work<sup>63</sup>. We have temporal presencing but not the present at hand, we have circumspect

perception but not a ‘theoretical seeing’, in the ‘significance contexture’ of Dasein’s absorbed everyday practical comportments, and all of these modes of intentional comportment belong to the structure of originary temporality.

Both practice and perception belong to horizontal presence (*Praesens as Anwesenheit*) understood in terms of ecstatic temporality. In this sense, the “whole of perception’s [*Warnehmung*] intentional structure of perceiving, perceived, and perceivedness—and that of every other mode of intentionality—is grounded in the ecstatic horizontal constitution of temporality” (p. 314-315/447). This is also the case for Husserl, as far as both the intentionality of perception and of practice is concerned. Straightforward perception originates in the horizontal structure of lived time, in originary temporality. Husserl’s understanding of time is also ec-static in that subjectivity is constituted in our lived relation to things as they give themselves in the lifeworld; the phenomenological ego is already ‘outside itself’ being constituted in that lived relation.

Yet according to Heidegger, Husserl’s concept of time merely describes a subject’s rational consciousness of time, on the basis of which Husserl then proceeds on to the problematic of transcendental phenomenology and its analysis of the natural scientific understanding of objectivity. The priority of the practical over the natural attitude is also then merely the priority of a subject’s rational mediation of practice over the theoretical apprehension of objective things. However, and contrary to both Heidegger’s and Dreyfus’ emphasis on the supposed subjectivism of transcendental phenomenology, Husserl’s concept of time squarely situates the phenomenological ego as an ecstatic process of perception within the horizon of presence (*Praesens*) as constituted in originary temporality. For Husserl, as we have seen in the analyses of *Ideas 2*, this temporal horizon is bounded by practical activity in

the sense that present activity is always already fading into the past horizon of presence, and thus constantly brings us back to perception in anticipating future activity.

It now remains for Heidegger to show just how practice, theory and perception originate in ecstatic temporality, or rather, how these are structurally related to the temporality of Dasein's self-projection as it is set out in the second division of the existential analytic. The concluding task of the analytic of Dasein, as projected in the third division of part one of *Being and Time*, was an exposition of time and being as the temporal structure of human understanding, or temporality (*Temporalität*) as such. Here, "temporality is the condition of the possibility of the understanding of being" (p. 302/429) in the sense of the unity of the three ecstatic horizons of *Zeitlichkeit*. Within this threefold temporal horizon, what then might be the structure of the ecstatic conditions of the possibility of being? How are intentional compartments related to time and presence? As the lecture course draws to its conclusion this question requires for Heidegger to show how the "understanding of the handiness [*Zuhandenheit*] of handy equipment is as such a world understanding and how this world understanding, as the Dasein's transcendence, is rooted in the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of the Dasein's temporality" (p. 302/429-430). Heidegger never completed this task, but on his way to the 'turning' he lists a number of conditions for its fulfillment. Practical understanding must be in some way structurally related to Dasein's self-projection, for the unobtrusive presence of the ready to hand is already given in the temporality of that self projection where:

*The handiness of the handy, the being of this kind of beings [sic], is understood as Praesens, a Praesens which, as non-conceptually understandable, is already unveiled in the self-projection of temporality, by means of whose temporalizing anything like existent commerce with entities handy and extant [at hand] becomes possible (Heidegger, 1982, p. 309/438-439).*

The ready-to-handedness of artefacts is a peculiar form of non-conceptual presence (*Anwesenheit*) which is already given in the ecstatic temporality of the self and within the ecstatic horizon of presence or presencing. As one goes about one's business, absorbed in the work at hand, the work of course gives itself to oneself and is understood in practice. The practical self is given in its work and so "we lose ourselves in it. The temporality of dealing with equipment is primarily an enpresenting" (p. 309/440), a 'making present'. The temporal self, which is not yet a representational self, for whom the work is practically understood immerses itself into the 'totality of involvements' within which work makes sense, it immerses itself in the temporal structure of 'making present'. In doing so, the ready-to-hand is itself present in an unobtrusive sense, and as Dreyfus points out, it need not be cognized or rationally mediated as such. In cases where the work is interrupted, a specific piece of equipment might become an explicit object of one's theoretical concern but still this object will only make sense within the context of the work and one's own embodied practical activity. Dasein's practically absorbed self and its embodied practical activity both belong together within the constantly dissolving unity of ecstatic temporality and its horizon of presence.

The meaningful unity of lived experience, of horizontal presence or mundane everydayness, is a temporal unity of self-projection for which temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) is "ecstatic-horizontal self-projection simply as such, on the basis of which the Dasein's transcendence is possible. Rooted in this transcendence is the Dasein's basic constitution, being-in-the-world, or care, which in turn makes intentionality possible" (p. 312/444). Practice, theory and perception, or intentionality as a whole, is dependent on the temporal structure of Dasein's self-projection. Thus, lived experience, as an ongoing

moment of presence, originates in the unity of the horizons of past and future within which there are any number of intentional relations at play, and the unity of this lived experience is founded in the ecstatic-horizonal temporality of self-projection in a non-representational sense. The concrete temporal relation of practice to perception is perhaps to be found then in the existential analytic of *Being and Time*, and specifically in the structure of the ecstatic horizonal temporality of Dasein as set out in division two.

Something like this self-constituting unity of temporality is also posited in Husserl's phenomenology of time where the retention of the present moment of perception, as it constantly dissolves into the immediate past, forms the context of an anticipative protention of the next percept, and where the ongoing ecstatic process of retentive expectance constantly 'makes present' the actuality of the lived moment. Lived experience is, in this phenomenological sense, a dynamic temporal process founded in the constant dissolution of retentive memory, where dissolution is the fundamental characteristic of originary or 'pre-empirical' temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*). In this dissolution belonging to the flux of consciousness there nonetheless belongs a unity, the unity of inner time consciousness as a constant reproduction of the 'now'. It is the temporal structure of the phenomenological ego that constitutes the ongoing continuity of consciousness, as a unity in change, and all practical/personal intentionality is based on this fundamental, temporal ground.

For Husserl then, within the originary temporality of presence (*Präsenz*), with its past and future horizons, past practical activity brings us to the constantly dissolving horizon of the perceptual present as the retentive/expectant memory of objective being and the self-constituting unity of the flow of consciousness. This temporally structured perceptual

basis is a condition for feelings that are inherently motivational. Habitual, non-representational motivations are a condition for any present practical activity, where all theoretical intentionality is founded in the practical understanding of the lifeworld. As we have seen in the analyses of *Ideas 2*, the temporal horizon of presence is bounded by practical activity in the sense that present activity bridges the past and future horizons of lived experience and is a condition for the possibility of future lived experiences. As present activity it is always already fading into the past horizon of presence, and thus constantly brings us back to perception whilst projecting future activity. In this way, practical activity is a condition for the possibility of future lived experience. Furthermore, all of these conditions must be thought as simultaneous and co-dependent rather than as a linear progression of moments. Everything takes place within the originary temporal structure of the lived primordial present as a dynamic intentional unity of the past and future in 'making present', or within the horizon of presencing as it is constituted in the dissolvent structure of originary temporality.

These temporal-intentional relations, as co-dependent conditions of the possibility of lived experience, will form the basis of an attempt to clarify just how Husserl's early phenomenology might be situated within Heidegger's existential phenomenology and the temporality of Dasein. How might the general themes of practice and temporality, or work and dissolution, be interpreted in relation to Dasein's self-projection and in terms of the fall into an absorption in a factual everyday world of work, its circumspect perception and intentional compartments?

*IV–Work and Dissolution*

*§16. Perception and presence in the existential analytic*

Having circumscribed Heidegger's writings leading up to and immediately after the publication of *Being and Time* it seems clear, on this phenomenological reading at least, that a central problematic of the existential analytic revolves around the temporal structure of practical understanding and perception or presence. It is quite probable that these themes were developed, at least in part, through Heidegger's interaction with Husserl's phenomenology; from the initial distinction between categorial and sensible intuition in the *Logical Investigations*, the ecstatic temporal structure of perceptual intentionality in the *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* and through to the question of the relation between practice and originary temporality in *Ideas 2*. At the very least, the similarities here point to a genuinely symbiotic relationship between the two co-founders of phenomenology.

These phenomenological themes are also apparent in the existential analytic, although expanded upon and systematised by Heidegger with a number of important additions and reinterpretations. As a 'preparatory analysis' of the temporality of lived experience, this analytic is concerned with the temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) of Dasein's self-projection rather than the temporality (*Temporalität*) of being as outlined in the subsequent lecture course on the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. One overriding theme, however, remains the relation between the temporal structure of Dasein (and its practical understanding), and the traditional notion of being as perception/presence. As Heidegger states in regard to the problematic of *Being and Time*:

Because the ontological problematic of Being has heretofore been understood primarily in the sense of presence-at-hand ('Reality', 'world-actuality'), while the nature of Dasein's Being has remained ontologically undetermined, we need to discuss the ontological interconnections of care<sup>64</sup>, worldhood, readiness-to-hand, and presence-at-hand (Reality) (Heidegger, 1962, p. 228/183<sup>65</sup>).

Before these ontological interconnections can be disclosed, the traditional understanding of being as presence must first be made clear, and this requires "a preliminary ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the subject" (p. 45/24), or an analysis of the relation between time and the *ego cogito*. This is a peculiarly Husserlian problem, although as far as Heidegger is concerned the "first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of Temporality or has even let himself be drawn hither by the coercion of the phenomena themselves is Kant" (p. 45/23)<sup>66</sup>. Yet apparently even Kant was 'incapable' of understanding the originary nature of time, for he uncritically takes up Descartes' ontological position. Again in parallel with the overall theme of Husserl's early phenomenology, the unquestioned self-evident nature of the '*cogito sum*' is identified as the major error of all modern ontology. As Heidegger says, what Descartes leaves undetermined is "the kind of Being which belongs to the *res cogitans*, or—more precisely—the *meaning of the Being of the 'sum'*" (p. 46/24). This is the task of the existential analytic, a phenomenological disclosure of the temporal structure of Dasein as the meaning of the being of the 'sum'. As already stated, such a task requires a critical dismantling of the traditional understanding of being, for which "the decisive connection between time and the 'I think' was shrouded in utter darkness; it did not even become a problem" (p. 45/24).

According to Heidegger, Descartes understands the *res cogitans* as an *ens*, and as such a thinking thing, it is an *ens creatum*. As "something that has been produced" (1962, p. 46/24) the thinking ego is in turn based on the

structure of the ancient Greek ontology of being. As we have seen, the notion of productive compartments as the origin of the traditional understanding of presence is dealt with in detail in the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. From the perspective of an existential phenomenological interpretation of ancient Greek philosophy, ancient ontology was concerned with the “treatment of the meaning of Being as παρουσία or οὐσία, which signifies, in ontologico-Temporal terms, ‘presence’ [*Anwesenheit*]. Entities [beings] are grasped in their Being as ‘presence’; this means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time—the ‘Present’” (1962, p. 47/25). From the beginning then, the traditional concept of being means presence or presencing, and this implies a relation to time where the understanding of presence, as:

λέγειν itself—or rather νοεῖν, that simple awareness [*schlichte Vernehmen* or straightforward perception] of something present-at-hand in its sheer presence-at-hand, which Parmenides had already taken to guide him in his own interpretation of Being—has the Temporal structure of a pure ‘making-present’ [*Gegenwärtigens*] of something (p. 48/25-26).

The Husserlian notions of the straightforward perception of bodily presence and its temporal structure as a ‘making present’, already inform Heidegger’s interpretations of the Greeks right back to Parmenides. Now although the ancient Greeks understood being in the most ‘authentic sense’ as presencing (*Anwesenheit*) with respect to the phenomenological notion of a ‘making present’, they “managed to interpret Being in this way without any explicit knowledge of the clues which function here, without any acquaintance with the fundamental ontological function of time or even any understanding of it, and without any insight into the reason why this function is possible” (p. 48/26). The relation between presence and time is thus nascent in ancient ontology, at least from the perspective of a phenomenological interpretation of the Greeks, yet their ‘common’ concept of time was still not worked out appropriately in terms of ecstatic temporality. In light of the problem of time,

the traditional notion of being as presence or self-presence is inadequate in defining the being of the 'sum', for the ego is not something that is simply produced and present at hand like an object or one thing amongst others. As Dasein, or human understanding, the 'sum' is where beings first become meaningful as present at hand things, as states of affairs, or as the natural world in general. Presence must be understood in the context of this lived understanding, for:

not all presence-at-hand is the presence-at-hand of Things. The 'Nature' by which we are 'surrounded' is, of course, an entity within-the-world; but the kind of Being which it shows belongs neither to the ready-to-hand nor to what is present-at-hand as 'Things of Nature'. No matter how this Being of 'Nature' may be Interpreted, *all* the modes of Being of entities within-the-world are founded ontologically upon the worldhood of the world, and accordingly upon the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world. (p. 254/211).

Reality is dependent upon our being in the world in the sense that reality is something that is already understood as such in our familiar everyday involvement with the work world. Dasein is not, then, to be understood in terms of reality but, rather, in terms of a critical non-traditional understanding of being, an understanding that is to be disclosed by the 'phenomenological method of investigation' that begins with Husserl's maxim '*zu den Sachen selbst*'; to the things, the matters or states of affairs themselves. What then is the object of existential phenomenology?

Heidegger defines his conception of phenomenology in section 7 of *Being and Time* on 'The phenomenological method of investigation' (1962, p. 49-63/27-39). Here, the term 'phenomenon' is derived from a Greek verb which signifies 'to show itself' and so "phenomena' are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light" (p. 51/28). He then distinguishes this phenomenon from semblance in that in order for something to seem like something else it must already have been brought into

the light. Thus, the notion of semblance must presuppose the “phenomenon as the manifest” (p. 51/29). Similarly, appearance signifies a “reference-relationship which is in [a being] itself, and which is such that what *does the referring* (or the announcing) can fulfil its possible function only if it shows itself in itself and is thus a ‘phenomenon’” (p. 54/31). In such a referential relation, the manifest phenomenon refers to something, or meaningfully presents itself as something other than itself. Thus “appearing is possible only *by reason of a showing-itself* of something.... Appearing is an *announcing-itself* [das Sich-melden] through something that shows itself” (p. 53/29). To explicate something in terms of a reference to something else, or to mistake something for something else, both presuppose the simple fact that *something* is already given in the first place.

A methodological distinction is made here between the matter of phenomenology, the manifest phenomena, and our interpretation of that manifestation. As far as interpretation is concerned, Heidegger translates logos as *Rede* or ‘discourse’, which means “to make manifest what one is ‘talking about’ ... The λόγος lets something be seen ... namely, what the discourse is about” (p. 56/32). Logos is a way of making manifest what is talked about in discourse. It is only on the basis of this simple disclosure that logos can be a form of synthesis where ‘making manifest’ has the character of “letting something be seen in its *togetherness* [*Beisammen*] with something—letting it be seen *as* something” (p. 56/33). Logos has here the ‘apophantical’ function of appearance, in the sense of making an interpretive judgement about something, yet it is not merely truth as the correctness of a judgement. Logos as ‘letting-something-be-seen’ also means that “the [beings] of which one is talking must be taken out of their hiddenness; one must let them be seen as something unhidden” (p. 56/33).

Logos, as apophantic discourse, thus has the basic function of unconcealing, of simply bringing something into the open. These two moments of ‘truth’, the discourse itself and what it manifests, are fundamentally different. Since logos lets something be seen, it can let it be seen as something else, as the mere semblance or appearance of what is actually manifested in the discourse. Thus logos can have the dual structure of unconcealing and concealing; it can be true or false. Yet even in covering up what has been manifested the logos must have already uncovered something, and this unconcealing function of discourse is the basis of all truth such that the:

‘Being-true’ of the λόγος as ἀληθεύειν means that in λέγειν as ἀποφαίνεσθαι the entities *of which* one is talking must be taken out of their hiddenness; one must let them be seen as something unhidden (ἀληθές); that is, they must be *discovered* (p. 56-57/33).

Logos, as discourse, is founded on aletheia as unconcealing. Yet since truth in Heidegger’s sense, as aletheia, has this character of purely unconcealing then “the λόγος is just not the kind of thing that can be considered as the primary ‘locus’ of truth” (p. 57/33) because logos can also conceal. So what then is the primary locus of truth according to Heidegger? The basic locus of truth as aletheia is to be found in that mode of access to things which can never be false, which never covers up:

Αἴσθησις, the sheer sensory perception [*schlichte, Sinnliche Vernehmen*] of something, is ‘true’ in the Greek sense, and indeed more primordially than the λόγος which we have been discussing. Just as seeing aims at colours, any αἴσθησις aims at its ἴδια (those entities which are genuinely accessible only *through* it and *for* it), and to that extent this perception is always true. This means that seeing always discovers colours, and hearing always discovers sounds. Pure νοεῖν is the perception of the simplest determinate ways of Being which entities as such may possess, and it perceives them just by looking at them. This νοεῖν is what is ‘true’ in the purest and most primordial sense; that is to say, it merely discovers, and it does so in such a way that it can never cover up. This νοεῖν can never cover up; it can never be false; it can at worst remain a *non-perceiving*,

ἀγνοεῖν, not sufficing for straightforward [*schlichten*] and appropriate access (1962, p. 57/33).

In an exposition of the basic concepts of his existential phenomenology, Heidegger links aletheia as primordial uncovering with noein and aesthesis. These ancient Greek concepts of perceptual presencing, which Heidegger identifies with the phenomenological notion of straightforward sensory perception, are associated with the fundamental locus of human understanding and the origin of ‘truth’. As such a locus, perception can only uncover what is given to it, and this uncovering is not logos, and thus nor is it a simple judgement about what is uncovered, for these latter can be either true or false. I am not suggesting here that straightforward perception is therefore the fundamental concept for existential phenomenology, but rather, that Heidegger identifies noein or aesthesis as the most basic non-theoretical mode of access for all previous ontologies back to the very beginnings of ancient Greek philosophy with Parmenides. The problem of presence and perception remains at the heart of the existential analytic, and this predominance is reflected in the problematics that immediately surround the publication of *Being and Time*, in the *History of the Concept of Time* and the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*.

So what then might be the relation between the ancient Greek notion of noein and Heidegger’s thinking of being? What does the definition of being as presencing actually mean, and especially in terms of the temporality of ‘making present’? Noein, aesthesis or straightforward sensory perception, in Heidegger’s sense, does not mean merely thinking about or imagining something, it means that thing itself ‘as it gives itself’. It means this whole lived world of things, the light through the window, the afternoon clouds racing across the sky, that particular hammer you reach for in order to get on with the work at hand. Yet there are two moments in the perception of these

everyday things. There is what is uncovered, the thing itself, and then there is the ‘act’ of uncovering. Traditional ontologies generally emphasise the former, as the objectivity of things, whilst relegating the latter to the act of a subject’s relation to externally given sense objects.

For Heidegger, however, as for Husserl, this formulation remains inadequate in that it fails to account for the ontological structure of the subject and its basis in everyday lived experience, and thus completely overlooks the fundamental relation to lived time. What Heidegger finds so compelling in the ancient Greek conception of truth, and what is lacking in the traditional modern understanding of truth, is this emphasis on the non-theoretical uncovering aspect of perception where “‘Being-true’ (‘truth’) means Being-uncovering.... If a λόγος as ἀπόφανσις is to be true, its Being-true is ἀληθένειν in the manner of ἀποφαίνεσθαι—of taking entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen in their unhiddenness (their uncoveredness)” (p. 262/219).

Truth, here, no longer means the correctness of an assertion about some matter but, rather, that straightforward perception always simply uncovers ‘something’. He goes on to say that aletheia “signifies what shows itself—*entities [beings] in the ‘how’ of their uncoveredness*” (p. 262/219). From the perspective of phenomenology, this is the basic point of departure for the existential analytic of Dasein; a retrieval or re-interpretation of the Greek understanding of aletheia, founded in the primordial access to beings given in noein. Everyday lived experience, and its ongoing straightforward perception, is in this sense always already a mode of ‘being-true’ in that it is always uncovering beings. Before we can even make truth statements about things, something must already have been disclosed in straightforward sensory perception, and it is this simple disclosure, which can only uncover,

that forms the basis of Heidegger's restricted sense of the term 'truth'<sup>67</sup>. Regarding this simple non-subjective disclosive notion of truth, Heidegger states that:

It is not we who presuppose 'truth'; but it is 'truth' that makes it at all possible ontologically for us to be able to be such that we 'presuppose' anything at all. Truth is what first makes possible anything like presupposing. What does it mean to 'presuppose'? It is to understand something as the ground for the Being of some other entity. Such understanding of an entity in its interconnections of Being, is possible only on the ground of disclosedness—that is, on the ground of Dasein's Being something which uncovers (p. 270/227-228).

The ground of disclosedness, Dasein's being something which uncovers, has already been linked to that primordial kind of uncovering that Heidegger identifies with *noein*, *aisthesis* and straightforward sensory perception. In the context of his re-interpretation of *aletheia*, Heidegger is taking us back from 'judgements', from truth as merely representation, to 'uncoveredness'. Dasein, as such an uncovering, has the temporal structure of constantly 'making present' what gives itself to lived experience. While the Greeks, at least according to Heidegger's interpretation, saw this fundamental character of truth or presencing as being-uncovering and as distinct from what is uncovered, they failed to take the problem any further. That things are uncovered in straightforward perception would seem to be a rather simple, self-evident statement. Yet the question of how these things are uncovered involves the whole dynamic structure of lived everyday experience, where human understanding is founded in the temporal structure of Dasein. The question of the being of beings is, from this perspective, the question of the disclosedness belonging to primordial uncovering, *noein*, *aisthesis* or straightforward sensory perception. As already stated, this does not mean that the existential analytic is therefore centred around a descriptive analysis of perception or presence, rather, what is in question here is the 'how' of the

disclosure that first brings us to perceive things, and from there to representing these uncovered things as merely present at hand objects.

What is it that phenomenology is to ‘let us see’? What is it that must be called a ‘phenomenon’ in a distinctive sense? What is it that by its very essence is *necessarily* the theme whenever we exhibit something *explicitly*? Manifestly, it is something that proximally and for the most part does *not* show itself at all: it is something that lies *hidden*, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground (Heidegger, 1962, p. 59/35).

The phenomenon par excellence is ‘Being’, the disclosedness of Dasein or lived experience, or that form of understanding and structure of existence that first sets up and makes meaningful what we can then reflect upon and represent as one’s own self amidst this world of things. The question of the ‘how’ of disclosedness, the question of *Being and Time*, nonetheless starts with the disclosedness of perception, of that which shows itself, with what constitutes its meaning and its ground, and what the ancient Greeks understood as presencing given in ‘mere beholding perception’. It is the disclosive context of *noein* or straightforward sensory perception that is in question here. Being as mere presence at hand is opened up to the wider context of Dasein’s everyday world, its practical relations of sense and their common origin in temporality, as constitutive of the sense of the ‘things themselves’<sup>68</sup>. Heidegger’s critique of traditional ontology is not then a simple rejection of presence, but a reinterpretation of that in terms of originary temporality. This temporal dimension is what is innovative in both Heidegger’s and Husserl’s analyses. As Caputo (1988, p. 83) states: “it is only recently that we have begun to awaken to the temporal sense of Being.... The ‘historical destruction’ is meant to loosen the grip which the tradition exerts upon us and which tends to block off a discovery which is breaking through in modernity”, where the “quest for the meaning of Being is a deconstructive

one which dismantles historical theories in order to find out what makes them work” (p. 89).

What Heidegger sees as important in his subjectivist Husserl, and more ‘originally’ in the Greeks, is this explicit emphasis on presence, that something is uncovered. There is a fundamental ambiguity in *noein* in that it both refers to the presence of what is uncovered as well as to being-uncovering. It is this ambiguity that allows us moderns to forget *Dasein* and its lived world in order to emphasise merely the objectivity of the thing itself, and to define truth as the correctness of assertion rather than as existence. That is how Heidegger frames the phenomenological maxim ‘To the things themselves’ in terms of *logos* and *apophansis*—back to the matter for thinking, back to the uncoveredness of beings in the ancient Greek sense, back to the primordial uncovering of “*noein*, that simple awareness of something present-at-hand in its sheer presence-at-hand” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 48/25-26). This is not simply to re-affirm the ancient Greek concept of truth but to outline the starting point for his existential phenomenological re-interpretation of the meaning of presence in terms of *Dasein*, practical understanding and time<sup>69</sup>.

Heidegger, throughout his career, returns to this problematic over and again in an authentic repetition of the one simple question concerning being, where being will eventually come to mean *presencing* in relation to openness (cf. ‘The end of philosophy and the task of thinking’ in Heidegger, 1972, p. 73). This is how I understand both Heidegger’s engagement with ancient Greek thinking and his dedication to Husserl such that the “following investigation would not have been possible if the ground had not been prepared by Edmund Husserl, with whose *Logische Untersuchungen* phenomenology first emerged” (1962, p. 62/38).

There are thus three notions of truth at work here in Heidegger's existential ontology, the first is that of the truth of being, and as *aletheia* this is closely connected with what he sees as the phenomenological basis of the ancient Greek understanding of truth. Thirdly, there is the modern notion of truth as the correctness of judgements about a matter. Both Husserl and Heidegger strongly emphasise that this last moment of truth, as representation, as truth statements, or as correspondence theory and so on, rests solely on the givenness of *Dasein* or lived experience. In order to make a judgement about something, that 'something' must have already been uncovered as what it is, it must have given itself to our ongoing lived experience of the everyday world at large. Heidegger thus posits the truth of *aletheia* against the traditional notion that "the 'locus' of truth is assertion (judgment)" and "that the essence of truth lies in the 'agreement' of the judgment with its object" (p. 257/214).

With regards to this question of the ideal representation of real things Heidegger asks: "*How are we to take ontologically the relation between an ideal [being] and something that is Real and present-at-hand?*" (p. 259/216). Yet rather than proceed with this line of questioning, the question itself and the subjective relation to truth that it presupposes are themselves called into question. As falling thrown understanding, as historically situated *Dasein*, our understanding of truth is already heavily laden with modern preconceptions. This is especially evident in the abstract notion of truth as the subjective ideation of real objects, where Heidegger asks: has "the question already been perverted in the very way it has been approached—in the ontologically unclarified separation of the Real and the ideal?" (p. 259/217). To demonstrate this problem, Heidegger posits the following scenario:

Let us suppose that someone with his back turned to the wall makes the true assertion that ‘the picture on the wall is hanging askew.’ This assertion demonstrates itself when the man [sic] who makes it, turns round and perceives the picture hanging askew on the wall. What gets demonstrated in this demonstration? What is the meaning of ‘confirming’ [*Bewährung*] such an assertion? (1962, p. 260/217)

What is intended in this assertion that ‘merely represents’ is, for Heidegger, nothing other than the “Real picture on the wall. What one has in mind is the Real picture, and nothing else” (p. 260/217). No ideal object or mediating relation exists because, phenomenologically speaking, asserting “is a way of Being towards the Thing itself that is” (p. 260/218). Being towards the thing itself through assertion demonstrates “the Being-uncovered [*Entdeckt-sein*] of the [being] itself—that [being] in the ‘how’ of its uncoveredness” (p. 261/218). It is in this way that the knowing which asserts is “itself a *Being towards* Real [beings], and a Being that *uncovers*” (p. 261/218). Thus the truth of logical assertion must be understood in the primary phenomenological sense of “*Being-uncovering*” (p. 261/218). What is confirmed in the assertion about the picture on the wall is not some representation of that picture, but the uncoveredness of the actual picture itself when one turns and perceives it there; it gives itself in “*showing itself in its selfsameness*” (p. 261/218).

On the basis that an assertion uncovers the being it intends, “*the uncoveredness of the [being] moves into the kind of Being of that which is ready-to-hand within-the-world*” (p. 267/224-225). That is, we must have already understood what it is we are talking about in order to make a true or false statement about it. This pre-understanding implies a relation to the world and our selves that goes before any theoretical assertion. For both Heidegger and Husserl, this pre-understanding involves an embodied interaction with the world as it gives itself to straightforward perception, and this practical understanding is the lived everyday context of presence whose apriority is temporally structured rather than simply ‘earlier’ than theory. However, if this dynamic everyday

relation to truth is interpreted in terms of a subjective ego's relation to a merely present at hand object, then "*the uncoveredness (truth) becomes, for its part, a relationship between things which are present-at-hand (intellectus and res)—a relationship that is present-at-hand itself*" (p. 267/225). Again, and following Husserl's own critique of Kant and Descartes, the question of the subjectivity of the subject remains unclear, as does the fundamental meaning of truth as the disclosedness belonging to noein/aesthesis.

Yet the temporal structure of everydayness, of human understanding, is not something that can become present-at-hand to itself, it can not become an 'object' of scientific concern. Thus truth, as the disclosedness of beings within which assertion is a 'Being-towards' that uncovers beings, cannot be reduced to "truth as agreement between things which are present-at-hand within-the-world" (p. 268/225). With this notion of truth as a way of uncovering beings, Heidegger attempts to show the "ontologically derivative character of the traditional conception of truth" (p. 268/225). It is against this traditional concept of truth that Heidegger posits the existential phenomenological truth of being. The persistence of the traditional delimitation of truth that constitutes our pre-ontological understanding will be a problem that dogs his thinking and his attempts to explain 'being' throughout his long career, for:

*The primordial phenomenon of truth has been covered up by Dasein's very understanding of Being—that understanding which is proximally the one that prevails, and which even today has not been surmounted explicitly and in principle (1962, p. 268/225).*

The uncovering function of assertion is itself possible only on the basis that Dasein is as 'being-in-the-world', or that we exist as our ongoing lived experience of the world. "This latter phenomenon, which we have known as a basic state of Dasein, is the *foundation* for the primordial phenomenon of truth" (p. 261/219). That beings may be uncovered by Dasein, as being-

uncovering, is possible only because a world is already disclosed to our understanding. Such “disclosedness is that basic character of Dasein according to which it *is* its ‘there’” (p. 263/220). Thus, “only with Dasein’s *disclosedness* is the *most primordial* phenomenon of truth attained.... In so far as Dasein *is* its disclosedness essentially, and discloses and uncovers as something disclosed to this extent it is essentially ‘true’. *Dasein is ‘in the truth’*” (p. 263/221). To the extent that lived experience means that we always already find ourselves in this everyday world alongside others and things, then this sheer existence is what is always fundamentally true, at least in a restricted phenomenological sense.

All other notions of truth are then founded in this disclosive basis of human understanding. The term ‘truth’ can thus function in the existential analytic only insofar as it is fundamentally understood as the sheer disclosedness of lived experience because disclosedness is a form of Being that is “essential to Dasein. *‘There is’ truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is*” (p. 269/226). This reinterpretation or relocation of truth, and the radical bracketing of truth as logical assertion, would seem to render the notion of ‘truth’ as a functional philosophical term rather superfluous. This is especially so, given the complete subordination of the term to disclosedness in that, since “*the kind of Being that is essential to truth is of the character of Dasein, all truth is relative to Dasein’s Being*” (p. 270/227). Truth statements, and this is also the case for Husserl, are not the primary focus of Heidegger’s phenomenological interpretation of the foundations of human understanding. The origin of this ‘pre-theoretical’ understanding is to be found in the pure givenness of everyday lived experience, in the uncovering function of straightforward sensory perception, or what the ancient Greeks apparently identified in *aletheia* as the disclosedness belonging to *noein* or

aesthesis, or more fundamentally still—in the relation of presencing to both originary temporality and practical understanding. As already suggested, this is more or less the position Husserl reached in *Ideas 2*, at the conclusion of his early phenomenological investigations into categorial being, straightforward sensory perception and inner time consciousness.

Heidegger constantly reiterates this critical difference, between truth as judgement and the truth of being, throughout the existential analytic of *Dasein*. As we have seen above, his interpretation of ancient Greek philosophy places the *logos* midway between the modern notion of truth and its phenomenological foundation, where *logos* as *apophansis* has the dual signification of ‘being-uncovering’, in relation to *noein* and *aletheia*, and of pointing to what is uncovered, as the present at hand thing. According to Heidegger, both the ancient Greek and modern ontologies emphasise the presence at hand of things as the fundamental meaning of being. For traditional ontology, things give themselves as objects to which we can then add various use values or measure their natural properties and so on. Phenomenologically speaking, however, in order to first see something as a mere object we must have already come to understand it in the context of our ongoing everyday lived experience of the world. Yet the traditional philosophical mode of access to an object requires that we first take it out of its mundane familiar context and ‘merely look’ at it. Such mere looking would seem to be without any explicit theoretical assertion, and so we take the object simply as it gives itself to perception, ‘free’ of all subjective historical and cultural values. As Heidegger points out, however, in the context of a discussion of the hermeneutical ‘as’:

The fact that when we look at something (*schlichten Hinsehen*), the explicitness of assertion can be absent, does not justify our denying that there is any Articulative interpretation in such mere seeing (*schlichten Sehen*), and

hence that there is any as-structure in it. When we have to do with anything, the mere seeing of the Things which are closest to us bears in itself the structure of interpretation, and in so primordial a manner that just to grasp something *free*, as it were, *of the 'as'*, requires a certain readjustment. When we merely stare at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us *as a failure to understand it any more*. This grasping which is free of the 'as', is a privation of the kind of seeing in which one *merely* understands. It is not more primordial than that kind of seeing, but is derived from it (1962, p. 190/149).

Looking at something, and understanding it simply as an object that is present at hand, is not the most fundamental ontological way of accessing that thing, for it has already been 'pre-understood' as what it is in the context of our practical dealings with the world as a whole. This practical critique of objectivity was already given in the preceding *History of the Concept of Time* and is repeated more thoroughly still in the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, and it forms the basis of Heidegger's entire critique of traditional ontology and its emphasis on theoretical, logical or representational notions of truth. From this perspective, the objective basis of the natural sciences does not rest on a fundamental ontological understanding of the world, rather, it is derived from a historically situated interpretation of the meaning of being as 'presence at hand' that originates with ancient Greek philosophy and is then formalised in the subject/object dualism by Descartes and Kant amongst others. As with Husserl, Heidegger understands his critique of traditional ontology as an attempt to re-interpret the fundamental philosophical grounds of the natural sciences, and the difficulties of the subjective/objective dualism are perhaps nowhere more apparent than when the science of psychology attempts to understand human perception. Following on from Husserl's own critique of psychology in the *Logical Investigations* and his phenomenology of perception, Heidegger points to the problem of sensations in reference to hearing and asks where we might find a 'pure sensation':

Hearkening is phenomenally still more primordial than what is defined 'in the first instance' as "hearing" in psychology—the sensing of tones and the perception of sounds. Hearkening too has the kind of Being of the hearing which understands. What we 'first' hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking waggon, the motor-cycle. We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling. It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to 'hear' a 'pure noise'. The fact that motor-cycles and waggons are what we proximally hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, already dwells *alongside* what is ready-to-hand within-the-world; it certainly does not dwell proximally alongside 'sensations'; nor would it first have to give shape to the swirl of sensations to provide the springboard from which the subject leaps off and finally arrives at a 'world'. Dasein, as essentially understanding, is proximally alongside what is understood (1962, p. 207/163-164).

Before we can abstract what we perceive as a 'pure sensation', we first must already have come to understand this world we live in. It is on the basis of this lived understanding that, as for Husserl as well, all perception is already a perception of 'something' rather than of a chaotic barrage of sensations. Such an understanding is not put together theoretically as we go, nor can it be a habit derived from the theoretical identification of every possible sensation we might have previously perceived. What fundamentally undercuts any such theory of perception is the notion of practical understanding. Before we come to perceive something as an objective flux of sensations that has such and such properties, it has already been practically understood as something that is ready to hand, and in the lived context of a whole network of practical relations.

Yet as Heidegger asks; "if we never perceive equipment that is ready-to-hand without already understanding and interpreting it, and if such perception lets us circumspectively encounter something as something, does this not mean that in the first instance we have experienced something purely present-at-hand, and then taken it *as* a door, *as* a house?" (p. 190/149-150). He goes on to point out that the practical interpretation involved in circumspect

perception does not involve any sort of theoretical evaluation or representation of an object that is present-at-hand, rather, the things we encounter in our everyday work world are already a part of our embodied practical involvement with that world. Such an involvement is meaningful only in relation to the whole network of practical possibilities associated with whatever work is on hand. If one uses the hammer, it is circumspectly perceived as such, yet not thematically, it has presence, yet it need not be explicitly thought about. What brings one to perceive this hammer, and what makes this circumspect perception meaningful, is its relation to the work such that the “ready-to-hand is always understood in terms of a totality of involvements. This totality need not be grasped explicitly by a thematic interpretation” (p. 191/150). All straightforward sensory perception is already a meaningful part of our embodied practical interaction with the everyday world as a whole. In then focusing on that thing and explicitly taking it out of its practical context, such a ready-to-hand thing:

*with which* we have to do or perform something, turns into something ‘*about which*’ the assertion that points it out is made. Our fore-sight is aimed at something present-at-hand in what is ready-to-hand. Both *by* and *for* this way of looking at it [*Hin-sicht*], the ready-to-hand becomes veiled as ready-to-hand. Within this discovering of presence-at-hand, which is at the same time a covering-up of readiness-to-hand, something present-at-hand which we encounter is given a definite character in its Being-present-at-hand-in-such-and-such-a-manner. Only now are we given any access to *properties* or the like (p. 200/158).

The traditional emphasis on the perception of present at hand objects is a philosophically abstracted way of understanding the things we perceive. It is derived from the everyday perception belonging to our practical involvement with those things, or from the circumspect perception that already deals with ready to hand artefacts and in the context of getting on with whatever work is at hand. As Heidegger emphatically states yet again, and essentially in agreement with Husserl’s analysis in *Ideas 2*: “Thematically perception of

Things is precisely not the way equipment ready-to-hand is encountered in its ‘true “in-itself”’ (p. 405/354). This phenomenological problem is repeated over and again throughout Heidegger’s career; before we come to think about something explicitly it must already have been disclosed to our understanding, and this disclosure comes from already being immersed within this world by way of our embodied practical understanding.

So in reaching for that book to read, one does not generally have to correctly represent it to oneself as ‘this multifaceted perceptual object is a book, it has a use value for reading’ in order to simply use it. It need not be represented at all, nor even be explicitly thought about, yet still it gives itself as itself to circumspect perception, in the practical lived context of setting about to read something. If one cannot see it there on the shelf then there is a problem, a ‘breakdown situation’. Either it has been misplaced or perhaps it is time for a visit to the optometrist. One presumably has to see the book sitting there in order to use it, it must give itself perceptually as something enduring over time, it must have objective being in Husserl’s phenomenological sense.

As we have seen, this ‘bodily presence’ is precisely not a representation of some mere object, rather, it is constituted in the originary temporal structure of straightforward sensory perception. It is this non-representational ‘bodily presence’ of the thing itself that Heidegger calls straightforward sensory perception in the Husserlian sense. For both Husserl and Heidegger, this notion of presence is non-thematic or ‘pre-theoretical’, and for both thinkers the meaningfulness of presence is derived from the lived practical context of one’s own everyday existence, a context that is itself constituted in originary temporality. All perception can be meaningful only in the context of its lived experience, of being in the world and its practical understanding.

By showing how all sight is grounded primarily in understanding (the circumspection of concern is

understanding as *common sense* [*Verstandigkeit*]), we have deprived pure intuition [*Anschauung*] of its priority, which corresponds noetically to the priority of the present-at-hand in traditional ontology. 'Intuition' and 'thinking' are both derivatives of understanding, and already rather remote ones. Even the phenomenological 'intuition of essences' [*Wesensschau*] is grounded in existential understanding (p. 187/147).

Presumably Husserl, at least by the time of *Ideas 2*, would not disagree with Heidegger's assertion here regarding the intuition of essences and its relation to practice, although the implication that Husserl's phenomenology merely prioritises simple presence at hand might cause some concern. Apart from Heidegger's problematic interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology, it is clear that the former sees his existential analytic as a fundamental critique of the intuitive tradition in general and specifically of any modern ontology that presupposes the subject and objectivity. Where the ancient Greeks went wrong was in understanding being in terms of 'presence at hand' and as the fundamental way of understanding beings in general, without investigating any further into the problem of how this presence is uncovered.

So when one comes across something in one's concerned dealings with things, those things give themselves to perception, and the fundamental question is just how these perceptible things are meaningfully constituted. For Heidegger, this meaningfulness is not accessed in the traditional philosophical mode of merely looking at an object in its objectivity. There is another 'productive' context in which the things themselves are uncovered in *noein* or *aisthesis*. That 'productive/perceptual' context is *Dasein*'s everyday world of concerned dealings, of the functional context of the 'ready to hand', its practical comportments and circumspect perception. So straightforward sensory perception remains close to the fundamental locus of truth in the existential analytic of *Dasein*, but now it must be understood in relation to

the 'how' of Dasein as being-uncovering rather than taking being as the presence at hand of the thing itself.

*§17. Authenticity as a phenomenological method*

The main goal of *Being and Time*, at least from the perspective of existential phenomenology, is an authentic analysis of the temporal structure (*Zeitlichkeit*) of Dasein's self-projection, as a preparation for asking the general question about the temporality (*Temporalität*) of being as a whole. This analysis of the temporality of 'self-unity' or 'self-constancy' is given in the third chapter of Division II of the existential analytic, specifically in sections 64 and 65. The two chapters leading up to this analysis deal with the possibility or method of disclosing the temporal constitution of the self; in the phenomenon of 'being towards death' and the possibility of authenticity. From a description of the shared, practical context of straightforward perception, Heidegger's analytic of Dasein now moves on to the problem of the unity of the *ego cogito*, a unity that is constituted not in self-representation but 'outside' of itself, in the ecstatic structure of lived experience and its originary temporality.

In light of this preparatory emphasis on 'selfhood', perception, practice and time, in the context of one's own lived experience of the world, what mode of philosophical access might be appropriate to disclosing the unity of human understanding? Any recourse to theoretical models of understanding would obviously be inadequate, as would be merely pointing to the presence of things given in one's ongoing and constantly changing sensory perception. What goes 'before' any theoretical understanding or even simple perception of objects is that utterly familiar and mundane mode of understanding belonging to our absorbed everyday commerce with things and the work involved in taking care of the necessities of life. From a phenomenological

perspective, the temporal structure of average everyday existence is the fundamental context within which all human understanding works, where any way of theorizing about things has its origins in this 'pre-theoretical' understanding, or what Heidegger calls the understanding of being.

This is perhaps a rather simple point to make, yet so long as lived experience, 'subjectivity', or 'mere appearance', remain an un-explicated self-evident 'fact' for which the relation to lived time is inconsequential, no theory about human understanding can have a fundamental ontological basis. It is arguable, however, whether the natural sciences need to have such an ontological grounding, technological progress seems to carry on regardless of whether the traditional philosophical understanding of objectivity is fundamental or not. Yet conversely, one cannot argue against the necessity of fundamental ontology if it remains the subject of historical mis-conceptions and ambiguity. More to the point, what is at stake here is a redefinition of how we understand our relation to time. The most fundamental discovery of both Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenological investigations is the structure of originary temporality, for all intentional relations of sense are constituted in this origin. The notion of a non-calculative, non-linear form of time that is constitutive of our common understanding of time as a linear series of discrete moments is perhaps the most difficult aspect of phenomenology to gain access to. Yet this is precisely the ultimate objective of the existential analytic of Dasein; a disclosure of the temporal structure of everyday existence.

Such a phenomenological disclosure cannot simply be a logical derivation of the meaning of the being of Dasein, but rather, as a phenomenological disclosure it must also, and primarily, attempt to show the temporal structure of understanding as it gives itself for one's own existence. There can be no

recourse here to objective standards of truth in any empirical sense, for what is in question is given only as one's own 'subjective' lived experience of this world. Yet in order to explain this experience one must inhabit the average everyday familiarity of our understanding of being, an understanding that already gives meaning to this world we live in. It is, in this sense, that the temporal structures of being cannot be logically derived from the meaning of being, for that meaning is already presupposed in our everyday understanding of the world, it is what is in question. As Heidegger (1962, p. 28/8) states, concerning this problematic circularity in the attempt to explicate our everyday understanding:

the issue is not one of grounding something by such a derivation; it is rather one of laying bare the grounds for it and exhibiting them. In the question of the meaning of Being there is no 'circular reasoning' but rather a remarkable 'relatedness backward or forward' which what we are asking about (Being) bears to the inquiry itself as a mode of Being of [a being].

Existential ontology must be a descriptive phenomenology in the sense of a constant self-reflexive recursion to the self-evidence of one's own lived experience. The demonstration of the structure of being can only be accomplished by and for oneself, and then only in relation to one's own personal, factual existence, for "in each case Dasein, as my Dasein and this Dasein, is already in a definite world and alongside a definite range of definite [beings] within-the-world. Disclosedness is essentially factual" (p. 264/221). The origin of human understanding is to be found where it first gives itself, in the understanding belonging to one's own factual lived experience in this world we share. Any phenomenological demonstration, however, must first take into account the fact that our everyday understanding of being is generally absorbed in the necessities of everyday life, where; "Proximally and for the most part Dasein is lost in its 'world'" (p. 264/221).

The difficulty here lies in the problem of how to approach a philosophical disclosure of one's own absorbed understanding. Obviously, any philosophical method that relegates everyday understanding to a mere epiphenomenon, such as in the case of traditional ontology's emphasis on objectivity over practical understanding, will fail to uncover anything fundamental about human existence, at least not as far as phenomenology is concerned. So care must be taken not to diverge too far from the mundane phenomena of one's own everyday existence. This everyday understanding is characterised by its constant fall into the necessity of dealing with everyday matters, and thus since "*Dasein is essentially falling, its state of Being is such that it is in 'untruth'*" (p. 264/222). What Heidegger calls 'falling' is an essential, existential structure of everydayness, yet such falling is by definition something other than a self-reflexive attempt to understand existence as a whole. A paradox arises here for any philosophical regard that attempts to disclose its own falling absorption in the world, for such a disclosure is an activity that must step back from an absorption in the everyday world in order to describe that absorption. It is these procedural difficulties that prescribe a methodological approach for any attempt at a phenomenological disclosure of the foundations of human understanding. As Heidegger states:

The expression 'phenomenology' signifies primarily a *methodological conception*. This expression does not characterize the what of the objects of philosophical research as subject-matter, but rather the *how* of that research.... Thus the term 'phenomenology' expresses a maxim which can be formulated as 'To the things themselves!' (p. 50/27)

Phenomenology cannot simply posit that which it is attempting to describe, rather, it must show how it is possible to uncover for oneself what is most self-evident in existence; that lived context within which the things themselves are first given. Only in terms of this methodological approach can the fundamental structures of Heidegger's ontology be grasped as a

possibility, for we “can understand phenomenology only by seizing upon it as a possibility” (p. 63/38)<sup>70</sup>. Authenticity is, in this sense, a phenomenological method for disclosing the temporal structure of Dasein or lived experience. What then is the authentic way of access and mode of interpretation that will allow Dasein, always in each case one’s own, to “show itself in itself and from itself” (p. 37/16)? What is authenticity?

For Heidegger’s existential ontology it is the phenomenon of death that opens up the possibility of an authentic disclosure of the temporality of lived experience. Thus we “must, in the first instance, make plain in a preliminary sketch how Dasein’s existence, facticity, and falling reveal themselves in the phenomenon of death” (p. 293/250). Authenticity is to be projected in, or disclose itself as, a ‘temporalising’ relation to death as a possibility, a possibility in which falling and one’s own factual situation reveal themselves. So what is the relation between authenticity and falling, between a philosophical disclosure of the being of Dasein and a forgetful absorption in beings? Such a question involves an analysis of one’s everyday relation to death, and specifically in relation to the phenomenon of falling. According to Heidegger, as *das Man*, the ‘they’, or the one which we all are together in tending to the necessities of everyday life in this world we share, we generally fall into a common manner of talking about death. For one’s everyday self, death is “understood as an indefinite something which, above all, must duly arrive from somewhere or other, but which is proximally *not yet present-at-hand* for oneself, and is therefore no threat” (p. 297/253). In this way, by conceiving the end as some sort of as yet distant event, “the ‘they’ provides a *constant tranquillization about death*” (p. 298/253). ‘We’ are apparently constantly tranquillized in taking death as an indeterminate event that is always, for the moment, deferred.

Beyond this deferral, whenever death inevitably presents itself to everyday experience, “proximally and for the most part Dasein covers up its ownmost Being-towards-death, fleeing *in the face* of it” (p. 295/252). A falling absorption in the work world is, therefore, a tranquilization as well as a fearful fleeing, and so we flee in the face of the anxiety of death while we can, since death can not in the end be ‘outstripped’. For Heidegger however, it is in this anxiety or *Angst* that Dasein is brought “face to face with itself” (p. 298/255). Yet rather than face itself the ‘they’ “concerns itself with transforming this anxiety into fear in the face of an oncoming event” (p. 298). Instead of encountering existential angst, ‘we’ fall away from an authentic face to face encounter with the phenomenon of death, and into a fearful fleeing from this possible event. In this “falling Being-alongside, fleeing from uncanniness announces itself; and this means now, a fleeing in the face of one’s ownmost Being-towards-death” (p. 295-296/252). ‘Being towards death’ is an existential structure for all lived experience, where all the possibilities of one’s life are bounded by death as the necessary and ultimate possibility. Any activity we take part in, whether it be an authentic disclosure of temporality or an inauthentic absorption in the work at hand, is already a being towards death, whether that is explicitly recognised or not.

Which is to say, inauthentic angst, as being towards death, is a structural component of everyday life, it is a fundamental mood for human being. Why else do any of us get up in the morning, feed and clothe ourselves, and go about our life’s work? Even the simple joys of life are joyful being towards death. Angst, in this existential sense, becomes a structural component of everydayness, rather than a necessary experience, for everydayness need not generally be consumed by angst. Inauthentic angst seems to me to structurally manifest itself in everydayness as this constant ongoing mortal

necessity; there is this life to be lived, and one has to work to maintain life. In this existential sense angst is apparent, in an inexplicit mundane way, in the work involved in simply perceiving something, through to forming ideas about things, as well as in any simple practical activity, in working for a living or raising a family, in the inevitability of ageing, sickness and the fading away of youth. It is this philosophical notion of our intrinsic relation to death that makes possible any authentic disclosure of everydayness, for all everydayness is as being towards death. It is on the basis of the structural phenomenon of mundane everyday being towards death, and its inauthentic angst, that Heidegger (1962, p. 235/190) posits the possibility that authentic angst as a phenomenon can take on “a methodological function *in principle* for the existential analytic”.

According to Heidegger, however, this authentic possibility must overcome our everyday reticence towards contemplating death. For the ‘they-self’ that we all are together apparently refuses to face the anxious uncanniness (*Unheimlichkeit*) of mortal existence and instead ‘we’ prefer to flee into a communally alienating “‘superior’ indifference” (p. 298/254) that interprets this angst as merely ‘cowardly fear’ in the face of the possible event of death. Rather than face into authentic defamiliarising anxiety, ‘we’ fall for the untroubled temptation of an ‘indifferent tranquillity’ that alienates ‘us’ from authentic individuation. In this way, “temptation, tranquillization, and alienation are distinguishing marks of the kind of Being called *falling*’. As falling, everyday Being-towards-death is a constant *fleeing in the face of death*” (p. 298/254). In compliance with Heidegger’s interpretation of falling everydayness, our “Being-towards-death has turned out to be an evasion in the face of death—an evasion which conceals” (p. 299/255). ‘Our’ subjective relation to death, given that ‘we’ are always already falling back into the

necessities of life, is an evasive deferral of authentic angst, a deferral that diverts 'us' into a fearfully communal negation of authentic individuation.

Uncanniness is an essential characteristic of the authentic projection of death. It is in the face of death that authentic angst overcomes Dasein's fall into the forgetful absorption in everyday necessities. Against 'our' fearful fleeing, authenticity requires of the resolute Dasein that it faces away from mundane familiarity and into this individualising strangeness, which is for Heidegger the "most elemental way in which thrown Dasein is disclosed" (p. 321/276). The defamiliarisation of angst thus plays a central role in the authentic resolute projection of the temporality of Dasein's self-projection, for which uncanniness is the "basic kind of Being-in-the-world" (p. 322/277). For Heidegger, it is only through this mood that one comes "face to face with the 'nothing' of the world" (p. 321/276). Thrown into or against the nothingness of the finitude of existence, authentic Dasein becomes "primordial [*ursprüngliche*], thrown Being-in-the world" (p. 321/276), and one's self is "individualized down to itself" (p. 322/277), down to a bare 'that it is'. The authentic projection of death, on the threshold of the disclosure of temporality, is given as a joyful abandonment of inauthentic fear in the face of death, for which:

*anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concerned solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned **freedom towards death**—a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the 'they', and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious (1962, p. 311/266).*

The defamiliarisation of angst is essential for the early Heidegger's methodological access to the temporalising self projection belonging to everydayness. What is given in this defamiliarisation is the simple continuity of one's own existence as constituted in the temporal structure of everyday concerns that have already been thrown into various possibilities; an

existence that is constantly fleeing from an authentic relation to its own being and into an absorption in beings.

Or in other words, whilst authentic individuation makes the world strange in defamiliarising angst, the others flee from the defamiliarisation of death and into a 'superior' indifference to angst. This inauthentic relation to death is an alienating identification with these others. And yet, the foregoing also circumscribes a subjective relation to the others, the 'they', that has always in this case been Heidegger's, obviously, and probably such is the case with any attempt to do philosophy. However, this somewhat reactionary account of everyday understanding and its relation to death sets up Heidegger's notion of authenticity in opposition to it, as an anxious defamiliarising attempt to uncover the structure of mundane everydayness. While the existential structures of falling absorption and being towards death would seem to me to be definite characteristics of everydayness, it is perhaps questionable how appropriate a defamiliarising method might be to uncovering the mundane familiarity of everyday life. Furthermore, such a method as authentic angst defines itself over against a rather strange conception of one's everyday public self as a fearful fleeing in the face of death.

As we have seen, Hubert Dreyfus has already pointed out these problems concerning authenticity and its relation to everydayness. For Dreyfus, authentic angst is a 'special method' for displaying the finitude of belief, yet Heidegger's "account leads him ... far from the phenomenon of everyday temporality" (Dreyfus, 1991a, p. viii)<sup>71</sup>. Furthermore, Dreyfus contends that the characterisation of inauthentic angst as a 'fleeing in the face of death' is a psychologistic error that can be corrected by simply disregarding the notion of 'fearful fleeing'. However, this critique of the existential analytic of Dasein is based on an existentialist interpretation of authenticity as a way of life

rather than as a phenomenological method. The various existentialist interpretations of *Being and Time*, following Heidegger's own use of Kierkegaard's terminology, are important for understanding and unpacking Heidegger's dense and multi-layered idiom, yet from a phenomenological perspective, the notion that authenticity is primarily an existentialist prescription for the good life presents a number of difficulties. For the purposes of a phenomenological interpretation of the temporality of everydayness it will be necessary to prioritise authenticity as a philosophical method over any existentialist interpretation. Both interpretations are still valid, in their own terms, although somewhat mutually exclusive.

To reiterate, Dreyfus' account of authenticity in *Being in the World* is based on the realisation, in a transformative moment, that one's beliefs are finite and dependent on the meaningfulness of unthought background practices. On realising this authentic finitude one then adopts an ongoing resolute commitment to live one's life in recognition of such finitude. It is this self-constancy that produces a new more authentic temporality that replaces the old inauthentic temporality. Once authenticity has been realised and integrated into one's absorbed everyday existence there can then be no fearful fleeing back into inauthentic ways of being. Yet this interpretation of authenticity leaves us with a paradox in that Heidegger considers inauthenticity to be an essential existential structure of life. As Dreyfus (p. 334) asks: "Why does even authentic Dasein have a tendency to flee?" Once an existentialist has decided to be authentic in their everyday life why would they leave the wonder and flee back to the old inauthentic ways?

Dreyfus solves this existentialist paradox by separating out two senses of 'falling' in the existential analytic. Structural falling, as an absorption in everyday practices, constitutes the intelligibility of our everyday world. The

second sense of falling is the psychologically motivated inauthentic fearful fleeing in the face of the angst of death. It is this 'motivational' or 'psychological' account of falling that, as Dreyfus claims, fails to provide any ontological necessity for the notion of 'fearful fleeing'. If we disregard the analysis of inauthentic falling as 'fleeing' in the face of death, then we are left with structural falling as an absorption in everyday affairs. Both authenticity, as an existentialist way of life, along with inauthentic ways of life, have falling absorption in the work world as a necessary phenomenon, and this everyday absorption is free of, or indifferent to, any tendency to 'flee' the angst of death. From this existentialist perspective, what distinguishes authentic from inauthentic falling absorption is the degree to which one is 'fascinated' by the everyday world.

It is this notion of structural falling that will inform my phenomenological account of Heidegger's authentic method, although not quite in the sense that Dreyfus intends it. Authenticity, in an existential phenomenological sense, means a self-reflexive attempt to disclose the structure of everydayness, where everydayness is simply a falling absorption in the work world. Authenticity is therefore not an alternative way of life, it is not itself a mode of falling absorption in everyday states of affairs. While I agree with Dreyfus that authentic angst and its reactionary account of the fearful others is problematic, his existentialist interpretation of authenticity is antithetical to a phenomenological account of everydayness. From this latter perspective, authenticity is a method, a 'how to', and at most it is a self-reflexive absorption in the work of philosophy, yet not a falling back to the 'lostness' of one's everyday absorption in work. One either does phenomenology, or goes and chops wood, washes the dishes, and so on.

Yet Dreyfus further complicates the relation between authenticity and falling absorption by linking inauthenticity in general to the motivational tendency to 'flee', thus relegating inauthenticity to Heidegger's failed psychologistic interpretation of falling. In its place we now have undifferentiated Dasein for whom the question of either being authentic or inauthentic does not even occur. Undifferentiated Dasein is indifferent to any question of authenticity, and this indifference is the primary characteristic of all everyday absorbed activity. I have already suggested that this distinction is untenable, for inauthenticity simply means being absorbed in everyday work, it already is 'undifferentiated'. For Dreyfus, however, there are only authentic and undifferentiated ways of living in this world, both of these are ways of being forgetfully absorbed in the everyday world of work, and both are separate modes of temporality.

What I find difficult in this account is the notion that authenticity is an either/or situation. On a more 'traditional' interpretation, authenticity is a method for disclosing the temporality of Dasein's self-projection. From a phenomenological perspective, it is doubtful that anyone could live their everyday life in an existential-temporal analysis of everyday absorption precisely because, by definition, life is a constant fall back to inauthentic forgetfulness, back to actually living in everydayness as opposed to a phenomenological analysis of that. If being authentic means using a disclosive philosophical methodology twenty four hours a day then most of us would simply not have time to eat, work and sleep. By definition, inauthenticity means being absorbed in everyday living, whereas authenticity is a methodology for disclosing the originary temporality of Dasein's self-projection. As to the specific structure of temporality, Dreyfus defers this analysis to his former student William Blattner. Yet Dreyfus' implicit linear

understanding of time, which leads him to understand authenticity as a transformative moment that one then leaves behind, is contrary to the notion of ecstasis, or of the dynamic, non-linear structure of time, that both Husserl and Heidegger have put forward, and that Blattner agrees with in principle.

Blattner's (1999) text, *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism*, acknowledges that the "future, Present (*Gegenwart*), and past into which Heidegger analyses originary temporality are not successive" (p. 89). Yet he goes on to claim that Heidegger then abandons the "idea that there is some non-sequential form of time" (p. 289), and that therefore the entire early account of the temporality of Dasein and being fails. The later Heidegger's 'turning' away from the transcendental or existential phenomenological analyses of *Being and Time*, from this perspective, amounts to a wholesale rejection of 'temporal idealism' in favour of a "quasi-mystical stance toward the obtaining of being" (p. 291). There are many ways of interpreting Heidegger's 'turn', and it is also possible to emphasise the continuity<sup>72</sup>, as opposed to any radical break, of his thinking on time and authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) in relation to the later concepts of Ereignis and the truth of Being (*Seyn*); as evidenced from the mid 1930's text *Contributions to Philosophy*<sup>73</sup> through to the late sixties lecture on 'Time and Being'<sup>74</sup>. Heidegger himself clearly states that the turning is "not a consequence of altering the standpoint, much less of abandoning the fundamental issue, of *Being and Time*" (in Richardson, 1974, p. xvi). On the contrary, it involves a rethinking of the reciprocal relation between presencing (being) and time, for which the "[process of] presenc-ing [*Anwesen*] (Being) is inherent in the lighting-up [*die Lichtung*] of self-concealment (Time). [The] lighting-up of self-concealment (Time) brings forth the process of presenc-ing (Being)". However, whilst the problem of the

'turn' is beyond the scope of this thesis, the basic concepts underlying Blattner's interpretation of originary temporality are certainly relevant.

Blattner's radical conclusions are based on a particular interpretation of temporality, and specifically on Dreyfus' existentialist interpretation of authenticity<sup>75</sup>. This is a basic presupposition for Blattner's thesis since he does not "explore in any depth" (1999, p. 28) the problems of authenticity and historicity. In his introduction he follows Dreyfus in rejecting the psychologistic notions of in/authenticity in favour of 'modally indifferent' Dasein. Originary temporality is now "neutral with respect to the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity" (p. 28), it is not authentic temporality. Blattner deals with these founding concepts in an earlier account of time in the existential analytic where he claims that "Heidegger clearly indicates that originary temporality is *not* authentic.... [Originary temporality] is the way of being in time that is implicated in the characterisation of Dasein given in Division I" (1992, p. 100).

This interpretation of originary temporality, whilst following Dreyfus' notion of background coping strategies, attempts to account for the relevance or otherwise of the authentic projection. Contrary to the usual reading of the existential project, for Blattner originary temporality is not authentic temporality. Originary temporality is the undifferentiated temporality of everyday Dasein which is 'indifferent' to the question of authenticity, thus Heidegger's supposed existentialism is secondary to the wider question of the temporality of everydayness. However, Blattner also contests the pragmatic account of temporality that disregards authenticity altogether. Time is interpreted 'futurally' by pragmatists such as Okrent, for whom futural originary temporality is "the act in which Dasein expects, anticipates, or intends a possible future for itself" (Okrent, 1988, p. 193). On this account the

notion of authenticity is negated entirely in favour of everyday practice. According to Blattner (1992, p. 105), such a generalised reading of originary temporality interprets the future as a time which is 'not yet' but is to be actualised in some way through one's own futural projects.

In opposition to this account, Blattner points out that Heidegger posits the future as a temporal structure of Dasein which can never become actual. Okrent's notion of originary temporality is based on the past as the initial conditions on which we base our present projects in the constant attempt to actualise our possibilities at some time in the future. While the pragmatists separate the 'existentialist' sections of *Being and Time* from the ontology of everydayness, Blattner insists that death and nullity are essential to an understanding of originary temporality and its 'indifference'. He then goes on to provide an innovative explanation for the logical progression of the analytic from Division I through the existentialist problematic and on to originary temporality. For this reading, authenticity remains an important preparatory step in unveiling the phenomenon of temporality but the impassioned defamiliarising angst which characterises this authentic method is not necessary for the subsequent temporal interpretations of undifferentiated everydayness. In this way, originary temporality can be 'indifferent' to the methodological excesses of the authentic negation of inauthentic falling.

The resolute angst of authenticity is then, merely a preparatory disclosure of the futural structure of that temporality. Thus authentic existential angst is only necessary in a disclosure of authentic, as opposed to originary, temporality which opens up the way of access to the other mundane modes of being 'futural'. On Blattner's reading, once the futural structure of temporality has been demonstrated through the anxiously authentic

projection of death, the analytic of Dasein moves on to the wider phenomenon of mundane everyday temporality<sup>76</sup>. Heidegger's 'existentialism' remains a necessary step in the preparation for a disclosure of originary temporality whilst the latter need no longer concern itself with the question of in/authenticity. Authenticity is restricted to an initial step in the methodological access to the origin and so "*authentic temporality is merely one mode of originary temporality*" (Blattner, 1992, p. 101). This statement, however, seems to contradict his earlier assertion (on page 100) that originary temporality is not authentic but undifferentiated Dasein. It seems now that originary temporality can have two modes, one authentic and the other everyday. This ambiguity seems to be clarified in his latest work, however, where he identifies originary temporality with undifferentiated everydayness.

Now while I agree in principle with much of what Blattner has to say about the ecstatic structure of time; that it is non-linear; that authenticity discloses the temporal structure of authentic angst; and that undifferentiated Dasein is 'indifferent' to being either authentic (self-reflexive) or inauthentic (fearfully fleeing); his conclusions that originary temporality is not authentic, and that Heidegger fails to uncover the non-linear temporal structure of everydayness, are somewhat contentious. The "*temporalization-structure of temporality*" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 381/332), uncovered in authentic angst as the structure of Dasein's self-projection, was clearly intended by Heidegger to form the basis of the subsequent investigation into the temporality of everydayness given in sections 67 through 71 of *Being and Time*. These sections deal with the various structures of everydayness, including angst and falling, and thus "reveal a possibility for the temporalising of temporality in which Dasein's inauthenticity is ontologically grounded" (p. 384/335). The 'temporalising' structure of originary temporality founds both its authentic disclosure as well

as inauthentic everydayness. Originary temporality is not itself a mode of understanding that can be indifferent or otherwise to authenticity, for it is the constitutive origin of any unified sense of self understanding<sup>77</sup>.

I will not go any further into an argument about the ‘correctness’ or otherwise of these interpretations, for Dreyfus’ and Blattner’s attempts to expand upon Heidegger’s texts, rather than simply restate them, are more philosophically oriented towards the question of being than any mere exegesis<sup>78</sup>. As I see it, the difficulties here are largely a result of definition. What Dreyfus calls ‘undifferentiated’ Dasein is, in my terms, simply inauthenticity. Similarly, if authenticity is understood in terms of method, rather than as a way of life, then Blattner’s attempt to explain the structure of ‘modally undifferentiated’ temporality is, in my terms, a philosophical (authentically ‘ownmost’) attempt to disclose the temporality of indifferent, absorbed everydayness (inauthenticity). What we have here is, then, mostly a difference of opinion over terminology. What I propose, following Dreyfus’ criticisms of authentic defamiliarisation and inauthentic fleeing, is a re-interpretation of the relation between authenticity and inauthenticity, one that negates the ‘fearful fleeing’ of the ‘they’, while at the same time relinquishing Heidegger’s notion of angst as a necessary component of an authentic phenomenological method.

With Dreyfus then, I would like to dispense with the definition of inauthentic falling as the temptation of fleeing. Angst, as a methodological principle, defines itself as a mode of defamiliarisation over against this motivational account of inauthenticity, therefore it too is no longer a necessary component of an authentic method. It remains to be seen then, how authenticity, as a phenomenological method, might uncover the ecstatic temporal structure of the self-unity of everydayness, without recourse to resolute angst or any

generalised notion of the ‘they’ as a cowardly shirking away from death. These methodological problems are posited in the context of Heidegger’s preceding analysis of the disclosive practical context of straightforward perception or *noein* given in Division I of *Being and Time*. With this in mind, in what way is the originary temporal constitution of the self, or ego, related to both the intentionality of practical comportments and of straightforward perception or presence? This wider question encompasses the problematic of Heidegger’s subsequent investigations in the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, yet it is also more or less the concluding question of Husserl’s own early analyses as outlined in *Ideas 2*. The main themes of this thesis, centred on practice, perception and time, thus converge in the innovative interpretations of human understanding given in both Husserl’s and Dreyfus’ philosophies that, together, perhaps provide a way of opening up Heidegger’s rather idiosyncratic question of being.

*§18. Authenticity and the temporal structure of the self*

The authentic projection of the temporality of Dasein is posited as the concrete potential for a resolute relation to authentic angst and the possibility of one’s own death, where authenticity is accessed by way of the “*anticipation*’ of this possibility” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 306/262). Authenticity must resolutely anticipate the possibility of death without falling in with the irresolute others, the ‘they’, which one already is. Authentic resolute angst is posited in reaction against these fallen others and one’s ongoing, guilty complicity with them. The phenomena of resoluteness, of falling guilt and its authentic conscience, are brought together in authenticity, for which this “distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience—*this reticent self-projection upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety*—we call ‘*resoluteness*’” (p. 343/296-297). The authentic

method posited here in Kierkegaard's existentialist terminology, and with all its theological resonances, goes hand in hand with Heidegger's notion of angst.

As already noted, this existentialist orientation represents a very late draft of *Being and Time*, one that is altogether unrepresented in the earlier version given in the *History of the Concept of Time*. Accordingly, all the methodological characterisations of authenticity in relation to angst and its existentialist terminology will not be considered in this phenomenological account. What remains to be uncovered are the authentic, or 'ownmost', temporal structures of Dasein's self-projection and the methodology appropriate to that uncovering. To begin with, Heidegger identifies a strange sort of circularity belonging to the authentic disclosure of the temporal unity of Dasein, or one's own lived experience, which is already 'ahead of itself' in understanding its own existence. He points out that any attempt at an authentic disclosure of this everyday understanding "*is itself a kind of Being which discloses Dasein possesses*" (1962, p. 363/315). Any authentic disclosure thus explicitly involves a self-reflexive attempt to uncover the structure of its own understanding, and thus there is no basis here for any form of objectivity, and no logical ground to stand upon. The circularity of Dasein's being, of the structure of everyday understanding, is not even something that can be overcome, for it reflects the circular structure of originary temporality itself. Authenticity must move within this circle of understanding, we must "endeavour to leap into the 'circle', primordially and wholly, so that even at the start of the analysis of Dasein we make sure that we have a full view of Dasein's circular Being" (p. 363/315).

How then might authenticity first approach this circular understanding if there is no definite logical basis to start with? Inauthentic Dasein, as one's

own everyday lived experience, is by necessity absorbed in everyday work. Lost in this absorption, in the way everydayness is already understood in practice, Dasein “*fails to hear* its own Self in listening to the they-self” (p. 315/271). In order to get on with whatever work is at hand, one is not generally concerned with the philosophical problem of the self, such as, for example, an ego’s relation to a perceptual flux or to objects. More to the point, practical understanding gets by without recourse to a constant theoretical mediation of its practical activity. At most, one may perhaps be thinking about the work in the context of completing something, of keeping to a schedule, or one may even be contemplating something unrelated to the work, such as what food to prepare later, and so on. Still, all these everyday theoretical concerns make sense only in the context of one’s embodied, non-theoretical, practical relation to the ‘work world’ at the time.

For an authentic method to uncover the temporality of this unobtrusive and utterly familiar mode of understanding, Heidegger posits the possibility of ‘another kind of hearing’ or mode of understanding, a possibility that lies in an ‘unmediated call’. This call “comes *from* me and yet *from beyond me and over me.... Dasein calls itself*” (p. 320/275). We are to listen for a call that goes beyond the limitations of one’s thinking ego, yet is still concretely founded in the meaningful intentional relations of one’s own lived experience. It is at this point of the existential analytic of Dasein that Heidegger introduces the notion of ‘reticent silence’ as a methodological concern. That which authenticity is to uncover is uncovered not in the sense of a logical definition, in fact it “does not put itself into words at all” (p. 318/273), rather, it “*discourses solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent*” (p. 318/273). The call is itself silent and is thus essentially indeterminate, where such indeterminacy characterises the call in a “*positive way*” (p. 319/275). In terms of method then,

so far, authenticity must inhabit the groundless circularity of our non-theoretical, absorbed, everyday understanding of being or existence. The authentic disclosure of this everydayness is not first given in words but must be accessed in meditative silence and its unmediated and essentially indeterminate meaningfulness<sup>79</sup>.

Heidegger's authentic method is, in this sense, a silent philosophical meditation on the existential structures of lived time that constantly give meaning and a sense of unity to our practical activity and its straightforward perceptions. Furthermore, this self-unity is to be found in the 'actuality' of lived experience, where authenticity "brings the Being of the 'there' into the existence of its Situation" (1962, p. 347/300). In authenticity one is called not into some 'empty ideal of existence' but rather into one's own factual 'situation', whenever and wherever that may be. This 'place' is the here and now where one already finds oneself along with the others in this world we share. For example, in this case, it is the practical, everyday context in which one is reading this text, in the familiarity of one's immediate environment and one's embodied practical relation to that. Thus authenticity "discloses the current Situation of the 'there' in such a way that existence, in taking action, is circumspectively concerned with what is factually ready-to-hand environmentally" (p. 373/326). This circumspective concern with the ready to hand nature of the chair, for instance, or the book, or perhaps a computer, and whatever else one is surrounded by in the context of the activity of reading, is not itself a theoretical or thematic concern. The text itself is a thematic concern, not one's bodily, practical understanding of the surroundings, which is necessarily not something theoretical; and how else might one become absorbed in reading?

Yet this non-theoretical practical concern is precisely what authenticity is to disclose “in such a way as to let one encounter what *has presence* environmentally [*umweltlich Anwesenden*]” (p. 374/326). The ‘situation’ that is to be disclosed in the surrounding world of one’s practical, everyday concerns, is that of presence or presencing (as *Anwesenheit*), which means the “*Present [Gegenwart]* in the sense of making present [*Gegenwärtigen*]” (p. 374/326), insofar as it is constituted in ordinary temporality. In this way, the earlier problematic of straightforward perception, or noein/aesthesis as presence, is to be disclosed in relation to the temporality of practical understanding and its self-unity. Authenticity thus means to bring oneself back from a falling absorption in work and its practical understanding, “in order to be more authentically ‘there’ in the ‘moment of *vision*’ as regards the Situation which has been disclosed” (p. 376/328). In the existential phenomenological analysis of everydayness what is given in the ‘moment of vision’ (*Augenblick*) is presencing as the temporal structure of the self in relation to practice and its circumspect perception, and in the context of one’s own situated, mundane everydayness. As a phenomenological method, it is characterised by the circular nature of a silently meditative disclosure of presencing that is to uncover the existential structures belonging to our everyday understanding.

As already stated, one such structure is that of being towards death, where one’s own death is commonly thought of as an event that must happen at some time in the future. Death is, of course, a certainty for any living being, and as such it “*is possible at any moment*. Along with the certainty of death goes the *indefiniteness* of its ‘when’” (p. 302/258). This indefinite possibility can eventuate at any moment but so long as one is alive the event of death is constantly deferred as something that is ‘not yet’. This constant deferral of

death brings to light the ‘futural’ structure of lived experience as a whole, in that “there is always something *still outstanding*, which, as a potentiality-for-Being for Dasein itself, has not yet become ‘actual’” (p. 279/236). What makes one’s own death different from other possible future events, however, is the way in which it can present itself as an ‘event’. All other future events are something that can happen in and for one’s lived experience, yet in passing on we relinquish the “possibility of experiencing this transition and of understanding it as something experienced” (p. 281/237). One’s own death marks the absolute limit of lived experience, for to lose one’s life is to lose any possibility of experiencing anything at all, and so while the death of others might reveal itself as a loss, there is no way to experience one’s own “loss-of-Being” (p. 282/239). With the phenomenon of one’s own death, authenticity thus “finds itself *face to face* with the ‘nothing’ of the possible impossibility of its existence” (p. 310/266).

What is at stake in the question of death and nothingness is the impossibility of an experience of one’s own death, an impossibility that calls into question the totality of lived experience. The existential concept of death is a futural possibility that can never become an actual present experience, and thus the “*closest closeness which one may have in Being towards death as a possibility, is as far as possible from anything actual*” (p. 306-307/262). One’s own death, at least in this phenomenological sense, cannot be conceived in terms of the ending of something present at hand or ready to hand, in the sense that the “rain is at an end—that is to say it has disappeared” (p. 289/245), or “a road breaks off when one finds it under construction” (ibid), or when “the painting is finished with the last stroke of the brush” (ibid). It is in this sense that “Dying is not an event” (p. 284/240), rather, the end of one’s own life is simply the end of any possible intentional relation whatsoever towards things and

others. This existential notion of death highlights the futural structure of all lived experience which is characterised by a constant play of future possibilities in that “there belongs to Dasein, as long as it is, a ‘not-yet’ which it will be—that which is constantly still outstanding” (p. 286/242). One’s own death stands as the ultimate possibility for all lived experience, the ultimate ‘not yet’, for it can never be experienced. All lived experience has this futural structure, where the present is always a situated existence given in relation to its future possibilities, the limit of which is death. As Heidegger states:

just as Dasein *is* already its ‘not-yet’, and is its ‘not-yet’ constantly as long as it is, it *is* already its end too. The ‘ending’ which we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify Dasein’s Being-at-an-end, but a *Being-towards-the-end* of this [being]. Death is a way to be, which Dasein takes over as soon as it is. ‘As soon as man [sic] comes to life, he is at once old enough to die’ (p. 289/245).

The existential notion of being towards death thus concerns a ‘possibility-of-Being’ that is in every case one’s own and where “if Dasein exists, it has already been *thrown* into this possibility” (p. 295/251). Being towards death, as an existential structure of lived experience, encompasses all possible future events. As such, it is an implicit existential structure of all inauthentic absorption in work. In an authentic method, therefore, one must explicitly demonstrate this structure for oneself, and this means, for Heidegger, one must ‘anticipate’ the possibility of one’s own death. One must authentically anticipate something that can never become an actual lived experience. Anticipation is thus a constant deferral of the ultimate ‘not yet’, so long as one is alive, and as such it exhibits the temporal structure of any present relation to possible future lived experience. Authentic anticipation, as explicit being towards death, is a fundamental methodological principle for the disclosure of ecstatic temporality. It is in this existential phenomenological sense of death, as an anticipatory way of being, that authenticity “stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being” (p.

294/250). Authentic being towards death is, for Heidegger, the “disclosedness of the fact that Dasein exists as thrown Being *towards* its end” (295/251). As the limit horizon of all future possibilities met with in the present, one’s own death is the horizon of the future.

From a delineation of the future in terms of being towards death, Heidegger moves on to the problem of the past and its relation to the present, as the foundation of the self-unity of lived experience. As regards this self-unity, or the unity of one’s practical and theoretical interaction with the world, this unity cannot be thought in terms of an ego in Descartes’ sense of a thinking animal. Not only is rational thought founded in the sense of self-unity belonging to one’s absorbed everyday lived experience and its practical understanding, the concept of an ego is also generally naïvely posited in terms of something that exists in some sense or other. Contrary to this, the self-unity of lived experience is “altogether incommensurable with anything present-at-hand” (p. 329/283), and so the self is to be formally thought as “*Being-the-basis of a nullity*” (p. 329/283). To be authentic is to disclose this null-self not as something ‘in itself’, nor as merely the formal subject of the predicate ‘I am’, but as the unity constituted in the temporally articulated existential structures of facticity (or ‘thrownness’), and existence (or ‘projection’).

Lived experience, as essentially finite, finds itself already thrown into its present everyday situation, on the basis of what has already been, yet this past “does not lie behind it as some event which has happened to Dasein, which has factually befallen and fallen loose from Dasein again” (p. 330/284). The existential structure of ‘thrownness’ means that the present situation and its possibilities are constantly based on possibilities acted out in the past. On the basis of the past we are constantly thrown into present possibilities for

existing, and thus into what Heidegger calls understanding as ‘projecting’. Projection is not something that is rationally thought out and then acted on, rather, everyday understanding can only project the possibilities for activity on the basis of those possibilities into which it has already been thrown:

As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities. Furthermore, the character of understanding as projection is such that the understanding does not grasp thematically that upon which it projects—that is to say, possibilities. Grasping it in such a manner would take away from what is projected its very character as a possibility, and would reduce it to the given contents which we have in mind; whereas projection, in throwing, throws before itself the possibility as possibility, and lets it *be* as such. As projecting, understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as possibilities (p. 185/145).

Projection belongs to everyday understanding, which is primarily practical understanding, in which one already understands the possibilities for relating to the things encountered in the present situation. For example, in the context of using the hammer, one need not rationally plan out in advance how to pick it up and swing it, one need not even think about the hammer explicitly in order to simply use it. As a ready to hand item of equipment it already belongs in the meaningful context of the work and is presented in its practical possibility for such work. In the projection of practical understanding this possibility presents itself as such and it is on this basis that one can then actually use it in order to hammer something. Thus circumspective understanding, through projection, lays out those possibilities into which it is already thrown, as possible modes of comportment in the world.

Projection belongs to the present, as the projection of possibilities into which it has been thrown, and is itself possible only on the basis of the past and its constantly thrown possibilities. It is in this relation to thrownness, as the horizon of the past, that the authentic self ‘lays the ground for itself’. There is

no way of gaining control over the past, obviously, and thus there is also no way of gaining control over the self, for one always already finds oneself thrown into the current situation and its thrown possibilities. It is only as this constantly thrown possibility that the authentic self can be the “basis of its potentiality-for-Being” (p. 330/284). An authentic disclosure of self-projection cannot first lay that basis itself because it can only find its finite authentic self in being already constantly thrown into its own factual existence; there are no first beginnings here. Constantly thrown into the finite possibilities of one’s own existence in this world, one’s self can “*never* get that basis into its power” (p. 330/284), yet one already *is* this finite basis in constantly projecting the possibilities into which one is thrown.

An authentic disclosure discloses itself as the finite, thrown basis of its own factual everydayness. In this way, in being its own finite basis, “that is, in existing as thrown—Dasein constantly lags behind its possibilities” (p. 330/284). Existence does not precede these finite possibilities but, rather, the everyday self exists as the projective understanding of those possibilities into which it has always already been thrown. Or in other words, one can only project these possibilities from the grounds of one’s own thrown finitude, on the basis of what has been, but this finitude can never itself be encompassed because one is always already too late. The self as grounding itself, as ‘being-a-basis’, therefore “means *never* to have power over one’s ownmost Being from the ground up” (p. 330/284); rather, the self already is this constantly thrown basis. The self, as being its own basis, thus becomes a “nullity of itself” (p. 330/284). The authentic definition of this nullity is given by Heidegger as:

in being its *Self*, Dasein is, *as* a Self, the [being] that has been thrown. It has been *released* from its basis, *not through* itself but *to* itself, so as to be *as this basis*. Dasein is not itself the basis of its Being, inasmuch as this basis first arises from

its own projection; rather, as Being-its-Self, it is the *Being* of its basis (1962, p. 330/284-285).

One's own self, rather than some sort of enduring substance or logical subject involved in the statement 'I am', is here thought as the finitude of constant projection, where projection is itself possible only on the finite basis of one's own thrown, factual existence. This basis is given only as possibilities into which one is constantly being thrown, thus not only is the "projection, as one that has been thrown, determined by the nullity [*Nichtigkeit*] of Being-a-basis; as *projection* it is itself essentially *null*" (p. 331/285). Thrownness and projection belong together in the circular nullity of everyday understanding, where the self is now to be thought as a temporal process of projective understanding on the basis of the past horizon of thrown possibilities.

With this notion of the self as a unity of the temporal process of non-theoretical, everyday understanding, an authentic method cannot claim any sort of naïve or purely spontaneous philosophical objectivity. Any appeal to some sort of absolutely 'objective', 'pre-theoretical' or purely 'external' leverage point for authentic understanding would be a gross misreading of Heidegger's existential phenomenology. Authenticity means being always already caught in the throw, in the facticity of one's own projective understanding. In an authentic disclosure, one's own understanding is "ahead of itself in such a way that at the same time it directs itself back to its thrownness" (p. 337/291), and this is a calling back to the self as a process of constantly thrown projection, on the basis of the past horizon of possibilities. Such a self-disclosure cannot be explained by "tracing it back to some psychical faculty such as understanding, will, or feeling, or of explaining it as some sort of mixture of these" (p. 317/271), nor can it posit this self as "a free-floating 'I'" (p. 344/298) somehow severed from its world. The authentic self

is constituted not as merely some mental faculty but only in relation to the projective understanding of thrown possibilities and the intentional compartments of everyday lived experience. From the ‘internality’ of the subject, or mind, authenticity directs one back out to the meaningful relations of lived experience, which means to one’s own embodied interaction with the things of one’s immediate environment, and in doing so it brings the “Self right into its current concerned Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand” (p. 344/298).

The ‘place’ or ‘locale’ of this authentic self-disclosure is that of one’s own everyday lived experience and its work world, whose “‘subsistence’ is not based on the substantiality of a substance but on the ‘*Self-subsistence*’ of the existing Self” (1962, p. 351/303). This self-subsistence is constituted in its relation to lived time and its existential structures, where, in an authentic disclosure of this existential self, “*Temporality [Zeitlichkeit] gets experienced in a phenomenally primordial way*” (p. 351/304). These existential structures of Dasein are founded in the self-unity of lived experience, and are all “modes of the temporalizing of temporality” (p. 352/304). For authenticity, these temporal structures are to be revealed in that factual everyday situation where one already finds oneself, and where authentic “Dasein itself *is* this revealing and Being-revealed” (p. 355/307). In this self-reflexive way, authenticity is called back from an absorption in everydayness, it is “called back into the stillness of itself, and called back as something that is to become still” (p. 343/296) in a silent meditation on the circular structure of presencing in relation to the past horizon of thrownness, present projection, and futural being towards death.

Heidegger’s somewhat concise description of the ecstatic temporality of Dasein’s self-projection is given in section 65 of *Being and Time*. In the

preceding section, in order to set up this temporal problematic, he re-introduces the problem of Kant's notion of subjectivity. Here, the existential structures of thrownness and projection are a temporally 'articulated whole' which is 'held together' by the 'I', where the latter has generally been thought as the "supporting ground (as substance or subject)" (p. 365/317). According to Heidegger, Kant rightly rejects defining the self in terms of some sort of soul substance in favour of the 'I' as the logical subject of predication or representation. As such a logical subject the 'I think' becomes the form of all representation, and as *subiectum* or *hypokeimenon* it underlies all possible truth statements about the world. However, even this logical definition of the 'I think' as *subiectum* reifies the notion of self as something that endures in itself, and in doing so it "*characterizes not the Self-hood of the 'I' qua Self, but the selfsameness and steadiness of something that is always present-at-hand*" (p. 367/320). Kant effectively posits the subject in Descartes' sense, as a *res cogitans* or thinking thing, and so the ego or 'I' remains something merely self-evident and unquestioned.

This conclusion also motivated Husserl's own critical dismantling of Kantian subjectivity; except where Heidegger is to derive the originary temporal structure of self-unity from the existential structure of projection, Husserl derived it from the intentionality of straightforward perception. In fact, Heidegger goes on to invoke the phenomenological conception of intentionality against the concept of self as substance, in that the "'I' is not just an 'I think', but an 'I think something'" (1962, p. 367/321). The thinking subject is always posited in an intentional relation to the things of lived experience, thus the statement 'I think' can express itself only in this lived relation, it "*expresses itself as Being-in-the-world*" (p. 368/321). From this existential phenomenological perspective, the self can only be fundamentally

derived from ‘outside’ itself in its relation to the temporal structure of the intentional compartments belonging to lived experience.

In this general sense then, the central problematic of *Being and Time*, the temporality of Dasein’s self-projection, is nothing other than a reworking of Husserl’s own early project, in a re-interpretation of the Kantian subject and its existential (intentional) relation to lived time<sup>80</sup>. It is in the authentic disclosure of this temporal relation that the ‘self constancy’ of the subjectum is to be given, where authenticity is constituted as futural being towards death for whom all future possibilities can only be projected on the basis of the past horizon of thrown possibility. The temporal structure of self-reflexive authenticity is the “self-understanding Dasein itself” (p. 372/325) for whom the three ecstases of the past, present and future constitute its own temporalising being as thrown projection. In this sense, Dasein simply is its own time, where time is first and foremost the lived time of one’s own absorbed, everyday, lived experience of the world.

Heidegger first of all gives the name ‘futural’ to that structure of authenticity in which, as being towards death, Dasein constantly “comes towards itself” (p. 373/325). From the perspective of the future, authentic anticipation constantly comes towards itself in the possibility of what is ‘not yet’, and which as death can never become actual. As such a futural projection, the authentic disclosure of being towards death is always ‘ahead of itself’ in anticipating the constant play of a possibility which never ‘gives itself’ as such. The futural horizon of the possibility of one’s own death constantly defers itself, and in such a deferral anticipation is suspended in constantly ‘coming towards itself’, that is, towards the continued anticipation of what is ‘not yet’. Thus for Heidegger, the self-disclosure of authenticity must be “grounded in the future” (p. 375-376/327). Or in other words, for the

authentic disclosure of the ecstatic nature of time, this futural anticipation which is constantly suspended in the present, is a methodological starting point for uncovering the dynamic structure of the past, present and future.

The ecstasis of the past, of 'what has been', is given in the finite factuality of thrownness, and according to Heidegger, it is that which authentic being towards death is constantly coming towards. The anticipation of one's own death is a mode of present understanding in which one projects the possibility of death by anticipating what is 'not yet'. Authenticity involves a constant anticipation of what is 'not yet', and as projection, this authentic understanding is null, in the sense that it is founded on the basis of its own finite, thrown situation in the present. Furthermore, any present anticipation can be as such only on the basis of the past, for 'what has been' is constantly delivering oneself into the present possibilities for understanding. It is here, in a dynamically unfolding sense, that "Dasein comes towards itself futurally in such a way that it comes *back*" (p. 373/326). Authentic being towards death, as constant anticipation, is a mode of projective understanding that is constantly fading into the past. This immediately past anticipation sets up the possibility for its continuation in the present, yet this projection is itself possible only if one constantly returns to anticipating the futural possibility of one's own death. In a peculiar sense, then, there can be no present anticipation, for it is always already something past in projecting its own future possibility. In constantly fading away into 'what has been', futural anticipation is constantly becoming itself. In this sense, authentic anticipation is an explicit mode of constant becoming.

These two ecstases of past and future constitute the temporally articulated structure of thrown anticipatory projection that constantly brings authentic anticipation back into its current situation, back to the presence of the things

themselves in a temporalising sense. Or as Heidegger states, the past arises from the future in that the future is constantly “in the process of having been” (1962, p. 374/326). The authentic method brings this dynamic relation between the past and the future explicitly to light by constantly anticipating the ultimate futural possibility for all lived experience, one’s own death, a possibility that can never be fulfilled in the present. In doing so, the present is not something that can endure in time only then to pass away into what has been, rather, authenticity discloses the present, “in the sense of making present” (p. 374/326), as something that is always already past in the projection of future possibilities. Thus, authenticity constantly “releases from itself the Present” (p. 374/326) as the temporal process of futural projection that is always already dissolving into ‘what has been’. What is uncovered here, is the originary temporal structure of presence, as presencing, in relation to authentic, anticipatory projection, for which one’s own present situation and its self-unity are constituted as an ongoing temporal process in the constant dissolution of the future into the past. Authentic anticipation must constantly return to its null, finite basis in order to be as futural anticipation, and in this constant return it becomes itself, it is explicitly a mode of becoming in constant dissolution.

Inauthenticity, on the other hand, as an immersion in the world of one’s everyday concerns, is not generally characterised by a constantly repeated, silent anticipation of one’s own death. Again, it is a mystery to me why this authentic anticipation must be experienced as the angst of a joyfully impassioned freedom towards death. Also, the notion that one’s inauthentic self is characterised by a fearful negation of authentic angst seems to lack any ontological necessity, as Dreyfus suggests. As regards everydayness, instead of attempting a philosophical disclosure of existence, one is much more likely

to be involved in dealing with whatever necessity of life presents itself in the ongoing flux of lived experience. Inauthenticity is an undifferentiated absorption in the present and its contingencies, where the present is the “*primary basis for falling*” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 376/328). A falling absorption in the work of everydayness involves a projection of the possibilities that one is already thrown into, and just as for authenticity, this inauthentic understanding of the situation is a futural projection of possibilities that are constantly in the process of ‘having been’. The originary temporal structure of authenticity, in the sense of the dynamic relation between the past and future, is also apparent in the structure of everyday projection. The difference here is that, whilst the authentic projection of death anticipates a possibility that can never become actual, inauthentic projection constantly anticipates possibilities that can actually be fulfilled, so instead of authentically holding itself open to the future, inauthenticity is absorbed in the present and its contingencies.

Heidegger underlines this difference by defining inauthentic projection as an awaiting (*Gewärtigen*) as opposed to the ‘running ahead of itself’ of authentic anticipation (*Vorlaufen*). Inauthentic absorption, then, “temporalizes itself as an awaiting which makes present [*gegenwärtiges Gewärtigen*]—an awaiting to whose ecstatical unity there must belong a corresponding ‘having been’” (p. 388/338-339). The temporalising structure of both these modes of projective understanding constantly ‘make present’ the situation one already finds oneself in. Originary temporality is this ecstatic unity of time, a unity that constitutes both authentic and inauthentic modes of understanding and their self-unity, as a “process of temporalizing in the unity of the ecstases” (p. 377/329). It is in this sense that I understand Blattner’s statement (1992, p. 101) that ‘authenticity is merely one mode of originary temporality’, yet originary

temporality is not itself something that can then be indifferent or otherwise to the problem of being authentic. It is not itself a mode of understanding but, rather, it is the originary structure of time that constitutes the unity of any mode of projective understanding.

In the sections immediately following the authentic disclosure of the temporality of self-projection, Heidegger goes on to describe the originary temporal structure of inauthentic understanding, in Husserl's terminology, as the relation between retention and awaiting in making present. This 'Husserlian' analysis, however, is posited in terms of practice rather than perception, in describing the relational structure of whatever everyday work one might be involved in and the practical understanding belonging to that work. For this inauthentic understanding, the "*awaiting [Gewärtigen]* of what it is involved in, and—together with this awaiting—the *retaining [Behalten]* of that which is thus involved, make possible in its ecstatical unity the specifically manipulative way in which equipment is made present [*Gegenwärtigen*]" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 404/353). The practical understanding of one's everyday situation is characterised by an awaiting of that 'towards-which' the work and its ready to hand things are involved. One grasps the hammer in order to use it, and in doing so one awaits that 'towards which' the work involves the use of the hammer. This notion of awaiting, as a temporal structure of practical understanding, is not a thematic or rationally thought out goal, in the sense that one must think 'now I need to pick up this hammer in order to use it'. Awaiting belongs to the non-theoretical practical use of the hammer in order to simply use it.

Yet in grasping the hammer one also, at the same time, retains the possibility of using it in this work, and likewise, this retention is not a thematic concern. The projective understanding belonging to the practical activity of

hammering something constantly retains, or holds onto, the possibility of that ‘towards which’ it puts the hammer to use. Together, this retentive awaiting lets the hammer be involved in the work, from the moment one picks it up, through the downward arc and on to its impact. Practical understanding, and its ongoing retentive awaiting, thus ‘makes present’, by way of temporally constituting the unity of both the practical activity of hammering, and the ‘unobtrusive presence’ of those things that are disclosed to its circumspect perception as ready to hand for such activity. An absorption in work lets these things be involved, and this involvement is not a theoretical mediation of one’s practical activity, for:

Letting something be involved is constituted rather in the unity of a retention which awaits, and it is constituted in such a manner, indeed, that the making-present which arises from this, makes possible the characteristic absorption of concern in its equipmental world. When one is wholly devoted to something and ‘really’ busies oneself with it, one does not do so just alongside the work itself, or alongside the tool, or alongside both of them ‘together’. The unity of the relations in which concern circumspectively ‘operates’, has been established already by letting-things-be-involved—which is based upon temporality (p. 405/354).

This descriptive analysis of inauthentic practical understanding, again using Husserl’s terminology, is repeated in the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* where practical understanding is a “retentive expectance [*behaltendes Gewärtigen*], in which the equipment is *enpresented* [*gegenwärtigt*]. In expectant-retentive enpresenting the equipment comes into play, becomes present [*anwesend*], enters into a present [*Gegen-wart*]” (Heidegger, 1982, p. 293/416). Heidegger’s notion of the originary temporal structure of presencing, for which the horizons of the past and future constantly give rise to the present as an ongoing lived moment in dissolution, is perhaps the most fundamental concept of his early ontology of being. Originary temporality founds the unity of self-projection as well as perception and practical activity, yet its

structure is based on Husserl's own concept of time. The following year, in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Heidegger explicitly acknowledges this debt to Husserl, albeit along with a contentious critique of his supposed 'subjectivism'. It remains, however, that what "Husserl still calls time-consciousness, i.e., consciousness of time, is precisely time, itself, in the primordial sense.... [where] Temporality [*Zeitlichkeit*] in its temporalizing is the primordially self-unifying unity of expectancy, retention, and making present" (Heidegger, 1984, p. 204/264)<sup>81</sup>.

In his phenomenology of 'time-consciousness' Husserl derived the self-unity of consciousness on the basis of the intentional structure of straightforward perception and the temporally constituted presence of things. A retention of the immediately past moment of perception forms the basis of an anticipative protention of the next percept that is itself already fading into the past, and so on. The ongoing process of retentive protention constantly 'makes present' the presence of the thing itself, where presence is nothing 'in itself' but is temporally constituted as a unity in change. Along with this temporally constituted presence goes the ongoing retention of the immediately past consciousness of perception that, likewise, constitutes the unity of the flux of consciousness. Time-consciousness is this constantly fading retention of the past moment of perception that anticipates the future, where both the self-unity of that perception and the presence of the things themselves are constituted in the constant dissolution of ordinary temporality. The unity of consciousness, in the context of one's own ongoing lived experience, is thought here as a unity in change, a self-constituting unity of ordinary temporality.

This dynamic account of lived time as a temporal process, in which the future is constantly dissolving into the past, has no present in the sense of

something that endures in time only to pass away itself. The present, as ‘making present’ has no duration, rather, it is that ongoing moment (the ‘primordial now’) in which one lives one’s life out, and on the basis of which one can calculate something like a duration in the movement of a clock, the daily cycle of the sun, or the passing of years. The phenomenological concept of time is the basis for both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s early accounts of the origins of human understanding, yet where Husserl emphasises the retentive structure of lived time and its fading away or constant dissolution, Heidegger states that the *“primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality [Zeitlichkeit] is the future”* (1962, p. 378/329).

This is so, even though temporality does not first arise through a cumulative sequence of the ecstases, but in each case temporalizes itself in their equiprimordially. But within this equiprimordially, the modes of temporalizing are different. The difference lies in the fact that the nature of the temporalizing can be determined primarily in terms of the different ecstases. Primordial and authentic temporality temporalizes itself in terms of the authentic future and in such a way that in having been futurally, it first of all awakens the Present (p. 378/329).

Heidegger emphasises the futural structure of temporality, and yet the authentic disclosure of temporality as essentially futural is still posited on the basis of its dissolution in the constantly fading past horizon of thrownness which is, nonetheless, ‘equiprimordial’ with the future. Authentic temporality is one mode of originary temporality, a specialised philosophical mode that uses anticipation to uncover the ecstases of the past, present and future<sup>82</sup>. In anticipation, the self-constancy of authenticity is enacted only in a constant return from out of ‘what has been’ back to itself as futural projection; it is a mode of constant becoming.

Yet authentic projection can only become itself futurally in that the future is constantly in the process of having been. This constant passing over into ‘what has been’, the dissolution of the future into the past, provides the

necessity for authentic self-constancy in constant becoming. In a sense, the constant fading away of the future into ‘what has been’ is the primary basis of authentic becoming. Heidegger derives the priority of the future on the basis of the necessity for authentic anticipation as a method of disclosure, yet it is the dissolution aspect of futural becoming that makes this method necessary. The apparent priority of futural becoming is posited on the basis of its constant dissolution into what has been. There are thus two moments to the authentic temporalising of temporality—becoming and its dissolution—and it is the latter, following Husserl’s account of the retentive structure of lived time, that is the fundamental characteristic of originary temporality. The self as a temporalising process is itself nothing, it can never give itself except as this constant process of futural becoming in dissolution, within the finite closure of originary temporality.

*§19. Ecstatic conditionality*

Heidegger’s early phenomenological project, from its beginnings in his collaboration with Husserl at Freiburg University (1917-18) through to the problem of the temporality of being outlined in the last lecture courses at Marburg in 1928, attempted to describe the structure of human understanding in terms of lived or originary time and in relation to practice and perception. This project not only built upon and systematised Husserl’s own early analyses, but also seems to have had a positive influence in their development after about 1920 through various redrafts<sup>83</sup>.

For both Husserl and Heidegger, the most fundamental concept of these phenomenological analyses was that of originary temporality as a dynamic temporal process in which the present is constituted as a ‘unity in change’ or an ‘ecstatic unity’ of temporality. While the terminology and the focus of these investigations may differ, radically so in some respects, it remains that

the fundamental basis of Heidegger's existential phenomenology is that of Husserl's groundbreaking conception of temporality. Although Heidegger obviously saw his own work as a radical critique of phenomenology, he still defers to time in Husserl's sense, as a temporal process of the constant dissolution of the future into the past. It is this dissolution aspect of becoming—the constant and ongoing fading away of retentional/expectant primary memory—that Husserl identifies as the structure of primordial temporality, and which leads him towards the problems of 'extreme skepticism' and the intentional structure of one's transcendence of the flux of perception.

Furthermore, the problem concerning the temporality (*Temporalität*) of being, as outlined in Heidegger's *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, concentrates on the phenomenological constitution of practice and perception, a question that Husserl also sketched out in the third section of *Ideas 2*, possibly five years or more beforehand, although Heidegger's influence may also play a part here. Both phenomenologists attempted to bring together the intentional structures of perception along with practical and theoretical compartments, and show how these are all constituted in the structure of originary temporality. Where Husserl suggests a motivational relation between practice and the self-constituting temporality of perception, Heidegger posits the ecstatic temporal structures of practice and perception, founded in the temporality of self-projection, as the 'horizon of presencing'.

From this perspective, Heidegger's early phenomenological work, up to the end of the 1930's, identifies a number of fundamental themes, both explicit and implicit in Husserl's incredibly wide ranging analyses, and concentrates them in the one simple question concerning the meaning of being. Yet Heidegger failed to advance these phenomenological analyses beyond the

statement of the problem concerning the horizon of presencing. Beyond the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, the necessity of his ‘turning’ is founded, at least in part, in the fact that “the question of the extent to which one might conceive the interpretation of Dasein as temporality in a universal-ontological way ... is a question I myself am not able to decide, one which is still completely unclear to me” (Heidegger, 1984, p. 210/271).

Given this failure of the existential phenomenological analytic, what then might be the relation between Husserl’s and Heidegger’s notions of the temporality of lived experience? Both phenomenologists identify a number of intentional structures in the temporal relation between practice and perception, some of which they share in common and others that are unique to their own analysis. An outline of these various structures would, then, perhaps help clarify the problem. To start with, lived experience is to be thought in terms of this ecstatically present moment, the ‘primordial moment’, in which one lives one’s entire life out and which, as a constant unity in change, is bounded by a temporal horizon. Heidegger’s notion of temporal ‘horizons’, a term that Husserl also uses, is derived from his interpretation of lived time and its ecstases of the past, present and future. These three ecstases, together, form the lived moment as a temporal process in ‘making present’. From this perspective, the fundamental condition for the possibility of lived experience, and the origin of our understanding of this world, *“lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical unity, has something like a horizon.* Ecstases are not simply raptures in which one gets carried away. Rather, there belongs to each ecstasis a ‘whither’ to which one is carried away. This “whither” of the ecstasis we call the ‘horizontal schema” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 416/365).

Lived time is the horizon of all human experience and its understanding, it is the limit of all perception, either circumspect or objective, and forms the bounds within which we can practically interact with, and formulate theories about, the world, its past and possible future. Within this horizon of presencing, each ecstasis has a different intentional relation to that horizon; it has a horizontal schema. The horizon of the past is characterised by thrownness, where ‘what has been’ constantly sets up the possibilities that one is abandoned to in the current situation. What has gone before us and set up the possibilities within which absorbed everyday understanding already operates, is nothing other than this same falling absorption in work and its practical and theoretical compartments. One’s own practical activity constantly sets up, or brings one into, the current situation and its possibilities. Theoretical compartments arise from this bodily interaction with the world of the practical understanding and its unobtrusive meaningfulness, yet as past compartments, they likewise also have thrown consequences for the present situation. An absorption in everydayness and its compartments belongs to thrownness in the horizon of the past.

The horizon of the present is that within which one is circumspectively concerned with those possibilities into which one has already been thrown. Here, practical activity and its circumspect perception are involved in the projection of possibilities for dealing with the everyday world of work and its contingencies, where “Dasein, as Being-alongside, is at the same time making present. The horizontal schema for the *Present* is defined by the ‘*in-order-to*’” (p. 416/365). ‘Being alongside’ also means comporting oneself “circumspectively as well as with theoretical concern” (p. 402/351), and thus includes all modes of judgement, representation, any thought or speech, within the horizon of the present.

This present horizon also bounds that perceptual activity in which one merely looks at a thing in order to disclose it as an object (and this philosophical concern is also a mode of work with its own practical compartments<sup>84</sup>). Aesthesis, and the traditional philosophical understanding of being as presence, is founded in the horizon of the present in that it “lets what is ready-to-hand and what is present-at-hand be encountered ‘bodily’ in themselves with regard to the way they look. Letting them be thus encountered is grounded in a Present. This Present gives us in general the ecstatic horizon within which entities can have bodily *presence*” (p. 397/346). It is probably safe to say that Husserl would not have disagreed with this designation of the horizon of bodily presence, provided of course that it is understood not as something merely present in itself but as constituted in the unity of originary temporality.

The horizon of the future is that ‘towards which’ all projective understanding and its practical and theoretical compartments are directed, where that schema “in which Dasein comes towards itself *futurally*, whether authentically or inauthentically, is the *for-the-sake-of-itself*” (p. 416/365). As being towards death, all of one’s works in this world are for the sake of this life that must be lived. This is not meant in a selfish sense, for even works of charity, such as caring for others, are something that one does for the sake of this existence as a whole, for the sake of life, which is not merely the self, even if everydayness is constantly burdened by the necessity of meeting one’s own immediate needs for food and shelter. All work either goes towards maintaining one’s existence in this world or self-destructively cutting it short. Either way, one works for the sake of this existence, or for the sake of constantly becoming who one already is. As such a futurally directed becoming, existence is

always a being towards death, towards that which is ‘not yet’, and whose ultimate limit is one’s own death.

These three horizontal schemata together, in their temporal-intentional relations to one another, are co-conditions for the possibility of lived experience as a whole. All three horizons belong together as a unity of lived time, for just as “the Present arises in the unity of the temporalising of temporality out of the future and having been, the horizon of a Present temporalizes itself equiprimordially with those of the future and of having been” (p. 417/365). All three horizons, together, are a necessary condition for something like the self-unity of human understanding and its lived world to exist, and as such a temporalising unity they are founded in the structure of originary temporality and its constant dissolution. Furthermore, it is only because one’s own lived experience is this temporal-intentional process of ecstatic temporality and its horizontal schema, that there can also be something like this world we live in and understand as such. In this sense, the lived “world is neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand, but temporalizes itself in temporality. It ‘is’, with the ‘outside-of-itself’ of the ecstases, ‘there’. If no *Dasein* exists, no world is ‘there’ either” (p. 417/365).

This does not mean that if we die then there is no physical world as such, rather, something like the objective, material universe is itself only meaningfully given to human understanding and its lived experience. This lived experience, however, is not a subjective construct of human understanding and rationality. The lived world in which one exists, or the present situation in which one is ‘here’ with the others and alongside things, is first opened up in the phenomenon of originary temporality, where “*Ecstatical temporality clears [lichtet] the ‘there’ [‘here’ or Da] primordially*” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 402/351). The lived world is constituted in originary

temporality and is therefore something ‘outside’ of any mere subjective understanding or experience. Lived experience, as one’s own existence in this world, is “cleared [*gelichtet*] in itself, not through any other [being], but in such a way that it *is* itself the clearing [*die Lichtung*]” (p. 171/133).

This notion of the clearing and its openness is not something that is accomplished by human understanding, rather, as something ecstatically temporal it is transcendent, something given from ‘outside’ of any possible experience in forming the originary basis of lived experience. In this sense, having its “ground in the horizontal unity of ecstatical temporality, the world is transcendent. It must already have been ecstatically disclosed so that in terms of it [beings] within-the-world can be encountered” (p. 417/366). The physical world of objects, of the natural sciences, is disclosed on the basis of one’s everyday understanding of the world, which is a temporalising basis that transcends subjective experience. Echoing Husserl’s own fundamental problem concerning originary temporality and the possibility of transcendence, Heidegger states:

The ‘problem of transcendence’ cannot be brought round to the question of how a subject comes out to an Object, where the aggregate of Objects is identified with the idea of the world. Rather we must ask: what makes it ontologically possible for entities to be encountered within-the-world and Objectified as so encountered? This can be answered by recourse to the transcendence of the world—a transcendence with an ecstatico-horizontal foundation. If the ‘subject’ gets conceived ontologically as an existing Dasein whose Being is grounded in temporality, then one must say that the world is ‘subjective’. But in that case, this ‘subjective’ world, as one that is temporally transcendent, is ‘more Objective’ than any possible ‘Object’ (p. 417-418/366).

The lived world is ‘subjective’ in the authentic sense that it is always the world of one’s own lived experience. Yet as something transcendent, being constituted in originary temporality, it is as ‘natural’ and ‘objective’ a phenomenon as the physical world that is disclosed only in and for it. This

implies that the originary temporal structure of life is also a fundamental ontological characteristic of all objects. Such a conclusion is tantamount to proposing an ontological basis for the natural sciences, which is what Heidegger explicitly sets out to do in the third section of the introduction to *Being and Time* on ‘The ontological priority of the question of being’ (pp. 28-31/8-11), and precisely what Husserl also attempts to provide in his phenomenology of perception and the temporal constitution of objective presence<sup>85</sup>. What the consequences might be for any theory about the physical world, of taking the phenomenon of originary temporality as a fundamentally universal characteristic of ‘nature’, is here purely a matter of conjecture. What seems to be clear, however, is that Heidegger shares Husserl’s focus on the fundamental ontological basis of lived experience and its originary temporality. This common focus is also apparent in Husserl’s *Ideas 2* where he introduces the temporal structure of practical activity in its fundamental relation to perception<sup>86</sup>.

According to Husserl, and in the context of his analysis of the intentionality of practical understanding, “consciousness has a content of originary lived experiences and a horizon of past ones which is represented in the now in the form of a lived horizon of ‘primary memory’, of retention, and the originary and the horizational are continuously transformed into one another” (1989, p. 314/300). In this account of horizational temporality, past lived experience is what constantly brings us to the present and its perceptual flux. As habitual practical (and also theoretical) intentionality, these lived experiences are not something merely ‘behind’ us but are ‘present’, in a dynamic temporal sense, as the past horizon of presence, and this past horizon is a condition for the possibility of being able to experience or perceive anything at all. Or in other words, past lived experiences constantly

set up the perceptual situation into which one is always already being thrown.

Past practical and theoretical compartments bring us to the 'lived horizon' of the originary present, which as the retentional/expectant primary memory of the unity of time consciousness, is itself constantly dissolving into the horizon of the past. Along with this self-unity goes the unity of perception in which any perceptual flux is perceived as the thing itself enduring in time. This temporally structured perceptual basis is a condition for sensuous feelings that are inherently motivational, and all of these are also constantly fading away into the horizon of the past. These habitual, non-representational motivations, as an inherent tendency associated with sensuous feeling, are a condition for any present practical activity, where all theoretical intentionality is founded in the practical understanding of the lifeworld. Likewise, as with perception, feeling and motivation, all present activity is itself already fading into the horizon of the past even as it 'anticipates' the future. Thus it is practical activity that bridges the past and future horizons of lived experience, for as present activity it is always already dissolving into the past horizon of presencing, and thus constantly brings us back to perception whilst projecting future activity; and so on until death.

Husserl's account of the temporal structure of perception and practice is more or less in line with Heidegger's description, in the sense that both identify the temporal structure of retention/expectance in all of the intentional structures belonging to the horizons of the past, present and future. Furthermore, both agree that this horizontality is itself constituted in the temporalising of originary temporality, or the dissolution aspect of retentional-expectant becoming. Yet Husserl does not have a concept for projection, and one might well ask how motivations can be a condition for

possible comportments towards things and others in the world, without any projective understanding of those possibilities.

Likewise, of all the possible courses for acting in the world, how do we come to project only certain possibilities and not others? Motivations must be a condition for projecting only those possibilities that make sense to our everyday understanding. To take a very simple example; perhaps one's hand accidentally comes into contact with a flame on a stove, there is the perception of heat itself, and since no perception is without its associated feeling, there is pain. The feeling of pain has an inherent (and in this case urgent) motivational tendency towards action, and this motivation is in no way something thought out or rationally planned; one simply reacts. Yet, out of all the thrown possibilities available to someone in this situation, what comportment would make sense here? How does one react to the motivation of pain in a meaningful way? Practical understanding must project those possibilities that it is motivated to act upon, and in doing so, one generally moves one's hand away from the flame.

So then, in the horizon of the past there has always already been an absorption in the everyday world of work, an absorption in which one comports oneself towards things and others in this world. On the basis of this past horizon we are constantly being thrown into the current situation, its straightforward perceptions and their associated sensuous feelings. The horizon of the present is this flux of perceptual feeling and its ongoing inherent motivational tendencies, on the basis of which projection sets out those possibilities for comportment that are appropriate to it. Finally, there are those comportments themselves, both practical and theoretical, in which one comports oneself meaningfully towards things and others met with in the everyday 'work world'. One works towards those possibilities of existence

that are constantly arising in the horizon of the future, whose limit is death. Being towards death is this futural absorption in practical and theoretical compartments, which means an absorption in the work of constant becoming, and it is this work of becoming that conjoins the ecstases of the past and future in 'making present', within the horizontal schema of presencing.

Each of these intentional structures belonging to the horizons of the past, present and future—absorption, past compartments, perception and so on—are conditions for the possibility of those structures that they give rise to. For example, perception is the condition for its feeling, which is a condition for its inherent motivations, and so on. Husserl emphasises that this conditionality is simultaneous and co-dependent, rather than a linear progression of moments over time. The circle of becoming, as the ecstatic conditionality of horizontal temporality, takes place within the originary temporal structure of lived experience as a unity of the past and future in 'making present'. Thus each intentional structure can be thought in terms of the condition of its own possibility as well as being a condition itself. Ecstatic conditionality means that these intentional structures arise in dependence on the totality or combination of their conditions, where none of the conditions can occur individually without their relation to all the others. In this sense, there can be no projective understanding without its motivation towards activity, and the circumspect perception that goes along with that, and so on. The co-dependence of these conditions means that they are all equiprimordial, and thus there can be no linear, causal progression but, rather, a dependent co-arising in the temporalising structure of lived experience and its everyday understanding.

Yet just as these ecstatic conditions arise, or are constantly becoming from out of the horizon of the future, so too are they constantly fading away into the horizon of the past. Arise and fall, becoming and dissolution, belong to each ecstatic condition and bind them all together in the horizontal structure of originary temporality. Thus ecstatic conditionality means that each condition holds within it a temporal relation to all the others, where all the conditions are equiprimordial and co-constituting, as a unity of originary temporality. These temporal-intentional relations together, as a co-dependent totality of ecstatic conditions, are a condition for the possibility of lived experience as a whole.

From the perspective of a phenomenological interpretation of being and time, the horizontal structure of ecstatic conditionality is the basis of the fundamental relation between practice, perception and lived time, as these are set out in both Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenological analyses of the originary temporality of lived experience. Given the fundamental role of practical understanding across all the horizons of lived time, for both Husserl and Heidegger, the originary temporal structure of human understanding is posited here as the fundamental relation between work and dissolution, in terms of the fall into an absorption in a factual everyday world of work, its circumspectly straightforward perception, sensuous feeling, motivation, projection, intentional compartments, and being towards death. In summary, these ecstatic conditions are as follows.

#### *A. The horizon of the past*

##### *1. Absorption*

In lived experience, one has a past, obviously, from birth through childhood and onwards right up to this present moment. This is a past in which one has been absorbed in living, in the contingencies of everyday work and in its

relation to others. In order to be 'here', to have arrived at this present situation, there must have been this absorption in the indifferent or undifferentiated familiarity of the work world and the necessities of life. As a falling absorption in dealing with everyday necessities, this inauthentic indifference has still always been a striving 'towards death', in the inexplicit sense of having worked towards the continuation of life in the projection of possibilities that have now been actualised in this present moment. Both Heidegger and Husserl acknowledge this past lived experience not only as something that 'has been' but also as constitutive of the past horizon of presence. In this sense, past absorption in the life world is not something that one has somehow merely put 'behind' oneself, for it is constantly present in the immediacy of the past horizon.

## *2. Past comportments*

Past absorption in the everyday work world means an absorption in embodied practical activity and its theoretical comportments. Without an absorption in work there can have been no everyday comportment, and in this sense, absorption is a condition for the possibility of past comportments. These comportments are the totality of one's embodied interaction with the world up to the present, and are manifested in the past horizon of presencing as the accumulation of lived experience, of habits, skills, personal history, and so on.

Yet no past comportment has ever been the act of an isolated subject, for all comportment is an intentional relation towards this shared world we all live in. One's own past comportments have always been a meaningful relation towards the theoretical and practical comportments of all the others who have helped shape this world. In this sense, one's own past comportments are an accumulated cultural and historical background of shared practices, a

horizontal background that is constantly accumulating and bringing us into the present. Again, both Heidegger and Husserl share this temporal notion of the horizontality of past intentional comportment and the interconnectedness of its shared, social relations. All past comportments are present in a retentive or ecstatic horizontal sense, as constitutive of this present lived moment.

*B. The horizon of the present*

*3. Straightforward perception*

Past comportments, which means comportments performed in the immediate (retentive) past and also comportments performed since birth, are a condition for the possibility of ongoing perceptions. Past comportments are a cause, in an ecstatic sense, in that they have formed the present lived world that is given in one's straightforward perceptions. The house one lives in, for instance, the house that forms the perceptual background for any activity within it, has been brought to stand there not only by the comportments of those who built it but also by one's own comportments in entering into it and going about one's everyday activities. All past comportment, one's personal history as a whole in the shared world of everydayness, and therefore all history as such, is a horizontal condition for ongoing, straightforward sensory perceptions.

One's own embodied interaction in this lived world we all share is constantly bringing one to circumspectly perceive those things that are of concern to that practical interaction. On the immediate or retentive horizon, those past comportments simply are what one is involved in at the present moment, and so perhaps one turns to look out the window, and in doing so sees a blue sky in summer. The straightforward perception of something is brought about only in the context of its embodied practical activity. Past

comportments, as horizontal, are constantly setting up or, rather, giving form to what is perceived in the present, and in this sense, all the forms of perception are the fruition of one's past comportment in a shared world. Heidegger's circumspect perception, situated within an everyday absorption in work, and Husserl's straightforward sensory perception within the life world of everydayness, are both constituted within the horizon of presence by the momentum of past absorbed activity.

#### *4. Feeling*

For Husserl, all straightforward perception gives rise to its sensuous feeling and, as such, is a condition for the possibility of feeling. As something that is only ever a lived, everyday experience, perception is always something that is felt, in that it is either pleasant or unpleasant, or perhaps it is somewhere in between these, so it is an indifferent feeling. As perceptual feeling, it is a constant and ongoing flux of synesthetic, auditory and visual sensations, that are constantly fading away as they arise. Both perception and its concomitant feeling are the fruition of past comportments in the sense that they are never merely a barrage of raw sensory data but are always already something meaningfully formed in the ongoing context of an absorption in work.

#### *5. Motivation*

The constant flux of perceptual feelings is a condition for motivations in the sense that, according to Husserl, motivation is an 'inherent tendency' associated with all sensuous feeling. Motivation operates here at a fundamental, non-theoretical level, as an inherent tendency towards either the arousal or suppression of various kinds of sensuous feelings and the past modes of becoming associated with those feelings. For instance, one simply eats because one feels the pains of hunger, or perhaps one tries to eat well, if at all possible, because it increases one's feeling of wellbeing.

Insofar as habitual motivations are associated with both past comportments and the projection of future activity, they cannot merely be causally derived from perceptual feeling but, rather, with feeling as a condition for its possibility, motivation arises out of an intentionally directed relation to both the past and future horizons of lived experience. Any simple, causal relation between sense perception, cognition and behaviour is untenable from a phenomenological perspective, for lived experience is characterised by motivational relations of sense rather than a causal relation between physical things under a natural law. It is this notion of ‘motivation’ that ties Husserl’s schema of the temporal horizontality of lived experience together with that of Heidegger’s, for it is motivations that link perception to thrown projective understanding within the horizon of presence.

### *6. Projection*

Motivation is a condition for the possibility of futural projection in that it provides the basis on which only those possibilities that are appropriate to one’s everyday practical understanding are projected. Projective understanding, driven by habitual motivations, holds to those possible modes of becoming that it is motivated to project, and it grasps these in projecting possible comportments towards beings. Projection is not a theoretical way of planning ahead, rather, it is founded in habitual motivations that are inherently associated with perceptual feelings that are, in turn, the fruit of past comportments. As such, projection is primarily founded in one’s embodied practical interaction with the world, in practical understanding, for which possible comportments towards things and others are projected and acted upon.

In this way, projection is a condition for the possibility of comportments in general. Heidegger’s notion of projection needs the web of motivational

tendencies to direct it towards those possibilities that are appropriate to the present situation. Likewise, the present flux of motivations require the projective understanding to put into action those comportments that are meaningful for this present situation. Motivation and projection are co-dependent conditions of the horizontal present, and they bind together the phenomenological theories of the temporal-horizontal structure of lived experience posited by Heidegger and Husserl.

### *7. The work of becoming*

All present comportments are an absorption in the work of constant becoming, with projection as a condition for its possibility. Work is a constant continuation of past comportments, where any present comportment is a falling absorption in the work at hand in 'making present'. Any embodied practical relation to the world, along with its associated theoretical comportments, is constantly something that is already past, and as such, it constantly sets up the perceptual situation that provides the motivational basis for projecting yet more activity, thus it has a past and futural ecstasis within the horizon of the present.

For both Husserl and Heidegger, practical comportments conjoin the past and future in the retentional/expectant structure of presencing. As futural projection, any present comportment drives the continuity of work onwards towards those possibilities that are 'not yet', and as this mode of constant becoming, all present work is a being towards the ultimate possibility for all life, which is death. In this sense, the work of becoming is an ecstatic condition for future lived experience.

*C. The Futural horizon*

*8. Death*

Death is the horizontal future for all becoming, and the work of becoming is its condition as a mode of being towards death. Although Husserl alludes to the phenomenon of death in various analyses of lived time and perception he never developed it to the fine degree that Heidegger obviously did<sup>87</sup>. Nonetheless, any phenomenology of lived experience has death as its horizon, implicitly or explicitly, and in this sense, Heidegger's authentic existential phenomenological concept of death, as the limit horizon of all life, radically underlines the finitude of all human experience and understanding.

As the futural horizon, death bounds the continuity of lived experience and its continuation into future becoming. This continuity is founded in motivations that constantly give rise to, or bring to fruition, those comportments that are as futural being towards death<sup>88</sup>. Yet as futural lived experience, it is already an absorption in work, an absorption that is constantly dissolving into the horizon of the past. This past absorption and its comportments are the foundation for the fruition of perceptual feeling which has an inherent motivational tendency towards yet more futurally directed activity. Thus past, present and future lived experience form a circle of constant becoming, where all futural lived experience is a retentive/expectant absorption in the work of becoming, as being towards death. As the horizontal future, one's own death is not something that is merely yet to come about, for it has an ecstatic structure of its own and ties the past, present and future together in this circle of becoming. From this perspective, all of one's life, all pleasure and pain, all striving, join together in a single moment of becoming in constant dissolution.

§20. *Conclusion*

This tentative outline of the conditional structure of originary temporality is derived from a phenomenological interpretation of practice, perception and time in both Heidegger's early works culminating around the publication of *Being and Time*, and in Husserl's early descriptive phenomenology. It is Husserl's phenomenological notion of lived time, as the dissolution aspect of retentive/expectant consciousness, that provided Heidegger with the originary basis for his early existential phenomenology. Yet it was Heidegger who recognised the fundamental importance of originary temporality and made it the central and sustained focus of an ontology of lived experience.

From the perspective of this interpretation of the relation between the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger, there is a depth of agreement and convergence in their thinking on perception, practice and lived time that belies any fundamental 'radical break' between them. In contrast with any rationalist account of Husserl, his anti-rationalist critique of traditional notions of the ego and subjectivity, founded in the analysis of time, is as radical as Heidegger's, and may very well have influenced his former student to a degree not previously widely recognised. The contemporary rationalist interpretations of phenomenology, as in Dreyfus' influential account, fail to recognise the fundamental importance of Husserl's analysis of time, an analysis that underlies and ties together his early descriptive theories on perception and practice. This failure uncritically follows Heidegger's own contentious critique of Husserl, and his elision of the phenomenology of time.

The dynamic process of originary temporality, first worked out in detail by Husserl, informs and organises the analyses of the intentional structure of lived experience as posited by both Husserl and Heidegger. This intentional

structure has been summarised here in terms of eight ecstatic conditions, as they fall into an absorption in a factual everyday world of work, its circumspectly straightforward perception, sensuous feeling, motivation, projection, and ongoing intentional comportments as futural being towards death. The originary structure of temporality runs through all of these conditions such that each has an ecstatic temporal relation to the others and thus is not merely one moment in a linear series of cause and effect.

Each condition is 'simultaneous' or 'co-arising' in dependence on the others, and each is a retentive/expectant 'making present'. Similarly, the horizons of past, present and future also have an ecstatic structure in that the past horizon is not something that simply comes first in a series of horizontal moments. The past and future horizons, and their ecstatic conditions, constantly give rise to the horizon of presence. These horizons and their conditions are all equiprimordial, and each has an ecstatic temporal relation to the others. For instance, death as the horizon of the future is not merely something futural, for it has a temporal relation to the past in 'making present'. Furthermore, motivation, projection and the work of becoming, as conditions of the horizon of the present, are not simply 'present' but are all ecstatically related to the past and future. Taken as a whole, all the conditions and their horizons ecstatically constitute the lived moment as an ongoing temporal process of change.

The temporalising process of originary time, as in the constant dissolution of the future into the past, is thus evident in all the various intentional structures of the circle of becoming. All of these conditions, together, constitute a unity of this becoming. Yet dissolution is the basis of this unity, in that all forms of identity are constituted in the becoming aspect of originary time as the continuity of those conditions, a continuity that is always a 'unity in change'.

From this phenomenological perspective, the dissolution aspect of becoming is the fundamental principle of originary temporality. All the works of human being are subject to dissolution, all becoming and its self-unity as a continuity of ecstatic conditions, is only made possible in that lived time is fundamentally a temporal process of constant change. Dissolution is the transcendent condition for the possibility of any form of becoming, where all life is constituted as the work of becoming in dissolution.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> This is not to say that only texts from this period will be used, however, for much of what comprises this ‘early’ phase was subject to many years of revision and rewriting by Husserl through into the late twenties. For discussions of the problems involved in reconstructing the early phases of Husserl’s development of the phenomenological project see Mohanty (1995) and also Biemal (1970).

<sup>2</sup> There seems to be a growing appreciation of Heidegger’s anti-rationalism in ‘anglo-american’ philosophy, and this is due in large part to Dreyfus’ ground breaking work. Taylor (p. 317, 1993) also makes the claim that Heidegger is one of the few contemporary philosophers to have helped free philosophy from rationalism.

<sup>3</sup> Crowell (1990, p. 518) posits the possibility that an analysis of the constitution of what Husserl calls the ‘pure ego’ will situate the problematic of phenomenology within Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of being. Thus, a “significant *rapprochement* between Husserl and Heidegger becomes thinkable”.

<sup>4</sup> In his 1962 letter to Father Richardson, Heidegger characterises his philosophy as broadly phenomenological, albeit somewhat ambiguously as a movement ‘through’ phenomenology to his later thought. This movement was apparently necessary yet it remains unclear the degree to which Heidegger considers his later philosophy to have gone ‘beyond’ or surpassed phenomenology (Heidegger, p. x-xi, in the Preface/Vorwort to Richardson, 1974).

<sup>5</sup> Although Husserl translations have been more or less standardised through the work of Dorian Cairns and others the same is not true of Heidegger’s somewhat idiosyncratic German terminology. Since I will use the English translations extensively throughout this thesis in quotations some confusion may arise given the diversity of especially Heidegger translations. Therefore, the English translations of both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s main terms will be followed by the original German terms in parentheses where possible.

<sup>6</sup> For a discussion on the problem of immanence and phenomenological analysis see Steinbock, (1995).

<sup>7</sup> Both Husserl and Heidegger make extensive use of the term *Zeitlichkeit*, rendered here as ‘originary temporality’. Heidegger also uses *Temporalität* for a particular sense of the term ‘temporality’ and this will be noted where necessary with the German term in parentheses.

<sup>8</sup> See section 13.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Rojcewicz and Schuwer in the ‘Translators’ Introduction’ to *Ideas 2* (Husserl, 1989, pp. xi-xiii).

<sup>10</sup> Many Heidegger scholars also uncritically follow Heidegger’s own account of his critique of Husserl as regards this emphasis on the natural attitude and Cartesian notions of the ego/person/zoological thing. There seems to be a general tendency here to value discussions of ‘factual being’ over any notion of ‘mere consciousness’, no matter how radical that notion may be, leaving Husserl tarred with the brush of Cartesianism without any in depth analysis of his phenomenology. See for example Feher (p. 86, 1994) and van Buren (p. 255, 1990).

<sup>11</sup> Prufer (p. 201, 1989) suggests that this silence is due to the proximity of Heidegger’s own account with that of Husserl and its transcendental terminology. Likewise, Dahlstrom (p. 243, 1994) also questions the problem of Heidegger’s ‘silence’ and argues that while he is clearly influenced by Husserl’s account of time the refusal to acknowledge this contributes to a deliberate misrepresentation of the nature of Husserlian intentionality (p. 244).

<sup>12</sup> See section 14.

<sup>13</sup> In an earlier 1923 letter to Karl Löwith Heidegger actually claims that Husserl had never been a philosopher and that Heidegger was indeed ‘wringing his neck’ with his new factual approach to phenomenology (cited in Sheehan, p. 17, 1997). There seems to be little doubt

as to Heidegger's early opinion of himself in regards to his mentor, yet there is remarkably little in the way of published critical analysis by Heidegger to actually back this opinion up.

<sup>14</sup> See section 15.

<sup>15</sup> See von Herman (p. 124, 1993) for a discussion of the relation between the analyses of *Being and Time* and *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* as the movement towards the unification of *Zeitlichkeit* and *Temporalität*.

<sup>16</sup> It is in this critical sense, that we should, as Kockelmans (1984, p. x) says, "take distance from his [Heidegger's] thought and relate to it in both a positive and negative manner, applying Heidegger's own 'method' of destructive retrieve and re-collection". For this thesis, Husserl's phenomenology will provide just such an 'interpretive distance', yet one that is perhaps close enough to actually engage with the more esoteric aspects of Heidegger's thinking.

<sup>17</sup> Secondary pagination refers to Heidegger (1949).

<sup>18</sup> Secondary pagination refers to Heidegger (1989a).

<sup>19</sup> The relation between representational intentionality and practical understanding is certainly complex and remains to be dealt with in terms of the overall structure of intentional compartments in general. In the following chapters on Husserl and Heidegger I hope to outline a marked similarity in both of their accounts of the intentional structure of representations, imagination, perception and practice.

<sup>20</sup> Whilst the reduction is apparently first posited in an early 1907 lecture series on 'The idea of phenomenology', it is only developed later during Husserl's turn towards transcendental phenomenology (see Kern, pp. 126-149, 1977). Although the reduction or epoché, as a call to question traditional assumptions about the *ego cogito* and consciousness, is already implicit in the *Logical Investigations* it does not become a formal transcendental concept until much later. In the early descriptive phase of phenomenology it is still a rather generalised notion and, as such, it does not form a central theme for this thesis, beyond its call 'back to the things themselves' in a radical questioning of fundamental concepts.

<sup>21</sup> Da is usually translated as 'there' yet it also means 'here' and 'yonder'. As Heidegger (1962, p. 171/132) states, "the 'there' [*Da*] points to a 'here' [*hier*] and a 'yonder' [*dort*]" It is this general spatiality that the Da refers to, and more particularly to the essential characteristic of Dasein or lived experience that it is this spatiality itself. As Heidegger (p. 171/133) says, "as Being-in-the-world it is cleared [*gelichtet*] in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing [*die Lichtung*]"

<sup>22</sup> As Malpas (1999, p. 95), points out in a rebuttal of 'robust realism', all science is itself a practical involvement as a well as a disengaged, theoretical compartment. Scientific understanding thus cannot be purely separate from everyday understanding, for it also has its own practical compartments within the everyday world.

<sup>23</sup> Dreyfus (1995) rejects the traditional existentialist interpretation of *das Man* that relegates it to being merely one mode of life, for it is an essential structure of Dasein in the "shared norms" of significance (p. 424). Thus Dreyfus' notion of authenticity does not break with these norms in altogether rejecting *das Man*, instead it breaks out of 'conformism' whilst still being absorbed in everyday activity.

<sup>24</sup> See also Dreyfus and Rubin (1987) for a draft of the appendix that is included in *Being in the World*. They state that authenticity is a "consistent way of life.... attractive and livable" (p. 33), and so, given this existentialist account, a paradox arises, for "why doesn't Dasein seek anxiety [freedom] rather than flee it?" (p. 66).

<sup>25</sup> Dreyfus, as Cooper (1992, p. 243) points out, helps to 'uncouple' Heidegger from the existentialist positions of Sartre and Kierkegaard, amongst others, by showing how the existentialist themes of *Being and Time* are themselves inconsistent. Yet it remains that

Dreyfus' own version of Heidegger's existentialism is still itself an existentialist appropriation of Heidegger.

<sup>26</sup> There are many interpretive threads to this early development, and I am not suggesting that phenomenology is the only one. For example, Makkreel (1990), from the perspective of Heidegger's 1922 lecture on Aristotle, claims that the early developments in Heidegger's thinking leading up to *Being and Time* are based on an interpretation of both Aristotle and Dilthey, and in a critical reaction to Husserl's idea of a phenomenological science (p. 306). Heidegger's works are derived from the general philosophical milieu of his time, and this thesis will attempt to follow one such thread in Husserl's phenomenology.

<sup>27</sup> Olafsen (1994, p. 23), despite his opposition to Dreyfus' account of Heidegger, also shares this strong existentialist position for which resolute authenticity is a "style of moral life".

<sup>28</sup> Secondary pagination refers to Heidegger (1988).

<sup>29</sup> Christensen (1998, p. 65), despite his strident criticism of certain aspects of Dreyfus' translation of Heidegger, also emphasises the influential and innovative character of Dreyfus' interpretation of practice. From this perspective, the problem of exegesis is only important in relation to a critical analysis of the positive aspects of Dreyfus' interpretation, an interpretation that opens up the question of being in ways that no mere exegesis could provide. During my research stay at the ANU in 1997 it was Bruin Christensen who impressed on me the importance of engaging with Dreyfus' accounts of Heidegger and Husserl in this way.

<sup>30</sup> Miles (1994, p. 359) also claims that *Being and Time* is primarily an attempt to provide a fundamental ontology of being, and that this precludes any "stereotype of Heidegger as an 'existentialist'".

<sup>31</sup> As Sheehan (1992, p. 31) states, the analysis of time in *Being and Time* can be interpreted as a synthesis of phenomenology (and its critique of subjectivism) with a hermeneutics of history of philosophy since the ancient Greeks. As Makkreel (1990, p. 315) and Volpi (1994, p. 204) point out, this emphasis on ancient Greek thought is centred on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and its notions of *phronesis* and *praxis*.

<sup>32</sup> Secondary pagination refers to Husserl (1921).

<sup>33</sup> See also Hall's (1982, p. 176) critique of any simple idealist or realist interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology.

<sup>34</sup> Certain elements of analytic philosophy, on the other hand, have traditionally based any notion of intentionality on the assumption that an unproblematic distinction can be made between the psychical and the physical. Chisholm (1957) regards intentionality as purely a mental faculty as distinct from the physical world of things that it refers to. Strawson (p. 7-11, 1971) more specifically makes a distinction between the content of a linguistic expression and its use in the everyday world that gives it an objective relation. This separation of the mental content from its object would seem, as Husserl suggests, to uncritically posit objectivity as something simply given and not constituted in lived experience, which is not merely subjective experience.

<sup>35</sup> *Verhalten* is interpreted here as 'relational comportment' to preserve a reference to both the behavioural comportment and intentional relations of sense that can be implied in the German.

<sup>36</sup> Contrast this approach with various contemporary philosophy of mind theories that debate the usefulness of any phenomenological description of consciousness and its subjective content or 'qualia'. Dennett (1993) rejects introspection or 'auto-phenomenology' outright and favours a properly 'objective' scientific study of the third person 'heterophenomenology'. Similarly, Armstrong (1990) contends that sensory experience has no actual phenomenological content, rather, it is colourless or 'transparent', being a function of objective reference rather than merely subjective experience.

<sup>37</sup> As far as this Husserlian quest for neo-Cartesian certainty is concerned, it would seem that Quine's critique of empiricism has much more in common with Heidegger's notion of originary finitude. However, inasmuch as Quine's pragmatic nominalism and naturalistic epistemology still hold to the distinction between a system of beliefs organizing the flux of sense data, then his residual naturalism is tangential to both Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenological methods. Now while I have used Quine's critique of ontology to outline the differences between a naturalistic and a phenomenological approach to the flux of experience, this sketchy outline is not intended in any sense as a critique or refutation of that naturalism. Such a critique, if it were possible, would probably require a somewhat more detailed account of the two disparate traditions that give rise to these separate philosophies and their methodologies than has been given here. Instead, I have merely attempted to indicate how different the phenomenological method and its object of analysis are from any empirically based philosophy or empirical notion of intentionality. However, while there are both methodological and structural differences between the accounts of intentional synthesis and a system of beliefs, Davidson's critique of Quine is still roughly analogous to Husserl's holistic approach to the problem of psychologism and empiricism.

<sup>38</sup> For a discussion of the various stages in the complex development of Husserl's notion of 'ego' see Kockelmans (1967).

<sup>39</sup> Secondary pagination refers to Husserl (1966).

<sup>40</sup> See, for example, Husserl (1970a, p. 461/259).

<sup>41</sup> This mid 1924 lecture at Marburg University, given just before Heidegger takes up his teaching position there, provides an interesting if somewhat concise insight into the development of his account of time. I find the concluding question, "am I my time?" (p.22E), wholly consistent with Husserl's own approach to the fundamentally temporal structure of all lived experience. In this sense, Heidegger's question, at the beginning of his Marburg experience that culminates in the publication of *Being and Time*, is starting out from a peculiarly phenomenological perspective.

<sup>42</sup> See §7 of this thesis.

<sup>43</sup> As Brough (1996, p. 14) states, in a discussion of the temporal play of presence and absence in Husserl's phenomenology of time, "the succession of the flow is the consciousness of succession, both of its own succession and of the succession of immanent objects".

<sup>44</sup> See also Brough (1989, p. 287) for a discussion of the phenomenology of time in which he states that Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* and its concept of identity is "inseparable from the consciousness of time".

<sup>45</sup> See also Dreyfus (1988, p. 85) for his account of Heidegger's 'devastating' critique of "Husserl's cognitivism". While I totally agree with Dreyfus' critique of cognitivism in his debate with the proponents of AI, the equation of Husserl's phenomenology with any form of cognitivism is rather more difficult to accept.

<sup>46</sup> Secondary pagination refers to Husserl (1969).

<sup>47</sup> Mohanty (1978, p. 325) asks the question: "Is transcendental subjectivity a modality, an existential possibility for man [sic] whose original mode of being is *Dasein*? Or, is 'being human', and therefore 'being in the world' a modality of transcendental subjectivity, a mode in which transcendental subjectivity 'apperceives' itself?" Insofar as both transcendental subjectivity and *Dasein* are constituted in originary temporality, this question, rather than reflecting any radical opposition between Heidegger and Husserl, points towards the same fundamental problem of time that guides both of their phenomenological problematics.

<sup>48</sup> For a discussion of *The History of the Concept of Time* as a draft of the analyses of *Being and Time* (as a 'proto SZ') see Sheehan (1981) and also Kisiel (1985).

<sup>49</sup> Secondary pagination refers to Heidegger (1988).

<sup>50</sup> See §7 of this thesis.

<sup>51</sup> See also Watanabe (p. 111, 1993) for a discussion of the role that categorial intuition plays in *The History of the Concept of Time*.

<sup>52</sup> Nor is this quote included in the earlier 1979 German edition. Again, it must be noted that the use of student lecture notes to ‘fill out’ the gaps in Heidegger’s handwritten lecture notes and the official Gesamtausgabe edition gives rise to a number of possible readings and thus also of interpretations.

<sup>53</sup> Tugendhat (1992), likewise, seems to follow the subjectivist line that Heidegger develops in his interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology based only on the transcendentalism of *Ideas 1*. According to Tugendhat, although both Husserl and Heidegger hold “on to the idea of a first and most original principle” (p. 80), Husserl still merely “understands his transcendental philosophy as a phenomenological clarification of everything posited as true, with reference to a transcendental subjectivity whose distinctive characteristic lies in its absolute self-givenness” (p. 79).

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Rojcewicz and Schuwer in the ‘Translators’ Introduction’ to *Ideas 2* (Husserl, 1989, pp. xi-xiii).

<sup>55</sup> Dahlstrom (p. 242, 1994) claims that Heidegger is very selective in his reading of Husserl here, and somewhat ambiguous. The acknowledgement that Husserl’s ‘new’ personalistic philosophy undermines Heidegger’s critique yet at the same time is still based on scientific and naturalistic concepts makes for a rather weak argument, especially considering Heidegger’s reliance on Husserl’s account of time. For further discussion on the problems with Heidegger’s critique of Husserl see also Bernet (1990).

<sup>56</sup> Dahlstrom (1994, p. 239) also finds it curious that Heidegger did not publicly comment on Husserl’s account of time in the lecture courses leading up to *Being and Time*, concentrating instead on the apparent ‘ontology of presence’ implicit to the *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas 1*. According to Dahlstrom (p. 244), Heidegger’s “silence about the stark similarities between his account of temporality and Husserl’s investigation of internal time-consciousness contributes to a *misrepresentation* of Husserl’s account of intentionality”.

<sup>57</sup> Secondary pagination refers to Heidegger (1990).

<sup>58</sup> As Mensch (1988, p. 205) points out in reference to the temporal basis of the transcendental ‘absolute’, “the presence of the world *depends* upon the temporal dimension of consciousness.... The world achieves its presence through constitution; but such constitution is a temporal process”.

<sup>59</sup> Secondary pagination refers to Heidegger (1989a).

<sup>60</sup> Von Herman (p. 124, 1993) claims that the task of this third division is derived from the analysis of the temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) of Dasein’s self constitution and how “original time proves phenomenologically to be that horizon that endows all characteristics and modes of being and their derivatives with their temporal meaning”. From this perspective the overall task of the third division and thus the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* is a unification of *Zeitlichkeit* and *Temporalität*.

<sup>61</sup> According to Stapleton (1983, p. 107), and in a critique of Husserlian intentionality, “Transcendence is Being-in-the-world, and the latter does *not* denote an intentional relationship”. This statement presupposes the same subject-object relation of transcendence that Heidegger saw in Husserl’s account of intentionality, yet for both Husserl and Heidegger the lived world is constituted in the intentional-temporal structure of lived experience.

<sup>62</sup> I agree with Carman (1995) that praesens, or presencing, must be understood in this sense as the ‘horizon of the present’ (p. 443), it is not the ecstatic present itself but is its ‘horizontal schema’ within which the ecstases of the past and future are also structurally related to the present. In effect, Heidegger is here recontextualising the traditional notion of presence away from merely ‘the present’ and in terms of its horizontal relation to ecstatic temporality as a whole.

<sup>63</sup> As Christensen (1997, p. 86) states; “practical circumspection is quite literally a guiding, prudential sight and thus quite genuinely and nonmetaphorically perception”.

<sup>64</sup> Care or Sorge is defined in the existential analytic in terms of the being of Dasein as “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world)” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 237/192). The care structure refers to the totality of Dasein’s relational compartments, or the intentional structure of lived experience as a whole, which is fundamentally a temporal structure. While I will not generally make use of the term ‘care’ in this exposition, the ‘care-structure’ of Dasein’s self-constitution is precisely what is in question here in a phenomenological sense; that is, as the intentional-temporal structures of relation that constitute the ongoing unity of lived experience.

<sup>65</sup> Secondary pagination refers to Heidegger (1949).

<sup>66</sup> Given the originality of Husserl’s exposition of internal time consciousness this seems to be a rather contentious statement, even though Husserl and the neo-Kantians were obviously influenced by Kant’s account of time in the transcendental aesthetic. Furthermore, although Heidegger refers to Kant throughout the existential analytic, the use of Kantian, or perhaps more precisely, neo-Kantian terminology is a late addition to the final draft of *Being and Time*. Since Heidegger’s temporal analytic confronts a general neo-Kantian problem of time, which Husserl was also addressing, Kant himself is secondary to this thesis. This is not to say that a Kantian ontology of time and the transcendental imagination is inconsequential to the existential analytic but that the topic is a thesis in itself and not central to this phenomenological interpretation.

<sup>67</sup> Carman (1994) claims that presence, perception and aesthesis are not central to Heidegger’s existential analytic (p. 208). This is perhaps true insofar as Heidegger is not simply restating ancient Greek ontology and equating being with presence, although I think Carman might overstate the case somewhat. He also claims that Heidegger rejects and undermines any notion of presence, for it belongs to traditional ontology (p. 208), and while this is also true in part, I would argue that what is in question here is a re-interpretation of the traditional notion of presence.

<sup>68</sup> I agree with Olafsen (1987, p. xvii-xviii) that presence (*Anwesen, Anwesenheit*) is used extensively throughout the existential analytic, and that this reflects the fundamental importance of ancient Greek ontology for Heidegger’s own ontology of being. However, Olafsen’s claims that ‘being equals presence’ and that aesthesis plays a “foundational role” (p. 55) in *Being and Time*, can only be made on the basis of the equally fundamental role that practical compartments play in relation to straightforward perception and the structure of originary temporality as a whole.

<sup>69</sup> Olafsen (1996) also emphasises the continuity of Heidegger’s critique of the ancient Greek concept of presence, and claims that the existential analytic radicalises *ousia* in its implicit relation to temporality (p. 424). However, Olafsen goes on to completely reject Dreyfus’ ‘quasi-behavioural’ concepts of coping and intelligibility (p. 424). Olafsen’s emphasis on the role of presence would seem to be at the expense of the practical dimension of Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein, for which Dreyfus’ interpretation of practical understanding remains significant precisely in its relation to the originary temporality of presencing. That Dreyfus did not posit coping in any ecstatic-temporal sense does not preclude a temporal interpretation of that coping, and precisely in terms of its relation to presence.

<sup>70</sup> Macann (1992, p. 4) claims that Heidegger’s call to grasp phenomenology as a possibility is a rejection of Husserl’s concept of actuality. I would argue, however, that a

phenomenological conception of actuality that is founded in the originary temporality of consciousness is far closer to Heidegger's project than Macann would seem to allow.

<sup>71</sup> I agree with Dreyfus here that 'defamiliarisation' as a method is a rather strange way of attempting to disclose the structure of mundane everydayness. My own personal methodological bias, as far as the mood belonging to a disclosure of everydayness and the temporality of being is concerned, is towards the utterly mundane familiarity within which all everyday understanding already operates. I would guess that such a bias is dependent on one's own analytic tendencies and so the phenomenological disclosure of being might also be found in boredom, joyful wonder and suchlike.

<sup>72</sup> As does Olafsen (1998, p. 46) in his rejection of the 'turning' as merely the abandonment of *Being and Time*. I agree, here, that Heidegger's path of thinking leads him through a radical re-interpretation of the ancient Greek notion of presence in terms of its temporality (p. 46) but would also point out that this temporal concept of presence must also include the ecstatic structure of practical comportments in relation to aesthesis.

<sup>73</sup> For example, "»Zeit« ist in »Sein und Zeit« die *Anweisung* und der *Anklang* auf jenes [der Grundfrage nach dem Temporalität], was als Wahrheit der Wesung des Seyns geschieht in der Einzigkeit der Er-eignung" (Heidegger, 1989b, p. 74). See also Emad (2000, p. 70) for the relation between thrown projection and the later Heidegger's notion of Ereignis.

<sup>74</sup> See Wood (pp. 136-159, 1993) for a discussion of the continuity in Heidegger's thinking on time from the 1920's through *Being and Time* and on to the *Beiträge* and the late sixties lecture 'On time and being'.

<sup>75</sup> Blattner's (1996, p. 108) own innovative account of Heidegger's 'existentialism' gives authentic being towards death as "the condition of not being able to be anyone in particular", and is posited as a corrective for the 'common existentialist' interpretation of authenticity. Nonetheless, it remains an existentialist account of authenticity, and it is difficult to see how one might follow Heidegger's methodology in an authentic projection of the temporality of Dasein if one has been incapacitated by angst.

<sup>76</sup> However, Blattner (1994, p. 69) later complicates this argument for authenticity by claiming that the authentic anxiety of death, as a 'way to be', means to be rendered incapable of being involved in everyday activity, thus solving Heidegger's apparently 'paradoxical' statement that death "is a way to be Dasein, one in which Dasein is not able to be!" (p. 57). This account of authentic death is linked with his existentialist interpretation of *Being and Time* (see Blattner, 1996, p. 108). Another possible non-existentialist solution might be to differentiate between 'being towards death', as a 'way to be' which can be either authentic or inauthentic, and one's own death itself, which is the limit of any possible experience at all.

<sup>77</sup> I find Blattner's account of Heidegger on time, as in some sense a 'temporal idealism', rather difficult to reconcile with a phenomenological approach to either Husserl's understanding of time or an authentic disclosure of Dasein's temporality. Both Husserl and Heidegger collapse the realist/idealist dualism down to a holism of 'lived experience' or Dasein, and I cannot see how it is possible to insist on a notion of temporal idealism in a non-existentialist account of existential authenticity.

<sup>78</sup> Although I find it difficult to agree with much of Philipse's (1998) interpretation of Heidegger, I do agree that 'strictly internal' interpretations that merely restate Heidegger's own terminology are of limited use if one is attempting to unravel the question of being (p. 47). Textual exegesis is important in understanding how Heidegger's philosophy is structured, but this should not proscribe any attempt to think outside of Heidegger's own terminology, especially where notions such as 'lived experience', 'coping', or 'consciousness' are to be understood in their fundamentally ontological senses.

<sup>79</sup> For a discussion of the 'formal indication' in relation to Heidegger's method see Streeter (1997). Rather than simply being a work of logical derivation, the existential analytic "can only point and exhort others to carry out the direction in which it points.... Thus the present-

at-hand meanings (content) of what has been said in *Being and Time* must be read and considered with respect to the possibilities they open up” (p. 427).

<sup>80</sup> Taminaux (1994, p. 290) also posits the possibility of interpreting Heidegger’s notion of the ‘self’ in Husserlian terms. The question here is one of accepting the critical differences between these thinkers whilst also accounting for the continuity of Heidegger’s interpretation of phenomenology.

<sup>81</sup> Dostal (1993) also points out the fundamental relation between Husserl’s and Heidegger’s concepts of time. The major difference between these concepts is one of terminology rather than content in that the “early Heidegger rejects the language of consciousness, yet he follows Husserl in considering time to be primordial” (p. 165). This rejection led Heidegger to create a new phenomenological lexicon, yet one of the key aims of this thesis is to unpack this difficult idiom and understand it in terms of ‘consciousness’, ‘activity’ or ‘coping’, ‘lived experience’, ‘human understanding’, and so on. Rather than proscribe certain words as inherently ‘metaphysical’, I think it is important to uncover the fundamental, ontological senses in which they are put into use by thinkers such as Husserl and Dreyfus.

<sup>82</sup> The primacy of the future is a key claim of Heidegger’s, yet I would argue that this primacy is a methodological one, and most certainly not structural, for all the ecstases are equiprimordial. Carman (1994, p. 209), in rejecting any primacy of ‘presence’ in Heidegger’s account of time, tends to over emphasise the futural ecstasis. The traditional notion of presence is still valid, however, in the ecstasis of the present, which is structurally related to that of the future and past. The ecstatic present, or presence in the ancient Greek sense, is still a primordial ecstasis.

<sup>83</sup> For example, this is evident in the republication of the sixth investigation in the 1921 edition of the *Logical Investigations*, as well as in *Ideas 2* which was extensively reworked through to about 1928.

<sup>84</sup> All philosophical reflection, as a specialised mode of everydayness, involves practical activity of some sort, for “just as *praxis* has its own specific kind of sight (‘theory’), theoretical research is not without a *praxis* of its own” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 409/358).

<sup>85</sup> Held (1992, p. 194) also upholds the transcendent nature of the phenomenological conception of the world, for the “world is the subject matter of phenomenology because the *epoché*, the main gate to phenomenology, lays bare the prevolitional worldliness which precedes interest, forming the a priori of the interest governed intentional relation to the world”.

<sup>86</sup> as outlined in §12 of this thesis.

<sup>87</sup> For example, see Husserl (1991, p. 376/365). The diagram shows the temporal continuity of ‘ever new life’ over against the constant ‘sinking into the past’ of the ‘march of death’.

<sup>88</sup> Dasein’s mood or *Befindlichkeit* belongs to being towards death. Yet this mood is not something that can be produced, as it is whatever mood one finds oneself thrown into in any given situation. Heidegger’s authentic method prioritises the future inasmuch as he also prioritises angst as a method of disclosure, yet all moods belong here, whether authentic or inauthentic, within the horizon of the future.

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